

DESCENT INTO DARKNESS**PEARL HARBOR, 1941
A NAVY DIVER'S MEMOIR¹**REVIEWED BY MAJOR JANE-ELLEN BAGWELL²

Viewing the *USS Arizona* Memorial for the first time, visitors see the rusting wreckage of a once great battleship lying under water only a few feet beneath their feet. In stark contrast to the raging fires, explosions, and panic in Pearl Harbor after the attack on 7 December 1941, the *USS Arizona* today is somber and peaceful. Visitors are often surprised to notice a coral reef growing on the deck of the ship and many colorful reef fish swimming near the surface. One of the most surprising, yet touching, scenes is that of Japanese tourists throwing flower leis into the water, in memory of the men who died. During the tour, the guide will invariably remind visitors that the *USS Arizona* is the watery grave for more than eleven hundred sailors and marines who gave up their lives in the service of their country. On the west end of the Memorial a huge wall, listing the name of each man who died aboard the *USS Arizona*, dwarfs the visitor. While bells ring out *Amazing Grace*, tears come to the eyes of young and old, men and women, as they are overcome by the magnitude of the profound loss the United States suffered in a few short hours on 7 December 1941. Trying to hide their tears, visitors often stare quietly out to sea, probably trying to imagine the horrific attack that sank the massive battleship so quickly that over one thousand men died while moored in shallow water, just a few feet from shore.³

To most visitors, the water is forbidding and uninviting. Unlike the beautiful blue Hawaiian ocean surrounding Oahu, the water entombing the *Arizona* is murky and brown. It is coated with the rainbow colors from oil still leaking from the battleship almost sixty years later. Divers, however, are typically fascinated with the thought of diving the *USS Arizona* and often ask about diving the wreckage. According to Luke Spence, a member of the *USS Arizona* Memorial Association, because the *Arizona* is a gravesite, it is off-limits to recreational divers. Dives, however, are made

1. EDWARD C. RAYMER, *PEARL HARBOR, 1941, A NAVY DIVER'S MEMOIR* (1996).

2. United States Army. Written while assigned as a student, 49th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.

3. RAYMER, *supra* note 1, at 92.

aboard the *Arizona* on two occasions. When survivors of the *Arizona* pass away, they may be interred with their shipmates. Carefully selected divers enter the remains within the ship. Dives are also permitted as a part of an ongoing study to determine how best to preserve the remains of the *Arizona* against her rapid deterioration in the salt water.

The *USS Arizona* Memorial contains numerous historical references and a film recounting the tragedy of the Pearl Harbor attack and extolling the miraculous recovery of the Pacific Fleet after the attack. The visitor is merely told the Fleet was resurrected and many ships, bombed in the attack, significantly contributed to the Navy's battles in the Pacific. Unfortunately, the visitor is never told how this miraculous feat was accomplished. *Descent Into Darkness* tells that story.

Descent Into Darkness is an account of the Navy salvage dive team's efforts to raise the crippled Pacific Fleet following the attack on Pearl Harbor. It relates the spellbinding story of the unimaginable difficulties and horrors encountered by the salvage divers as they made life-threatening dives on the stricken battleships. *Descent Into Darkness* is the first book to tell this story, filling a critical gap in the history of World War II.

Descent Into Darkness is a compelling book that explores the resurrection of the Pacific Fleet and recounts a personal story of courage and camaraderie. Despite raging fires, explosions, and other life-threatening dangers, the Navy salvage divers had to enter the murky black water thickened by oil, debris from the attack, and corpses of the victims. Despite the divers' overwhelming fears, dives had to be made immediately following the attack. Divers not only assessed the damage of sinking ships and kept many of them afloat, they worked desperately against the clock to free trapped survivors from their underwater tombs. Early in the book, the reader is taken by the heart wrenching vision of Navy divers anxiously tapping on the underwater wreckage, hoping to locate and rescue survivors trapped inside before they suffocated or drowned.

Retired United States Navy Commander Edward C. Raymer wrote *Descent Into Darkness*. He was the senior petty officer and chief diver of the Pearl Harbor salvage operations team from 8 December 1941 until his transfer to Guadalcanal in August 1942. *Descent Into Darkness* is his personal account of the salvage divers' important contributions in resurrecting the Navy's Pacific Fleet. In addition to educating the reader about the professional lives of the salvage divers, Raymer provides much needed levity by entertaining the reader with tales of the off-duty lives of enlisted sailors

in wartime Honolulu. *Descent Into Darkness* will entertain a wide range of audiences. Military history enthusiasts will be interested in the little-known details of the recovery of the Pacific Fleet. Divers, particularly technical divers, will be fascinated by the accounts of the ingenuity of the Navy divers in overcoming underwater obstacles and developing diving techniques, many of which are still in use today. This book will also appeal to a wider audience with a general interest in human adventure stories.

Descent Into Darkness will captivate all audiences with Raymer's riveting personal stories. The book gets off to a strong start with Raymer's startling account of his first dive and subsequent near death experience aboard the *Arizona* in January 1942. The prologue is a gripping story of his experiences when he entered the black, oil-covered water, into the twisted wreckage of the battleship. The *Arizona* was severely damaged by massive explosions that ripped through her hull and intense fires burned atop the water around her for days following the attack. Divers entered the damaged ships through pitch-black water, without a light to guide them through some of the most dangerous diving conditions imaginable. Visibility underwater was barely two inches as the divers entered these sunken ships and wound their way hundreds of feet inside the ship's wreckage. Underwater, divers placed their lives in the hands of their teammates who tended lifelines, air hoses, and telephone lines from above. The dive team members, topside, used the ship's plans as a map to guide the underwater diver to his worksite and finally though his assigned task. Divers picked their way through dangerous wreckage that held unstable heavy machinery, sharp jagged metal, pockets of toxic and explosive gases, unexploded bombs, and countless other deadly hazards.

Dives aboard the *Arizona* were particularly frightening and gruesome, because the one thousand bodies of the men who died during the attack were still inside the *Arizona*. Raymer succeeds in making the reader feel as though he were experiencing the actual dive when he tells of his first encounter with a floating corpse.

Suddenly, I felt that something was wrong. I tried to suppress the strange feeling that I was not alone. I reached out to feel my way and touched what seemed to be a large inflated bag floating overhead. As I pushed it away, my bare hand plunged through what felt like a mass of rotted sponge. I realized with horror that the "bag" was a body without a head.⁴

4. *Id.* at 4.

Unfortunately, after capturing the reader's attention with such suspense-filled drama, what follows in the subsequent chapters will leave readers feeling disappointed. Throughout the remainder of the book, Raymer distances himself from the majority of his audience when he begins to use unfamiliar technical terms. When Raymer explains aspects of technical diving, his writing style reads like that of a military training manual. Contrast the above quote with the following quote describing the review of a method used in the salvage operations aboard the *USS California*.

The driver unit weighed ten pounds and had a firing barrel twelve inches long. The projectile was a half-inch in diameter; the pointed end was hardened, while the other end was threaded. The shell casing contained the powder charge of a .45-caliber shell. The projectile was fired by placing its point against the surface to be joined and pressing the driver sharply forward. It could penetrate half-inch thick steel plate.⁵

These mundane excursions into the not-so-fascinating world of technical diving and construction will lead many readers to skim over Raymer's overly technical accounts of salvaging each ship.

The chapters in *Descent Into Darkness* are divided according to the ships on which Raymer's dive team worked. The salvage team played a vital role in returning the *USS Nevada*, *West Virginia*, and *California* into the service of the United States Navy. They also salvaged valuable materials and equipment from the *USS Arizona*, *Utah*, and *Oklahoma*. Each chapter contains information about the salvage dives performed aboard each ship, including numerous stories about the ingenuity of the dive team as they devised innovative ways to combat many of the problems encountered. Technical divers will find that many of these techniques are still used today and many more laid the groundwork for modern dive operations. The majority of the audience, however, will dread the upcoming technical aspects of each chapter and will fail to fully appreciate the importance of the team's work.

Raymer should have followed examples from authors of popular books in the adventure genre. These books frequently take their audiences on an adventure based on a topic unknown to the reader. Many authors of these books adopt a style that both educates and entertains readers. This

5. *Id.* at 95.

combination of entertainment and education is necessary. The reader generally must understand some of the technical aspects behind the events in the book to understand and remain interested in the story. Recent examples that successfully employed this style include Jon Krakauer's *Into Thin Air*⁶ and Sebastian Junger's *The Perfect Storm*.⁷ In *The Perfect Storm*, Junger managed to make commercial fishing, a subject of little interest to the general audience, fascinating to millions of readers. Junger was successful because he took time to educate his readers on the technical aspects and the importance of his subject before launching into lengthy dissertations on the matter.

