2021 DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK

A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES

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The Domestic Operational Law (DOPLAW) Handbook for Judge Advocates is a product of the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO). The content is a collaboration of Federal statutes, Executive Orders, national policy, Joint Publications and Department of Defense (DoD) and Service regulations, as well as lessons learned and best practices from the field. The 2021 edition of the DOPLAW Handbook includes substantial revisions to Civil Disturbance Operations, Counterdrug Operations, and Cyber Space Operations in the National Guard. Additionally, it includes significant updates to all resources, including publications and website references.

This Handbook should serve as a working reference and a training tool; however, it is not a substitute for independent research. With the exception of footnoted material, the information contained in this Handbook is not doctrine and advisory only. Judge advocates advising in this area should monitor developments in domestic operations closely, as the landscape continues to evolve.

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INTRODUCTION: PURPOSE OF THIS HANDBOOK

In February 2013, the Department of Defense (DoD) published a new Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), which updated the DoD’s Domestic Support Strategy for the first time since 2005, and set out DoD’s vision for transforming homeland defense and support to civil authorities.1 The Department of Defense has identified two priority missions for its activities in the homeland: 1) to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors, and 2) to provide assistance to domestic civil authorities in the event of natural or manmade disasters.2

This Handbook focuses on the legal matters pertaining to providing assistance to domestic civil authorities, also known as DSCA. Circumstances involving the exercise of homeland defense authority and capabilities, i.e. “countering air and maritime attacks and preventing terrorist attacks on the homeland,”3 are beyond the scope of this handbook. Nonetheless, it should be kept in mind that actions taken within the homeland defense function may directly impact the DoD’s DSCA mission once an event has occurred. Likewise, for ongoing events or continuing attacks, DSCA actions may affect homeland defense capabilities.

The following text specifically addresses the DoD and National Guard (NG) role in planned civil support and emergency response operations within the United States. (Note, the “54 States and territories” or simply “States,” as frequently used throughout this Handbook, collectively refers to the 50 States, Guam, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.) It provides an understanding of the overall Federal Government approach to preparing for and responding to major disasters and emergencies. Very often, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will serve as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), to which the Department of Defense lends its support. Thus, a working knowledge of how DHS addresses emergency and disaster response is vital to fully appreciate the various DoD and NG authorities and policies in this area.

This Handbook, therefore, begins with a discussion on the role of the DHS, the National Preparedness System, and the National Incident Management System doctrines that permeate all emergency and disaster responses. It then examines the roles, responsibilities and authorities of the Department of Defense and the National Guard related to specific domestic support operations including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) incident management, support to civilian law enforcement, civil disturbance support, pandemic response, counterdrug operations, and other miscellaneous operations. It concludes with topics that are commonplace in all domestic operations: intelligence law, rules for the use of force, fiscal law, and cyber operations. Although each chapter stands on its own to assist the reader in developing an understanding of the capabilities and limitations applicable to civil support, a reading of the entire text provides the context for the best understanding of this area of law.

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2 Id. at 1.
3 Id. at 9.
CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

A. Background

The enduring core mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) is “to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation.”4 It has three critical homeland missions: homeland defense (HD), homeland security (HS) and defense support to civilian authorities (DSCA).5 U.S Armed Forces have had “a historic and enduring role in supporting civil authorities during times of emergency, and the role is described in the national defense strategy as a primary mission of the DoD.”6 Thus, the Department of Defense must always be ready to immediately respond to DSCA operations. The extraordinary destruction wrought by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017 reminded us that threats to the nation do not always originate from the acts of man.7 Just a few years later, the widespread demonstrations and civil unrest in 2020, spilling into early 2021, remind us that there are internal threats in the homeland.8 Finally, the Department of Defense’s ongoing support to our nation’s response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, which has now surpassed one year, demonstrates the uncertainty, complexity, and potential lengthily of a DSCA mission.

Since September 11, 2001, the Federal Government has taken aggressive and wide-ranging steps to better address both the threat of direct attacks on the United States and the challenges of natural or manmade disasters. Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002,9 Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—an executive agency that consolidated the functions and responsibilities of more than a dozen Federal agencies and departments, including the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), among others.10 On February 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed Homeland Security Policy Directive 5 (HSPD-5), “Management of Domestic Incidents.” The purpose of HSPD-5 was “[t]o enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents by establishing a single, comprehensive national incident management system [NIMS].”11 In paragraph 14 of HSPD-5, President Bush tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security with development

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6 Id. at 23.
7 Federal analysis indicates that the direct toll in lives and financial costs from natural disasters in recent decades far outweighs that from terrorist attacks. See Rawle O. King, Financing Recovery from Large-Scale Natural Disasters, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (9 Feb. 2009); See also 9/11 Terrorism: Economic Global Costs, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (5 Oct. 2004).
10 Id.
and administration of the NIMS. On December 3, 2003, President Bush signed Homeland Security Policy Directive 8 (HSPD-8), “National Preparedness.” HSPD-8 is a companion to HSPD-5 and “describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare for” incident response. “To help ensure the preparedness of the Nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies,” President Bush tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security to, “in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in consultation with State and local governments, . . . develop a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal.” As a result, the DHS published the National Response Framework (NRF) in January 2008, most recently updated in October 2019.

United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was activated on October 1, 2002, which “marked the first time a single military commander has been charged with protecting the U.S. homeland since the days of George Washington.” USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes the continental United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, The Bahamas, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the territorial waters to include the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. With the establishment of USNORTHCOM, the Department of Defense now has Combatant Commands whose combined geographic responsibilities cover all States and territories of the United States. On September 11, 2003, USNORTHCOM reached full operational capability. USNORTHCOM’s mission statement is:

“United States Northern Command Defends our Homeland – Deters, detects, and defeats threats to the United States, conducts security cooperation activities with allies and partners, and supports civil authorities.”

This mission statement recognizes the unique dual roles for USNORTHCOM in HD, DSCA, and Security Cooperation (SC), in addition to standard Geographic Combatant Commander-assigned

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12 Id., para. 14.
17 The other Combatant Command with responsibility for the United States is U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), whose AOR includes Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. It is important to note that DSCA operations in these areas fall under the authority USINDOPACOM.
18 About USNORTHCOM, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND, http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx (last visited April 13, 2021). The geographic area of responsibility for USNORTHCOM also contains Mexico, Canada, Bermuda, and portions of the Caribbean. Id. The exact dimensions of this geographic area are contained in the Unified Command Plan.
responsibilities. HD and SC authorities and capabilities are generally beyond the scope of this Handbook. However, understanding how the Department of Defense and its organizations (such as USNORTHCOM) fit in the larger emergency and disaster response framework allows for better comprehension of the DoD’s ability to provide support to civil authorities. Because of USNORTHCOM’s responsibility for operations in the homeland, it is engaged in nearly constant liaison with our national leadership and with the Federal agencies that would lead civil support operations.

B. The Role of the Department of the Defense in Civil Support

Federal military support provided to civil authorities is neither new nor unique to a single service. DoD support has been long provided support to the States in times of major disaster or emergency. During the Reconstruction after the Civil War, U.S. Marshalls called on the Federal military to assist with maintaining order in the southern States. In the late Nineteenth Century, the Army played a direct role in many disaster relief operations including the great Chicago fire, the Johnstown Flood, and the Charleston, South Carolina earthquake. When called on today, and under the proper authority, the Department of Defense will continue to fulfill its role in providing support to civil authorities when necessary and authorized.

Under the control of their State Governor and The Adjutant General (TAG), National Guard (NG) nits are the primary military responders in all civil support operations. The use of Federal forces to support State and local governments was, and remains, the exception rather than the rule. Federal forces are generally used only after State and local resources are exhausted or overwhelmed, and Federal assistance has been requested, normally in writing, by the State’s Governor or delegated official.

The Department of Defense has unique capabilities and resources to provide support to civil authorities if necessary. Like the NG, the Department of Defense consists of trained and disciplined personnel and organizations capable of rapidly responding on short notice to a broad spectrum of emergencies. Although primarily organized to conduct combat operations abroad, Federal military personnel and equipment are effectual in domestic disaster relief operations. In these instances, the DoD’s role is always one of support - civilian authorities retain primary responsibility for domestic operations.

19 Duties and assignments for Combatant Commanders are contained in the Unified Command Plan.
20 See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-07, STABILITY OPERATIONS (October 2008) [hereinafter FM 3-07].
21 Id., para 1-1.
22 In “State status” National Guard personnel are under the control of the particular Governor and The Adjutant General (TAG) of their particular State. In this context, “State status” includes “State Active Duty (SAD)” and the status maintained by members of the National Guard under Title 32 of the United States Code. See infra Chapter 3 for further discussion of National Guard status.
24 See STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DSCA, supra note 1, at 9, 14. See also U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES Encl. 4 (27 Feb. 2013) (C1, 8 February 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.21] (noting “[t]he primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order in the civilian community is vested in State and local governments.”)
Civil authorities may request Federal assistance, including DoD support, once it becomes clear that their capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded.25

U.S. domestic law, Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs),26 National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD), Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs),27 Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs),28 Executive Orders (EOs), and DoD regulations provide the framework for, and set limits on, the use of Federal military forces to support civil authorities. While the types of domestic support operations may vary widely, two forms of statutory restrictions, as well as policy concerns limit the scope of Federal support provided. Judge advocates must carefully consider fiscal law constraints29 and Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) limitations.30 From a DoD policy perspective, the “3025 series” of DoD Manuals, Instructions, and Directives are applicable.

The NG, while in State Active Duty (SAD) status, has primary responsibility for providing civil support to State and local governments.31 When Federal forces respond in a support role, they operate under the direction of a designated Lead Federal Agency (LFA). Federal laws recognize the importance of interdepartmental and interagency coordination and planning in this area. For example, the NRF is designed to maximize unity of effort when Federal agencies work together to respond to domestic emergencies.32

In summary, in domestic operations, NG units and personnel, in non-Federal status and under the command of their respective governors, have primary responsibility for providing civil support to local governments. The Department of Defense provides Federal military assistance only when civil resources are insufficient, when requested to do so by appropriate civil authorities, and when properly ordered to do so by DoD officials. **Unless otherwise authorized by law, the Federal Government may only provide support to civil authorities in response to an official request for assistance, and after State and local government resources have been exhausted or overwhelmed.**

C. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

The primary reference for the provision of all DoD support to civil authorities during domestic operations is DoD Directive (DoDD) 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.33 The

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25 See STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DSCA, supra note 1, at 15.
26 The PDD series was the mechanism used by the Clinton administration to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters.
27 In the George W. Bush administration, the directives used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters are designated National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs) and those on homeland security matters are designated Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs). Unless otherwise indicated, past directives of previous administrations remain in effect until superseded.
28 The PPD series is a mechanism that the Obama administration uses to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters.
29 See infra Chapter 14.
31 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 24, at 28.
32 NRF, supra note 15.
33 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 23.
Department of Defense promulgated DoDD 3025.18, with changes, on March 19, 2018.34 Notably, DoDD 3025.18 states that DSCA plans shall be compatible with the NIMS and will consider command and control options that emphasize “unity of effort.”35

DoDD 3025.18 provides the criteria to evaluate all requests for support to civilian authorities. Domestic operations practitioners refer to these criteria as the “CARRLL” factors.36 Commanders at all levels should be cognizant of these factors when forwarding a recommendation for Federal military support through the chain of command.

