

**THE FOURTH ANNUAL HUGH J. CLAUSEN
LEADERSHIP LECTURE:
SOLDIERING TODAY AND TOMORROW¹**

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1. This is an edited transcript of a lecture delivered by General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. to members of the staff and faculty, their distinguished guests, and officers attending the 46th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course at The Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, on 23 March 1998. The Clausen Lecture is named in honor of Major General Hugh J. Clausen, who served as The Judge Advocate General, United States Army, from 1981 to 1985 and served over thirty years in the United States Army before retiring in 1985. His distinguished military career included assignments as the Executive Officer of The Judge Advocate General; Staff Judge Advocate, III Corps and Fort Hood; Commander, United States Army Legal Services Agency and Chief Judge, United States Army Court of Military Review; The Assistant Judge Advocate General; and finally, The Judge Advocate General. On his retirement from active duty, General Clausen served for a number of years as the Vice President for Administration and Secretary to the Board of Visitors at Clemson University.

2. United States Army, Retired. During his active Army service, General Franks commanded Armored Cavalry units at the platoon, troop, squadron, and regimental levels in the 11th and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiments in periods from 1960 to 1984. General Franks served in combat in Vietnam as S-3, 2nd Squadron, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment from August 1969 until being medically evacuated to Valley Forge General Hospital in May 1970 after being wounded in action in Cambodia. He also commanded the Seventh Army Training Command in Germany from 1984-1985, 1st Armored Division from 1988-1989, and VII Corps in Germany from 1989-1991. As VII Corps Commanding General, General Franks commanded the United States and British forces of VII Corps during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in the main ground attack that as part of the Coalition liberated Kuwait in February 1991. He concluded his active service as Commanding General, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command from 1991-1994. He was primarily responsible for the Army's total school system and for formulating concepts and requirements for future land warfare. Other key assignments were as the Deputy Commandant U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas from 1985-1987, and as the first J-7, director of Plans and Interoperability on the Joint Staff in Washington, D.C. from 1987-1988.

General Franks holds two Masters Degrees from Columbia University in New York City. He is a graduate of the National War College. Since retirement, he wrote a book with Tom Clancy, *Into the Storm*; serves as a senior Observer/Controller in the U.S. Army's Battle Command Training Program; serves on the Board of Directors, OshKosh Truck Corporation; and works as a consultant.

General Franks' military awards include the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Distinguished Service Medal, Silver Star, two Purple Hearts, and numerous other decorations. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Airborne School, and Ranger training. He has received individual decorations from the governments of South Vietnam, France, Germany, and Spain.

I. Introduction

I want to talk about soldiering, today and tomorrow, in the context of command in three major areas, as is the spirit of these General Clausen lectures. The first area is in the form of a war story from Desert Storm that opens the way to the other two areas. The second is command. Specifically, your place in command and balancing choices between some enduring truths of land warfare with needed changes. Finally, I will give some thoughts on being a soldier.

II. A War Story from Desert Storm

First, the war story. My aide during Desert Storm, then Major Toby Martinez, kept an impeccable log of all our command activities. An entry on 14 March 1991 states, "Had a long session with Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) Colonel Huffman." The SJA was in fact then Colonel (COL) Walter B. Huffman, now Major General Huffman, The Judge Advocate General.

That was as important a meeting as I ever had as a commander. You see, that was about the time that XVIII Corps units had redeployed from Iraq back into Saudi as part of the "first in-first out" policy. We in VII Corps were ordered to remain in essentially what was occupied-Iraq until the United Nations (UN) passed the resolution that sealed the battlefield victory on Desert Storm. As you know, the UN passed Resolution 687 on 3 April 1991. At the time of the meeting, however, we did not know how long we would be there or when the resolution would be passed.

You might recall that the pressure was really on at that time to get our troops out of Southwest Asia and back home. In addition, there was an understandable feeling in the Theater Command, Central Command (CENTCOM), and from Washington that we were to do nothing to signal a long-term stay or a permanent occupation. There was command guidance to avoid doing anything, to include establishing refugee camps, that would suggest a permanent presence or cause onlookers to deduce from our actions that we were there for the long haul. The feeling was to get out of Iraq as rapidly as possible after the Iraqis agreed to abide by the UN sanctions and permit inspectors into their facilities.