Jon Krakauer's *Into Thin Air* provides another successful example of the adventure genre. This book chronicled a deadly attempt to climb Mount Everest. Before using technical terms to describe mountain climbing equipment, Krakauer fully educated his reader on what each piece of equipment was, how it was used, and why it was important to a mountain climber. He also enlightened his reader about the deadly medical conditions that threatened climbers, such as high altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE), which killed one of the character in *Into Thin Air*. Instead of simply telling the readers about the effects of this dangerous condition, Krakauer explained HAPE's causes and cures in two fluid sentences. For those desiring a more scientific explanation, Krakauer included the suspected medical causes of the condition in a footnote.⁸ From that point forward, whenever Krakauer discussed the threat of HAPE to the climbers, readers fully understood the seriousness of the condition and were not distracted by wondering why it was so important. Had Raymer used similar methods, he would have been more successful in entertaining his readers while helping them fully appreciate how and why the dive team's contributions were important in the Pearl Harbor salvage operations.

Although *Descent into Darkness* offers a very readable story, as it progresses it loses its humanity in a way that will once again disappoint many readers. A cornerstone of most personal historical accounts is the way in which characters' lives are intertwined with the events in the book. One of the most intriguing aspects of any good book is how the circumstances affect the lives of the characters. In many historical accounts, it is the human drama found in the lives of the characters that keep the reader interested in the story. While the historical events play an important part

6. JON KRAKAUER, *INTO THIN AIR* (1997).

7. SEBASTIAN JUNGER, *THE PERFECT STORM* (1997).

8. KRAKAUER, *supra* note 6, at 109.

in Raymer's story, he neglects to fully develop his life and the lives of his teammates.

The reader is introduced to the author's eight-member dive team early in the book. They are the heroes of this story. Raymer placed his life in the hands of these men daily and they developed enduring friendships of which Raymer said: "Friendships, such as I have described, are a phenomenon that civilians rarely experience."⁹ Although the author knew these great men well, the reader will feel cheated out of the same opportunity because character development is lacking from the beginning. In describing one of his teammates, Raymer says sparingly: "Martin Palmer sat next to him, quiet, bookish, squinting over a copy of *Time* magazine."¹⁰ The first chapter of *Descent Into Darkness* contains similar perfunctory descriptions of the other team members. The reader will not encounter several of these men until later in the story at which point readers will invariably forget who they are. This lack of character development separates the reader further from the all-important humanity of the story. In fact, many readers will feel the frustration of confusing the characters later in the book, being forced to return to the first chapter to figure out who the author is referring to.

Raymer could also use the examples of many great military history books such as *We Were Soldiers Once...And Young*¹¹ for character development. These books typically do an outstanding job of introducing characters by providing background information about their personal lives, their character traits, and often including their pictures. All of these books manage to create a bond between the reader and the characters; most develop the characters well enough to allow the reader to develop either an affection or a dislike. One way or the other, the reader should feel some type of emotion towards the characters instead of the apathy that comes from not knowing them.

Raymer attempts to humanize his story by providing details of the dive team's off-duty escapades. He also gives the reader a glimpse at the often-dismal life of a sailor in Honolulu in 1942. Each chapter contains many stories of the dive teams' preoccupation with meeting women, their attempts to build and operate a still, and other ways of coping with the

9. RAYMER, *supra* note 1, at 214.

10. *Id.* at 13.

11. HAROLD G. MOORE & JOSEPH L. GALLOWAY, *WE WERE SOLDIERS ONCE . . . AND YOUNG* (1992).

many restrictions placed on their lives. Despite this attempt to add human drama to the story, the reader will still feel the frustration of viewing history and experiencing life and death situations with characters they never really know.

In the end, the reader will feel a lack of closure with the story and its characters. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of character information in the epilogue. Raymer devotes a minimum of one paragraph to each of the battleships in his book's epilogue, but sums up the lives of all the divers in one combined paragraph, discussing only the medals they received.¹² The reader never finds out what happened to any of the characters after the war. The reader is not even told if all the men survived or what effect their experiences at Pearl Harbor had on their later lives. By contrast, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young* devotes eighteen pages in the epilogue to giving the reader closure, and it tells the reader how the experiences of the Vietnam War later affected the lives of over one hundred characters.¹³ Finding out what happened to each of the characters inevitably leaves the reader feeling more satisfied.

Descent Into Darkness prevents any bonding between readers and the book's characters. Because of the distance between the two, readers may be acquainted with the events, but are never able to fully honor and appreciate the bravery and sacrifices of the Navy's salvage dive team at Pearl Harbor. Since the one theme that resonated throughout the book was Raymer's intent to pay tribute to his teammates, it was unfortunate that he failed to develop them as endearing characters that readers could come to know and understand.

While *Descent Into Darkness* is not a great book, it is a good book and well worth reading. Because it sets out to tell the great and untold tale of the resurrection of the Pacific Fleet after the attack on Pearl Harbor, it has all of the ingredients of a remarkable story. In spite of its shortcomings and the lack of bonding between the reader and its characters, the reader will still manage to understand the ingenuity, bravery, camaraderie, patriotism, and other admirable attributes of the men who contributed to the resurrection of the Pacific Fleet. Although most readers will enjoy *Descent Into Darkness*, many will also feel there is a greater story yet to be told.

12. RAYMER, *supra* note 1, at 211.

13. MOORE & GALLOWAY, *supra* note 11, at 348-65.

**THE GREATEST THREAT: IRAQ, WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL
SECURITY¹**

REVIEWED BY MAJOR J.R. PERLAK²

*The greatest threat to life on earth is weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, biological.*³

The warning quoted above best summarizes the thought process that has driven Richard Butler, author of *The Greatest Threat*, throughout much of his adult life. His book emphasizes that weapons of mass destruction are too deadly to be dealt with based on political expediency, and he reminds us that there is plenty of work yet to be done in Iraq. With his exacting standards and uncompromising adherence to this perspective, Butler was thrust onto the world stage in the late 1990s when he insisted on Iraq's compliance with the stated will of the international community, thereby forcing a confrontation with the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein.

In July 1997, the career Australian diplomat and arms control advocate was handed the wheel of a ship known as the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq, or UNSCOM.⁴ Although it was not widely known or acknowledged in the world community at that time, that ship was perhaps "under way," but it was not "making way." A year into its new captain's cruise, most would agree the ship was foundering. With the launch of Desert Fox air strikes by the United States and the United Kingdom at the end of 1998, the ship had unquestionably sunk.

1. RICHARD BUTLER, *THE GREATEST THREAT: IRAQ, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL SECURITY* (2000).

2. United States Marine Corps. Written while assigned as a student, 49th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia. Major Perlak spent part of 1999 deployed as a United Nations Military Observer in the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), Headquartered in Umm Qasr, Iraq.

3. Butler, *supra* note 1, at xv.

4. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) (creating UNSCOM).

In a loosely chronological account, Richard Butler tells his side of the story regarding the final months of UNSCOM. Per the mandate of the United Nations Security Council in 1991, UNSCOM was created by Security Council Resolution 687 for the express purpose of disposing of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability.⁵ Six years into this process, when Ambassador Richard Butler took over as the Executive Director of UNSCOM in 1997, the world had every reason to expect that the process of disarming Iraq had made significant progress. What Butler discovered and brought to the world's attention was another matter entirely.

The media covered the international spectacle that was UNSCOM's demise with sufficient sensation. Suffice it to say that the mission turned confrontational and ultimately failed, with its inspectors forcibly denied access to the very sites they sought to inspect. These inspectors were accused of espionage and expelled from Iraq, a status that endures to this day.⁶

Butler's book is essentially an autobiographical after-action report on his tenure as the Executive Director of UNSCOM. As such, it is impossible to separate the author from the book. Filled with his often unvarnished personal impressions, it is obvious that Butler's career as a diplomat is over and his career as an arms control advocate by other means, including authorship and public commentary, has begun. He takes no prisoners.

Butler makes it clear that he inherited an already stagnant and untenable situation from his predecessor at UNSCOM, Rolf Ekeus. The Iraqis had frustrated Ekeus for years in his attempts to inspect, verify, and destroy weapons of mass destruction. In a seemingly desperate effort to carry out his mandate, Ekeus made a practice of requesting and accepting intelligence and surveillance information about Iraq from various countries, including the United States.⁷ This included the use of U.S. Air Force U-2 aircraft, emblazoned with the "UN" logo and under United Nations orders. Butler continued this practice. The use of this asset would later contribute to the unraveling of political support for UNSCOM on Butler's watch, with the accompanying Iraqi allegations of spying.

5. *Id.*

6. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, *U.S. Spied on Iraq Via U.N.*, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1999, at A1.

7. Butler, *supra* note 1, at 66.

Butler's impressions of Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz, both as a negotiator and human being, are often brutally unfavorable.⁸ Although a professional diplomat, Butler claims he was deliberately pushed to the limits of civility in his encounters with Aziz. The overall role of these interpersonal dynamics in the demise of UNSCOM cannot be divined from Butler's account, although the reader is left to contemplate how much Butler's uncompromising style may have hastened that demise.