The CARRLL factors are:

- **Cost** – Who pays and the impact on DoD budget;
- ** Appropriateness** – Whether it is in the interest of DoD to provide the requested support;
- **Readiness** – Impact on DoD’s ability to perform its primary mission;
- **Risk** – Safety of DoD forces;
- **Legality** – Compliance with the law; and
- **Lethality** – Potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces.

DoDD 3025.18 also outlines the roles and responsibilities of each DoD component and establishes request procedures and approval authorities for each type of domestic support operation. The Secretary of Defense has reserved approval authority of DoD support for civil disturbances and for responses to acts of terrorism. Various DoD Directives and Instructions cover specific types of domestic support authorities and are set out in the respective chapters of this Handbook.

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34 DoDD 3025.18 incorporated and canceled DoDD 3025.1 (Military Support to Civil Authorities) and DoDD 3025.15 (Military Assistance to Civil Authorities).
35 Id. at 4.
36 Id.
CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INCIDENT MANAGEMENT

KEY REFERENCES:

- E.O. 13286 – Amendment of Executive Orders, and Other Actions, in Connection with the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secretary of Homeland Security (2003).
- HSPD-8 – National Preparedness, December 17, 2003 and HSPD 8, Annex 1 – National Planning.²

¹ Recommended for historical reference. President Bush promulgated HSPD 7 to update and supersede the pre-9/11 PDD-63 dealing with the protection of critical infrastructure.
² Recommended for historical reference. President Obama promulgated PPD-8 to update and supersede HSPD-8 and HSPD-8, Annex 1, with the exception of paragraph 44 of HSPD-8 Annex 1, which remains in effect. Individual plans developed under HSPD-8 and HSPD-8 Annex 1 remain in effect unless otherwise replaced or rescinded.
A. The Federal Response Structure

In the 33 years since 1988, when President George H.W. Bush promulgated Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, the Federal Government has significantly changed its approach to preventing, preparing for, and responding to major domestic incidents. This chapter addresses the Federal Government’s current system for domestic all-hazards incident management, including the latest significant changes to the National Preparedness System (NPS) promulgated in 2013, as well as the vital role of the Stafford Act as the primary authority for the use of Federal resources to assist State and local governments during major disasters and emergencies.

1. E.O. 12656: Emergency Preparedness and Response Responsibilities

E.O. 12656, as amended, assigns national security emergency preparedness responsibilities to Federal departments and agencies, as an extension of their regular department or agency missions. It identifies the primary and support functions of the departments and agencies during any national emergency of the United States in order to develop plans and capabilities to execute those functions. E.O. 13228, establishing the Office of Homeland Security and Homeland Security Council,3 amended E.O. 12656 to account for the responsibilities of the new department within the functional and legal structure of emergency preparedness. E.O. 12656 and E.O. 13228 direct what is now the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to have primary responsibility for coordinating the efforts of, among other things, Federal emergency assistance.4

As part of preparedness, E.O. 12656 mandates that the heads of Federal agencies plan for continuity of Government in the event of a national security emergency and plan for the mobilization of agency alternative resources. In assigning areas of responsibility for domestic preparedness, E.O. 12656 provides the foundation for the former Federal Response Plan (FRP), now superseded by the NRF under the National Preparedness System (NPS).

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4 Exec. Order No. 12656, 3 C.F.R. 585 (1988); see also Exec. Order No. 12148, 3 C.F.R. 412 (1979), which transferred to FEMA responsibility for coordinating Federal response to civil emergencies at the regional and national levels.
Table 2-1 highlights some of the major areas of responsibility for several of the agencies identified in E.O. 12656, as amended by EO 13286.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGENCY</th>
<th>LIST OF SELECT AGENCY ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
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| Department of Agriculture     | **Lead Responsibilities**: Ensure continuation of agricultural production, food processing, storage, and distribution; Oversee use and handling of agricultural commodities and land exposed to or affected by hazardous agents.  
**Support Responsibilities**: Assist Secretary of Defense in formulating and carrying out plans for stockpiling strategic and critical agricultural materials.                                                                                                                   |
| Department of Defense         | **Lead Responsibilities**: Ensure military preparedness and readiness to respond to national security emergencies; Develop and maintain, in cooperation with the heads of other departments and agencies, national security emergency plans, programs, and mechanisms to ensure effective mutual support between and among the military, civil government, and the private sector; Develop and maintain damage assessment capabilities and assist the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the heads of other departments and agencies in developing and maintaining capabilities to assess attack damage and to estimate the effects of potential attack on the Nation; In consultation with the Secretaries of State and Energy, the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and others, as required, develop plans and capabilities for identifying, analyzing, mitigating, and responding to hazards related to nuclear weapons, materials, and devices.  
**Support Responsibilities**: Development of plans and programs to support national mobilization; Planning for the protection, evacuation, and repatriation of United States citizens in threatened areas overseas; Coordinate with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency the development of plans for mutual civil-military support during national security emergencies. |
| Department of Energy          | **Lead Responsibilities**: Identify, analyze, assess, and mitigate hazards from nuclear weapons, materials, and devices; All emergency response activities pertaining to DOE nuclear facilities, to include recapture of special nuclear materials.  
**Support Responsibilities**: Advise, assist, and assess the radiological impact associated with national security emergencies.                                                                                                                                 |
| Department of Health and Human Services | **Lead Responsibilities**: Mobilize health industry and allocate resources to provide health, mental health, and medical services to civilian and military claimants; reduce or eliminate adverse health and mental health effects produced by hazardous agents; Provide emergency services, e.g. social services, family reunification, mortuary services.  
**Support Responsibilities**: Support Secretary of Agriculture in development of plans related to national security agricultural health services.                                                                                          |
| Department of Homeland Security | **Lead Responsibilities**: Advise the National Security Council on issues of national security emergency preparedness, including mobilization preparedness, civil defense, continuity of government, and technological disasters; Coordinate with the other agencies and State and local governments to implement national security emergency preparedness policies.  
**Support Responsibilities**: Prepare plans and programs, to include plans and capabilities related to nuclear emergencies; Promote programs for Federal buildings and installations.                                                                                                   |

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2. The Homeland Security Act

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 represented a watershed moment in the manner in which the Federal Government organizes to respond to national level incidents. The Act established the Department of Homeland Security, and consolidated the consequence management missions, assets, and personnel of numerous Federal departments and agencies into a single department. The primary missions of the Department of Homeland Security include: preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from terrorist attacks that occur within the United States. It is comprised of various directorates and components including the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Secret Service, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

FEMA maintains responsibility for “[h]elping people before, during, and after disasters.” Activities pursuant to this responsibility include managing responses; directing the strategic response assets assigned to the Department of Homeland Security; overseeing the Metropolitan Medical Response System; and coordinating other Federal response resources in the event of a terrorist attack or major disaster. The Homeland Security Act also directed the development of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to integrate the Federal, State, and local government response to terrorist attacks, and consolidate existing Federal Government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated National Response Plan (NRP).

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7 Id. § 101. The Act also established the Department of Homeland Security as the focal point for “natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.” See § 101(b)(1)(D).
8 Id. § 101(b).
10 HSA, supra note 6, § 502. As explained below, the National Response Framework, which is now part of the National Preparedness System, superseded the NRP.
In sum, the Homeland Security Act served as the foundation for the Government to reorganize and consolidate incident management functions, assets, and personnel under a single Department. Further, it served as the legal impetus for a revised approach to incident management, later set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), as discussed below.

3. HSPD-5

HSPD-5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” established a new paradigm for Federal emergency management. It centers on the need for all levels of government across the nation to have a single, unified approach toward managing domestic incidents. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, HSPD-5 tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Response Plan (now replaced by the NRF) that would integrate Federal Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. It also tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a NIMS that would unify Federal, State, and local government efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic events regardless of cause, size, or complexity. The NRF and NIMS intend to provide the structure and mechanisms for establishing national level policy and operational direction regarding Federal support to State and local incident managers.

HSPD-5 also reaffirmed the Secretary of Homeland Security’s responsibility as the Principal Federal Official (PFO) for domestic incident management. HSPD-5 tasked the Secretary of Homeland Security with coordinating the Federal Government’s resources in response to, or recovery from, terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. This coordination responsibility exists when any one of the following four conditions applies: (1) a Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the Secretary; (2) the resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities; (3) more than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to the incident; or (4) the Secretary has been directed by the President to assume responsibility for managing the domestic incident. Table 2-2, seen below, summarizes the roles and responsibilities established by HSPD-5.

HSPD-5 also eliminates the previous distinction, established in Presidential Decision Directive 39, between crisis management and consequence management, treating the two “as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate functions.” Under the old FRP, the Attorney General was the lead Federal official for the Government’s response until the crisis management phase of a response was over. Now, under the NRF, the Secretary of Homeland Security remains the lead Federal official for the duration of the period involving Federal assistance. Even though HSPD-5 erased the distinction between crisis management and consequence management, it reaffirms the Attorney General’s authority as the lead official for conducting criminal investigation of terrorist acts or terrorist threats.

12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.

On March 30, 2011, President Obama issued PPD-8 to update and replace HSPD-8 and HSPD-8, Annex 1, National Planning. HSPD-8, Annex 1, was originally issued in 2007 to “further enhance the preparedness of the United States by formally establishing a standard and comprehensive approach to national planning.”15 PPD-8 complements HSPD-5, which remains in effect. PPD-8 aims at:

“strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. Our national preparedness is the shared responsibility of all levels of government, the private and nonprofit sectors, and individual citizens.”16

PPD-8 specifies that the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for developing the National Preparedness Goal (discussed below) and coordinating the domestic all-hazards preparedness efforts of all executive departments and agencies, in consultation with State, local, tribal, and territorial governments, non-governmental organizations, private-sector partners, and the general public. The directive further states that the heads of all executive departments and agencies with roles in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery are responsible for national preparedness efforts, including department-specific operational plans, as needed, consistent with their statutory roles and responsibilities. PPD-8 also specifies that nothing in the directive shall limit the authority of the Secretary of Defense with regard to the command and control, planning, organization, equipment,

<table>
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<th>Departments &amp; Agencies</th>
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<td><strong>Federal Government</strong></td>
<td>Sec. 3. Declares that U.S. Government policy is to treat crisis management and consequence management as a single, integrated function, rather than two separate functions.</td>
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| **Secretary of Homeland Security** | Sec. 4. Assigns Secretary of Homeland Security responsibility for coordinating Federal operations within the U.S. to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.  
Sec. 15. Tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS).  
Sec. 16. Tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Response Plan, or NRP (now the NRF). |
| **Attorney General** | Sec. 8. Reaffirms the Attorney General’s role as having lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats. |

Table 2-2. Roles and Responsibilities Established by HSDP-5

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training, exercises, employment, or other activities of DoD forces, or the allocation of DoD resources.17

HSPD-8, Annex 1 required the development of National Planning Scenarios.18 Consequently, the Homeland Security Council developed fifteen scenarios depicting “a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters.”19 USNORTHCOM subsequently developed CONPLANS that address each of the scenarios where DoD support is necessary. USNORTHCOM must grant permission to view these CONPLANS, and any requests should be directed via the chain of command to USNORTHCOM.20 These and other individual plans developed under HSPD-8 and Annex 1 remain in effect until rescinded or otherwise replaced.

