. . . in pursuing a foreign policy based on American interests, we will embrace diplomacy. The world must know that we do not go abroad in search of enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies.1
Security cooperation (SC) is clearly a topic of current interest to Congress and the Defense community. In recent years, several changes to the regulatory and statutory guidance have taken place that include the publication of a RAND Report reviewing Title 10 authorities for security cooperation in 2016,2 issuance of revisions to at least seven key joint references in 2017,3 the publication of a Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on Building Partner Capacity in March 2017,4 the designation of a new chapter under Title 10—Chapter 16 Security Cooperation—and the push to professionalize and develop the security cooperation workforce under the newly formed Department of Defense Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program (SCWD) within the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).5
Provided through the lens of the largest current Security Cooperation Office (SCO)—the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (OSC-I)—this article is meant to serve as a primer for judge advocates facing assignment to an SCO, as well as judge advocates who may have an SCO in their geographic area.
What Is Security Assistance, What Is Security Cooperation, and Who Does What?
While the term “security assistance” (SA) has been in frequent use in the Department of Defense (DoD) since at least 1971,6 the term “security cooperation” was first introduced by the Defense Reform Initiative in 1997.7 The Defense Reform Initiative led to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) being renamed the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), effective 1 October 1998,8 to reflect the enlarged mission and additional international programs DSCA would go on to administer. These programs are carried out by SCOs and DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies.9 Explanation and definitions of SA and SC are provided herein, followed by more information on SCOs and DoD Centers for Security Studies.
Security assistance primarily encompasses foreign military financing and sales, military education and training, peacekeeping, and counter-narcotics efforts.10 Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, reissued on 29 December 2016, defines SA in conformity with the underlying U.S. Code provision, and specifies that SA is one element within the broader category of SC:
Security Assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act [(FAA)] of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act [(AECA)] of 1976 or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is one element of security cooperation, which is funded and authorized by the Department of State and administered by the DSCA.
This definition received additional minor modifications in the 23 May 2017, Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation.11 The only substantive modifications were adding “lease” to the methods of providing defense articles, changing that assistance is authorized “through” Department of State rather than “by” Department of State, and adding DoD as administering in conjunction with DSCA.12 The most substantive update contained within both DoDD 5132.03 and Joint Publication 3-20 is the recognition that security assistance is one element of security cooperation.
While this term was the product of the 1997 Defense Reform Initiative,13 and entered the DoD lexicon with the renaming of DSAA to DSCA in October 1998,14 security cooperation remained ill-defined until 9 June 2004, when it was first formally defined within Joint Publication 1-02:
All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.15
That broad definition has continued to take shape, with 10 U.S.C. Ch. 16 § 301 currently defining security cooperation programs and activities of the DoD as meaning any program, activity (including an exercise), or interaction of the DoD with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve a purpose as follows: build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; to provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation; to build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.16
Department of Defense Directive 5132.03, reissued on 29 December 2016, includes a definition of SC in conformity with the underlying U.S. Code provision, and, like the current definition for SA, specifies that SA is included within SC:
Security Cooperation. All DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DoD-administered security assistance programs.
This definition received an additional minor modification in the 23 May 2017, Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, replacing the word “defense” relationships with “security” relationships.
Defense Security Assistance Agency, Security Cooperation Offices, and Regional Centers for Security Studies
The DSCA’s mission is to lead the Security Cooperation Community (SCC) in developing and executing innovative security cooperation solutions that support mutual U.S. and partner interests.17 This mission is executed through SCOs, which bring together DoD security cooperation and DoS security assistance efforts, as well as DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies which act as venues for international discussion and course work teaching security cooperation. While DSCA falls under the DoD and is thus a Title 10 entity, it draws its authorities to establish and operate SCOs from Title 22 under the DoS, a structure which indicates Congress’s desire that DoD and DoS synchronize security cooperation efforts.
Security Cooperation Offices are authorized by section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.18 Through that provision, Congress authorized the President to assign members of the Armed Forces of the United States to a foreign country to carry out the President’s duties under the FAA and AECA to perform one or more of seven enumerated functions: (1) equipment and services case management; (2) training management; (3) program monitoring; (4) evaluation and planning of the host government’s military capabilities and requirements; (5) administrative support; (6) promoting rationalization, standardization, interoperability, and other defense cooperation measures; and (7) liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance.
Notably, advisory and training assistance is limited under 22 U.S.C. § 2321i(b):
Advisory and training assistance conducted by military personnel assigned under this section shall be kept to an absolute minimum. It is the sense of the Congress that advising and training assistance in countries to which military personnel are assigned under this section shall be provided primarily by other personnel who are not assigned under this section and who are detailed for limited periods to perform specific tasks.
Security Cooperation Organization is defined in DoDI 5132.13 as:
All DoD elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security cooperation/assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security cooperation/assistance functions.19
Security Cooperation Offices go by different names, with different mission sets, in different countries. Examples, in addition to the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq, are the United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) in Saudi Arabia;20 the Office of Military Cooperation – Egypt;21 Office of Defense Cooperation – India;22 and Office of Defense Representative – Pakistan.23. While each of these organizations carries a different name, they all perform an SA mission involving Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training, and all play a role in security cooperation efforts such as training exercises.
The Director of the DSCA, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has approval authority for establishing SCOs and for making staffing changes.24 Security Cooperation Offices operate in foreign countries under the authority of the Chief of Mission (CoM).25 The CoM, under the direction of the President, has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in that country; shall ensure all such employees comply fully with all applicable directives of the CoM; and shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the U.S. Government within that country.
Any executive branch agency with employees in the country has a reciprocal duty to keep the CoM informed.26 An exception is employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander.27 However, as discussed below, CoMs exercise considerable authority over SCO personnel, to include Title 10 DoD employees. Chiefs of Mission also have, as a principal duty, the promotion of U.S. goods and services for export to such country.28 Given this statutory framework, the Title 10 DoD security cooperation and Title 22 DoS security assistance missions are clearly linked, and a key role of DSCA, through SCOs, is to help ensure a synchronicity of effort between DoS and DoD on security assistance and cooperation efforts.