Perhaps the most interesting relationship to discover in this book is between Butler and United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan. Beginning with Annan recruiting Butler to replace Ekeus as Executive Director in the spring of 1997, Butler describes a relationship based on a trust and personal loyalty he feels was ultimately betrayed. Butler recounts what he regards as Annan's duplicity in dealing with Iraq and other countries, frequently compromising on fundamental matters that would undermine the very legitimacy and essence of UNSCOM's work. Butler relates the extreme pressure he was under from several sides, and the utter lack of support he had from the Secretary General. The lifting of the increasingly unpopular scheme of international sanctions on Iraq was premised on Iraq's compliance with the mandate of UNSCOM. With pressure from China, France, and especially Russia, new and inaccurate definitions of what constituted "compliance" were forced on Butler. When he refused to accept these politically motivated efforts to lift the sanctions, and insisted on Iraq's basic compliance with inspections and monitoring, Butler contends that the Secretary General basically sold him out and refused to support him further.

Not surprisingly, Butler's description of his dealings with Aziz, Annan, and others spreads the blame for the demise of UNSCOM and can be criticized as self-serving. After all, Butler is in a position where, absent some favorable external frame of reference, he has to explain why his efforts at the head of a mature and visible arms control agency quickly resulted in an international crisis. However, Butler's account gains credibility from the context of the years of stonewalling that his predecessor Ekeus had experienced, and from the physical evidence and data gathered by UNSCOM inspectors, often gained only after significant cost of time and effort in overcoming Iraqi intransigence. The relentless pressure he claims to have been under from Aziz does not strain credibility. Lastly, the methodology in this book is much more than just Butler's personal impres-

8. *Id.* at 67.

sions. The book's sources, primarily consisting of United Nations Resolutions and other official correspondence, are readily retrieved and verified.

There is the inescapable impression from this book that Richard Butler's personality played a large part in the events that ultimately led to the dissolution of UNSCOM. For a career diplomat, he comes across as surprisingly uncompromising. On matters where he believes he is right, he becomes almost sanctimonious. Taken together, it is possible to conclude that he was simply the wrong person to be selected Executive Director of UNSCOM in 1997, and his personality doomed the mission.

This conclusion would be supportable if the subject at hand were the ordinary matters of diplomacy, but in the case of weapons of mass destruction we must look past Butler's seeming stubbornness and see his strength. Anyone familiar with the types and quantities of these weapons in the Iraqi arsenal will appreciate Butler's insistence that we give no quarter in seeing to their eradication. Iraq, known not only to have developed but also fielded these weapons in the Iran-Iraq war and against Kurdish nationals in northern Iraq in the late 1990s, went to great pains (as it still does) to conceal the actual extent of its manufacturing and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction. Butler recounts in detail UNSCOM's discovery that Iraq, after years of denials, not only had developed but had "weaponized" VX, the most toxic of nerve agents.⁹ When confronted with conclusive evidence they had done so, Iraq only admitted to producing some 200 liters, which it then claimed to have destroyed. UNSCOM's evidence showed that Iraq had nearly twenty times that amount.¹⁰

To get an appreciation of the lethality of VX and U.S. vulnerability to it, realize that the dispersal of roughly two pounds of VX in a large auditorium one hundred meters square and ten meters high would kill everyone inside within three minutes.¹¹ The results would be equally devastating in a high school gymnasium or a subway station at their busiest time of day. With this enormous destructive potential at stake, and only an incomplete accounting available, Butler's insistence on compliance and his refusal to compromise should be seen in a different light. Indeed, it is more accurate to conclude that he was the right person in the right job. The likely alternative would have resulted in the international community receiving an

9. RICHARD A. FALKENRATH, ROBERT D. NEWMAN & BRADLEY A. THAYER, *AMERICA'S ACHILLES' HEEL, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK* 148 (1998).

10. Butler, *supra* note 1, at 159-62.

11. FALKENRATH ET AL., *supra* note 9, at 148.

utterly false sense of security about the state of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

This book will prove useful to several disciplines. For those interested in the functioning of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council and its interplay with the Secretary General, Butler provides a unique insight. He relates his role as a high-visibility functionary, who nominally had the mandate of the international community and backing of numerous Security Council resolutions to assist him in his mission. Yet well before UNSCOM was expelled from Iraq, Butler could not garner the political backing of the Secretary General to thoroughly execute any of his essential tasks. Instead, he was asked simply to fold his tent and give Iraq a clean bill of health.

For Butler, anything short of thoroughness in the area of accounting for and destroying weapons of mass destruction was irresponsible and counterproductive; likewise, giving in to political pressures was out of the question for him. Students of political science will benefit from Butler's observations and experiences in dealing with the Iraqis, particularly his one-on-one dealings with Tariq Aziz, where diplomacy, gamesmanship, intimidation, and strength of personal character influenced the outcome of events of international significance. The historian will also appreciate these firsthand recollections from the last leader of UNSCOM, including the details of how and why the mission ultimately failed.

For the soldier, Butler's book offers numerous lessons. Nearly two years since the last efforts were made by UNSCOM inspectors to get an accounting of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Butler reminds the reader that no true accounting, much less a verifiable destruction of these weapons, was ever achieved. As such, UNSCOM's incomplete records of their partial destruction should provide little comfort. With this two-year hiatus and the recent history of Iraq as guidance, there is every reason to suspect that Iraq has maintained or rebuilt its stockpiles and has retooled its manufacturing capabilities for these weapons. Lacking the essential support of China, France, and Russia in the Security Council, the successor agency to UNSCOM, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, has been slow to get started and was probably doomed from its inception.¹²

For the sake of world security and the singular goal of eradicating weapons of mass destruction, Richard Butler captained his ship on the

proper course and unfortunately went down with her. *The Greatest Threat* effectively explains how and why this tragedy occurred.

12. Since the political demise of UNSCOM in December 1998, the United Nations has wrestled with the unfinished business of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Fully a year later, in December 1999, the Security Council voted to create a successor agency, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC. Three critical abstentions characterized the Security Council's creation of UNMOVIC—China, France, and the Russian Federation. S.C. Res. 1284, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1284 (1999). The abstention by three of the five Permanent Members of the Security Council has denied UNMOVIC political credibility. As of this writing, UNMOVIC is still recruiting and training personnel and has yet to inspect anything in Iraq. Daily Press Briefing, Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary General (Aug. 31, 2000).

BREAKING OUT: VMI AND THE COMING OF WOMEN¹REVIEWED BY MAJOR IMOGENE M. JAMISON²

On 26 July 1996, the United States Supreme Court rejected the single-sex admissions policy of Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and ordered the admission of women into the institution.³ Laura Fairchild Brodie's *Breaking Out* chronicles the behind-the-scene events that occurred following the Court's ruling as VMI sought to quickly comply with the Court's directive to "assimilate"⁴ the last all male academy in the country.

In *Breaking Out*, Brodie skillfully highlights the gender-related issues that VMI faced. Many of these issues have also challenged the Army's senior leadership as they struggle to create a "gender-neutral" Army. Judge advocates who desire to enhance their understanding of gender-related issues in the Army will benefit from reading *Breaking Out*. A useful parallel exists between the lessons learned during VMI's assimilation process and how the U.S. Army has dealt with issues regarding the integration of women into its force. As more and more women join the Army's ranks, commanders will inevitably seek out the advice of judge advocates as they balance the need to stay combat ready, ensuring mission success, with the integration process.

Breaking Out is well organized and easy to follow as Brodie skillfully arranges the book's chapters to tell VMI's story. She chronologically

1. LAURA FAIRCHILD BRODIE, *BREAKING OUT: VMI AND THE COMING OF WOMEN* (2000).

2. United States Army. Written while assigned as a student, 49th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.

3. BRODIE, *supra* note 1, at 21. See *United States v. Virginia*, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). The Court held that the state of Virginia violated equal protection with respect to its male-only admission policy at VMI. The state offered a proposed remedy of a separate women's institute at a private women's college. The Court held that this was not a cure for the constitutional violation.

4. *Id.* at 74. Virginia Military Institute considered other terms such as "co-education" and "integration" before settling for this word choice. The VMI decided that the word "co-education" implied more change than the school desired to undertake. The Court's decision did not require VMI to implement a new system of education jointly designed for men and women. Instead, the Supreme Court charged VMI with integrating women into its existing male-oriented program. The word "integration," however, carried its own political baggage. *Id.*

addresses each obstacle faced by VMI through creatively titled chapters, such as: “What is/was VMI;” “Co-education: the Initial Blueprints;” “The Language of Assimilation;” “Memories from Hell;”⁵ and “Break Out.”⁶ As the author proposes to provide the reader with a first-hand account of VMI’s transition to co-education, this format is quite appropriate. Brodie’s extensive use of interviews and her personal involvement with the assimilation process further enhances the book’s narrative.⁷

One of the greatest strengths of Brodie’s book is her detailed description of VMI as a distinctly Southern institution that resembles the U.S. military. She describes the school as a male-dominated institution priding itself on its methods of discipline, exemplified by its cultural homogeneity, resistance to change, uniforms, haircuts, and even its architecture. Throughout VMI’s assimilation process, school administrators and faculty members had to delicately balance the objective of “co-education” with the institution’s goal of maintaining its educational traditions and missions. Although Brodie does not provide a direct comparison, she commendably sets the stage to bring into analogy VMI and the U.S. military.