5. PPD-8 and the National Preparedness System (NPS)

PPD-8 specifically directed the development of a National Preparedness Goal (NPG) that identifies core capabilities necessary for preparedness, and the development of a NPS to guide activities that will enable the Nation to achieve the NPG.21 PPD-8 states that NPS shall include guidance for planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises to build and maintain domestic capabilities, and shall provide a whole nation approach for building and sustaining a cycle of preparedness activities over time. PPD-8 states that the NPS shall include five integrated National Planning Frameworks covering the mission areas of Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. These five frameworks set the strategy and doctrine for delivering the 32 core capabilities identified in the NPG document and “describe how the whole community works together to achieve the National Preparedness Goal.”22 PPD-8 further directed the frameworks be built on scalable, flexible, and adaptable coordinating structures to align key roles and responsibilities to deliver the necessary capabilities.23


The NRF predates the current NPS five-framework system. On March 22, 2008, the first NRF became effective and superseded the National Response Plan. It established a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of activities. The NRF was updated in 2013. It implements the new requirements and terminology of PPD-8, yet reiterates the

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17 Id.
18 HSPD-8 Annex 1, supra note 16, para. 34.
20 USNORTHCOM CONPLANs remain in force and effect until rescinded or replaced, as specified in PDD-8.
21 The National Preparedness Goal (NPG) is “[a] secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.” The NPG document identifies several core capabilities necessary to achieving the goal. The core capabilities are grouped into the five mission areas of prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. DHS, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL (Sept. 2015), available at http://www.fema.gov/national-preparedness-goal.
23 PPD-8, supra note 16.
concepts utilized in the 2008 version. Most recently, the “fourth edition of the NRF reorganizes and streamlines the previous version of the NRF, expands principles and concepts to better integrate government and private sector response efforts, and introduces the community lifelines concept and terminology.”

The NRF organizes governmental response to natural and manmade disasters and incidents occurring in the United States, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories and possessions. It builds upon and complements the NIMS. The NRF is designed to be used by the whole community, since engaging the whole community is essential for the Nation’s success in maintaining resilience and preparedness. The NRF is always in effect, and portions of it can be implemented at any time. Selective implementation of NRF structures allows for a scaled response and an appropriate level of coordination for each incident.

The NRF is comprised of the base document, Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), Support Annexes, and Incident Annexes.

- **Base Document.** The Base Document contains background on the scope of the NRF, describes roles and responsibilities of both public and private entities at the local, State, and Federal level, and specifies authorities and best practices for managing incidents and coordinating response entities.

- **ESF Annexes.** The ESF Annexes are Federal coordinating structures that group resources and capabilities into functional areas that are most frequently needed in a national response. There are fifteen ESFs in the NRF (see Table 2-3).

- **Support Annexes.** The Support Annexes describe other mechanisms by which support is organized among private sector, NGO, and Federal partners. The support annexes describe the essential supporting processes and considerations common to most incidents. The support annex

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26 DHS, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (Oct. 2017), available at https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/fema_nims_doctrine-2017.pdf [hereinafter NIMS] (last visited April 20, 2021). The NIMS is a nationwide template enabling government and nongovernmental responders to respond to all domestic incidents. NIMS provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy and operational coordination for domestic incident management. NIMS does not alter or impede the ability of Federal, State, local, or tribal departments and agencies to carry out their specific authorities. NIMS assumes that incidents are typically managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional and organizational levels, and in the smallest geographical areas feasible. There is further discussion on NIMS below.
27 NRF, supra note 25, at 4-5.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 3.
topics are: financial management, international coordination, public affairs, tribal relations, volunteer and donations management, and worker safety and health.31

- **Incident Annexes.** The incident annexes describe the unique response aspects of incident categories. They describe specialized response teams and resources, incident specific responsibilities, and other considerations specific to a particular scenario. The address the following events: Biological Incident, Catastrophic Incident, Cyber Incident, Food and Agriculture Incident, Mass Evacuation Incident, Nuclear/Radiological Incident, and Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation. These documents are now the annexes to the Response Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOP) rather than as supplements to the NRF.32

  a. **NRF Roles and Responsibilities.** The NRF specifies the roles and responsibilities of the following parties:

    - Individuals, Families, Households, and Communities;
    - Non-governmental Organizations;
    - Private Sector Entities;
    - Local Governments including the Chief Elected/Appointed Official, Emergency Manager, and Department or Agency Heads;
    - State Governments including the Governor, State Homeland Security Advisor, State Emergency Management Director, and NG;
    - Tribal/Territorial/Insular Area Leaders;
    - Secretary of Homeland Security;
    - FEMA Administrator;
    - Attorney General;
    - Secretary of Defense;
    - Secretary of State; and
    - Director of National Intelligence.

  b. **Core Capabilities**

    The core capabilities provide a common vocabulary describing the significant functions that must be maintained and executed across the whole community to achieve the goal of a “secure and resilient nation.”33 Response core capabilities generally must be accomplished in incident management, but even though core capabilities are aligned with a mission area, actions in one core capabilities inform core capabilities across mission areas.34 Points of intersection between the response mission area and other mission areas can be found in the NRF.35

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31 NRF, supra note 25, at 3.
33 NRF, supra note 25, at 12.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 13-15.
c. NRF Coordinating Structures and Integration

Coordinating structures are used to aid preparedness and response at all governmental levels and among the private sector, communities, and non-governmental entities. The structures help organize and measure response community capabilities, establish and improve relationships, and foster coordination prior to and following an incident. Examples of local coordinating structures include local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) and community emergency response teams (CERTs). State coordinating structures leverage capabilities and resources across the State. Examples include State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs), which manage State LEPCs, and State Disaster Planning Advisory Committees. Private sector coordinating structures include NGOs and industry trade groups, such as the American Pilots’ Association (a national association of maritime pilots of commercial vessels). These entities often serve as a conduit to government coordinating structures.36

(1) Federal Coordinating Structures

The National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the principal policy body for national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination, and it advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States. Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC is the President’s primary method for coordinating Executive branch departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy.37

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The Federal Government organizes its response resources and capabilities under the ESF construct. ESFs are groups of organizations that work together to support a response. The Federal ESFs are the primary (but not exclusive) response coordinating structures at the Federal level.38 Table 2-3 lists the ESFs and the designated lead Federal agencies for each function.39

36 Id. at 15.
37 Id. at 25.
38 Id. at 21.
39 Id. at 21-22.
### ESF # | ESF | ESF Coordinator
--- | --- | ---
1 | Transportation | Department of Transportation |
2 | Communications | Department of Homeland Security/National Communications System |
3 | Public Works and Engineering | Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers |
4 | Firefighting | Department of Agriculture/U.S. Forest Service/U.S. Fire Administration (DHS/FEMA) |
5 | Information and Planning | Department of Homeland Security/FEMA |
6 | Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services | Department of Homeland Security/FEMA |
7 | Logistics | General Services Administration and DHS/FEMA |
8 | Public Health and Medical Services | Department of Health and Human Services |
9 | Search and Rescue | Department of Homeland Security/FEMA |
10 | Oil and Hazardous Materials Response | Environmental Protection Agency |
11 | Agriculture and Natural Resources | Department of Agriculture |
12 | Energy | Department of Energy |
13 | Public Safety and Security | Department of Justice/ATF |
14 | Cross-Sector Business and Infrastructure | Department of Homeland Security/Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency |
15 | External Affairs | Department of Homeland Security |

Table 2-3. Emergency Support Functions Specified in the NRF

**ESF Coordinators.** ESF Coordinators oversee the preparedness activities for a particular ESF. Specific responsibilities include maintaining contact with ESF primary and support agencies through meetings and other interactions, ensuring the ESF is engaged in appropriate planning and preparedness activities, and coordinating efforts with corresponding NGOs, private entities, and local, State, and Federal partners.40

**ESFs Primary and Support Agencies.** *Primary agencies* have numerous ESF responsibilities including (but not limited to) orchestrating support within their functional areas for the appropriate response core capabilities, obtaining assistance from support agencies, managing Stafford Act mission assignments and coordinating resources needed for mission assignments, planning for incident management, maintaining trained personnel to support interagency response teams, and coordinating resources resulting from mission assignments. *Support agency* responsibilities include (but are not limited to) providing input to periodic readiness assessments, participating in planning for incident management, and coordinating resources needed for mission assignments.41

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40 Id.
41 Id. at 38.
**ESF activation.** Activation can be selectively accomplished by FEMA or as directed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to support response activities for both Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act events. Note, however, that not all incidents needing Federal support require ESF activation. When departments or agencies are activated as part of ESF activation, they may assign resources at the headquarters, regional, or incident level. Through the Stafford Act and in accordance with 6 U.S.C. § 741(4) and § 753(c), FEMA may issue mission assignments at all levels and across the ESFs to obtain resources from Federal entities.42

**Mission Assignments.** Mission assignments represent the practical and operational application of ESFs, through the FEMA organizational structure, to executive branch departments and agencies. A mission assignment is by definition a “[w]ork order issued to a Federal agency by the Regional Administrator, Assistant Administrator for the Disaster Operations Directorate, or Administrator, directing completion by that agency of a specified task and citing funding, other managerial controls, and guidance.”43 FEMA uses Mission assignments to task other Federal departments and agencies to provide direct assistance during emergencies and disasters. Mission assignments are used to reimburse Federal entities as well. The mission assignment process has been expanded to include Pre-Scripted Mission Assignments (PSMAs), which are prepared in advance to facilitate a more rapid response and standardize the process of developing mission assignments.44 Mission assignments can be issued from three FEMA-managed entities: Joint Field Offices (JFOs), Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs), and the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).45

(2) **Federal Response Operational Coordinating Structures/Personnel and State Response Entities**

The following are several of the key NRF operational coordinating structures and personnel used to manage emergencies and disasters. Several of these terms are derived from NIMS, which is discussed further below.

**Local/State Emergency Operations Center (EOC).** The location at which an effected municipal or State government coordinates the information and resources necessary to support the local or State incident management activities.46

**Incident Command Post (ICP).** The field location at which the primary tactical-level, scene incident command functions are performed. The ICP may be co-located with the incident base or other incident

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42 Id. at 22.
46 NRF, supra note 25, at 16-17.
facilities. The Incident Commander or Unified Command (in the event of a multi-agency or multi-jurisdictional response) is located at the ICP.

**Area Command (Unified Area Command).** An organization established to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are being handled by separate ICPs, or to oversee the management of a complex incident dispersed over a large area, and to broker critical resources. The Area Command does not have operational responsibility; that authority resides with the Incident Commander. The Area Command can become a Unified Area Command when incidents are multi-jurisdictional or involve multiple agencies.

**National Operations Center (NOC).** In the event of a major disaster or emergency declaration, the NOC acts as the principal operations center for DHS, coordinating and integrating information from NOC components to provide situational awareness for the Federal Government. Additionally, the NOC serves as the national fusion center, collecting information on threats and hazards across the entire integrated national preparedness system.

**National Response Coordination Center (NRCC).** The NRCC is a multiagency coordination center located at FEMA headquarters. When activated, its staff coordinates overall Federal support for major disasters and emergencies. FEMA maintains the NRCC as a component of the NOC for incident support operations.

**National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC).** The NICC monitors the Nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources on an ongoing basis. During an incident, the NICC provides a coordinating forum to share information across infrastructure and key resource sectors. It is both an operational component of the DHS National Protection and Programs Directorate and a watch operations element of the NOC.

**Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC).** The SIOC is the FBI’s worldwide EOC. It maintains situational awareness over threats and provides FBI headquarters, field offices, and overseas legal attaches with timely notification of strategic information. It shares information with EOCs at all other levels of government. It provides command, control, and communications connectivity and a common operating picture for managing FBI responses worldwide. In the event of an incident, the SIOC establishes the headquarters command post and develops connectivity to field command posts and Joint Operations Centers (discussed further below).