During President Barack Obama’s Administration, directives used to promulgate presidential decisions on national security matters were designated as presidential policy directives (PPDs).29 Presidential Policy Directive 23, Security Sector Assistance, dated 5 April 2013, articulated policy guidelines for U.S. SSA. That document included, among others, the following policy guideline for U.S. Security Sector Assistance (SSA):
Build sustainable capacity through comprehensive sector strategies. Partner capacity can only be sustained over the long-term when partner governments have the political will, absorptive capacity, credible and effective institutions, willingness to independently sustain U.S. investments, an equal stake in the success of security sector initiatives, and policy commitment to security sector reform. United States Government efforts must be sensitive to these requirements, including anticipation of partner capacity, sustainment and oversight needs, coordination with partner governments across the breadth of security sector assistance activities, and pursuit of security sector reform as part of a broader, long term effort to improve governance and promote sustainable economic development.30
This policy guideline effectively summarizes the key goals of an SCO—assisting partner nations in identifying and resourcing requirements to develop and build capacity in a sustainable manner, as well as utilizing security assistance as an element of security cooperation to help develop or reform the security sectors of partner nations.
Frequently heard doctrinal “buzz words” in an SCO include “building partner capacity” (BPC), “defense institution building” (DIB), “security sector assistance,” and “security sector reform” (SSR). Joint Publication 3-20 provides important doctrinal distinctions between these terms.
In setting forth security cooperation related activities and objectives, Joint Publication 3-20 states “SC can be conducted across the range of military operations and during all phases of an operation or campaign. Department of Defense policy supports SC activities that enable building security relationships, building partner capacity, and gaining/maintaining access.” It goes on to describe the roles of foreign assistance; SA; SSR; DIB, and security force assistance as SC-related activities and objectives.31
Judge advocates serving on SCO staff may provide valuable insight by reminding other staff members of the doctrinal definitions and checking for consistency in use of terminology across staff products undergoing legal review.
Building Partner Capacity involves developing specific partner nation capabilities and capacity for security and defense, addressing the partner’s internal security and their participation or coordination in operations with U.S. Armed Forces or multinational operations.32 Importantly, Joint Publication 3-20 notes: “Partner capacity can be described as an extant yet limited capability (e.g., forces, skills, or functions) within a PN’s security or civil sector that can be improved and employed on a national level.”33 The Security Assistance Management Manual states BPC programs “encompass security cooperation and security assistance activities funded with U.S. Government (USG) appropriations and administered as cases within the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) infrastructure.”34
At an action officer level, judge advocates may hear “building partner capacity” used interchangeably with “defense institution building;” however, the two terms have distinct definitions, with DIB defined as:
. . . .security cooperation activities that empower partner nation defense institutions to establish or re-orient their policies and structures to make their defense sector more transparent, accountable, effective, affordable, and responsible to civilian control. DIB improves defense governance, increases the sustainability of other DOD security cooperation programs, and is carried out in cooperation with partner nations pursuant to appropriate and available legal authority. It is typically conducted at the ministerial, general, joint staff, military service headquarters, and related defense agency level, and when appropriate, with other supporting defense entities. 35
One way to think of the distinction between these two SC components is to consider how building partner capacity, from a “bottom-up” approach, may help to form the forces, skills, or functions required to support defense institutions; while defense institution building, from a “top-down” approach, may provide the policies and structures to employ building partner capacity efforts effectively, affordably, and accountably. This is not necessarily a conundrum of which came first, the chicken or the egg; rather, it highlights that both of these SC components can be implemented simultaneously and in coordination to achieve two separate but related objectives.
Security Sector Reform improves or develops institutions, processes, and forces to provide security under the rule of law, often involving military, police, intelligence services, and border guards to secure points of entry and improve the way the country provides safety, security, and justice.36 Joint Publication 3-20 cautions against confusing SSR with SSA and DIB.37 Security Sector Assistance refers to the “overarching USG policy, processes, programs, and activities that integrate and synchronize DOS and DOD strategies, planning, programming, and budgeting for foreign assistance involving the security sectors” of partner nations.38 Development, restructuring, or reform of defense institutions at the ministry/department or joint/Service military headquarters level is more specifically characterized as DIB, and may or may not be part of a larger SSR effort.39
Regional Centers for Security Studies
The Department of Defense has established five Regional Centers for Security Studies. Section 342 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code authorizes the regional centers “as international venues for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants.”40 The five centers include the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, located in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany; the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, located in Honolulu, Hawaii; and three located in Washington D.C.: the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, and the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies.41
The judge advocate for an SCO needs to know and understand the Regional Centers for Security Studies. Regional centers host educational opportunities for partner nation attorneys and members of their government. International military training, discussed later in this article is the mechanism for how this is accomplished. Regional centers may also provide subject matter experts if you are tasked to research and learn more about a specific country in order to speak with or provide talking points to a senior leader. Finally, the George C. Marshall Center is co-located with the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC). The PfPC can make an assessment of a partner nation’s defense institutions educational capacity. The PfPC accomplishes this assessment and training through their Defense Education Enhancement Program (DEEP). TheDEEP addresses the professional defense education component of DIB and will support the Security Sector Reform Group (SSRG)’s line of effort by supporting faculty development (how to teach) and curriculum development (what to teach).
Authorities and Funding
Security Cooperation Offices derive their authorities and funding from a variety of sources, but predominately through appropriations under Title 10, Title 22, and release of funds held in the Security Assistance Administrative Trust Fund, which is a depository account held by Defense Finance and Accounting Service for administrative fees paid by host nations on foreign military sales cases.