Today’s Army leaders often walk a tightrope to effectively identify and resolve gender-related issues without compromising the Army’s mission. Lee Bockhorn,⁸ a critic of Brodie’s work who argues that the U.S. military has “feminized” its institution by lowering its standards, implies that the military’s mission has been clearly compromised by this process. Conversely, Bockhorn does not view VMI as being “feminized.” The

5. *Id.* at 74, 211. The name of this chapter refers to the initial training that VMI students undergo. VMI has a cadet system that consists of arduous training. Prior to becoming full-fledged cadets during their first year, VMI’s freshmen students (called “rats”) undergo six or seven rigorous months where they are constantly yelled at or “flamed.” They also walk around in an awkward pose known as “straining.” Most VMI administrators believe that the “ratline’s adversative training” leaves its survivors with a sense of accomplishment and confidence. It also encourages habits of time management under stress and promotes lifelong friendships. *Id.*

6. *Id.* at 307. The name of this chapter refers to the night when the “rats” claw their way up the muddy VMI Breakout Hill to join the ranks of full-fledged cadets. *Id.*

7. *Id.* at ix (referring to the acknowledgments section of the book). Brodie served on VMI’s Executive Assimilation Committee. Members of this group oversaw VMI’s transition to co-education. She attended weekly meetings from August 1996 through May 1997. She continued her participation on a biweekly basis throughout the 1997-1998 school year, and she also attended various subcommittee meetings and studied specific aspects of the assimilation process. *Id.*

8. Lee Bockhorn, *Women at Arms*, in THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION POLICY REVIEW (2000) (book review).

institution has, instead, made its women more like men. According to Bockhorn, neither of these approaches is palatable.

Despite Brockhorn's criticism, Brodie superbly details how VMI's "assimilation" plan addressed the issue of inclusiveness. Virginia Military Institute's school administrators, faced with the challenge of how to "include" women, revised school publications to reflect inclusive language, using "he or she," or "they," as opposed to only "he." Administrators pondered what to call their female cadets, considering such words as "girls," "gals," "women," "females," "ladies," and "cadets," finally settling on the word "cadet." Virginia Military Institute's superintendent also reviewed words that he thought might be offensive to women such as "dyke," "boned," or "run a period," deciding to keep these traditional terms because they had a legitimate origin.⁹ Brodie should be applauded on her very candid and honest discussion of these issues. Again, the gender issues that she addresses also hold true for Army commanders who must create a working environment where female soldiers feel as if they are a part of the team without detracting from the Army's war-fighting mission.

Another strength of Brodie's book is her willingness to tackle VMI administrators' attempts to ward off allegations of sexual harassment. She states that school officials sought to reshape the attitude of the cadet corps¹⁰ regarding its view of women and how to interact with them. Brodie shows how many people held certain pervasive attitudes about women in the military. Even VMI's cooks and members of the cleaning team opposed the admittance of women, on the basis that it would be difficult to cook or clean for them, effectively demonstrating that the administrators would need to reshape attitudes at all levels.

Over the last decade, Army commanders have also struggled with issues stemming from sexual harassment.¹¹ Although Army officials have drafted regulations that govern this specific conduct, sexual harassment

9. BRODIE, *supra* note 1, at 77-78. The word "dyke" refers to any uniform that is worn by a cadet or, more specifically, to various straps and sashes on cadet uniforms that hold up items such as the saber. It is also the relationship that exists between a "rat" and an "upperclassman." The word "boned" refers to a cadet who is reported for misconduct. The phrase "run a period" refers to each grading period. *Id.*

10. *Id.* at 20, 26. The VMI has an organized cadet corps where students live in barracks and wear their uniforms around-the-clock. The cadet corps has leadership positions that are held by student company officers, battalion commanders, and others. The Cadet Regimental Commander commands the entire cadet corps. *Id.*

remains one of the biggest challenges for Army leaders. VMI officials, adopting the military's approach, responded by drafting school regulations and providing sensitivity training to everyone at the institution from school professors to the buildings and grounds crews. Even though many cadets dismissed the training as unnecessary or a waste of time, according to Brodie, the training encouraged the cadets to "start talking." This leaves readers with the promise of awareness if not change.

Brodie next explains VMI's dating policy, an issue that the Army's senior leadership also faced regarding fraternization in the military. Brodie reveals how VMI administrators addressed concerns that arose from the placement of male and female cadets together in a "close and intense" academic environment. Virginia Military Institute implemented a policy that forbade senior cadets from dating new cadets, commonly referred to as "rats," throughout the senior cadets' entire fourth-class year. Company officers could not date within their companies, battalion commanders could not date within their battalions, and the Cadet Regimental Commander could not date anyone in the entire cadet corps. The administrators, echoing the concerns of the Army leadership, recognized that the authority upperclassmen exerted over the new cadets made dating "dangerous." As with the Army, it is unclear what issues will arise under this policy.

Brodie points out that prior to 1975, the U.S. armed forces maintained a policy of involuntary discharge for pregnant soldiers. Just as the military reversed its position regarding the involuntary release of female soldiers and addressed accommodation issues for them, VMI also had to scrap its parenthood plan. The plan stated procedures for dismissal of any pregnant cadet or cadet who caused the pregnancy of a fellow cadet or a civilian woman. Administrators were certain that pregnancy was clearly incompatible with a cadet's first year activities at VMI. Administrators, instead of creating a "one-size-fits-all" policy, decided to address the parenthood issue on a case-by-case basis, allowing for a generous leave of absence for the pregnant female cadets. Again, it remains to be seen how successful

11. *Id.* at 173. Brodie points out that even as VMI planned its orientation sessions, a scandal at the Aberdeen Proving Ground was "ballooning into a public outcry" against sexual harassment in the U.S. Army. *Id.*

the VMI policy will prove in practice. In the meantime, VMI appears to have set the groundwork to effectively resolve this issue.

Breaking Out highlights misconceptions that many VMI school officials and others held about women. The author writes about conversations that the assimilation committee members had regarding the proposal to require females to take group showers. The administrators rejected this proposal, concluding that women faced with the requirement to take communal showers were often too embarrassed to properly wash themselves. The administrators feared that this environment would diminish the female cadets' ability to properly clean themselves, thereby increasing the number of female urinary tract infections. Some school officials also believed that menstrual cramps would debilitate women and limit their school participation. Although these types of discussions add a comical flavor to the author's book, they also enhance the realism of her work. These misconceptions not only hold true for many members of the VMI administration, but also for many of the male soldiers serving in the military.

Brodie next uses the VMI example to explore the subject of how a military woman should look and act. Initially, the female cadets' appearance would not be a concern because they would have a "unisex" look with buzz cuts and uniforms that flattened the curves of their bodies, but the issue would arise after their first year. On the one hand, administrators planned for women being "too feminine," regulating what kind of underwear women could wear under their uniforms and creating a pantyhose policy. On the other hand, administrators feared that women would look "too masculine." They feared that these cadets would attract the wrong type of women to VMI. The administrators also worried that the school would receive complaints about the cadets' appearance when the female cadets traveled home during breaks wearing extremely short haircuts. Brodie provides no definitive answers in this section of the book. Regarding how a VMI woman should act, she concludes that the expectations have yet to be fully defined. Many questions remain. For instance, how will a VMI woman act in a leadership position? Will she command respect? Will she serve as an effective role model for all cadets?

While the reader may applaud Brodie for taking us behind the scenes to obtain a view of the steps that VMI administrators took to assimilate women, the reader is left wondering about the author's objectivity and openness. Brodie states in her introductory remarks that no one can talk about VMI without getting "personal," and she acknowledges that she brings "personal baggage" to the table. She is a member of the VMI

Assimilation Committee and teaches English literature at VMI on a part-time basis. Her husband is VMI's band director. In one breath, she states that she has loathed VMI at times. In another, she views herself as a self-proclaimed feminist who is a member of the VMI family.¹²

Despite Brodie's potential bias, she presents a fair and balanced account of VMI's transition. Philip Gold¹³ agrees, stating that Brodie's "evenhandedness is magnificent." A Brodie critic, Elizabeth Bobrick,¹⁴ comments that it is "usually difficult to tell where Brodie stands on any given issue. This makes her a trustworthy reporter, although the end result is a tad bland." Bobrick further comments that Brodie's status as an insider was both a "help and a hindrance." She applauds the author for not showing sympathy for the alumni or for those who attacked the Supreme's Court's decision. Bobrick additionally observes, however, that Brodie always made VMI's superintendent, Major General Josiah Bunting III,¹⁵ come out "smelling like a rose," showing that she revered him.¹⁶ While the reader may dispute Bobrick's finding that *Breaking Out* is a "tad bland," the reader will most likely agree with her ultimate conclusion that Brodie presents an objective account of what happened at VMI.