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48 Id.
49 NRF, supra note 25, at 24.
50 Id.
52 NRF, supra note 25, at 25.
Joint Field Office (JFO). The JFO is the primary Federal incident management field structure. It is a temporary facility established locally to coordinate Federal, State, tribal, and local governments, as well as private sector and non-governmental organizations, with primary responsibility for response and recovery. The JFO is organized and managed in a manner consistent with NIMS principles. The JFO uses the Incident Command System (ICS) structure but does not manage on-scene operations. Instead, the JFO provides support to on-scene efforts and conducts broader support operations that extend beyond the incident site.\(^{53}\)

Unified Coordination Group (UCG). This group is comprised of senior leaders from Federal and State interests, and in certain circumstances tribal governments, local jurisdictions, and the private sector. UCG members must have significant jurisdictional authority and responsibility over the response at issue. The composition will vary depending on the type and scope of incident. The UCG focuses on the JFO mission – not on managing on-scene operations, but providing support to those operations. When incidents affect multiple jurisdictions or the entire nation, multiple JFOs and UCGs may be established.\(^{54}\)

Unified Coordination Staff (UCS). The UCS is led by the UCG. Personnel from State and Federal departments and agencies and other entities (including the private sector and non-governmental organizations) make up the UCS and may be assigned to work at various facilities (the JFO, staging areas, field offices, etc.).\(^{55}\)

Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JOC is the focal point for all investigative law enforcement activities during a terrorist or other significant criminal incident. The JOC is managed by the FBI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) (also known as the SFLEO in an incident, as described below). It becomes a component of the JFO when the JFO is established.\(^{56}\)

Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC). FEMA maintains an RRCC in each of its 10 regional offices (the regional offices coincide with the 10 FEMA Regions). When activated, RRCC’s are multi-agency coordination centers staffed in anticipation of or in response to an incident. They operate under the direction of the FEMA Regional Administrator. The RRCC staff coordinates response efforts and maintains connectivity with FEMA headquarters, State EOCs, and other Federal and State coordination centers. The UCG will assume responsibility for coordinating Federal response activities at the incident level once established, freeing the RRCC to address other incidents.\(^{57}\)

Principal Federal Official (PFO). By Federal law and by Presidential directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the PFO for coordination of all domestic incidents requiring multiagency Federal response. The Secretary may elect to designate a single field representative to serve as his or her

\(^{53}\) NIMS, supra note 26, at 65.
\(^{54}\) NRF, supra note 25, at 19.
\(^{55}\) Id.
\(^{57}\) NRF, supra note 25, at 23.
primary representative to ensure consistency of Federal support and the overall effectiveness of the Federal incident management.\textsuperscript{58}

**Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO).** The FCO is a senior FEMA official who manages and coordinates Federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies.\textsuperscript{59} The President appoints an FCO after a recommendation by the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The FCO executes Stafford Act authorities, including committing FEMA resources and giving mission assignments to other Federal departments and agencies. The role of the FCO in a Stafford Act response is discussed further below.

**Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official (SFLEO).** The SFLEO is the senior law enforcement official from the agency with primary jurisdictional responsibility as directed by statute, Presidential directive, existing Federal policies, and/or the Attorney General. The SFLEO directs the intelligence and investigative law enforcement operations related to the incident and supports the law enforcement component of the on-scene Unified Command. In the event of a terrorist incident, this official will normally be the FBI Senior Agent-in-Charge (SAC).\textsuperscript{60}

**Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC).** The FRC manages Federal resource support activities related to non-Stafford Act incidents when Federal-to-Federal support is requested from DHS by another Federal agency. The FRC is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of resources to the requesting agency. Requesting agencies will appoint a senior official to work in coordination with the FRC as part of the UCG.\textsuperscript{61}

**Governor’s Authorized Representative (GAR).** The GAR, who is in most cases also the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) under a Stafford Act response, represents the Governor of the State. The GAR/SCO is most often a senior leader in the State’s emergency response organization and is a member of the UCG.\textsuperscript{62}

**Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO).** The DCO serves as DoD’s single point of contact at the JFO for the UCG. With few exceptions, DSCA requests originating at the JFO will be coordinated with and processed through the DCO. The DCO may have a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) consisting of a staff and military liaison officers in order to facilitate coordination and support to activated Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Specific responsibilities of the DCO (subject to modification based on the situation) include processing requirements for military support, forwarding

\textsuperscript{58} Congress limited the Secretary of Homeland Security’s ability to designate a “field representative” during a Stafford Act declared major disaster or emergency by barring such an appointment absent a specific waiver. The Secretary of Homeland Security may designate a person to operate in the field that is not titled “Principal Federal Official.” The position must report through the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO). The Secretary of Homeland Security must notify Congress if she/he appoints someone to function as a field representative. 2010 DHS Appropriations Act, § 522.


\textsuperscript{60} JFO SOP, supra note 56, at 15.


\textsuperscript{62} JFO SOP, supra note 56, at 15.
mission assignments to the appropriate military organizations through DoD-designated channels, and assigning military liaisons, as appropriate, to activated ESFs. Currently, DoD has assigned DCOs at each of the ten Department of Homeland Security/FEMA regions. (See Figure 2-1 below).

**Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander.** Based on the size and type an incident a combatant commander may utilize a Joint Task Force (JTF) to command Federal (Title 10) forces responding to the event. If a JTF is established, its command and control element will be co-located with the PFO at the JFO to ensure coordination and unity of effort. A JTF commander exercises operational control of all allocated DoD resources (excluding USACE resources, National Guard (NG) personnel in State Active Duty or Title 32 status, and, in some circumstances, DoD personnel in support of the FBI). The use of the JTF command and control element does not replace the requirement for a DCO/DCE at the JFO interfaced with the UCG. Requests for DoD assistance must still be coordinated through the DCO. The JTF command element will work with UCG members to ensure a clear understanding of the Federal military roles and responsibilities during the operation.\(^{63}\)

![Figure 2-1. Map of FEMA Regions\(^ {64}\)](image)

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\(^{63}\) Id. at 20.

Dual Status Commander (DSC). The National Defense Authorization Act for 2012\textsuperscript{65} stated when Federal forces and the NG simultaneously provide support to civil authorities, appointment of a DSC should be the usual and customary command and control arrangement.\textsuperscript{66} This arrangement helps Federal and NG personnel unify efforts in response to a major disaster or emergency. This includes Stafford Act major disaster and emergency response missions. A DSC maintains a commission in both a Title 10 and Title 32 capacity, and is subject to orders from both the State and Federal chains of command. This unique status serves as a vital link between the two. The use of DSCs have become common for incident response and special events since 2004. DSCs receive their appointment in one of two ways. First, under 32 U.S.C. § 315, an active duty Army or Air Force officer may be detailed to the Army or Air NG of a State. Second, under 32 U.S.C. § 325, a member of a State’s Army or Air NG may be ordered to active duty. Regardless of method of appointment, the Secretary of Defense must authorize the dual status, and the Governor of the effected State must consent.\textsuperscript{67}


\textsuperscript{66} National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 515(c), 125 Stat. 1395 (2011), 32 U.S.C. § 317, note. Despite a DSC being the usual and customary arrangement, this language “does not limit, in any way, the authorities of the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Governor of any State to direct, control, and prescribe command and control arrangements for forces under their command.” Id.

Figure 2-268

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Figure 2-3 outlines the interplay between these entities and organizations.

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69 See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-28, CIVIL SUPPORT (14 Sept. 2007). This publication has been updated to a 2018 version, the diagram is based on one first seen in JP 3-28 and not in the new version or in the version published in 2013. It has been updated by the authors to reflect changes since original publication.
7. National Prevention Framework (NPF)

The NPF provides guidance to leaders and practitioners at all levels of government, private and non-profit sector partners, and individuals, on how to prevent or stop a threatened or actual act of terrorism.\textsuperscript{70} It helps achieve the National Preparedness Goal of a secure and resilient Nation that is optimally prepared to prevent an imminent terrorist attack within the United States by:

- Describing the core capabilities needed to prevent an imminent act of terrorism;
- Aligning key roles and responsibilities to deliver Prevention capabilities in time-sensitive Situations;
- Describing coordinating structures that enable all stakeholders to work together; and
- Laying the foundation for further operational coordination and planning that will synchronize Prevention efforts within the whole community and across the Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery mission areas.\textsuperscript{71}

As mentioned above, thirty-two core capabilities were developed and published in conjunction with the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). Of the thirty-two, the seven Prevention core capabilities are:

- Planning;
- Public Information and Warning;
- Operational Coordination;
- Forensics and Attribution;
- Intelligence and Information Sharing;
- Interdiction and Disruption; and
- Screening, Search, and Detection.\textsuperscript{72}

As with other frameworks, there are multiple coordinating structures for Prevention (some are shared with the other mission areas). Departments or agencies, as well as private and nonprofit entities with unique missions in Prevention, bring additional capabilities to bear through these structures. Coordinating structures can function on multiple levels, to include national-level coordinating

\textsuperscript{70} For example, the Prevention framework describes the process through which the public is warned regarding credible terrorist threats through National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) alerts. DHS, NATIONAL PREVENTION FRAMEWORK 15 (June 2016), \textit{available at} https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=793534 (last visited on April 18, 2021).

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{72} DHS, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL, supra note 21.
structures such as the DHS National Operations Center (NOC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the DoD National Military Command Center (NMCC), the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), and others. Field coordinating structures, such as the FBI JTTFs and Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs), State and major urban area fusion centers, State and local counterterrorism and intelligence units, and other entities, also play a critical role as coordinating structures in preventing imminent acts of terrorism.

8. National Mitigation Framework (NMF)

The NMF establishes a common forum for coordinating and addressing how the Nation manages risk through mitigation capabilities. It describes mitigation roles for government, NGOs, and private entities. The NMF also addresses how the Nation will develop, employ, and coordinate mitigation core capabilities to reduce loss of life and property due to disasters. Building on a wealth of evidence-based knowledge and community experience, the NMF seeks to increase risk awareness and leverage mitigation products, services, and assets across the whole community.

The NMF advances operational planning throughout the whole preparedness community by offering a comprehensive approach to reducing the impact of disasters through the development, implementation, and coordination of seven mitigation core capabilities. The NMF seven core capabilities are: Planning, Public Information and Warning, Operational Coordination, Community Resilience, Long-term Vulnerability Reduction, Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment, and Threats and Hazard Identification.