The complexity of SCO authorities and funding can be highlighted by a comparison of three recent reports: RAND’s February 2016 From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation,42 Congressional Research Service (CRS)’s August 2016 DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues,43 and GAO’s March 2017 Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State’s Security Assistance Efforts.44
The RAND report catalogs 123 Title 10 authorities relating to SC, which it notes are in addition to statutes in Title 22 and other legislation, as well as programs that arise out of appropriations rather than authorizations, with a resulting conclusion that delivery of security cooperation is increasingly difficult for the DoD personnel who develop, plan, and execute initiatives with foreign partners.45
The CRS report estimates there are “more than 80 separate authorities to assist and engage with foreign governments, militaries, security forces, and populations….”46 It goes on to state that other organizations have adopted different counting methodologies, resulting in a larger number of authorities, noting a different, earlier RAND report from 2013, titled Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity,47 which listed 184 separate authorities, including authorities under Titles 6, 22, 32, 42, 50, public laws, and executive orders.48
The GAO, in its report, identified 194 DoD SC and DoS SA efforts that may be used to build partner capacity to address security-related threats.49 Of those, eighty-seven are DoD efforts requiring some level of DoS involvement, and thirty are DoS efforts requiring some level of DoD involvement. 50
Upon review of the draft report, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (OASD) responded that the GAO’s study methodology was flawed. Reasons included that a number of listed efforts are not used to build partner capacity, such as the Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands program, Bi-Lateral Meetings, and Counterpart Visits of Senior Foreign Officials.51 Additionally, OASD noted that the report’s conflation of terms such as “programs,” “activities,” and “authorities” leads to an overall inventory that is misleading and repetitive. For example, “Global Train and Equip” authority under 10 U.S.C. § 2282 is cited only once, while “Multilateral, bilateral, or regional cooperation programs: payment of personnel expenses” authority under 10 U.S.C. § 1051 is described as an “activity” and cited at least twenty-three times.52 Moreover, the report did not include updates for the FY2017 NDAA, which included modification or repeal of at least twenty-one authorities.53 The letter stated that the 2016 RAND report may serve as a more accurate reference for DoD SC authorities.54
The 2016 RAND report includes an appendix listing authorities, categorized as activity-based, mission-based, or partner-based, and further breaking each of those categories out into subgroups. It also lists twenty-seven SC programs introduced through appropriations legislation or other means.55
The activity-based authority subgroups are: military-to-military engagements; exercises; individual education/technical training; unit train and equip; equipment and logistics support; research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E); intelligence sharing and exchange.56
The mission-based subgroups are: humanitarian assistance/health; defense institution building; counter-narcotics; cooperative threat reduction and nonproliferation; counterterrorism; cooperative ballistic missile defense; maritime security; and cybersecurity.57
The partner-based authorities are not subgrouped, but include authorities for Afghanistan, Burma, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, Syria, Uganda, and Ukraine, as well as regional authorities encompassing Africa, Europe, the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region, and the Levant.58
Three clear takeaways that can be consistently drawn from a review of these reports are: (1) SC encompasses a vast number of authorities and appropriations which may be onerous to navigate at the SCO level; (2) Given the number and broad range of authorities, it is likely that whatever SC-related activity an SCO is interested in performing it is covered by an authority with a corresponding appropriation; the challenge is identifying it early enough in the planning cycle to allow time to confirm fund availability; (3) Close coordination with the GCC, DSCA, and DoS will likely be necessary to ensure funds are available to the SCO to conduct the desired security cooperation activity.
For a judge advocate beginning an assignment at an SCO, one of the first priorities should be to learn what authorities the SCO has historically relied on. Depending on the size and staff structure of the SCO, that may mean coordination with the SCO J-3/5 and J-8, or reaching back to COCOM staff to inquire.
Throughout an assignment at an SCO, judge advocates can add value to planning cycles by reminding staff to always consider the source of authorities in planning future activities. The broad range of security cooperation activities also creates an environment where an unauthorized commitment may occur if a proper fiscal analysis is not performed or if availability of funds is not confirmed in advance.
Maintaining a continuity file listing frequently used authorities, including detail on how those authorities have been amended over time, facilitates future fiscal reviews as it allows the legal advisor to quickly identify the congressional intent behind the authority and to see how the authority has evolved over time, which may provide insight into purposes the authority is or is not designed to support. An example of such an analysis is provided later in this article—in the “Organization & Mission” section—reviewing OSC-I’s special authority.
Title 10 Security Cooperation
Security cooperation programs and activities of the DoD encompass programs, activities, exercises, and interactions of the DoD with the security establishment of a foreign country to achieve one of three purposes: (1) build and develop allied and friendly security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; (2) provide the armed forces with access to the foreign country during peacetime or a contingency operation; and (3) build relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests.59
This language clearly defines the role of Title 10 authorities in encouraging and establishing enduring relationships between the DoD and foreign militaries. Additionally, other authorities under Title 10 enable DoD to conduct humanitarian assistance, military and government educational programs, and other efforts which are capable of assisting and enabling foreign militaries.60 Judge advocates interested in learning more about the various authorities under Title 10 are encouraged to consult the RAND, CRS, and GAO reports referenced earlier in this article.61
Title 22 Security Assistance
Authorities under Title 22 enable the U.S. Government to train, equip, and assist foreign militaries through security assistance mechanisms such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and International Military Education and Training (IMET).62 These DoS-driven authorities are rooted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA)63 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).64
Title 22 funds flow to the SCO from DSCA, through the GCC.65 The DSCA receives the funds from both the Security Assistance Administrative Trust Fund and from Title 22 appropriations. The result is that the SCO’s Title 22 DoS-led SA mission is executed by Title 10 DoD personnel, operating under Title 22 Chief of Mission Authority.
Foreign Military Sales is a non-appropriated program administered by DSCA through which partner nations purchase defense articles, services, and training from the U.S. Government.66 Foreign Military Financing is an appropriated program administered by DSCA. Congressionally appropriated grants and loans allow partner nations to purchase defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales. International Military Education and Training is also an appropriated program administered by DSCA, allowing partner nation military and civilian personnel to receive grant financial assistance for training in the U.S. and overseas facilities.
Part of the IMET training accomplished through the SCO takes place at DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies. Section 342 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code authorizes the regional centers “as international venues for bilateral and multicultural research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants.”67 The OSC-I deals primarily with the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in Washington, D.C.68
Judge advocates should involve themselves in the IMET planning process, as well as the draft process for the SSRG training Letters of Request (LORs) to include training courses specifically geared towards the legal community. The current IMET program offers three courses geared towards legal professionals. The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School offers international students eight courses: the Judge Advocate Officer Basic Course; the Judge Advocate Officer Graduate Course; the Military Judge’s Course; Operational Law of Armed Conflict Course; Contract Attorneys Course; Emergent Topics in International & Operational Law; Law for Paralegals Course; and the Advanced Law for Paralegals Course.69
A consideration for judge advocates regarding Title 22 SA authorities is that while these stem from DoS appropriations, they are largely administered by DoD through DSCA. Within DoS, the Office of Security Assistance (PM/SA) manages DoS SA efforts.70
The DSCA Green Book identifies twelve major SA programs authorized by the FAA or AECA, with the following breakdown of administration—71
DSCA Administered: Foreign Military Sales (FMS);72 Foreign Military Construction Services (FMCS);73 Foreign Military Financing (FMF);74 Leases;75 Military Assistance Program (MAP);76 International Military Education & Training (IMET);77 and Drawdowns.78
DoS Administered: Economic Support Fund (ESF) [USAID];79 Peacekeeping Operations;80 International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE);81 Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR);82 and Direct Commercial Sales.83
“T-20” Security Assistance Administrative Trust Fund & Foreign Military Financing Administrative Funds.
It is important to note that “T-20 funds” is how DSCA refers to the Security Assistance Administrative Trust Fund (SAATF).84 These are not “Title 20” funds.85 Security Cooperation Offices receive SAATF Administrative Funds and FMF Administrative Funds to finance SCO basic operating costs. The DoS uses the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) to effectively bill tenants utilizing mission resources for their use.