One potential criticism of *Breaking Out* is that it is not a serious work. Brodie informs the reader up front that her book is not a scholarly work based on exhaustive research. She also states that she relied heavily on nonconfidential information and documents that school officials distributed at meetings. Brodie based her book on a total of sixty-six interviews that she conducted with cadets, administrators, faculty, and staff at VMI. However, approximately 430 new male cadets and thirty new female cadets matriculated to VMI in the fall 1997 class alone. This number does

12. *Id.* at xiii. The VMI administrators would not have allowed Brodie to conduct her research if she had not been considered an "insider." She states that one other female before her had attempted to chronicle VMI changes. According to Brodie, "this short-term visitor to the Post was touted in the papers as an expert on VMI, espousing a viewpoint so full of doubts that the Commandant who had befriended her thought 'Never again.'" *Id.*

13. Philip Gold, *VMI and Women Cadets: Planning, Implementing and Living with It*, WASH. TIMES, MAY 21, 2000, at B-7 (book review).

14. Elizabeth Bobrick, *Arms and the Woman*, in WOMEN'S REVIEW OF BOOKS, June 2000, at 8 (book review).

15. BRODIE, *supra* note 1, at xiii. General Bunting gave Brodie permission to undertake an oral history of VMI's transition process. He also invited Brodie to join the VMI Assimilation Committee. In the acknowledgments section of her book, Brodie thanks General Bunting for his generosity and open-mindedness for allowing her to conduct her research.

16. Bobrick, *supra* note 14, at 9.

not include the more senior cadets, leading the reader to question why Brodie did not include interviews from a larger pool of cadets to support her theories, thereby reflecting her desire to present an objective view and the majority view of the cadets. Despite these shortcomings, Brodie does an excellent job of putting forth the issues. The reader is left with hope that VMI will become a much stronger and more diverse institution as a result of the “breaking in” of women.

The theme that runs throughout VMI’s attempts to address gender-related issues is the clear need for VMI administrators to have a thorough understanding of the law and the legal implications of their actions. Brodie makes it clear that the school administrators relied heavily on their legal team. Similarly, the Army’s senior leadership will look to judge advocates to review and interpret Army rules and regulations concerning gender issues. Judge advocates will greatly benefit from reading *Breaking Out*, and they will gain a better understanding of their role in advising commanders on these gender-related issues. Also, if judge advocates understand what is often misunderstood about the integration process, they will be able to conduct more meaningful legal training.

VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND¹REVIEWED BY MAJOR GEORGE R. SMAWLEY²

What happens when war is fought with impunity: a “spectator sport”³ without sacrifice, with unequal teams, vague rules, and few if any penalties? Technology and the relaxed political accountability afforded by the demise of the Warsaw Pact have given the West the ability to play a game that is faster and neater than at anytime in our history. In the modern era of sports, home teams are exposed to few if any injuries, minimal cost, and a free-agency previously unheard of. War, like sports, has always had a moral paradigm that implicitly attributes at least the possibility of loss to either side. Recent events suggest that paradigm is shifting.

Virtual War describes three key aspects of the Kosovo conflict: the history of the Balkans leading to the 1998 NATO air war, Operation Allied Force; Western intervention in a civil war without United Nations (U.N.) sanction; and the means of war which distinguish this conflict from others. The book provides more than merely a review of the methods used by NATO during the Kosovo air campaign. It effectively describes the conflict in general terms that benefit readers without extensive background in the war itself, international law, or military history. Author Michael Ignatieff also goes one step further and explores the conflict from the perspective of a journalist experienced in Kosovo, asking whether war can be justified on moral grounds despite the absence of firm legal authority.⁴ Ignatieff concludes that the NATO air campaign echoed in a new age of modern warfare, remote politically and militarily for all except the civilian Kosovar and Serb populations, who suffered dearly.

1. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, *VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND* (2000). Ignatieff also authored *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (1998) and *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (1993).

2. United States Army. Written while assigned as a student, 49th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.

3. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 191.

4. *Id.* at 163. The author argues that humanitarian justice demanded the unilateral NATO action, ignoring Yugoslav sovereignty otherwise guaranteed by the U.N. Charter. *Id.*

I. Historical Perspective

Virtual War begins with a historical account of the war and its aftermath. The journalist author adds insight to this historical narrative, owing to his coverage of the Kosovo conflict and his long-standing ties to the region. It includes a perceptive look at “Balkan physics,” introducing the Milosevic regime, its tortured political and military miscalculations, and the resistance to international involvement in what many consider a sovereign matter. Included are sympathetic vignettes of the daily struggles encountered by the civilian populations before, during, and after Operation Allied Force, and the Western response to their suffering.

Ignatieff comments that Serb bitterness toward NATO tactics ultimately worked in Milosevic’s favor. The author includes, as an example, an icy exchange with a Serb friend critical of NATO governments willing to “kill in name of values, but not to die” for them.⁵ Here, Ignatieff begins to lay the loose groundwork for the book’s main premise: technology and the unchallenged political status of the West allowed NATO to ignore Yugoslav sovereignty and prosecute a devastating campaign, without significantly endangering a single NATO soldier. The cloud of questionable legal justification and divided international opinion fueled the perception of victimization by the Serb people, and it helped legitimize Milosevic’s claim of Western imperialism.

The author assumes little of the reader’s understanding of the history of the conflict, and this approach may come as a disappointment to anyone with a dedicated interest in Balkan affairs. Instead, Ignatieff offers compelling human insight and critical historical context complete with detailed military, diplomatic, and political profiles.⁶ His freelance approach is sometimes distracting, but the style and subject of the interspersed tails of his Balkan experiences are interesting nonetheless. Ignatieff reminds the reader that the war was about people, and he is unable to resist the human-interest story, which he relates with passion.

The Balkan historical exposé is well done.⁷ The book’s occasional treatment of related issues of politics and law, however, can be frustrating,

5. *Id.* at 151.

6. Including General Wesley Clark, Richard Holbrooke, and prosecutor Louis Arbour.

7. The author includes references to President Wilson’s enunciation of the right of Balkan peoples to national self-determination, and traces the development of Balkan nationalism from that point forward.

as they are often incomplete. Ignatieff relates, for example, that Milosevic abolished the limited autonomy Kosovars previously enjoyed under the Tito constitution,⁸ but fails to explain how that autonomy worked. Similarly, he describes “the cross-cultural validity of human rights norms”⁹ as a basis for intervention on behalf of Kosovars suffering from years of Serb repression, but avoids any meaningful discussion of human rights as a legal force under international law.¹⁰ The book references these issues, and the idea of humanitarian intervention, because they are undeniably part of the Kosovo story. Anything more is beyond the author’s scope, which is unfortunate given the ambitious promise set in the book’s introduction.

Where the author does succeed, however, is in his superb overview of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Ignatieff accurately details the history and practical workings of the court, and the experience of Chief Prosecutor Louise Arbour. In a chapter aptly called “Justice and Revenge,” he describes the nature of the tragedy, and discusses the successes and challenges faced by the international community to bring indicted war criminals to justice. In this the author humanizes the war and illuminates a central crux of the book: that the war was about people—its victims—in whom the justification for intervention is found.

II. Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty (Virtual Law)

An integral part of “virtual war,” asserts the author, is the ability of the West to disregard certain tenets of international law. Midway through the book begins a discussion of the absence of U.N. sanction for the NATO action in Kosovo. This section centers on the short but fascinating personal correspondence between the author and a member of the British House of Lords, Robert Skidelsky. This spirited exchange between Skidelsky, an unapologetic Westphalian¹¹ opposed to the NATO intervention,¹² and Ignatieff,¹³ an internationalist, mirrors the debate that occurred

8. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 20.

9. *Id.* at 82.

10. See also WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, *THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR* (1982) (viewing war from the context of social morality, and discussing attempts to justify war where motives are consistent with fundamental human notions of justice).

11. Referring to the Treaty of Westphalia (1649) (emphasizing preservation and rights of national sovereignty), available at <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm>.

in Western capitals over the international right of intervention and Prime Minister Tony Blair's new "Doctrine of International Community."¹⁴

The letters provide the author with a creative forum to argue his case that intervention is warranted where diplomacy fails and where systemic human rights abuses threaten the existence of ethnic populations and regional security.¹⁵ The argument is emotional, and Ignatieff avoids any serious discussion of NATO's violation of international law.¹⁶ Military coercion, however, has an integral legal component that cannot be ignored. The author's failure to address relevant tenets of international law leaves many questions unanswered, thereby compromising his advocacy for humanitarian intervention.

This short exchange over sovereignty and law is nonetheless a highlight of the book. It contributes to the general balance of opinion expressed throughout the work. Unfortunately, it is unaccompanied by a much deserved critical examination of the justifications used by NATO in support of the air war.¹⁷ Instead, Ignatieff advocates generally for intervention where extreme human rights abuses and threats to regional stability justify military action. The author disregards the U.N. Charter regime in such cases. That regime, however, is the cornerstone of international law for conflict management, and the failure to address the war in the context of a discussion of Article 2(4)¹⁸ or Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is a critical weakness in the discussion.

So, too, is the absence of any meaningful review of Security Council actions. It is important to remember that in early 1998, the Council found

12. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 86. Lord Skidelsky was deeply concerned over the implications of disregarding the international legal regime shielding sovereign states from intervention on matters of internal politics and policy.