As with the NRF and other mission area frameworks, the mitigation mission area and NRF refer to the multiple levels of coordinating structures already discussed. Numerous existing coordinating structures already support the mitigation mission area, such as the National Security Council (NSC). The Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG) is a coordinating structure established to coordinate mitigation efforts across the Federal Government and to assess the effectiveness of mitigation capabilities as they are developed and deployed across the Nation. The MitFLG includes relevant local, State, tribal, and Federal organizations. It is chaired by FEMA in consultation with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership. Consistent with PPD 1 (Organization of the

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74 Under PPD-8, mitigation capabilities “include, but are not limited to, community-wide risk reduction projects; efforts to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure and key resource lifelines; risk reduction for specific vulnerabilities from natural hazards or acts of terrorism; and initiatives to reduce future risks after a disaster has occurred.” See PPD-8, supra note 16.
76 Id. at 39-40.
77 Id. at 15.
78 Id. at 33.
National Security Council System), the MitFLG coordinates with the relevant National Security Council Interagency Policy Committees.79

9. National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF)

The NDRF was published in September 2011 as a guide to promote effective recovery from incidents. It provides guidance that enables effective recovery support to disaster-impacted States, tribes, and local jurisdictions. The NDRF also provides a flexible structure that enables disaster recovery managers to operate in a unified manner. Last, the NDRF focuses on how best to restore, redevelop, and revitalize the health, social, economic, natural, and environmental fabric of the community after an incident.80 The NDRF defines:

- Core recovery principles;
- Roles and responsibilities of recovery coordinators and other stakeholders;
- A coordinating structure to facilitate communication and collaboration among stakeholders;
- Guidance for pre- and post-disaster recovery planning; and
- The overall process by which communities can capitalize on opportunities to rebuild stronger, smarter, and safer.81

As with the other frameworks, the NDRF discusses the development and implementation of core capabilities. The eight core capabilities82 for the NDRF are:

- Planning;
- Public Information and Warning;
- Operational Coordination;
- Economic Recovery;
- Health and Social Services;
- Housing;

79 Id. at 34.
81 Id.
• Infrastructure Systems; and

• Natural and Cultural Resources.

The NDRF introduces four new concepts and terms: Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC), State or Tribal Disaster Recovery Coordinators (SDRCs or TDRCs), Local Disaster Recovery Managers (LDRMs), and Recovery Support Functions (RSFs). The six new RSFs provide a structure to facilitate problem solving, improve access to resources, and foster coordination. The RSFs are similar in concept to ESFs in that each RSF has coordinating and primary Federal agencies, as well as supporting organizations that operate together with local, State and tribal government officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private sector partners. As with the ESFs, RSFs can be selectively activated, as needed. The FDRC, SDRC/TDRC, and LDRM are three new positions that provide focal points for incorporating recovery considerations into the decision-making process and monitoring the need for adjustments in assistance, where necessary and feasible throughout the recovery process.

10. National Protection Framework

The National Protection Framework, Second Edition, was published in June 2016 and describes what the whole community—from community members to senior government leaders—should do to safeguard against acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and other threats or hazards. This Framework helps achieve the NPG of a secure and resilient Nation that is prepared to protect against the greatest risks in a manner that allows American interests, aspirations, and way of life to thrive. This Framework provides guidance to leaders and practitioners at all levels of government; the private and nonprofit sectors; and individuals by:

• Describing the core capabilities needed to achieve the Protection mission area and end-state of “creating conditions for a safer, more secure, and more resilient Nation;”

• Aligning key roles and responsibilities to deliver Protection capabilities;

• Describing coordinating structures that enable all stakeholders to work together; and

• Laying the foundation for further operational coordination and planning that will synchronize Protection efforts within the whole community and across the Prevention, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery mission areas.

The NPG identifies 11 core capabilities for the Protection mission area: Planning; Public Information and Warning; Operational Coordination; Intelligence and Information Sharing; Interdiction and

83 Id. at 36.
84 Id at 44.
86 Id.
Disruption; Screening, Search, and Detection; Access Control and Identity Verification; Cybersecurity; Physical Protective Measures; Risk Management for Protection Programs and Activities; and Supply Chain Integrity and Security. The first three core capabilities—Planning, Public Information and Warning, and Operational Coordination—are common to all five Frameworks. The Protection and Prevention mission areas share three core capabilities: Intelligence and Information Sharing; Interdiction and Disruption; and Screening, Search, and Detection. The Protection Framework provides detailed descriptions of each core capability and the relationships to the other mission areas.88

Similar to the other NPS Frameworks, the Protection Framework describes coordinating structures that provide the mechanisms to develop and deliver the core capabilities. In the context of the National Protection Framework, coordinating structures support protection program implementation. Additionally, the coordinating structures strengthen the Nation’s ability to increase the protective posture when required to augment operations that take place during periods of heightened alert, incident response, or in support of planned events. The coordinating structures are used to conduct planning, implement training and exercise programs, promote information sharing, shape research and development priorities and technical requirements, address common vulnerabilities, align resources, and promote the delivery of Protection capabilities.89

11. National Incident Management System (NIMS)

HSPD-5 directed the Secretary of Homeland Security coordinate with other Federal department and agencies along with State, local, and tribal governments to develop a NIMS. The Secretary of Homeland Security remains responsible for administration of the NIMS. First published in 2004, NIMS provided a consistent nationwide template to enable Federal, State, tribal, and local governments as well as non-governmental organizations and private entities to work together to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents.90 Since then, NIMS has been revised to reflect input from a broad variety of stakeholders. In addition, lessons learned from recent incidents were considered in the latest version. NIMS is not an operational management plan. Instead, it is a core set of doctrine, concepts, terminology, and organizational processes intended to enable efficient and collaborative management of incidents.91

As with the Stafford Act, NIMS is based on the premise that most incidents begin and end locally. Additionally, most incidents are managed on a daily basis at the lowest possible geographical, organizational, and jurisdictional level.92 NIMS focuses on the following elements of preparedness: planning; procedures and protocols; training and exercises; personnel qualifications and certification; and, equipment certification.93 NIMS also stresses a unified approach to management and response activities, and that all levels of governments and organizations must identify their capabilities before incidents occur. NIMS comprises three major components:

87 Id. at 1-2.
88 Id. at 11-12.
89 Id. at 21.
90 NIMS, supra note 26, at iii.
91 Id. at 4.
92 Id. at 10.
93 Id. at 50.
a. Communications and Information Management. NIMS emphasizes that well planned, established, and utilized communications are critical for enabling the dissemination of information during an incident.94 Common plans, standards and communication architecture help to facilitate interoperability and maintain a constant flow of information during an incident.95 As with incident response in general, communication systems should be flexible and scalable to effectively manage any situation.

b. Resource Management. According to NIMS, resource management is divided into three sections: (1) Resource Management Preparedness; (2) Resource Management During an Incident; and (3) Mutual Aid.96

c. Command and Coordination. NIMS incorporates the existing Incident Command System (ICS) and Multi-Agency Coordination Systems (MACS) as the command structure for response to all hazards at all levels of government.97 The ICS works at the tactical level, organizing the on-scene operations.98 In comparison, MACS coordinate activities above the field level and can be either informal or formal. Formal coordination addresses issues before an incident occurs and is the preferred process.99

HPSD-5 authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a mechanism to ensure the ongoing management and maintenance of NIMS. The National Integration Center (NIC) was established to assist government and private sectors in implementing NIMS and to provide for its refinement.100 As part of this process, NIMS notes the continued development of science and technology as playing a critical role in improving response capabilities.

12. Other Significant Response Plans, Authorities, and Policies Related to the National Preparedness Framework

When DHS initiates the response mechanisms of the NRF, including the ESFs, Support Annexes, and Incident Annexes, existing interagency plans that address incident management are incorporated as supporting plans and/or operational supplements to the NRF. For incidents not led by DHS, other Federal agency response plans provide the primary Federal response protocol. Common interagency plans responders may encounter during such incidents include the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, more commonly called the National Contingency Plan (NCP), and the National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). Agencies should note the NRF may modify their responsibilities in the event of a major disaster or emergency.

94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 6-11.
97 Id. at 3.
98 Id. at 24.
99 Id. at 19.
100 Id. at iii.
a. The National Contingency Plan (NCP)

The NCP\textsuperscript{101} was developed pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or Clean Water Act of (1972). It sets out procedures for preventing and responding to oil discharges into navigable waters and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants into the environment. The NCP provides that a predesignated on-scene coordinator (OSC) shall direct response efforts at the scene of a discharge or release. Inland, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead response agency and provides OSCs for responses. In coastal areas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead response agency for coordinating the Federal response. Executive Order 12580 authorizes the establishment of the National Response Team (NRT) for planning and preparing for response actions; designates the EPA and the Coast Guard as co-chairs; and designates responsibilities of other agencies on the NRT and on Regional Response Teams.\textsuperscript{102} Generally, the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy (DOE) will provide the OSC and lead the response to the release of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants when the incident is on or comes from a facility or vessel under the DoD or DOE control, custody, or jurisdiction, respectively.\textsuperscript{103} Whether or not the NRF is activated, the OSCs apply NIMS and Incident Command principles during a response.

ESF #10 governs the response to oil and hazardous materials. Although the EPA is the ESF #10 coordinator under the NRF, either the EPA or DHS/Coast Guard will serve as the primary agency for ESF #10 response actions, depending on whether the incident is in the inland or coastal zone (the role of primary agencies under the ESFs are discussed above). The NCP is considered an operational supplement to the NRF. If the NRF or ESF #10 is activated for an oil discharge or hazardous material release, the NCP will serve as the basis for actions taken in support of the NRF.\textsuperscript{104}

b. The National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP)

Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) to develop the first National Emergency Communications Plan (NECP). Title XVIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002,\textsuperscript{105} as amended, calls for the NECP to be developed in coordination with stakeholders from all government levels and with members from the private sector. DHS worked with stakeholders from Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies to develop this strategic plan establishing a national vision for the future state of emergency communications. The vision is to “[e]nable the Nation’s emergency response community to communicate and share information securely across communications technologies in real-time, including all levels of government, jurisdictions,

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\textsuperscript{103} 40 C.F.R. § 300 (2017).


\textsuperscript{105} HSA, supra note 6.
disciplines, organizations, and citizens impacted by any threats or hazards event”. Emergency Support Function 2 of the NRF, Communications, supplements the NECP and sets out procedures for coordinating the provision of temporary national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications support in areas impacted by a major disaster or emergency.

c. Nuclear/Radiological Incidents

The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA) of the NRF supersedes the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP) of 1996. The NRIA describes the policies, situations, concepts of operations, and responsibilities of the Federal departments and agencies governing the immediate response and short-term recovery activities for incidents involving release of radioactive materials. The incidents may result from inadvertent or deliberate acts. Pursuant to the incident annex paradigm, when DHS exercises domestic incident management functions, it is supported by other Federal agencies that are either “coordinating” or “cooperating” agencies.

“Coordinating agencies” provide the leadership, expertise, and authorities to implement critical and specific nuclear/radiological aspects of the response and facilitate nuclear/radiological aspects of the response in accordance with those authorities and capabilities. The coordinating agencies are those Federal agencies that own, have custody of, authorize, regulate, or are otherwise assigned responsibility for the nuclear/radioactive material, facility, or activity involved in the incident. “Cooperating agencies” include other Federal agencies that provide additional technical and resource support specific to nuclear/radiological incidents to the Department of Homeland Security and the coordinating agencies.

When the Department of Homeland Security is not exercising domestic incident management responsibilities, the coordinating agency, as determined by their authorities, will be the responsible agency. The Department of Defense is the coordinating agency for incidents involving DoD-owned or operated nuclear facilities, materials shipped by or for the Department of Defense, nuclear weapons, and DoD satellites containing radioactive materials that impact within the United States.


NSPD-46/HSPD-15 detail the policy of the United States for combating terrorism and reaffirm the lead agencies for the management of various aspects of the counterterrorism effort. They recognize that States have primary responsibility in responding to terrorist incidents, including actual events, and the Federal Government provides assistance as required.