There were problems, however. While the negotiations dragged on into the middle of March, we were faced with: a growing population of refugees who were fleeing the brutality of the Iraqi government; civilians

returning home challenging law and order (Safwan, for example, a small village, was deserted on 28 February 1991 and was about 12,000 population by mid-March 1991); acute food and water shortages; severe health problems among the population; closed schools; and unexploded munitions all around re-populated civilian areas. How we handled these problems would define who we were and what we stood for as Americans. In the absence of orders, we decided to do what was right and deal with the situation. Without announcing what we stood for, our actions spoke louder than anything we could have said.

What to do was simple in my judgment: Do what was right and do what the law requires. Normally those two are not in contradiction. I called COL Huffman forward to our tactical command post (TAC CP), and we talked about the problems and solutions for some time. He was a friend, legal counselor, combat veteran from Vietnam, and a soldier with a total appreciation of the problem. He was also an American with a sense of what was right. I asked COL Huffman to fast forward to the day we were to leave Iraq, whenever that might be, and tell me what we should have done between then and now to comply with the Laws of Land Warfare. Without any other official orders, COL Huffman's description of that end-state became our plan for the remaining month we were in Iraq. We owed all that to each other, to our soldiers who also knew what was right and had fierce pride in their conduct as American soldiers, and we owed it to our country to obey international law. We had no official authorization, although when I informed my Third Army commander, Lieutenant General John Yeosock, what we were going to do, he told me to use my judgment and to do what I thought was right.

That session with Walt Huffman gets very little attention in the history books but was crucial to our mission accomplishment. We went on to establish two refugee camps, provide medical treatment to over 30,000 Iraqi men, women, and children, distribute an enormous amount of water and food (to include baby food, not exactly a class of supply readily available to a tank corps), clean up unexploded munitions at no small risk to our soldiers, establish law and order in towns being reoccupied, open schools for Iraqi children to include providing text books and school lunches, and even collect evidence of Iraqi atrocities committed against their own people by interviewing refugees.

There continue to be many lessons for us. A quick review reveals that the strategic environment continues to resemble in many ways the one that we faced in southern Iraq and that others faced in Provide Comfort in

northern Iraq. Our 1993 *U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5* doctrine laid out this changed environment and ways to think through the use of forces in operations other than war (OOTW). Yet, there are additional demands on commanders and units today that did not exist even a few years ago. As we speak, our Army continues to do its duty in Bosnia at a sustained standard of excellence that our nation can be proud of in a tough OOTW environment. We have a brigade deployed to Kuwait ready to fight if that is necessary. Our Army has proven to be remarkably adaptive in executing the wide variety of operations from those days of the early 1990s until now. Success, however, is anything but automatically assured. You have to work at it.

In your future duties you will continue to encounter situations where there is no clear precedent to guide you, situations where you will call on your education and your considerable ability to think, situations where you have to use your own wits and your knowledge of the law to help your commanders sort their way through conditions or scenarios hard to predict much in advance. But you have something else. You know who you are and what you stand for. You are lawyers, but you are also American soldiers and stand for something. We as Americans are not alone in this of course, but we must use those values as a basis for our actions for which little or no precedent or orders exist. You must also bring that to bear with your commanders just as my friend COL Walt Huffman did in VII Corps seven years ago. You will make a difference. I know you will.

III. Command and Your Place in the Command

How our Army trains and educates commanders, and the climate of command that those commanders create will affect the success of missions in these new situations that are difficult to predict far in advance. This challenge of soldiering today and tomorrow. I believe in this world of challenging and largely unpredictable scenarios with its varying uses of force and forces, there are three parts to being a commander in the U.S. Army that remain relevant: character, competence (to include balancing choices between enduring truths of land warfare and where there must be changes), and leadership.

A. Character

Who we are and what we stand for really matters. Sun Tzu advised us of the secrets in battle, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.” Values and principles, like integrity, honor, physical and moral courage, duty, loyalty, make a difference for soldiers and in the tenor or climate of the command. They make a difference in situations where little to no precedent exists but choices must be made. They make a difference on the battlefield when you order soldiers and units into tough situations where some of them will not return. Soldiers need to know that we will be there for them when they need us during the battle and later. To fulfill this trust as commanders, we must know ourselves and what we stand for and what our command stands for.