As an example, for OSC-I, life support on the Baghdad Embassy Complex, to include housing, meals, office space, security details, transportation, motor pool access, etc., is paid for through ICASS. Additionally, travel for SCO SA personnel is typically funded through FMS case funds.86 The takeaway is that “T-20” funds are not directly linked to a U.S. appropriation; however, Congress does control the release of funds, which are collected by DFAS, administered by DSCA, and apportioned to the COCOMs for distribution to SCOs.87
Judge Advocates as “The Authority on Authorities”
Judge advocates in an SCO face several challenges related to authorities. Upon arrival, judge advocates must quickly gain an understanding of the different applicable authorities. Throughout their tour, they must track proposed changes to any authorities directly applicable to their SCO through each legislative cycle in order to effectively advise on the impact of proposed changes to the authorities. Most importantly, judge advocates must emphasize the importance of authorities to other staff members, to ensure that operations are shaped according to the authorities available to the organization. Having explored the background and general mission of SCOs, the remainder of this paper provides insight into SCO operations and a judge advocate’s role in the SCO through an exploration of what is currently the largest SCO, the OSC-I.
The Creation and Location of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq
In remarks delivered at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, on 27 February 2009, President Obama indicated that following the planned withdrawal of U.S. troops by 31 December 2011, the United States was committed to pursuing sustained diplomacy to build a lasting strategic relationship between the United States and Iraq.88
As of 1 January 2010, the three Iraq major commands, Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I), Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I), and Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I), merged into a single command as U.S. Forces – Iraq (USF-I).89 Through its Deputy Commanding General for Advising and Training, USF-I performed the initial planning for establishing OSC-I and transitioning security assistance from DoD to DoS.90 The initial roles of OSC-I included oversight of foreign military sales as well as international education and training.91
The OSC-I obtained Initial Operating Capacity on 1 June 2011, and Full Operating Capacity on 1 October 2011.92 The OSC-I initially planned to operate out of ten sites, five shared with the DoS.93 Projected DoD sites were Besmaya, Tikrit, Taji, Umm Qasr, and Union III.94 Projected sites for OSC-I to share with DoS were Basra, Erbil, Kirkuk, Camp Sather, and Camp Shield.95 Shortly after OSC-I achieved operating capacity, on 12 December 2011, DSCA notified Congress of Iraq’s interest in a foreign military sale of eighteen F-16 aircraft.96 That this notification occurred just prior to the withdrawal of military forces on 31 December 2011 indicates that OSC-I, from its outset, was managing its SA mission while simultaneously serving a role in managing the transition from DoD to DoS control of facilities utilized by the U.S. Government in Iraq.
The stated mission of OSC-I as of November 2012 was: “The Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq, in coordination with USCENTCOM and USM-I, conducts Security Cooperation activities to build partner capacity in support of the developing strategic partnership with a stable, self-reliant, and regionally-integrated Iraq.”97 The four lines of effort associated with these BPC efforts were modernize, train, professionalize, and integrate regional activities.98
In its first two years as an SCO managing Iraq’s FMS portfolio, OSC-I oversaw the delivery of twenty-seven IA-407 helicopters, six C-130J aircraft, a Rapid Avenger surface-to-air missile battery, and twelve P-301 patrol boats.99 As of 22 March 2017, the United States had approved “more than 22 billion worth of FMS to Iraq.”100
Today, the DoS maintains the U.S. Embassy—referred to as the “Baghdad Embassy Complex”—located in Baghdad, with consulates in Basrah and Erbil and a Diplomatic Support Center (BDSC) located adjacent to Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The OSC-I, as a member of the Country Team, operates in these DoS facilities, primarily the Baghdad Embassy Complex.
Organization & Mission
The OSC-I’s mission statement is currently: “In support of the U.S. Mission and CENTCOM, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq conducts Defense Institution Building, Security Assistance, and regional engagements to enhance Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) capabilities and ensure the enduring strategic partnership between the U.S. Military and the ISF.”101 To accomplish this, OSC-I coordinates with the DoS and Iraq’s Office of the National Security Advisor in Security Sector Reform activities. The OSC-I also works with representatives from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United Nations Development Program, CJTF-OIR, and the European Union in this effort while ensuring that the strategy aligns with OSC-I Country Security Cooperation Plan objectives derived from the U.S. Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) Theater Campaign Plan.102
Essential OSC-I tasks include: managing FMS, conducting End Use Monitoring (EUM), both routine and enhanced, managing the IMET program, promoting defense reform initiatives/institutionalize reform, and facilitating Military-to-Military regional engagements.103
The OSC-I does this through an organized structure which includes: SA, SSRG, Senior Advisory Group, Tribal Engagement Coordination Cell, and Counter Terrorism Service. The role of each section is briefly described below.
The SA section focuses on acquiring equipment, items, and training necessary to the government of Iraq (GOI) and in accordance with U.S. national security interests, managing a multi-billion-dollar FMS program with hundreds of contracts. Security Assistance then works with SSRG, to ensure the FMS and FMF programs are part of the overall Iraqi strategy and considerations are given to the sustained maintenance and viability of programs.
The OSC-I legal section’s coordination with SA ensures legal coverage and guidance when SA meets with U.S. industry, as well as when they correspond or interact with the GOI. It is important that judge advocates stay current with DoD guidance on interacting with U.S. industry. The Office of the Secretary of Defense periodically makes its intent known through publication of an official memorandum on engaging with industry.104 Knowing the implications of such memoranda will allow a judge advocate to give clear and direct guidance on what type of assistance and information is meant to be shared with industry representatives. Additionally, the “dos and don’ts” related to industry are laid out in the Security Assistance Manual and found in Appendix I of this article. Judge advocates assigned to the SCO mission should familiarize themselves with these left and right limits to properly advise, not only SA, but all of the members of OSC-I who come in contact with industry.
Security Sector Reform Group
Security Sector Reform, led by DoS, is focused on reinforcing diplomacy and defense while reducing long-term security threats by helping to build stable, prosperous, and peaceful societies.105 It includes the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice.106
Within OSC-I, the SSRG works with the DoS, the GOI, the United Nations, the European Union, and other international partners on SSR efforts. The OSC-I SSRG section also oversees portions of the international military education and training program, through which Iraqi leaders attend U.S. training courses with an emphasis on SSR and long-term sustainment.
The OSC-I Legal Advisor’s coordination with the SSRG helps shape their legal line of effort. Over the years, it is through this involvement that a number of Iraqi attorneys have had the opportunity to attend courses at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School107, and the Defense Institute for International Legal Studies (DIILS).108 It is also through this involvemet that DIILS mobile training teams have come to Iraq to teach Iraqi attorneys and members of the GOI courses such as The Law of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (Feb. 2017) and Combatting Corruption (Feb. 2019).