108 Id. at 22.
109 Id. at 26.
110 NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 46/HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 15, “U.S. STRATEGY AND POLICY IN THE WAR ON TERROR” (classified), March 6, 2006.
e. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act\textsuperscript{111}

Title 50 of Chapter 40 of the U.S. Code concerns the U.S. Government’s response to the proliferation of and use or threat to use nuclear, chemical, or biological WMD or related materials and technologies.\textsuperscript{112} Title 50 U.S.C. § 2313 directs the Secretary of Defense to designate an official within the Department of Defense as Executive Agent to coordinate DoD assistance with Federal, State, and local entities when responding to incidents involving such materials. The Secretary of Defense has appointed the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA)) as Executive Agent. The Department of Energy (DOE) was directed to designate an Executive Agent for its nuclear, chemical, and biological response, and DoD and DOE Executive Agents are responsible for coordinating assistance with Federal, State, and local officials when responding to threats involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.\textsuperscript{113}

B. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act)

The Stafford Act provides for assistance from the Federal government to States in the event of emergencies or natural and other disasters.\textsuperscript{114} The Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for Federal emergency and disaster assistance to State and local governments. Congress’ intent in passing the Stafford Act was to provide for an “orderly and continuing means of assistance by the Federal government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters.”\textsuperscript{115} The Stafford Act sought, among other things, to: 1) broaden the scope of disaster relief programs; 2) encourage the development of comprehensive disaster preparedness and assistance plans, programs, and capabilities of State and local governments; and 3) provide Federal assistance programs for both public and private losses sustained in disasters.\textsuperscript{116}

Through the Stafford Act, Congress delegated to the President emergency powers that may be exercised in the event of a declared major disaster or emergency. Generally, Federal Stafford Act assistance is given upon request from a State Governor\textsuperscript{117} provided certain conditions are met;


\textsuperscript{112} 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (2012 & Supp. IV 2017) provides the Federal authority for the mobilization of Reserve Components in response to the use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction.


\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{117} An example where a request is not required is in the case of an emergency in an area where the Federal Government is determined to have primary responsibility, as discussed below. \textit{See} 42 U.S.C. § 5191(a) (2012 & Supp. IV 2017). Additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 5170a(5) states that in a major disaster, the President may provide accelerated Federal assistance in the absence of a request where necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage as long as
primarily that the Governor certifies that the State lacks the resources and capabilities to manage the consequences of an event without Federal assistance. The Stafford Act lists the roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies and departments when providing both major disaster and emergency assistance, and it outlines the types of assistance that affected State(s) may receive from the Federal Government. (See Table 2-4 below).

FEMA operates under the Stafford Act and is the lead Federal agency for Stafford Act responses, focusing its efforts on managing the consequences of disasters and emergencies. FEMA’s actions under the Stafford Act are generally driven by requests from State and local governments. Figure 2-3 provides an overview of the process of providing Federal support to States under the Stafford Act.

To coordinate the relief efforts of all Federal agencies in both major disasters and emergencies, the Stafford Act authorizes the President to appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) immediately after declaring a major disaster or emergency. The Stafford Act also requires the President to request that a Governor seeking Federal assistance designate a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to coordinate State and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the Federal government.118

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEPARTMENTS &amp; AGENCIES</th>
<th>ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Office of the President (President or as delegated)</td>
<td>Major Disaster Assistance—upon request of a State Governor. Provide specified essential services; coordinate disaster relief activities; direct Federal agency assistance to States and localities; take other action as consistent with the Act and within delegated authority. Emergency Assistance, upon request of a State Governor or sua sponte: Direct Federal agencies to provide resources and technical and advisory assistance; provide essential services; coordinate all disaster relief assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Coordinating Officer</td>
<td>Major Disaster and Emergency Assistance: Establish field offices; coordinate relief efforts; take other necessary actions within authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Support Teams</td>
<td>Assist the Federal Coordinating Officer in carrying out his or her responsibilities in a major disaster or emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Governor(s)</td>
<td>Request declaration by the President that a major disaster or emergency exists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Agencies</td>
<td>Provide, consistent with appropriate authorities and upon request from the President: Personnel for the Emergency Support Teams; and, assistance in meeting immediate threats to life and property</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To coordinate the relief efforts of all Federal agencies in both major disasters and emergencies, the Stafford Act authorizes the President to appoint a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) immediately after declaring a major disaster or emergency. The Stafford Act also requires the President to request that a Governor seeking Federal assistance designate a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to coordinate State and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the Federal government.118


Chapter 2
National Framework for Incident Management
resulting from a major disaster or emergency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FEMA</th>
<th>Prepare, sponsor, and direct Federal response plans and programs for emergency preparedness; provide hazard mitigation assistance in the form of property acquisition &amp; relocation assistance.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Upon President’s direction, provide “emergency work” to protect life and property prior to declaration of major disaster or emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American National Red Cross and other relief organizations</td>
<td>Major Disaster: As a condition of receiving assistance, comply with regulations relating to non-discrimination and other regulations as deemed necessary by the President for effective coordination of relief efforts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2-4. Stafford Act Roles and Responsibilities

Figure 2-3.119

The FCO may utilize relief organizations, such as State relief organizations and the American National Red Cross (ANRC). The use may be for the distribution of emergency supplies, such as food and medicine, and in reconstruction or restoration of essential services, such as housing. The FCO may coordinate all relief efforts. However, States, localities, and relief organizations must agree with the courses of action. The President must form Emergency Support Teams (EST) of Federal personnel to be deployed to the area of the disaster or emergency. By delegation, the FCO may activate ESTs, composed of Federal program and support personnel, which deploy into an area affected by a major disaster or emergency. The EST is the principal interagency group that supports the FCO in coordinating the overall Federal disaster assistance.

1. Requests for Emergency or Major Disaster Declarations

Under the Stafford Act, the Governor of an affected State may request the declaration of a major disaster or emergency. The Governor must demonstrate, as a prerequisite for receiving assistance, both that the State’s response plans have been activated and that State and local capabilities are inadequate for an effective response. The Stafford Act’s definitions of “emergency” and “major disaster” are referenced in many of the legal documents related to incident management and are used consistently throughout this chapter.

a. Major Disasters

A “major disaster” is defined as follows:

[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.

A major disaster encompasses fires, floods, and explosions, regardless of cause, when such acts cause damage of sufficient severity to warrant Federal disaster assistance, as determined by the President. A WMD event involving fire or explosion, including the detonation of a high-yield explosive, would likely meet this threshold. Following the letter of the law strictly, a chemical, radiological, or biological WMD event in the United States will qualify as a major disaster only if it results in a fire, flood, or explosion. A WMD event of catastrophic proportions could warrant treatment as both a major disaster and an emergency.

121 44 C.F.R. § 206.43 (2017). These teams may also be called emergency response teams.
Major disaster assistance is a more comprehensive grant of Federal aid for long-term consequence management. In a major disaster, the President has broad authority to assist States and localities. To receive Federal assistance, a Governor must not only indicate to the President that the State does not have the capacity or resources to mount an effective response, but he or she must also furnish information on the measures that have or will be taken at the State and local levels to mitigate the effects of the disaster. In addition, the Governor must certify that State and local government obligations and expenditures will comply with all applicable cost-sharing requirements of the Stafford Act.  

The President’s powers after the declaration of a major disaster include, but are not limited to, providing: specified technical and advisory assistance; temporary communications services; food; relocation assistance; legal services; crisis counseling assistance and training; unemployment assistance; emergency public transportation in the affected area; and fire management assistance on public or privately-owned forest or grassland. In addition, the President is authorized to direct Federal agencies to provide equipment, supplies and facilities to State and local governments; distribute food and medicine to victims; and perform work and services (such as search and rescue) necessary to save lives and protect property.

b. Emergencies

The Stafford Act defines “emergency” as follows:

[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.

An emergency is, more broadly, any situation in which Federal assistance is required to save lives, protect health and property, or mitigate or avert a catastrophe. Generally, the existence or threat of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive WMD would be deemed an “emergency,” if it overwhelms State and local authorities and warrants the assistance of the Federal Government.

Emergency authority granted to the President is similar to that authorized for handling major disasters, but not as extensive. Emergency assistance is more limited in scope and in time. Additionally, total assistance may not exceed $5 million for a single emergency, unless the President determines there is a continuing and immediate risk to lives, property, public health or safety, and necessary assistance will not otherwise be provided on a timely basis. In contrast to its provisions for major disasters, The Stafford Act authorizes the President to declare an emergency sua sponte, when the emergency

127 See id. § 5170b.
129 See id. § 5193.
“involves a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and authority.”  

In any emergency, the President may direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to use the authorities and resources granted to it under Federal law in support of State and local emergency assistance efforts to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. The President may coordinate all emergency relief assistance and provide technical and advisory assistance to affected State and local governments for the: performance of essential community services; issuance of hazard and risk warnings; broadcast of public health and safety information; and management, control and reduction of immediate threats to public safety. The President may also direct Federal agencies to provide emergency assistance; remove debris pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 5173; provide temporary housing assistance in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 5174; and assist State and local governments in the distribution of food, medicine, and other consumable supplies. The Stafford Act also authorizes the President, upon request from the Governor of an affected State, to provide “emergency work” essential for the preservation of life and property, by the Department of Defense for a maximum of ten days before the declaration of either an emergency or a major disaster.

2. Liability under the Stafford Act

The Stafford Act specifically provides for immunity from liability for certain actions taken by Federal agencies or employees of the Federal government pursuant to the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 5148 of the Stafford Act provides:

The Federal Government shall not be liable for any claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the Federal Government in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.

3. Categories of Agency Support Under the Stafford Act

Once an emergency or major disaster is declared, it means a State has requested assistance from the Federal Government (except in the case of the limited exception discussed above). The assistance given will typically take one of two forms: Direct Federal Assistance or Federal Operations Support.

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130 See id. § 5191(a).
131 See id. § 5192.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 See id. § 5170b(c).
135 See id. § 5148.
a. **Direct Federal Assistance** is assistance where one or more Federal departments or agencies provide goods and services to State and/or local governments. Direct Federal Assistance is authorized and reimbursed by FEMA and is subject to Federal-State cost sharing.

b. **Federal Operations Support** is assistance where one or more Federal departments or agencies provide goods or services to FEMA and/or other Federal agencies to enable them to provide direct Federal assistance or other supplemental Federal assistance. Federal operations support is requested by FEMA or another Federal department or agency. Federal operations support is authorized and reimbursed by FEMA and is not subject to Federal-State cost sharing.

4. **Interplay Between the Stafford Act and National Preparedness System (NPS)**

The following is a summary of how Stafford Act assistance typically occurs, with reference to relevant NPS concepts.

As the DHS NOC monitors for potential major disasters or emergencies, it will receive advance warning of an incident, at which time DHS may deploy representatives to State EOCs for situational assessment. Regional Response Coordination Centers (RRCCs) and other coordinating structures discussed above may be activated.

Immediately after the incident, local emergency personnel assess the situation. They may seek additional resources through mutual aid agreements or the State. State officials will mobilize State resources and may use mutual aid processes such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) to augment their resources. The Governor will activate the State emergency operations plan, declare a state of emergency, and may request a State/DHS joint Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA). State and Federal officials conduct the PDA in coordination with tribal/local officials as required and determine if the event warrants a request for a Presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency.

After a major disaster or emergency declaration, an RRCC coordinates initial activities until a JFO is established. If regional resources are overwhelmed or if it appears that the event may result in particularly significant consequences, DHS may deploy a national-level Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT). Depending on the scope and impact of the event, the NRCC carries out initial activations and mission assignments and supports the RRCC. The Governor appoints a State Coordinating Officer (SCO) to oversee State response and recovery efforts. A Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), appointed by the President in a Stafford Act declaration, coordinates Federal activities in support of the State.