Who are we? What do we stand for? These are two questions leaders must ask themselves before they accept command of American soldiers. Do we have the courage then to be who we really are? The courage to ensure the command is a reflection of those beliefs in all things? Do our values, our principles, transcend the competition for advancement, for schooling, for command itself, transcend possible public or private criticism, or even a place in history? When we stumble, because no one is consistently perfect, or our command fails to live up to our own expectations, can we square-up and face-up to those situations, fix what needs fixing, learn, and be stronger for it? What are our own litmus tests for our own character and that of the command?

Character to me is one of the bedrocks of a successful military commander. It is a good idea to see how well we know ourselves by making an inventory, asking ourselves some basic questions. Write it out. Do a personal after action review (AAR). Match your deeds with the inventory. Do the two match personally and in the command? If not, why not? Can we do something about it if the two do not match? Of course, we can. Character is not some predisposition given to life’s genetic lottery and we get stuck with it. By and large, we can shape our own character. We can choose and change to embrace and live values and principles and have those values also guide our commands to give our commands character. In the U. S. Army, commanders are given wide discretion in their command prerogatives to accomplish the mission. We are not powerless in all this at all. We have choices.

Let me briefly mention a few elements of character. Make your own list. Character includes integrity. We could spend a whole lecture on

integrity, having honor. I mean being honest with yourself and with others in word and deed. This is what I would call intellectual honesty and honesty of actions. The harder right versus the easier wrong. Commanders creating a climate of integrity, where candor and disagreement flowing from honestly held opinions is tolerated: where there is a healthy openness of communication and trust; where there is total and complete mutual respect; where the system of administrative actions and administration of military justice are carried out with impeccable integrity, openness, and equal application. Honesty has a clarity and steel endurance all its own. You must help ensure this happens.

Integrity is one of those principles continually put to the test. When integrity is challenged there must be an answer right then, not later. Integrity requires constant vigilance both personally and in the command. Integrity in command is the province of the commander. And there are litmus tests. Do we mean what we say? Does say equal do? Do we accept responsibility for our actions no matter the consequences, or in these days, the media pressure, or the instant historical reputation? Where are our loyalties? Do we return loyalty to our subordinates? Do we look mainly internal to our people and our own organization or external to check the winds of opinion? Do we share hardships with our troops? Do they see us and hear from us when the going really gets tough? Do we square up to the really tough calls? Do we shine the spotlight of inquiry into any area that is called for no matter the consequences?

In your duties as legal advisors to ensure the right tenor of command, this command climate that has character, you will be called on to recommend courses of action that sometimes your commander might not want to hear. But you must do it. I am confident that they will listen and do the right thing for the command. You play a key role for your commander in the integrity of the command. I know my SJAs did.

All this has to do with integrity—commanders either earn trust or they do not. Trust matters on the battlefield, and in other situations where choices must be made often at very junior echelons of command and by individual soldiers.

A few days before we attacked into Iraq, I was talking to a group of soldiers in the Third Armored Division, forcefully and at some length explaining that our scheme of maneuver would catch the Iraqis by surprise. Midway through an altogether too long explanation a soldier stopped me and said, “Don’t worry, General, we trust you.” In an instant that soldier

captured the essence of what we are trying to do as commanders: establish and maintain trust. I got a little weak in the knees and I vowed then to do everything I could, as Corps Commander, to fulfill that trust. If we as commanders gain and maintain that trust in our words and deeds, we will do our duties to our mission and our soldiers.

A sense of duty also is part of character, and it too builds trust. Duty is a tough value. Duty to our mission, to our soldiers, to our Army, and to our Nation takes the best we have. It leaves little room for much else, sometimes little room for families and always little room for self. Our first duty I believe is to ensure that our soldiers and units are prepared for their mission. I hold with Field Marshal Rommel who said, "The best form of welfare for the troops is first class training." When units are not getting that kind of training what does the commander do? The answer is an issue of character in command.

In addition, a sense of humility and focus on the people in the organization is part of the leader's character, as well as the organization. Each individual member of the organization is important. He who would be first in the organization must also be last. To lead is also to serve. The goal of the leader should be to make the members of the organization grow, to be famous if that presents itself, to be a teacher and coach, to feel that their most important legacy is the development of people. If leaders believe in their people and establish trust, mutual respect, and loyalty, there is no limit to what the organization can accomplish.

Character. Leaders of character and commands with character have always made a difference for our Army and our Nation in peace and war. They continue to do so today and must in the future. You must help see to that.