13. Ignatieff is a renowned journalist, biographer, and commentator who publishes widely on issues of nationalism and humanitarian intervention. He has published two previous books on ethnic nationalism. *See supra* note 1.

14. *Id.* at 74 (citing Prime Minister Tony Blair, Address at the Economic Club of Chicago (Apr. 22, 1999) (arguing for international cooperation as a means to preserve regional security)).

15. *Id.* at 76 (including a casual discussion of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, mandating intervention where the sovereign's policies threaten to destabilize neighboring states).

16. *See* Jonathan I. Charney, *Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo*, 93 A.J.I.L. 834, 863 (1999) (editorial comment) ("The doctrine of 'humanitarian intervention' is not well defined and the evidence does not establish a rule of law permitting the use of force against a state in situations like that of Kosovo.").

that the Milosevic regime had committed serious human rights violations. United Nations action included ordering a cessation of hostilities toward the Kosovar Albanian population, and the creation of an observer force.¹⁹ While lacking express legal authority for intervention afforded by Chapter VII, this provided critical political cover that ultimately made the operation palatable to the West. Similarly, Security Council action subsequent to the air campaign suggests international concurrence and a possible ratification of the NATO intervention.²⁰ The book should note such facts, but does not.

The absence of more than a passing reference to the U.N.'s interventionist approach to conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia is another omission. They would assist the reader's understanding of a new international humanism justifying intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, one of the key points the author tries to make. An historical analysis of the political dynamic and legal justifications for an inter-

17. See, e.g., Michael J. Matheson, *The Twelfth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law*, 161 *MIL. L. REV.* 181 (1999).

In justifying its use of force on its own authority, NATO pointed to various factors. These included the severe humanitarian catastrophe caused by Serb conduct, the threat to stability and security of other states in the region, the actions taken by the Security Council, the special role of NATO as a regional organization in securing peace in Europe, the extensive violations by the FRY of its past commitments, and the extensive violations of international humanitarian law. These factors taken together justified armed intervention in these unique circumstances.

Id. at 189.

18. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4) ("All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.").

19. See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53th Sess., 3868th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53th Sess., 3930th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53th Sess., 3937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998), available at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres>.

20. *Id.* S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999) (requiring withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, authorizing NATO deployment and peace enforcement under Chapter VII, and establishing U.N. civil administration in Kosovo).

ventionist approach to humanitarian relief is significant as the precursor to what happened in 1998 in Kosovo.²¹

III. Means and Methods (Virtual War)

Taking a narrative look at the character of the conflict, Ignatieff observes that Western air superiority allowed NATO to wage a devastating campaign with near impunity, and minimal exposure to loss. The basis for using modern means to avert casualties is simple: technology allows it, and the politics of democratic constituencies demand it. The strategy of limited engagement arises where political expediency justifies a war, as well as limits it; that is, the engagement is justified by humanitarian need, but limited by political constituencies with little taste for total war. In this sense, Kosovo was a limited armed conflict in the tradition of Clausewitz's "cabinet war".²²

The analogy is illustrative. Almost by definition Allied Force was a cabinet war fought with modern means, limited only by public opinion.²³ "Virtual war" simply represents the evolution of limited armed conflict. The nature of the NATO intervention easily fits with the classic notion of "continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means,"²⁴ a fact not entirely lost on the author.²⁵ "Technology that removes death from the experience of war"²⁶ characterized the conflict, and thereby lim-

21. From the Israeli treatment of Palestinians to apartheid in South Africa, as well as the evolving conflicts in the Balkans, the growing willingness of the U.N. to act in otherwise sovereign internal matters is unmistakable.

22. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 111.

Cabinet wars are fought and won by technicians and [General] Clark's team produced a virtuoso display of technical improvisation. Cabinet wars do not end with parades, garlands, civic receptions or sorrowful ceremonies at graveyards. They do not reach deep into the psyche of a people; they do not demand blood and sacrifice and they do not reward their heroes.

Id.

23. *Id.* at 104 ("[General] Clark was never allowed to forget what was at stake for the politicians . . . Tony Blair . . . told him straight out that the political future of every leader in Europe depended on the outcome.").

24. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, *ON WAR* 605 (Michael Howard & Peter Part eds., 1984).

25. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 110 ("[T]his was not a war at all, but an exercise in coercive diplomacy designed to change one man's mind.").

26. *Id.* at 5.

ited its impact upon allied civilian, military, and government institutions through the distance afforded by modern aerial war.²⁷

While limited war is not new, casualty-free war that “transforms the expectations that govern the morality of war” is, and comes after close consideration of the legitimacy of war without risk.²⁸ Ignatieff provides an important historical context²⁹ that places NATO at the cutting edge of the armed conflict spectrum where “precision lethality” removes traditional concerns of cost, substituting instead questions of the moral and legal implications of a war free from reprisal.³⁰ The author’s analysis suggests the West,³¹ free from the legal constraints of the U.N. Charter and capable of projecting extraordinary power with minimal risk, may venture into similar wars elsewhere.

In his analysis, Ignatieff underestimates the difficulty with which the military campaign was prosecuted, and ignores the extraordinary reluctance of democratic leaders to engage in armed conflicts. Military capability and political will are two very different things. While Ignatieff includes a passing reference to public support,³² he otherwise fails to seriously reconcile the two. The West’s political will to engage in future humanitarian intervention is critical, and quite possibly more important than the ability to prosecute war itself. Diplomatic and economic interests will always be involved; values will always be tempered by national interest.³³

27. See also ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, *THE LESSONS AND NON-LESSONS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE WAR IN KOSOVO* (1999) (summarizing the success and failures of the air campaign, and the limits of air power as a unilateral strategy for control of ground forces).

28. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 161.

29. *Id.* at 164-176. The author details the history of armament development from the crossbow forward, and notes that the objective has always been one of perfecting accuracy at a distance.

30. Suggesting that Yugoslav forces were unable to impose serious losses on NATO forces.

31. It is important to remember that Security Council members Russia and China, and a significant number of Non-aligned states opposed the intervention.

32. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 193 (“By the end of the operation, poll support for further bombing slipped below 50 percent for the first time, and it is doubtful that military action could have been continued much longer than it was.”).

33. Rwanda, Chechnya, and Tibet are proof of the limitations.

IV. War with Impunity (Virtual Accountability)

Finally, Ignatieff describes a set of conditions that facilitated an armed conflict conducted, he maintains, with near impunity. They include the political, physical, psychological, and economic distance between the theater of operation and the allied nations. Clearly, NATO air superiority and advanced weaponry freed General Wesley Clark from the reliance upon a sizeable expeditionary force that may or may not have been possible. First displayed during the Gulf War, this weaponry provided the West with unparalleled conventional capabilities.³⁴

Ignatieff identifies several key characteristics of the modern war that distinguish it from the “total” war of the Cold War era and earlier. Among them is “virtual consent,”³⁵ where democratic constituencies and legislatures are removed from the decision making process, and “virtual mobilization,” where a number of common factors regarding citizens’ participation in the conflict are identified. The fluid nature of the law of war is also noted.³⁶ Consent and mobilization enfranchise populations and give them a stake in the outcome through their collective effort and sacrifice. The absence of each, therefore, reinforces the distance civilians feel from the battle.

Allied Force was premised on the notion that there are fundamental principles of humanity worth fighting for. The problem, Ignatieff observes, is that “values are [only] real to the degree that we are prepared to risk something in order to make them prevail.”³⁷ Therefore, he finds “virtual values” prevail in the West where the willingness to uphold them is tempered by political pragmatism and an unwillingness to take casual-

34. For a complete history on the application of technology to war craft, see MAURICE PEARTON, *DIPLOMACY, WAR AND TECHNOLOGY SINCE 1830*, at 11 (1984) (“Technology has enlarged the options open to policy-makers in their pursuit of the aims of the state, . . . it has also made the problems and costs of choosing more onerous.”).

35. Ignatieff makes the case that this is most apparent in the United States, where presidents have been circumventing the War Powers Act since Truman’s foray into Korea. It is significant that legislative bodies, excluded from the process, become free to undermine and criticize the executive’s decision and thereby compromise the integrity of the decision itself. The consent of the government as a whole is never obtained.

36. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 200. The author faults military lawyers for converting intensely moral issues into legal guarantees used to justify the means to the end: “The real problem with the entry of lawyers into the prosecution of warfare is that it encourages the illusion that war is clean if the lawyers say so.” *Id.*

37. *Id.* at 201.

ties, as in Somalia. The only thing that has changed over time is the expectation that it can be done with *no* casualties.