Senior Advisory Group & Tribal Engagement Coordination Cell
The OSC-I Senior Advisory Group consists of colonels who advise Iraq’s ministries on matters related to defense institution building. These advisors are often the “public face” of OSC-I to senior Iraqi military and civilian officials. Separately, the Tribal Engagement Coordination Cell interacts with local leaders throughout Iraq, which provides insight into how building partner capacity efforts are working from the ground up, and how institution-level initiatives are impacting local populations from the top down.
Counter Terrorism Service
Iraq’s Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) is structured to operate independently from both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, organized with a headquarters, the Counter Terrorism Command, and three Iraqi Special Operations Forces Brigades.109 The CTS has played an instrumental role in Iraq’s fight against ISIS,110 and from 2011 to the present, OSC-I has provided institution-level advisors to the CTS.111
Judge Advocate Support
The number of attorneys assigned to OSC-I has fluctuated over time from two to one and back to two. A key challenge to this assignment is balancing traditional staff roles while also fostering and maintaining key leader engagements (KLEs); providing input to SSRG efforts that include the GOI’s Rule of Law initiatives; SA efforts in keeping the FMS process running smoothly; as well as attending U.S. industry meetings with the Chief of OSC-I and members of the SA section. The KLEs with the Iraqi legal community are important as the GOI Ministries rely heavily on their attorneys. Having the OSC-I Legal Advisor engage early and regularly with counsel for the ministries produces results when issues arise.
The Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq’s Special Authority: National Defense Authorization Acts
The OSC-I’s special authority originated as section 1215 of the FY2012 NDAA. The original authority provided for operations and activities of OSC-I and SA teams in Iraq, and stated such operations and activities “may include life support, transportation and personal security, and construction and renovation of facilities.”112
The OSC-I’s authority evolved with the FY2013–FY2017 NDAAs to permit OSC-I to conduct non-operational training activities in support of Iraq’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) and CTS personnel,113 as well as requiring training to include observing and respecting human rights and respect for legitimate civilian authority within Iraq.114 This timeframe also witnessed OSC-I being given the authorization to conduct training activities in support of the MoD and CTS personnel at a base or facility of the GOI to address capability gaps, integrate processes relating to intelligence, air sovereignty, combined arms, logistics and maintenance, and to manage and integrate defense-related institutions.”115
The FY2018 NDAA increased OSC-I’s ability to engage in DIB activities with internal security forces, such as regional border guards and energy police, which do not fall under the MoD or CTS.116 This ability increased because OSC-I was given authority to conduct “activities to support” DIB and professionalization and reform of “military and other security forces with a national security mission.”117
The FY2019 NDAA, limits funding and adds new items to the congressional reporting requirements.118 After seven years of existence, Congress is asking OSC-I to normalize in order “. . . .to conform to other offices of security cooperation, including the transition of funding from the Department of Defense to the Department of State by the beginning of fiscal year 2020.”119
Consolidated Appropriations Acts (CAAs)
Similar to the NDAA authority, the FY2012 Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA), the original appropriations authority, designated an amount of Air Force Operations & Maintenance (O&M) funds “to support United States Government transition activities in Iraq by funding the operations and activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq and security assistance teams, including life support, transportation, and personal security, and facilities renovation and construction.”120
Additionally, the FY2013 CAA tracked the NDAA language,121 but the FY2014 CAA added “and site closeout activities prior to returning sites to the Government of Iraq,” so that portion of the provision from FY2014–FY2017 CAA reads: “to support United States Government transition activities in Iraq by funding the operations and activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq and security assistance teams, including life support, transportation, and personal security, and facilities renovation and construction, and site closeout activities prior to returning sites to the Government of Iraq.”122
However, while the NDAA training language was updated in section 1237(a) of the FY2015 NDAA to remove “non-operational,” and replace “in an institutional environment” with “at a base or facility of the Government of Iraq,” section 9011 of the FY2015 was not updated to reflect the change, and it remained unchanged in section 9011 of the FY2016 and FY2017 CAAs.123
Neither the FY2018124 nor the FY2019125 CAA mentions OSC-I specifically. That said, the FY2019 CAA does mention Iraq and has made funds available for international SA.126
Status of Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq Personnel
Military members assigned or attached to OSC-I are Title 10 personnel operating under Title 22 Chief of Mission Authority. The United States of America – Government of Iraq Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) of 2008 expired on 31 December 2011. As OSC-I was in the process of standing up and the expiration of the SOFA drew near, DoS engaged the GOI regarding status of OSC-I personnel, with the result that OSC-I personnel are accorded the privileges and immunities of Members of Administrative and Technical Staff.127 Those privileges include: no arrest or detention; inviolability and protection of private residence, papers, correspondence, and personal property; and within the course of duty, immunity from criminal jurisdiction and certain civil and administrative jurisdiction.128 Importantly, members of OSC-I, operating under Title 22 Chief of Mission Authority, must continue to abide by the guidance and policies of the Title 10 geographic combatant commander while also abiding by the guidance and policies of the U.S. Mission–Iraq.
Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq Legal Advisor Role & Functions
The mission of the OSC-I Legal Advisor, as outlined in the 2017 OSC-I legal section standard operating proceedure, is to serve as the primary Legal Advisor to the Chief, OSC-I. This encompasses similar roles to a staff judge advocate (SJA) but also includes building and fostering professional relationships with senior Iraqi legal counterparts in the GOI, as well as coordinating all legal actions with USCENTCOM, DSCA, DoS, and all other Federal agencies.
While the Legal Advisor is the primary advisor to the OSC-I Chief on matters concerning implementation of military justice within OSC-I, the Chief is not a court-martial convening authority, and all UCMJ actions must be coordinated through USCENTCOM Command Judge Advocate (CCJA). Headquarters Service Element Commands exercise disposition authority over OSC-I personnel.
That said, the Chief of OSC-I can conduct investigations, to include Army Regulation 15-6 investigations and informal inquiries. The Chief of OSC-I can execute non-substantive administrative actions consistent with their official positions as supervisors against a uniformed member of OSC-I, such as verbal counseling. All substantive administrative actions under the UCMJ must be coordinated with CCJA prior to execution.
Ultimately, if a crime is committed by a member assigned to OSC-I, every attempt should be made to have the service member reassigned to a location where the respective element commander has operational control.