B. Competence

The second area for commanders is competence. I believe our soldiers have every right to expect that we as commanders will know what we are doing.

After going over the battleground where the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment's Battle of 73 Easting had taken place late the afternoon of 26 February 1991, I asked H.R. McMaster, who had courageously commanded Troop E in the fight, how long his troop battle has lasted. He said

the sharp fight lasted twenty-two minutes. Joe Sartiano, who had courageously commanded Troop G in the same battle, said his part of it had gone on for about two hours. What commanders do is spend their professional lifetime in study and practice so that during those twenty-two minutes, or two hours, or two days, or longer, we are ready to accomplish the mission at the least cost to our soldiers. At each echelon of command or in other positions, we have to work hard to know what we are doing. Know your stuff, someone once said. That about sums it up. It is not easy work, especially these days in the set of strategic conditions you find yourselves in where force, war, and forces are used in widely varying ways to accomplish strategic objectives. Look how long we wait until we entrust our major tactical organizations to commanders. Fifteen to seventeen years for battalions, twenty or more years for brigades, twenty-five plus years for divisions, and longer for corps. And for good reason—being a military professional is hard work and takes constant study and practice to get it right.

I need not lecture you endlessly on competence, except to remind you that the failure of commanders to be competent has for our soldiers the severest consequences. We have many areas of competence we call technical and tactical competence: reading maps, tank gunnery, maintenance, technology literacy, maneuver formations, fires, aviation, and so forth at each echelon of command. For you it is the law: military and international, treaties, local law and custom in places you never heard of before, administrative procedures, rules of engagement, legalities involved in the United States commanding units of other nations and other nations in command of U.S. troops. None of this should be ignored or given a back seat. It takes continuing study and practice to attempt to master. Professional competence is the continuing goal of a professional lifetime. “Continue to grow,” one of my early mentors said so well. Much of competence, however, is an acquired and learned art over years of practice, with commanders who often make choices derived from intuitive sensings gained from those long years of practice and study.

Rather than talk anymore about competence from a technical and tactical standpoint, I want to insert some thoughts about the future of land warfare. I believe that part of today’s and tomorrow’s competence requires commanders to balance the choices between enduring truths of land warfare with needed change so that they are prepared to fight and win present and future battles. It is not an easy balancing act. It never was with any generation of our Army.

Commanders in our Army have a big challenge because anyone who is speaking about the future and the conduct of future wars must tread carefully. In times of transition, as we are in now, such choices are always present. Although our recent track record is good in making the right choices to stay prepared, nothing ensures it will always be so. As a matter of fact, some might think we have such a legacy in our Army of fighting the last battles of the last war or of unpreparedness that we might overcompensate and ignore past experience.

In the book, *America's First Battles*, there is ample evidence of past failures in first battles to support such opinions. I would hasten to add that book was published in 1986, before Panama, Desert Storm, and before Bosnia. Our recent record is excellent. But success in the future is anything but automatically assured. In a book published last year, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command*, Andrew Gordon cautions, "In times of peace, empirical evidence fades and rationalist theory takes its place. The advent of new technology assists the discrediting of previous empirical doctrine. The purveyors of new technology will be the most evangelizing rationalists." What I believe we need is balance.

Sometimes we even "out-future" ourselves in our intensity to describe a future that will have little probability of happening, or worse, give our critics an excuse to ignore resources for near term modernization requirements and wait for the future to arrive that we have just so clearly described to occur. As a matter of record, most changes in land warfare are evolutionary, the result of experimentations, trial and error. Yet, the choices do remain difficult and the resources to fulfill choices more and more elusive to our Army—falling to less than half of what is required to modernize the force.

I of course have no more the key to these enduring truths than anyone does. But I can offer an opinion from a whole lifetime of empirical evidence and as one who in his last assignment, along with a lot of others in the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), was responsible for moving the Army toward the future.

Last year, 1997, the strategic environment required that on any day there were in excess of 30,000 soldiers deployed from home station into training centers or into operational environments. Soldiers were in operational environments such as Kuwait and Bosnia. Soldiers were deployed to various places teaching, training, countering drugs, doing civic action, or humanitarian work to include de-mining operations. Since the end of

the Cold War our Army has been ordered again and again into operations in this strategic set of conditions. Over eighty percent of the time that forces are used, our Army has been there. It is a proud legacy of service since the end of the Cold War.