Unlike real war, “virtual victory” is a self-limiting concept satisfied with an end state short of the removal of the enemy. It may well be the U.N. Charter regime that preserves tyrants in a world where the “continuation of a rogue sovereign is deemed preferable to the costs of reconstituting something in its place.”³⁸ There is an irony in a military alliance willing to breach international guarantees of sovereignty, but unwilling to “finish the job” through removal of the sovereign himself, one where tyrants are defeated but not vanquished. Given that this new development has resulted in thousands of U.S. and NATO personnel deployed to the Middle East and the Balkans, Ignatieff correctly notes that virtual victory may be a “poor substitute for the real thing.”³⁹

V. Summary

Ignatieff’s *Virtual War* offers plenty of history with telling observations and anecdotes, but limited hard analysis of what Allied Force meant to the development of international armed conflict. The presentation is akin to the mighty Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania: a mile wide and three feet deep. The author’s discourse on NATO’s departure from international law is accurate but undeveloped. The treatment of precision weaponry is interesting but unremarkable. Since the most striking feature of the Kosovo campaign was the West’s disregard for the rule of law in favor of humanitarian principle, the real revolution was not in war itself but in the vacuum of virtual law that has energized legal scholars everywhere. Unfortunately, the book fails to address this with any real depth.⁴⁰

Still, *Virtual War* is an excellent beginning for the lay reader unfamiliar with the complexities of Balkan history, international law, and NATO’s conduct of the war. It introduces the key players, history, and critical issues for arguably the most complex, on-going international crisis since the Gulf War. Ignatieff is a journalist—a good one—who makes sufficient reference to authorities able to take the reader to the next level, though he endeavors little to appeal to lawyers or military historians with more than

38. *Id.* at 209.

39. *Id.* at 210.

40. *See generally* EDITORIAL COMMENTS: NATO’S KOSOVO INTERVENTION, 93 A.J.I.L. 824 (1999) (provides a series of seven scholarly commentaries collectively providing a superb overview of the conflict’s legal issues).

a casual interest in his subject. Nevertheless, he excels in the presentation of facts and personalities to humanize the NATO intervention in Kosovo with a journalistic flourish that successfully captures the essence of the conflict.

VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND¹REVIEWED BY LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WILLIAM F. O'BRIEN²

Despite our apparent victory, this theme is also at the center of the Kosovo story: why nations that have never been more immune from the risks of waging war should remain so unwilling to run them. Virtual War attempts to explain this paradox, by exploring the new technology of war and the emerging morality governing its use.³

In his introduction, Michael Ignatieff establishes an ambitious goal of exploring the technology and morality of the emerging twenty-first century conflict. Fortunately for his reader, he fails. Instead, the author provides a portrait of the Kosovo conflict, admirably told through the people who lived it. Michael Ignatieff is neither Tom Clancy nor Norman Polmar taking us through the technological innovations of a modern military. Nor is he St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas exploring the morality of the use of force. Instead, Ignatieff is a storyteller. A journalist by trade, he employs participants of the conflict, both central and peripheral, to guide the reader through the issues he raises.

From General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, to Aleksa Djilas, a Serbian writer and historian, Ignatieff frames the conflict in a manner that cannot be captured in gun-sight videos and press briefings. From Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to Blerim Shala, a leader of the Kosovar Albanian delegation at Rambouillet, Ignatieff shows his readers perspectives of the conflict that would otherwise be inaccessible. His method results in a series of stand-alone snapshots, which he uses to outline the elements of the conflict. While these stories are interesting, it is the employment of three common themes that ties these anecdotal chapters into a coherent work. At its core *Virtual War* explores: (1) the relatively new politico-military concept of a "virtual war;" (2) a state's (or group of

1. MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, *VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND* (2000).

2. United States Navy. Written while assigned as a student, 49th Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia.

3. IGNATIEFF, *supra* note 1, at 7.

states') decision to intervene in a conflict within the territory of a sovereign state; and (3) the nature of such interventions.

I. "Virtual War"

In order to appreciate the journey, one must first understand the language of the tour guide. In Ignatieff's view, the Kosovo conflict represents a new player on the use of force stage: the virtual war. Ignatieff first observes:

For the citizens of the NATO countries, on the other hand, the war was virtual. They were mobilized, not as combatants but as spectators. The war was a spectacle: it aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way that sports do. The events in question were as remote from their essential concerns as a football game.
...⁴

Kosovo did not include Sergeant Stryker (John Wayne) leading his men ashore on Iwo Jima. Nor did it include a Desert Shield type build-up of forces overseas in preparation for combat. Instead, Kosovo had an unreal quality about it. "For NATO combatants the experience of war was less visceral than calculative, a set of split-second decisions made through the lens of a gun camera or over a video-conferencing system."⁵ Examining the impact of this new-type of limited conflict on the conduct and morality of warfare is a path that Ignatieff follows throughout his book.

Although not a virtual war, Ignatieff believes elements of Desert Storm laid the foundation for the concept we are now struggling to understand.

Ever since the moment during the Gulf War in 1991 when reporters saw cruise missiles 'turning left at the traffic lights to strike the bunkers of the Iraqi regime, the Western public has come to think of war like laser surgery. Displays of this kind of lethal precision at first awakened awe; now they are expected. We routinely demand perfection from the technology that surrounds us—our mobile phones, computers, cars. Why not war?⁶

4. *Id.* at 3.

5. *Id.* at 4.

6. *Id.* at 92.

The man charged with managing this technological display was General Wesley Clark. In the chapter “The Virtual Commander,” Ignatieff provides a glimpse of the man whose job was to keep together a coalition of nineteen nations while directing a combat campaign using tactics with which he personally disagreed.⁷ Ignatieff’s portrayal of Clark can be compared to a composer leading his symphony through a difficult performance. The music, written collaboratively by nineteen different composers, is not finished when it is handed to the conductor. The conductor’s job, in addition to getting the orchestra through a very public performance, is to do so in a manner that keeps all nineteen composers happy. The music is technically challenging, and while everyone listening realizes the complexity, no one is willing to tolerate mistakes. Even if few and far between, sour notes—such as bombing a civilian train, a refugee convoy, or a nursing home—flavor the entire performance. As a result, the conductor is fired; or as Ignatieff stated: “The man who won the first postmodern war in history was now looking for a job.”⁸

An interesting note that carries throughout Ignatieff’s book is whether Clark’s dismissal was pre-ordained by the very nature of a virtual war. Given the technological superiority of NATO, expectations may have been unfairly heightened that a show of force would produce a permanent Balkan solution. Unfortunately, in Ignatieff’s opinion, a virtual war can only lead to a virtual victory.⁹ This leaves us with one of the troubling paradoxes uncovered by the author. As this style of warfare becomes a more viable option, western countries (particularly the United States and Great Britain) may turn to it with increasing frequency as an element of their foreign policy. Unfortunately, absent a truly limited set of goals, a virtual war can only result in a hollow victory. A lasting solution to most disputes still requires military presence if not a ground-based use of military force.

II. The Decision to Intervene

But are Western countries more likely to consider a “virtual” campaign an option in future international hot spots? Ignatieff is unsure. Citing British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s speech to the Economic Club of

7. *Id.* at 93.

8. *Id.* at 112.

9. “Virtual war proceeds to virtual victory. Since the means employed are limited, the ends achieved are equally constrained: not unconditional surrender, regime change or destruction of war-making capacity of the other side, only ambiguous ‘end state.’” *Id.* at 208.

Chicago on 22 April 1999, Ignatieff seems to accept Blair's five-part test for when intervention is appropriate:

The presumption enshrined in the U.N. Charter that states should not resort to war except in self-defense and that they should be immune from intervention by other sovereign states had now to be revised. Acts of genocide, [Blair] said, could never remain a purely internal matter. Likewise, oppression which led to massive flows of refugees could not be allowed to stand. If such conditions mandated intervention in principle, [Blair] went on, we also had to ask practical questions before we sent troops in. First, are we sure of our case? Second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? Third, are there military options "we can sensibly and prudently undertake?" Fourth, are we prepared for the long-term? And finally, do we have national interests involved? If we could answer these questions in the affirmative, we should intervene.¹⁰

In a "virtual debate" with independent member of the House of Lords, Robert Skidelsky, published in *Prospect* magazine, Ignatieff's position paraphrased most of these conditions for intervention; notably, however, Ignatieff dropped the requirement for a national interest.¹¹ In this regard, his position appears to have been significantly influenced by his visit to a refugee camp in Macedonia in April 1998. As he looked down on the camp from a Macedonian hillside, Ignatieff contemplated events of the last ten years in the former Yugoslavia. At that moment, national interest seemed irrelevant.¹²

While the intellectual justifications for military intervention were clear when listening to the Prime Minister or visiting a refugee camp, they become far less clear to Ignatieff when walking the streets of Belgrade with an old friend shortly after the bombing campaign stopped. After visiting reminders of NATO's air strike, Ignatieff and Aleksa Djilas agreed to disagree.

The requirement that "he who casts the first stone should be without sin" is a guarantee of inaction. The fact that the West does not live up to its ideals does not invalidate the ideals or

10. *Id.* at 72-73.

11. *Id.* at 76-77.

12. *Id.* at 45.

invalidate their defense. Ideals are frequently defended by people with dirty hands—a bad conscience. This is what our argument came down to—bad conscience on both sides.