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137 Example provided by *Overview of Stafford Act Support to States*, supra note 122.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
A JFO may be established locally to provide a central point for Federal, State, tribal, and local executives to coordinate their support. The UCG leads the JFO. The UCG may need to meet initially via conference calls to develop objectives and an initial action plan.\textsuperscript{143} The UCG coordinates field operations from the JFO. In coordination with State, tribal, and/or local agencies, ESFs are activated to assess the situation and identify response requirements. Federal agencies provide resources under DHS/FEMA mission assignments or their own authorities.\textsuperscript{144}

As immediate response priorities are met, recovery activities begin. The Stafford Act Public Assistance program provides disaster assistance to States, tribes, local governments, and certain private nonprofit organizations. As the need for full-time interagency coordination at the JFO decreases, the UCG plans for selective release of Federal resources and demobilization.\textsuperscript{145}

C. Immediate Response Authority (IRA)

1. Federal Military Commanders

Federal military commanders, heads of DoD Components, and/or responsible DoD civilian officials have IRA under DoDD 3025.18. In response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority, DoD officials may provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the United States.\textsuperscript{146} \textquotedblleft The civil authority’s request for immediate response should be directed to the installation commander or other appropriate DoD official responsible for the installation . . . .\textquotedblright \textsuperscript{147} The DoD official must exercise judgement in determining the maximum allowable distance from the installation that the immediate response may take place and should also, unless otherwise directed by a higher authority, prioritize DoD resources and requirements before addressing the civil authority’s request.\textsuperscript{148} IRA does not allow for actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory (for a detailed discussion, see the Chapters within on Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement and Civil Disturbance Operations).

Separately, per DoDD 3025.18., paragraph 4.i.4, any decision by an IRA to temporarily deploy resources requires notification to the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC). Commanders may not normally continue support under IRA beyond 72 hours. When using this

\textsuperscript{143} Id.
\textsuperscript{144} Id.
\textsuperscript{145} Id.
\textsuperscript{146} U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 3025.18, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES para. 4.i. (29 Dec. 2010) (C2, 19 Mar. 2018) [hereinafter DoDD 3025.18].
\textsuperscript{147} Id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{148} Id.
authority, DoD commanders shall reassess whether there remains a continued need for a DoD response as soon as practicable, but no later than 72 hours after the request for assistance was received.149

As noted in Chapter 1, Commanders must evaluate requests from civil authorities for assistance for:

- Cost – Who pays and the impact on DoD budget;
- Appropriateness – Whether it is in the interest of DoD to provide the requested support;
- Readiness – Impact on DoD’s ability to perform its primary mission;
- Risk – Safety of DoD forces;
- Legality – Compliance with the law; and
- Lethality – Potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces.150

2. State Governors

As the principle authority during State emergencies, Governors may direct an immediate response using NG personnel under State command and control (including personnel in a Title 32 status).151 However, NG personnel will not be placed in or extended in Title 32 status to conduct State immediate response activities.152 Additionally, State leadership must coordinate with the Chief of the NG Bureau to approve the continued use of personnel in a Title 32 status responding in accordance with IRA in excess of seventy-two hours.

D. Conclusion

The NPS and NIMS represent a significant shift from the pre-9/11 and pre-Hurricane Katrina approach of the Federal Government to domestic incident management. Although the Stafford Act remains the primary mechanism for Federal support to State and local authorities, and State requests for assistance still formally initiate the Federal response, the manner in which the Federal Government provides the assistance has changed. Consolidation, unification, anticipation, and systemization are the unifying themes of these key changes. It is possible that DoD personnel153 or assets could be among first responders to an emergency or disaster (e.g., an event near a DoD installation). In such a case, DoD personnel and assets might be employed pursuant to immediate response authority per DoDD 3025.18 before a larger Federal response is orchestrated under the NRF. Figure 2-4 below illustrates the process for local requests for assistance following a Stafford Act declaration and under IRA. Judge advocates should be familiar with and prepared to advise on the various authorities under which the Department of Defense may provide assistance to non-Federal entities.

149 Id.
150 Id. at 4e.
151 CHIEF NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, INST. 3000.04, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU DOMESTIC OPERATIONS (Jan. 24, 2018) para. 4.a. [hereinafter CNGBI 3000.04].
152 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 150, at para. 4.j.
153 Under 10 U.S.C. § 12304a, the Secretary of Defense may involuntarily order military reserve members and units to active duty to support a Governor’s request for assistance in response to an emergency or major disaster under the Stafford Act.
Figure 2-4
CHAPTER 3

STATUS AND RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPONENTS
RESPONDING TO DOMESTIC INCIDENTS

KEY REFERENCES:

- DoDI 6025.13 - Medical Quality Assurance (MQA) and Clinical Quality Management in the Military Health System (MHS), February 17, 2011, incorporating Change 2, April 1, 2020.
- DoDI 1215.13 - Ready Reserve Member Participation Policy, May 5, 2015.
- DoDD 5124.10- Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, March 14, 2018.

A. Introduction

This chapter discusses the various Service components and the importance of their designated status to the missions they perform. The Reserve Component (RC), which is comprised of the reserve of the various Services and the National Guard (NG) of States, plays a significant role in domestic support operations. The purpose of the RC is to provide trained and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or for other national security requirements.\(^1\) The RC has unique personnel/duty categories that are important to understand because they not only determine what benefits (e.g., medical and retirement) and protections (e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act or similar liability rules) RC members have, but they also determine the different types of duties that Service member may perform. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASD (M&RA)) is responsible for the supervision of RC affairs in the Department of Defense, and establishes the directives that provide guidance on RC activation, mobilization, and training.\(^2\)

Judge advocates practicing domestic operational law should also be familiar with the structure and roles of the U.S. Coast Guard, the NG in a non-Federal status, and the Civil Air Patrol because these entities have unique roles in domestic operations and will often work jointly with the Department of Defense during domestic civil support missions. For example, in addition to being a branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, the Coast Guard is also a Federal law enforcement agency and has the responsibility to act as a lead agency for numerous domestic missions including environmental response, maritime search and rescue, and maritime migrant interdiction.\(^3\) Additionally, while in a non-Federal status, the Air and Army NG have different authorities and capabilities in domestic missions. Finally, the Civil

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Air Patrol, a nonprofit corporation, also serves as an auxiliary to the United States Air Force. Understanding the roles of these entities ahead of time will assist judge advocates during future joint operations.

B. Reserve Component

The RC consists of the Army NG of the United States (ARNGUS), the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air NG of the United States (ANGUS), the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. Members of the RC are a true reflection and extension of civilian society. The defense of the United States is dependent upon the contributions of these citizens who prepare for active service during peacetime and enter active duty during times of national emergency.

1. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)

The USAR’s mission is to meet Department of the Army contingency operations and mobilization requirements. The Army Reserve makes up 20 percent of the Army’s organized units, but provides half of the Army’s combat support, and 25 percent of the Army’s mobilization base expansion capability.

2. U.S. Air Force Reserve (USAFR)

The USAFR is composed of 35 wings that report to one of 3 Numbered Air Forces (NAFs). With just over 10 percent of the Air Force’s manpower, the USAFR performs more than 30 percent of all Air Force missions. Like all of the other RCs, the role of the USAFR is to provide trained and ready forces to support its parent service. Yet the USAFR also has several unique missions. For example,

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7 AR 140-1, supra note 6, para. 1-8.
11 The unit program of the USAFR is called the “Category A” program. Personnel perform a minimum of one weekend of inactive duty training every month, referred to as a unit training assembly (UTA), and two weeks of active duty (annual training) for pay and points each fiscal year. The “Category B” program is the individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) program consisting of individual reservists assigned to major commands, field operating agencies, joint organizations, direct reporting units and outside agencies. Although some commands allow training with other units in the member’s local area, this decision is made on a case-by-case basis by the individual command. Inactive duty training periods for pay and points are usually performed during the week in increments of four IDTs per quarter. A day is worth two IDT points. Members also perform a 12–14 day paid active duty training tour annually with one point awarded for each day. In the “Category E” program, personnel do not earn pay for their service, but they do earn retirement points. Examples of this are service with the Civil Air Patrol Assistance Program and the Chaplain reinforcement designees.
the 731st Airlift Squadron, assigned to the 302nd Airlift Wing, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, is trained in the use of modular airborne firefighting systems that support local, State, and Federal agencies during wildland fire response. Additionally, the 53rd Weather Reconnaissance Squadron at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, performs hurricane reconnaissance exercises over the Atlantic, Pacific, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico and is the only DoD unit tasked to perform weather reconnaissance in support of the Department of Commerce.

3. U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR)

The Naval Reserve is composed of both commissioned units (self-contained, deployable assets with both personnel and mission equipment) and augmentation units (non-hardware units that provide trained manpower to active Navy units). Typically, members of the U.S. Naval Reserve (USNR) serve one weekend a month and an additional two weeks per year. However, members may also serve fulltime as Navy Full-Time Support or Navy Individual Augmentees. USNR unique missions include operation of a Mine Countermeasure Ships, Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Units, Helicopter Warfare Support Squadrons, and Navy Expeditionary forces such as Seabees and Cargo Handlers.

4. U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR)

The Marine Corps Reserve is composed of one Marine division, one Marine air wing, one service support group, and a Marine Corps Reserve support command. Marine Forces Reserve is the headquarters command for roughly 100,000 members of the USMCR. Unique units in this reserve branch include Civil Affairs Groups and Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Companies.

5. U.S. Coast Guard Reserve (USCGR)

The USCGR, like its active duty counterpart, is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security. Under Title 14 and Title 10 of the United States Code, the Coast Guard is at all times an armed force, as well as a law enforcement agency. As an armed force, the Coast Guard is required to maintain a state of readiness to function as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war or upon Presidential declaration. The Coast Guard, discussed more below, is a unique member of Joint Forces involved in civil support missions because of its mix of military, civil law enforcement, and regulatory authorities that allow it to respond to a wide variety of threats at home and abroad.

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Coast Guard reservists may be called in response to serious natural or man-made disasters, accidents, or catastrophes such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, or floods. The Secretary of Homeland Security has the authority to order members of the Coast Guard Ready Reserve to active duty without their consent in a domestic emergency. They may be used for not more than 120 days in any two-year period to augment the Regular Coast Guard. Coast Guard reservists perform unique missions as well. Among the most important is the staffing of Guard Port Security Units (PSUs)—specialized deployable security units that have served both domestically and abroad during times of war. Additionally, under 10 U.S.C. § 12302, the USCGR provided key support to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

6. NG of the United States (NGUS)

a. Overview

The terms Army NG of the United States (ARNGUS) and Air NG of the United States (ANGUS) refer to the NG as a RC of their respective service. The terms “Federal service” and “Federalized” are applied to NG members and units when ordered to active duty in their RC status or called into Federal service in their militia status under various sections of Title 10 of the U.S. Code. The terms “Army NG” (ARNG) and “Air NG” (ANG) refer to the Federally-recognized (and usually Federally trained and funded under Title 32, U.S. Code) organized militia of the various States—in other words, members of the NG in a “State status” pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution. The ARNG and ANG train for their Federal military missions according to congressionally-established disciplines under Title 32 of the U.S. Code, and they are under State control. ARNG/ANG members also take oaths to obey their respective governors and abide by State law. Upon enlistment/commissioning in the Army and Air NG, members simultaneously become members of the ARNGUS or ANGUS respectively, and thus may be called into Federal service.