A few years ago, some of us thought, we should separate operations according to what their intended use was in conjunction with other elements of national and international power to gain strategic objectives. We made a distinction between the use of force and the use of forces. When force is the primary method, we call that *war*. The military is the only part of our government to do that and must be ready on short notice to execute to standards that our Nation has every right to expect from her military. Force remains a legitimate method of exercising national and international will. The other operations are when forces are used to coordinate with and normally subordinate to other elements of power to achieve the strategic aim. The strategic method used is neither force nor war, but might on occasion result in isolated combat actions. So we called these OOTW to clearly distinguish the two and to remind our commanders that the methods in execution, and rules of engagement, have considerable differences.

That being so, then we must ask what will determine success in each to determine if resources and time are being spent in the right places. I will let the OOTW go for another day and focus on war.

What will be the means to win tactical battles and engagements on the way to campaign success, and success in achieving strategic goals? For now, it means land forces must control or dominate a particular area always as part of a joint team, usually combined with other nations, and normally at considerable distance from garrison locations. To do so requires getting there, then killing the enemy, capturing the enemy, destroying the enemy's equipment or physical ability to continue, destroying the enemy's will to continue, or running the enemy off the area you want to control.

To do those things requires that our land forces achieve a measure of lethality over the other side, protect our own side or be more survivable, and do all this at a tempo of operations that the other side cannot match or handle. Thus, I would conclude that lethality, survivability, and tempo are some enduring truths of land warfare. I would also add that lethality cannot be done at a distance without putting soldiers at risk who must close with an enemy to gain that control and do so in terrain that puts that enemy at ranges measured in feet or meters rather than kilometers.

Another truth, therefore, is that combat on land is not easy. It is hard, physically and mentally, to keep going day and night in the face of casualties, weather, terrain, and lack of sleep. It is tough, often brutally lethal, and calls on every bit of moral and physical fiber we have to succeed. It demands teamwork at the highest levels at every command echelon from small units to all the arms and services in major tactical formations like divisions and corps in a finely tuned orchestration of battle, with those battles fought where and when you want to fight them, with forces massed or dispersed as you need them to be for the mission on the terrain and against a particular enemy, and with weapons systems operated skillfully and with the lethality necessary to accomplish the mission at least cost to our own soldiers. It may go fast, but it is *never* easy. There may be some battles fought at long range, but there are still those fought where you can see the enemy clearly and they can see you, both day and night. We can never forget those enduring realities of land warfare and what that means for the training and the development of commanders and leaders. That of course does not mean that land warfare is not changing, but amidst that discussion of change we should also consider the following: what wins tactical battles and engagements, the nature of land warfare in the future, the warrior ethos so required of land warriors in the tough, brutally lethal arena that is land combat, and training soldiers and developing leaders for that reality. Such clarity is vital to making the right choices.

Let me just briefly touch on areas that got us started a few years ago and might help you understand where our Army is now and is headed in the future. After Desert Storm we had lots of meetings and reports about lessons learned to help us point the way to the future. At TRADOC, we had the dual responsibility to continue training to be relevant to the considerable needs of our Nation (recall the eighty percent participation by the Army since the early 1990s) in the current and foreseeable future, while also beginning to experiment into where land warfare was changing. We wanted to begin to experiment with ideas, and not focus exclusively on technology.

The first area was to expand the battlespace where landforces operate. We thought we could dominate the expanded battlespace with fewer of our own forces. We saw this in Desert Storm and in our early experiments at Fort Benning and Fort Knox.

The second area was that instead of distinct close, deep, and rear battles as was the case in our Cold War doctrine, we could now attack the enemy throughout the depths of his formations and land area in what we

referred to as “depth and simultaneous attack.” No place was safe from continuous land attack, air attack, or attack from the sea. The enemy had no sanctuary on the battlefield. No longer were we fighting deep to shape the close battle. We would be doing all this simultaneously. We saw that first in Panama in 1989, then in Desert Storm from 24-28 February 1991. Experiments with the Fourth Mechanized Division last year gave additional insights into this possibility as well as expanding the battlespace.