As an appointed ethics counselor by CCJA, OSC-I Legal Advisor is responsible for OSC-I’s ethics program. This includes annual ethics training, legal reviews of foreign gifts, ethics opinions as required or requested, and management of OGE-278 and OGE-450 financial disclosure requirements. While the vast majority of foreign gifts received by OSC-I are of a de minimis value, it is important for the legal advisor to check the personal retention limit, which is currently $390 and updated every three years.129
Legal assistance services are limited to notaries and powers of attorney for authorized patrons. This prevents potential conflicts of interest and conserves resources of the SCO’s small legal office. However, even these limited services provide an outsized benefit to OSC-I, as obtaining notary services through the Embassy can cost $50.130
Presently, OSC-I does not adjudicate foreign claims. The legal office provides the information on any claims it receives, to the SJA office of CJTF-OIR. The CJTF-OIR Claims Attorney is an appointed Foreign Area Claims Officer by the U.S. Army Claims Service.
Administrative & Fiscal Law
The administrative and fiscal roles of the OSC-I legal office are similar to those of any legal office. Advice is provided on investigations and legal reviews, opinions are provided regarding the expenditure of government funds, a digital library of resources is maintained, and participation in working groups designed to shape future missions and policies is encouraged.
International & Operational Law
The Legal Advisor forwards requests to negotiate or conclude an international agreement to the CCJA, as OSC-I personnel may not negotiate or conclude an international agreement without the appropriate delegation of authority from CCJA and Commander, USCENTCOM. The OSC-I legal advisors face a variety of interesting issues involving Iraq law.
For example, contractors have raised the issue of taxation by the GOI on multiple occasions to both the Embassy and to OSC-I since the expiration of the SOFA in 2011. While the tax law in Iraq has not changed substantially since that time, it is an issue that each iteration of legal advisors becomes familiar with due to its recurrence. In summary, for the most part, contractors were exempt from Iraq taxes from 16 April 2003 through 31 December 2008.131 Effective 1 January 2009, the SOFA exempted taxes on goods and services purchased by or on behalf of the U.S. Forces in Iraq.132 Since 1 January 2012, following the expiration of the SOFA, Iraq tax laws apply unless an exemption is specifically granted.133
The OSC-I personnel must quickly gain familiarity with organizational and local Mission policies. This may be the first joint assignment for some personnel, and a first staff assignment as well. As a result, there is a mix of service-specific, joint, inter-agency, intra-agency, Iraq-specific, and international policy, regulation, and law that must be considered in daily work.
Moreover, violating a Mission Policy could result in the OSC-I member being sent home. As such, through group and individual newcomer’s briefings, a preventive law training program highlighting ethics and DSCA guidance on interacting with contractors, and by providing information to personnel on topics like authorities and personnel status, the legal office attempts to foster an environment where all personnel are keenly aware of the authorities and legal framework within which they operate.
Congress is clearly becoming more interested in SC, as evidenced by the recent interest of CRS and GAO and by the reorganization of Title 10 SC authorities under Chapter 16 – Security Cooperation, in Title 10.134 Even with this reorganization, SC authorities remain a patchwork pulled from Title 10, Title 22, and various other appropriations.135 As a result, judge advocates in SCOs often help to inform and shape conversations on proposed operations and activities by ensuring SCOs clearly identify the target audience for the desired training activity or action in order to determine the applicable authorities.
Individuals with an interest or need to gain further insight into SCOs are encouraged to explore DSCA’s materials. The DSCA offers a number of other publications,136 as well as online and resident courses through the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies.137 At a minimum, any judge advocate assigned to work in an SCO should first become familiar with “The Management of Security Cooperation”—referred to as the DSCA “Green Book,”138—as well as the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM),139 and depending on the level of interaction on SCO budgets, the DSCA T-20 Administrative Budget Policy Handbook may also be instructive.140 TAL
Contributing authors include past and present Chief and Deputy Legal Advisors to the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq.
SUBJECT: OSC-I Interaction with FMS Contractors
1. BLUF. OSC-I personnel may not favor one U.S. contractor over another, but may facilitate their interaction with GOI. SCOs support the marketing efforts of U.S. companies while maintaining strict neutrality between U.S. competitors.
2. Background. OSC-I personnel should be familiar with the rules for dealing with FMS contractors. These rules permit SCO personnel to support the marketing efforts of U.S. companies while maintaining strict neutrality between U.S. competitors.
3. References. The Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) provides guidance. SAMM C2.1.8 addresses SCO support to industry, but other provisions also apply.
a. DoD prefers that countries friendly to the United States fill defense requirements with U.S. origin items. Unless an item is “FMS Only,” DoD is generally neutral as to whether a country purchases U.S.–origin defense articles or services commercially or through FMS channels. Unless the host country requests the purchase be made through FMS, the DoD tries to accommodate the U.S. contractor if its preference is for DCS. The SCO assists a broad spectrum of U.S. defense industry marketing efforts and the SCO is expected to provide adequate support to vendors regardless of the complexity or price of the item. SAMM C220.127.116.11; SAMM C4.3.4.
b. The SCO is the principal point of contact in U.S. missions for most U.S. defense industry representatives marketing defense equipment. SCOs support the marketing efforts of U.S. companies while maintaining strict neutrality between U.S. competitors. The SCO facilitates the flow of U.S. systems information, subject to releasability and export licensing considerations, while avoiding advocacy of a program with a specific U.S. producer. SAMM C18.104.22.168.
c. Neutrality. SCO personnel may not favor the merits of one U.S. proposal over another. U.S. advocacy must be generic. When more than one U.S. competitor is involved, the SCO should explain to host country personnel why a U.S. system would be to the country’s advantage–the U.S. proposals are combat proven, interoperable with many nations, technologically superior, worldwide supportable, etc. SAMM C22.214.171.124; SAMM Table C4.T4.
d. This neutral stance extends to OSC-I presence in meetings with foreign officials. If OSC-I personnel are present for one U.S. contractor presentation, every effort must be made to be present for all briefings on other U.S. offerings. Only when one MILDEP or contractor team remains in the competition can the OSC-I advocate one U.S. offering. SAMM Table C4.T4.
e. Information. Upon request, but subject to factors such as availability of resources and country sensitivity to release of specific data, the SCO provides industry representatives the following types of unclassified information:
(1) Data on the defense budget cycle in the host country including the share of the budget devoted to procurement. Industry representatives may also be informed of the country’s current FMS, FMF, and defense budgets. SAMM C126.96.36.199.1.
(2) Information on the national decision making process, both formal and informal, and on decision makers in the MOD and MILDEPs. SAMM C188.8.131.52.2.
(3) Information on the national procurement process, to include bidding procedures, legal or policy impediments to procure from U.S. sources, and other information needed for the U.S. commercial competitor to work with the country. SAMM C184.108.40.206.3.
(4) Information on current and future partner nation defense requirements and, when appropriate, procurement plans for equipment. SAMM C220.127.116.11.4.