The bad conscience on my side was that we had talked the language of ultimate causes and practiced the art of minimum risk. Aleksa's bad conscience was that he had lived inside a morally squalid state and had done so little to bring it to its senses.¹³

It was not simply the morality of intervention that led to disagreements between the author and his acquaintances; the lack of domestic process and procedural safeguards leading up to NATO's intervention also caused a healthy debate. Personally, Ignatieff seems less troubled by the failure of NATO to get U.N. approval, then by the failure of the United States and United Kingdom to get wide-spread approval within their respective political systems.¹⁴ Citing inaction in Rwanda, the author believes that absent Security Council reform, the current world order guarantees U.N. inaction. As such, he believes a regional organization such as NATO is justified to step in. "When a house is on fire, you do not seek a search warrant before entering to put out the blaze."¹⁵ While legal scholars will be quick to cite the U.N. Charter and enter a debate with Mr. Ignatieff over the legality of NATO's action, it is important to remember that the author is a journalist, not a lawyer. While his letters to Mr. Skidelsky demonstrate a good understanding of international legal philosophy, *Virtual War* is not intended as a legal treatise. The author is the son of a diplomat who spent two years living and studying in Belgrade as a child. This book not only examines the evolving nature of warfare, but also is, in a way, the author's attempt to come to terms with his nation's bombing of his childhood hometown.

III. The Nature of Intervention

The decision to intervene is only a jumping off point. Once accomplished, the tactics take center stage. This issue, as woven through the book, might be the most contentious. NATO's air campaign was controversial from a number of respects. Under Prime Minister Blair's own cal-

13. *Id.* at 155.

14. *Id.* at 177. "In place of Congress and Parliament as the effective control on the war-making powers of our executives, we have polls and focus groups." *Id.*

15. *Id.* at 181-82.

culus, intervention is only justified if it has a chance of success. Whether or not an air-only campaign had a “chance of success” is a matter of great disagreement. Underlying this debate is the truly important question of the Kosovo campaign: what was the objective?

The larger question was whether the air campaign—for all its astonishing accuracy—had actually worked. When the Serbian columns withdrew northwards in mid-June, with the men in sunglasses and bandannas standing up in the tanks making obscene gestures at the Western camera crews, it became clear that Clark’s air campaign had not defeated Milosevic’s forces in the field. It seemed strange that such a mighty display of air power—34,000 sorties over seventy-eight days—should have achieved such an ambiguous result.¹⁶

Ignatieff seems to argue that, by its very nature, a virtual war had no chance of success. In his view, the goal of the campaign needed to be a sustainable peace for the whole region.¹⁷ This goal, however, is beyond the limited objectives of a virtual war.

The nature of NATO’s intervention is not only controversial because of the questionable nature of the results it made possible, but also because the air-only campaign brought into question the moral and legal underpinnings of NATO’s tactical decisions. Aleksa Djilas, the author’s Serb friend, became embittered when he discussed the hypocrisy of NATO’s willingness to kill for ideals, but not die for them.¹⁸ He is not alone. The author himself appears troubled as he realized “the alliance’s moral preferences were clear: preserving the lives of their all-volunteer service professionals was a higher priority than saving innocent foreign civilians.”¹⁹ These common misgivings, however, seem to flow from different streams, one looking backward, and the other looking forward. Djilas represents the Serb resentment that they never got a fair shot at NATO, whereas Ignatieff’s concerns are for the precedent this may set for future conflicts. It’s important to keep in mind that, although the author accepts intervention without U.N. approval, there are rather strict sets of criteria that must be met. This new virtual warfare, he fears, may make Western intervention more common-place: “If war becomes virtual—and without risk—demo-

16. *Id.* at 94.

17. *Id.* at 65.

18. *Id.* at 151.

19. *Id.* at 62.

cratic electorates may be more willing to fight especially if the cause is justified in the language of human rights and even democracy itself.”²⁰

The final impact of a virtual war on the conduct of hostilities is its impact on the target set. The greater accuracy of the weapons contain their own built-in paradox:

While precision guidance weaponry is supposed to reverse the twentieth-century trend towards even greater civilian casualties, warfare directed at a society’s nervous system rather than against its fielded forces, necessarily blurs the distinction between civilian and military objectives. The most important targets have a dual use.²¹

So where does that leave society as we enter the new century? Is virtual war a more or less humane form of warfare?

To the technologically advanced nation capable of waging a virtual war, the risks to their own armed forces are decreased significantly. It would appear to follow from this that such a country would be more willing to use military force. That may not be the case. While virtual war makes casualties less common, they also make them less acceptable to a technological society involved in a conflict. Unfortunately, as Ignatieff points out, a virtual war is limited to achieving very narrowly tailored objectives. The great majority of campaigns where substantial change is going to be effected require troops on the ground. Because virtual war makes casualties less acceptable, does it make it more difficult for a Western nation to amass the political will to intervene in a conflict that may require the deployment of troops?

And what of the targets of a virtual war campaign, how do they respond? This is an open issue. Milosevic chose to attempt to manipulate Western public opinion.²² A nation that cannot compete on the technological battlefield has a very limited choice of responses, but may not follow the Serb model. “The only viable responses have been asymmetrical, aimed not at military objectives per se, but at American public opinion: terrorism against civilian targets or American installations abroad”²³ Will Americans believe that precision weapons have made the world a

20. *Id.* at 180.

21. *Id.* at 170. “The extraordinary fact about the air war was that it was more effective against civilian infrastructure than against forces in the field.” *Id.* at 108.

safer place if, in response to a future intervention, a terrorist attack strikes the American heartland? Ignatieff compares a virtual war to a sporting event on more than one occasion, stating: “These conditions transform war into something like a spectator sport. As with sports, nothing ultimate is at stake: neither national survival, nor the fate of the economy.”²⁴ Does that analogy stand if the action is no longer on the television screen, but down the street from one’s home?

The author’s sporting event analogy effectively provides a simple and workable framework through which to examine the impact of a virtual war on the home front. Much like a Super Bowl, a significant amount of hype precedes a virtual war campaign. By kick-off, most Americans are tuned-in. As the game progresses, absent truly compelling occurrences, interest begins to fade. If the game is a blowout, only a percentage of those who tuned in will watch the second half. It’s no different with a virtual war. A large number of people follow the conflict at the outset. Once it becomes apparent that U.S. forces are not at great risk, public interest fades.²⁵ This conclusion leads Ignatieff to his most troubling question: “If violence ceases to be fully real to the citizens in whose name it is exercised will they continue to restrain the executive resort to precision lethality?”²⁶ Only time will tell.

22. *Id.* at 52.

Instead of fighting NATO in the air, he fought NATO on the air-waves. By allowing CNN and the BBC to continue broadcasting from inside Serbia, he hoped to destabilize and unsettle Western opinion with nightly stories of civilians carbonized in bombed trains and media workers incinerated by strikes on television stations.

Id.

23. *Id.* at 192.

24. *Id.* at 191. In a conflict where thousands were killed, this analogy may appear to trivialize human suffering. Clearly this is not the author’s intent.

25. Southwest Asia is an example of this phenomenon. In December 1998, a large number of people followed Operation Desert Fox in Iraq. As that campaign evolved into enforcement of the northern and southern no-fly zones, public interest waned. Despite the fact that coalition forces continue to drop ordinance on Iraq, it is difficult to find a newspaper story (or television coverage) of the conflict. *See id.* at 191.

26. *Id.* at 163.

IV. Conclusion

While Michael Ignatieff does an outstanding job of tracing his three major themes through the Kosovo conflict, his work unfortunately suffers from two weaknesses. First, the author's criteria for international intervention within a sovereign state contain a tone reminiscent of colonial-era paternalism. Second, Ignatieff is too quick to brush aside the absence of U.N. Security Council action prior to NATO intervention in Kosovo. While listed as two separate and distinct shortcomings of his book, both are probably more appropriately characterized as symptoms following from one central ailment: the author's distinctively Western-centric view of the world order.

In their debate on NATO intervention in Kosovo, Robert Skidelsky remarked on this tendency.²⁷ Defenders of Ignatieff may counter by citing the author's criticism of the West for its failures to readily assist the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague.²⁸ Even in this criticism, however, the roots of Ignatieff's bias can be seen. His disappointment rests with the West, particularly the United States and United Kingdom, and not the world community at large.²⁹ Ignatieff's apparent view that the West has an obligation to take the lead in solving the world's problems, leads to an impression that he is also willing to allow the West to define what constitutes those problems. In this regard, the author's overseas childhood as the son of a diplomat may be both a blessing and a curse. While it has provided him a unique perspective on the former Yugoslavia, it may in part be responsible for the obligatory interventionism he seems to view as a Western responsibility. It is important to keep in mind, nevertheless, that while relevant when examining the merits of *Virtual War*, Ignatieff's Western bias does not detract from his vision of twenty-first century warfare or the moral issues it raises.

Anyone reading *Virtual War* looking for definitive answers to the issues presented will be disappointed. Much like the outcome of the bombing campaign itself, Ignatieff's book leaves the reader looking to an uncertain future. As a definitive philosophical work on the application of morality to emerging military technologies, it is a failure; however, as an enjoyable and thought-provoking guided tour through the Balkans in 1998

27. *Id.* at 80, 86.

28. *Id.* at 125.

29. *Id.* at 126.

which leaves the reader to contemplate the implications of this conflict on the future of the international community, it is a success.