The third area was in battle command—to increase the ability of commanders and units in an attack to operate at a tempo that no enemy could handle. As mentioned earlier, land warfare is highly lethal and battles and engagements are brutal and short. It was here that we thought we needed to focus on what commanders do, on battle command. How do commanders think? How much analysis and how much synthesis form a mind's-eye picture of what is going on? How do they decide? How do they and their staffs and subordinate commanders interact in both planning and execution? Where do they decide as they move about the battlefield? How are orders communicated and understood? What is the difference in tactical problem solving in planning and in fighting? How to achieve faster and more focused horizontal integration of arms and services at each echelon of command to include other members of our joint team?

We wanted to focus on the heart of what makes that integration happen, that is, battle command. By experimenting with varying sizes of staffs, sizes of tactical formations, mixing and matching arms and services together rapidly, physically massing when necessary to close with and destroy the enemy, then dispersing again quickly, we might discover where we could alter doctrine, change organizations, adjust training, and even experiment with some new and emerging technology.

To do these experiments we formed five battle labs in TRADOC in 1992, each headed by a major general and a small dedicated team, who began experiments that have a direct line to the advanced war-fighting experiments concluded at the National Training Center a year ago and at Fort Hood last Fall.

The payoff during this six years of experiments was to make us wiser in making choices between retaining the enduring truths of land warfare while adopting changes that allow us to be more lethal, survivable, and operate at a greater tempo than our enemies now and in the future. That means seeing ourselves better, seeing the enemy better, seeing the terrain better, and having the ability to integrate arms and services—in the right

place, at the right time, in the right combination. It also means remembering what and who wins, our soldiers, and how to get them and their commanders ready to win. Those experiments continue. My generation thought what we needed to do was set up this process of experimentation so that the generation that would execute the answers, you, could discover those answers.

The choices are not easy. You can help. But the key question I would urge you to ask continually is what are the enduring truths of land warfare and are we paying the right attention to those? Then, the other question is where is land warfare changing and are we making the right changes in equipment, organizations, doctrine, and training, so that our future soldiers will have the same edge on the battlefield in lethality, survivability, and tempo as we had during Desert Storm and since? It is a tough balance to achieve.

C. Leadership

The third area of command is leadership. It quite simply is providing purpose, direction, and motivation to our organization. It is building effective teams. Sometimes in battle leadership is necessary to get units to go in directions and over terrain that their natural inclinations would not allow them to go. Sometimes in OOTW leadership means entrusting decisions to the individual soldier, and then supporting them in following those decisions.

I would advocate what has been called an inclusive leadership style. One that says almost everyone in the organization wants it to be the best. No one these days normally joins an organization and deliberately seeks to make it worse because they are there. No one wants to be part of a losing team. In today's military, individuals are both well informed, talented, and want to be part of the team. It seems to me the tank gunner, legal assistant, truck driver, medic, or infantry squad leader are all as interested in the success of the organization as the commander. They know. In this information age they are informed. They notice. They pay attention to not only what they are doing but what is going on around them. They communicate with fellow soldiers about the mission, training, and the organization. They have opinions and ideas. We must use that energy and talent. The key is making all soldiers, to include the commander, equally motivated for success and willing to share in that success. I always felt that there

were many men and women in the organization who wanted us to succeed. All I had to do was let them help.

As with many others, I learned throughout a lifetime of Army service about the young men and women of America, about the untapped potential that is there if only you give them a chance. I learned of their potential, their selflessness, toughness, sense of duty, and desire to put their team before themselves. In a chamber of commerce speech in Atlanta a few years ago when I was Commanding General of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, I described the talented men and women who I saw personally in our training base. I explained their enormous potential if we gave them a chance, essentially "To be all they could be." After the speech one of the members asked me how I could reconcile the many reports of troubles with our young people with the glowing terms I had used to describe them. After all, they were the very same men and women. I said simply that it showed me the untapped potential of these young people. There is enormous talent there. All we have to do is find it, give it a chance to develop, and give it a chance to work for us. Focus on our own team. Develop their talents. Free their talents to work for a common goal. Put the spotlight squarely on the led, not the leader. The mission is important but so is our team. Have an inclusive style of leadership, not an exclusive one.