(5) Information on the marketing efforts of foreign competitors. SAMM C18.104.22.168.5.
(6) Information on the major in-country defense firms and their products. This can assist U.S. firms with identifying possible subcontract support services, or teaming, licensing, and other cooperative arrangements. SAMM C22.214.171.124.6.
f. Appointments. The SCO should assist industry representatives with visit appointments in the Embassy and, as time and circumstances permit, with host country MOD and services. Industry representatives make appointments with country officials to avoid the impression of SCO endorsement of a given item or service. The SCO makes the appointment only if the host country desires that appointments be made through the SCO. The SCO may attend key meetings to help assess defense requirements and the extent of U.S. industries’ ability to meet those requirements, if requested by the industry representatives and the host government. To help ensure program continuity, industry representatives should also brief SCOs before departing the host country. SAMM C126.96.36.199.
g. The SCO Chief should encourage visiting U.S. contractors to debrief the SCO Chief and other relevant members of the mission staff on their experiences in country. The SCO Chief responds to follow-up inquiries from industry representatives with respect to any reactions from host country officials or subsequent marketing efforts by foreign competitors. The SCO Chief alerts embassy staff to observe reactions of the host country officials on U.S. defense industry marketing efforts. As appropriate, the SCO Chief can pass these reactions to the U.S. industry representatives. SAMM C188.8.131.52.
h. The DoD lead (not the SCO) ensures MILDEP and/or contractor teams submit proposals that are consistent with internal U.S. decisions, are as responsive as possible to the requirements of the foreign solicitation, and meet the solicitation’s schedule. In cases of multiple U.S offerings, the DoD lead must facilitate all U.S. proposals impartially so that there is no perception that one offering is preferred over another and there is no biased interpretation of policy. SAMM C184.108.40.206.
1. President Donald Trump, America First Foreign Policy, https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2017/01/20/en/america-first-foreign-policy (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
2. David E. Thaler et al., Rand Corporation, From Patchwork to Framework: A Review of Title 10 Authorities for Security Cooperation at 8, 89–105 (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1438.html.
3. The updates, listed by date of release with newest release first: Dep’t of Def., Instr. 5132.13, Staffing of Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs) and the Selection and Training of Security Cooperation Personnel (9 Jan. 2009) (C1, 6 June 2017) [hereinafter DoDI 5132.13]; Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD Dictionary of Military Terms (Sept. 2018); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-20, Security Cooperation (23 May 2017) [hereinafter JP 3-20]; Dep’t of Def., Dir. 5205.75, DoD Operations at U.S. Embassies (4 Dec. 2013)(C1, 22 May 2017) [hereinafter DoDD 5205.75]; Dep’t of Def., Dir. 5205.82, Defense Institution Building (27 Jan. 2016)(C1, 4 May 2017); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-0, Joint Operations (17 Jan. 2017) [hereinafter JP 3-0]; and Dep’t of Def., Inst. 5132.14, Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise (13 Jan. 2017). See also Dep’t of Def., Dir. 5132.03, DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation (29 Dec. 2016).
4. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-17-255R, Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts (2017) [hereinafter GAO Report]. See Enclosure 2 of the report for the full list.
5. Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, 130 Stat. 2000 (2016). For more information on the workforce reform initiative, see Nicole Stomper Davis, Security Cooperation Workforce Reform: The Path to Effectively Including the Acquisition Community, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, http://www.discs.dsca.mil/documents/articles_of_interest/Security_Cooperation_Workforce_Reform.pdf.
6. Def. Inst. of Sec. Cooperation Studies, The Management of Security Cooperation, at 1-1 (38th ed. 2018), http://www.discs.dsca.mil/documents/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf [hereinafter Green Book].
9. 10 U.S.C. § 342 authorizes the DoD to “administer the Department of Defense Regional Centers for Security Studies as international venues for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, exchange of ideas, and training involving military and civilian participants.”
10. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(d)(2) provides the full definition of security assistance.
18. Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (eSAMM), ch. 2, DoD Def. Sec. Cooperation Agency, http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-2.
19. DoDI 5132.13, supra note 3.
20. United States Military Training Mission, http://www.usmtm.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
21. Office of Military Cooperation, Sections & Offices, U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Egypt, https://eg.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulate/cairo/sections-offices/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
22. Office of Defense Cooperation in India, Sections & Offices, U.S. Embassy & Consulates in India, https://in.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/new-delhi/sections-offices/office-of-defense-cooperation/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
23. Office of Defense Representative – Pakistan, Sections & Offices, U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Pakistan, https://pk.usembassy.gov/embassy-consulates/islamabad/sections-offices/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
24. Electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (eSAMM), C220.127.116.11.1., DoD Def. Sec. Cooperation Agency, C18.104.22.168.1., Establishment and Manning of SCOs, http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-2.
25. 22 U.S.C. § 3927.
26. 22 U.S.C. § 3927(b), Chief of Mission – Duties of agencies with employees in foreign countries.
27. Id. at (a)(2). The other exception is Voice of America correspondents on official assignment.
28. Id. at (c). See also Appendix I for an information paper on the SAMM guidance for dealing with U.S. industry.
29. Presidential Policy Directive List, American Federation of Scientists (Apr. 5, 2013), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
30. Presidential Policy Directive 23, Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy (Apr. 5, 2013) at 3, https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ssa.pdf.
31. JP 3-20, supra note 3, at II-1-9.
32. Id. at II-3. It also states: “When directed, DOD can also support appropriate PN civilian authorities to strengthen civil sector capacity at the local and national levels. . . . Building partner capacity requires a long-term, mutual commitment to improve capacity, interoperability, and when necessary, the employment of that PN capacity in support of USG strategic objectives.” Id.
33. JP 3-20, supra note 2, at II-3.
34. Id. at II-4.
35. Id. at II-6.
36. Id. at II-5.
37. Id. at II-6.
40. 10 U.S.C. § 342(a).
41. Id. at (b)(2).
42. Thaler, supra note 2, at 8, 89–105.
43. See Cong. Research Serv., DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues (2016).
44. GAO Report, supra note 4.
45. Thaler, supra note 2, at 8, 89–105.
46. See Cong. Research Serv., DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues 6 (2016).
47. Jennifer D.P. Moroney, David E. Thaler, Joe Hogler, Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commanders Utilize to Build Partner Capacity, RAND Corporation (2013), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR413.html.
48. See Cong. Research Serv., DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues 6 (2016).
49. GAO Report, supra note 4. See Enclosure 2 of the report for the full list.
51. Id. at 55.
52. Id. at 55–56.
53. In the letter, DASD-SC identified the following provisions as having been repealed or modified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code: 168, 184, 1050, 105a, 1051, 1051a, 1051c, 2010, 2249c, 2282, 4344, 4345, 4345a, 4681, 6957, 6957a, 6957b, 9344, 9345, 9345a, and 9681. See GAO Report, supra note 4, at 55.
54. Thaler, supra note 2, at 8, 89–105.
55. Id. at 126–27.
56. Id. at 89–97.
57. Id. at 98–102.
58. Id. at 102–04.
59. 10 U.S.C. § 301(7). See also DoDD 5132.03, supra note 3.
60. See generally, Major Timothy Furin, Legally Funding Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, Army Law., Oct. 2008, at 1, 1–26.
61. Thaler, supra note 2; Cong. Research Serv., DoD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues (2016); GAO Report, supra note 4.
62. Authorities: 22 U.S.C. § 2347, International Military Education and Training; 22 U.S.C. § 2761, Sales from Stocks – allows for the FMS of items from current military stocks; 22 U.S.C. § 2762, Procurement for cash sales – allows for the FMS of items through U.S. contracting mechanisms; 22 U.S.C. § 2763, Credit sales – allows for FMF utilizing U.S. funds with terms for repayment.
63. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. ch. 32 § 2151, as amended by Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135 (2017).
64. Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976, 22 U.S.C. ch. 39 § 2751.
65. Green Book, supra note 6, at 7–10.
66. The DSCA Transparency Handbook provides guidance on structuring information exchanges with host countries to develop Letters of Request for major procurements. DoDDef. Sec. Cooperation Agency, Transparency Handbook (2017), https://dsca.mil/dsca-transparency-handbook.
67. 10 U.S.C. § 342(a).
68. Id. at § 342(b)(2).
69. Course Offerings to International Students, TJAGLCS, https://www.tjaglcspublic.army.mil.
70. The Office of Security Assistance directs over $6 billion annually in U.S. military grant assistance to allies and friends through policy development, budget formulation, and program oversight. https://www.state.gov/t/pm/sa/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
71. Green Book, supra note 6, 1-1 – 1-16.
72. Id. at 1-2.
75. Id. at 1-3.
77. Id. at 1-4.
78. Id. at 1-5.
81. Id. at 1-6.
84. DoD Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Administrative Trust Fund (T-20) Budget Policy Handbook (DSCA 01-19), App. A (2001), http://www.samm.dsca.mil/policy-memoranda/dsca-01-19 [hereinafter T-20].
85.Title 20 of the U.S. Code is “Education” and has no bearing on security assistance.
86. Green Book, supra note 6, at 5-14.
87. T-20, supra note 84.
88. Remarks of President Barack Obama (as prepared for delivery), Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq, Feb. 27, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-ndash-responsibly-ending-war-iraq. The speech outlined the strategy and phased approach for the responsible drawdown of U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq and development of an enduring strategic partnership with Iraq.
89. Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. DODIG-2012-063, Assessment of the DoD Establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq (Mar. 16, 2012), at 6 n.5 [hereinafter DODIG-2012-063].
90. Id. at 2.
91. C. Todd Lopez, The Office of Security Cooperation Maintaining a Presence in Iraq Once Soldiers Go Home, U.S. Army (Dec. 1, 2011), https://www.army.mil/article/70048/The_office_of_security_cooperation_maintaining_a_presence_in_Iraq_once_soldiers_go_home/.
97. Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Def., No. DODIG-2013-136, Assessment of the Office of Security Cooperation – Iraq Mission Capabilities (Sept. 18, 2013), at 8, 23 [hereinafter DODIG-2013-136].
99. Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: U.S. – Iraq Cooperation, The White House (Nov. 1, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/01/fact-sheet-us-iraq-cooperation.
100. Office of the Spokesperson, Fact Sheet: U.S. Security Cooperation with Iraq, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/269040.htm.
101. Interview with Colonel Corey L. Crosbie, Director, Chief’s Initiatives Group, OSC-I (Nov. 2018).
102. Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq, Activities Report, April 1, 2018 to October 31, 2018 at 1.
104. See Appendix II for the OSD Memorandum. The full memorandum and attachments are found at: http://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/Headquarters/StrategicPlan/ShanahanMemo8March2018.pdf.
105. U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev, U.S. Dep’t of Def. & U.S. Dep’t of State, Security Sector Reform 1 (2009), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/115810.pdf.
106. Id. at 3.
107. International students are selected through the U.S. Embassy in their home country. JA Professional Military Education / Command Courses, TJAGLCS, https://tjaglcspublic.army.mil/pmecourses (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
109. David Witty, The Brookings Institute, The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service 5 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/David-Witty-Paper_Final_Web.pdf.
111. See generallyid.
112. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, §1215(a), (b), 125 Stat. 1298, 1631 (2011).
113. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1211(f), 126 Stat. 1632, 1982 (2013).
114. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, § 1214(d)(2)(C), 127 Stat. 672, 906 (2013).
115. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, § 1237(a), 128 Stat. 3292, 3562 (2014).
116. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1224, 131 Stat. 1283, 1654 (2017).
118. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, §1235 (2018).
125. Consolidated Appropriations Act 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-6 (2019).
126. Id. § 704(3)(c)(1)(A).
127. DODIG-2013-136, supra note 97, at 69; Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 2 FAM 232.1-2, Members of Administrative and Technical Staff (July 6, 2018), https://fam.state.gov/fam/02fam/02fam0230.html.
128. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 29–31, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 23 U.S.T. 3227, http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf.
129. U.S. Gen. Services Admin., Federal Management Regulation (FMR) Bulletin B-41 Foreign Gift and Decoration Minimal Value (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/129418.
130. Notarial Services, U.S. Citizen Services, U.S. Embassy & Consulates in Iraq, https://iq.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/local-resources-of-u-s-citizens/notaries-public/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
131. CPA Order No. 37, effective 19 Sept. 2003, §§ 1-3, Al-Wakaa Al-Iraqia No. 3980, Mar. 2004.
132. Agreement between the U.S. and the Republic of Iraq, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122074.pdf.
133. See Income Tax Law No. 113 of 1982, as amended through 2003.
134. Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Conference Report to Accompany S. 2943 at 544 of 1587, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-114hrpt840/pdf/CRPT-114hrpt840.pdf.
135. See generally Thaler, supra note 2.
136. Main Publications, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, https://www.discs.dsca.mil/_pages/resources/default.aspx?section=publications&type=mainpubs (last visited 20 Feb. 2019).
137. Online Learning: Overview, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, https://www.discs.dsca.mil/_pages/courses/online/catalog/default.aspx?section=policies (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).