That also means building teams where all team members are vital to success. You form teams here with your classes, seminars, and groups, both informal and formal. Where each member of the team feels and knows their contribution is vital to the overall success. Where there is intense loyalty to team members. The epitome of such loyalty was Specialist Ardon "Brad" Cooper who on 21 February 1991 while in a combat action with the First Cavalry Division died as a result of shielding his fellow soldiers from Iraqi mortar and artillery fire. Brad Cooper was awarded the Silver Star posthumously for his actions. Teamwork where Major General Butch Funk, commanding the Third Armored Division, sent over 25,000 gallons of needed fuel to his flank unit, the First Armored Division, without any orders. Where Major General Tom Rhame said to me, "Hey, boss, don't leave us behind" after the Big Red One's successful breach. The Big Red One gave us the third division of our VII Corps fist for our attack on the Iraqi Republican Guard. Teamwork. It counts and it is combat power.

Commanders are responsible for providing direction. Usually we call that "intent"—a vision of where we want the organization to go. It need not

be long and should not be complicated. I believe the best vision or intent statements are short, easily understood, and embraced by the whole organization. It needs to be taught by the leader, and is usually better if the organization had a role in devising it. One major factor at work with us in VII Corps in Desert Storm was that we shared a common vision of the battles and the campaign, our collective vision or commander's intent. Such a short statement explains to the entire organization the vision for the operation and allows for and even demands initiative in parts of the organization to achieve that intent. It allows members of the organization to operate freely within the intent to accomplish their part of the campaign. It liberates talent by giving subordinates operating room. It serves as a unifying idea, rather than a restrictive measure. Intent allows for movement of the organization forward toward the strategic objective while also paying attention to the day-to-day operation. Formulation of the intent or vision, modifying or adjusting it as conditions change, and teaching it to the organization is a leader's business.

There are some litmus tests where leadership shows its true identity.

How do the leaders and organizations work in crises? Can they rise to the occasion and go about their duties without a sense of panic or strained communication between leader and led? Do they pull together? Is there teamwork without asking? Can the leader see what to do immediately but also the wider or strategic issues so the crises are resolved in a way that allows the organization to move toward its goals and keep functioning?

How do organizations and units learn? This is especially important when those organizations will be placed in situations where there is little to no precedent and they have to get it right. What do leaders do when things do go wrong? An early mentor of mine, General Bruce C. Clarke used to say, "When things go wrong look for reasons why starting in concentric circles around your own two feet." Do we learn from setbacks? Certainly we would like to learn from others' failures and not our own but that is not always possible. The AAR is perhaps in my own judgment as important a process as ever instituted by the U.S. Army. It allows us to learn, to be bold without arrogance, to listen to the organization, to get the whole organization to participate. Many failures come from arrogance or failure to listen. Lack of communication between leaders and their organization is often fatal. Good communication with an organization produces success. Look at the way information flows in high performing units and you will see what I mean.

So, there you have it. Challenges for your generation in service to our Nation. Soldiering, today and tomorrow. Challenges while reminding yourselves of the major elements of command: character, competence to include balancing those enduring truths with needed changes when making choices, and leadership.

IV. Being A Soldier

Let me end with some brief thoughts about being a soldier. Someone asked me a few years ago why I wanted to be a soldier. I thought a few seconds before answering. Then I said:

If you like what our country stands for and want to serve those ideals you ought to be a soldier. If you want to be around a lot of other people who feel the same way about that as you do, you ought to be a soldier.

If the sound of the National Anthem, and the sight of our flag stirs something inside you then you ought to be a soldier.

If you like a challenge, are not afraid of hard work, and think you are tough enough to meet the standards on the battlefield you ought to be a soldier.

If you and your family are strong enough to endure the many separations often on a moment's notice and can live that kind of life, then you ought to be a soldier.

If the thought that at the end of your life you can say I served my country and that appeals to you then you ought to be a soldier.

You could even summarize all this in what I used to call the "T" words: trust, training, toughness, troops, and teamwork. Trust for character. Training and toughness for competence and enduring truths of land warfare. Troops and teamwork for leadership. It really matters. A mother of a cavalry trooper said it best after Desert Storm, "It was training and teamwork that kept my son alive." The mother of a soldier killed in action, said in a recent letter in response to our scholarship program in honor of those soldiers killed-in-action in VII Corps during Desert Storm, "Honoring the memory of our departed loved ones lets us know they will not be forgotten." All this really matters, before, during, and after the battle.

It was the blessing of a lifetime for me to have had the honor and privilege to serve in peace and two wars with such magnificent Americans as our soldiers.

Thank you for the opportunity to share these thoughts with you this morning. Thank you for what you are doing in service to our Nation. You will continue to make a difference. I know you will.