Determining whether a NG member is in a State or Federal status can be critical to defining their roles and responsibilities. Status is also the primary factor for determining the applicability of law for such issues as benefits, protections, and liabilities. For instance, members of the NG only become subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) when Federalized (serving on active duty under Title 10); while in a State status they are subject to their respective State codes of military law.

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21 10 U.S.C. §§ 101(c), 10101 (2018). Per 10 U.S.C. §§ 10105 and 10111 (2018), the Army National Guard of the United States (ARNGUS) and Air National Guard of the United States (ANGUS) specifically consist of (1) Federally recognized units and organizations of the ARNG/ANG, and (2) members of the ARNG/ANG who are also members of the Army/Air Force Reserves.
justice. Additionally, some laws, such as the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) only apply to the NG when they are in a Title 10 status. NG members are usually relieved from duty in the NG when on Federal active duty as a member of the NGUS under 32 U.S.C. § 325. However, per the National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2004, 32 U.S.C. § 325 was amended to allow Federalized NG officers to retain command authority over State forces with the approval of POTUS and the consent of the Governor.

Guard personnel in Title 10 and Title 32 status receive Federal pay and are covered under the Federal Torts Claims Act. Title 10 personnel always receive Federal military retirement credit for the performance of duty. It is helpful to keep in mind that the determination of whether the NG is in Federal or State service does not rest on the entity that funds the activity, but rather which entity has command and control.

b. History

Congress created the organized militia (i.e., the NG) in 1903, and further strengthened its organization and training with The National Defense Act of 1916. However, during WWI, members of the NG were still drafted to serve during wartime. As a result, Congress amended the National Defense Act in 1933 to establish the dual status of the NG, creating the “two overlapping but distinct organizations” - the NG of the various States and the NG of the United States. Members of the NG would be relieved from their militia status while on Federal status, but would revert back to State status at the conclusion of their Federal service. In other words, this statute created the “dual enlistment” requirement that we know today.

c. Federal Missions

Like the other RCs, ARNGUS/ANGUS members and units integrate with the Active Component as part of a total force capability for responding to a wide range of national defense missions. To become an ARNGUS or ANGUS member, the Service member or Service member’s unit must be “Federally recognized,” and to be Federally recognized, the Service member or Service member’s unit must

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25 Section (G)(6)(a) of this chapter and section (A)(6) of chapter 2 discuss Dual Status Commanders in more detail.
30 This is a system that the Perpich Court recognized as a statutory creation, causing a member of the militia to be relieved from State status for the “entire period of Federal service.” Perpich, 496 U.S. 334, 345–346.
31 When ANG members enter Title 10 active duty, they are transferred from their ANG units and assigned to the Air National Guard Readiness Center (ANGRC), either directly or to a detachment of the ANGRC created for the purpose of deploying forces in support of an active duty mission. The ANGRC is a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of HQ USAF that executes NGB policy for the ANG and ANGUS and exercises elements of command and control over ANGUS units and members. It is a Title 10 organization with a 32 U.S.C. § 104 commander appointed on G-series orders. The ANGRC commander, currently a brigadier general, also serves as the Deputy Director of the ANG Directorate and is on Title 10 orders. See U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 10-402, MOBILIZATION PLANNING, (8 Mar. 2018). (Guidance Memorandum 7 Oct. 2020), https://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3/publication/afi10-402/afi10-402.pdf (last visited October 27, 2020). [hereinafter AFI 10-402].
NG units or members may be ordered to Federal active duty either (1) under various provisions of Title 10 (e.g., partial mobilization, volunteer duty, or pre-planned Combatant Commander support)\(^{34}\) as members of the ARNGUS or ANGUS;\(^{35}\) or (2) pursuant to the power of Congress to call out the militia to enforce Federal law, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions. Under the latter authority the NG is “called” to duty as part of the militia of the United States.\(^{36}\) Congress has given the President the authority to call the NG to active duty for these purposes.\(^{37}\) As discussed in section (G)(2) of this chapter, the NG can also be utilized for “Federal missions” in a Title 32 status under certain conditions. Authorized duty under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) includes support of operations at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense, for example, natural disaster response and assistance to the Department of Homeland Security on the Southwest border.

d. Other Title 10 Duty

In addition to duties performed when Federalized under the aforementioned authorities, members of the NG serve in a full-time Title 10 status in other ways. Members in this category include members of the NG Bureau (NGB), U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFO) in each State serving the NG,\(^{38}\) and any other NG members serving a tour of duty under Title 10 in support of NGB, Major Commands, or other “seats of government” tours.

(1) NG Bureau (NGB)

The NGB is designated under Title 10 as a “joint activity” of the Department of Defense, serving as the NG channel of communications between the Army and Air Force and the fifty-four States and territories.\(^{39}\) While the NGB serves as the coordination, administrative, policy, and logistical center for the ARNG and the ANG, NGB does not command and control either the Army or Air NG. Pursuant to its charter, NGB is responsible for, among other things, implementing Army and Air Force guidance, prescribing and monitoring training discipline and requirements, and supervising and administering the budgets of the ARNG and ANG.\(^{40}\)

Through the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, the Chief, NGB (CNGB), a four-star general, became a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with responsibilities advising the President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.\(^{41}\) As a member of the


\(^{34}\) 10 U.S.C §§ 12302, 12304b (2018); see also U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instr. 1215.06, UNIFORM RESERVE, TRAINING, AND RETIREMENT CATEGORIES FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS app. to encl. 4 (11 Mar. 2014) (C1, 19 May 2015).


\(^{36}\) U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15; 10 U.S.C. ch. 13 (these statutes also include the use of the Armed Forces of which the NGUS is part); 10 U.S.C. § 12406 (2018). Although these statutes are in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, members “called up” under these provisions retain their militia status.


\(^{39}\) 10 U.S.C. § 10501 (2018). The “54,” as they are often called, include the fifty States, Puerto Rico, Guam, U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia.

\(^{40}\) Dep’t of Defense, Dir. 5105.77, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB) (30 Oct. 2015) (C1, 10 Oct. 2017).

Joint Chiefs, CNGB is responsible for matters involving non-Federalized NG forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions.\textsuperscript{42} CNGB also serves as the principal advisor on all NG matters to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and to the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{43} CNGB has executive agent responsibility for planning and coordinating the execution of NG military support operations. The Director, ARNG, and the Director, ANG, are responsible to the CNGB and assist in executing the functions of NGB as they relate to their respective branches. The Chief Counsel’s office at NGB provides legal advice and assistance to the CNGB, the Directors of the Army and Air NGs, and to the full-time judge advocates at the State level. The Chief Counsel’s office normally employs a joint staff of military and civilian attorneys in a wide variety of disciplines, including administrative law, contract and fiscal law, international and operational law, environmental law, labor law, legislation, and litigation.

\textbf{(2) U.S. Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFO)}

Each State has a USPFO. As Title 10 officers assigned to the NGB, a USPFO is detailed for duty to a States and is accountable for all Federal funds and property provided to the NG of each State.\textsuperscript{44} The USPFO and his staff also perform functions relating to supply, transportation, internal review, data processing, contracting, and financial support for the State NG.\textsuperscript{45} When required, the USPFO staff can support AC or other RC forces on a reimbursable basis.

e. Other NG Authorities for Duty

Members of the NG perform Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and Annual Training (AT) in a Title 32 status. They can also perform Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS) in a Title 10 status to support the ANG and ARNG at Federal headquarters levels.\textsuperscript{46} As noted above, some “AGR” tours are also in a Title 10 status. They also perform ADOS in a Title 10 status to support Active Component requirements. Army and Air Force appropriations fund these missions.\textsuperscript{47}

\section*{C. Reserve Component Categories}

There are three Reserve categories: Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. Each member of the NG and Reserve is assigned within one of these categories. All members of the Army

\textsuperscript{43} Id.
\textsuperscript{44} 32 U.S.C. 708 (2018).
\textsuperscript{45} NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU REG. 130-6/AIR NATIONAL GUARD INSTRUCTION 36-2, UNITED STATES PROPERTY AND FISCAL OFFICER APPOINTMENT, DUTIES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES (1 Jul. 2007).
\textsuperscript{46} See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 135-200, ACTIVE DUTY FOR MISSIONS, PROJECTS, AND TRAINING FOR RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS, ch. 6 (26 Sept. 2017).
\textsuperscript{47} See id. Note that ch. 2, § 521 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, exempts reserve officers on the reserve active-status list (RASL) serving on active duty for three years or less from placement on the active-duty list (ADL). Previously, these soldiers were added to the ADL for promotion.
NG and Air NG, including those in the Inactive NG (ING), are in the Ready Reserve or Retired Reserve.48

1. Ready Reserve

The Ready Reserve consists of three subgroups: the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive NG. These are units and individuals subject to order to active duty to augment the Active Forces during a time of war or national emergency.49 This chapter will primarily address the Selected Reserve.

a. Selected Reserve

The Selected Reserve consists of Soldiers assigned to Reserve Component units, the Individual Mobilization Augmentation (IMA) Program, the Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentation (DIMA) Program, and the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) Program. These individuals and units essential to wartime missions and have priority for training and equipment over other RC categories.

(1) Drilling Unit Reservists

Sometimes called Troop Program Units (TPU), these units consist of members assigned to Tables of Organization and Equipment or Tables of Distribution and Allowances who normally perform at least 48 Inactive Duty Training (IDT) assemblies and not less than 15 days, exclusive of travel time, of Annual Training (AT) each year. In the alternative, they may perform Active Duty for Training (ADT) for no more than 30 days each year, unless otherwise specifically prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.50

(2) Individual Mobilization Augmentees and Drilling Individual Mobilization Augmentees

IMAs and DIMAs are RC members in a Selected Reserve status and not attached to an organized Reserve unit. The IMA Program function is to provide qualified soldiers to fill pre-designated mobilization required positions. IMAs are assigned to AC organizations or Selective Service System positions that must be filled to support mobilization requirements, contingency operations, operations other than war, or other specialized or technical requirements. Drilling IMA positions are identified as critical elements for mobilization during a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) requiring an incumbent to maintain an even higher level of proficiency than a regular IMA Soldier. Soldiers assigned to these positions are authorized to perform 48 paid IDT periods per year. All IMAs must perform a minimum of 12 days of AT each year.51

48 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INST. 1215.06, UNIFORM RESERVE TRAINING AND RETIREMENT CATEGORIES, para. E5.1 (11 Mar. 2014) (C2, 19 May 2105) [hereinafter DoDI 1215.06].

49 Id. para. E5.1.1. These individuals and units may be involuntarily ordered to active duty during war or national emergency under the authority of 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301, 12302 (2018) and 14 U.S.C. § 3713 (2018).


51 DoDI 1215.06, supra note 48, encl. 3, para. (3)(a)(2). The Army National Guard and the Air National Guard do not have IMA programs.
(3) Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) Program

The AGR Program consists of Soldiers performing active duty or full-time NG duty (FTNGD) for 180 days or more for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the Reserves.

b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)

The IRR is a pool of pre-trained individuals who have already served in Active Component units or in the Selected Reserve and have some part of their Military Service Obligation (MSO) remaining. Some members volunteer to remain in the IRR beyond their MSO or contractual obligation and participate in programs providing a variety of professional assignments and opportunities for earning retirement points and military benefits. IRR members are subject to involuntary active duty and fulfillment of mobilization requirements.

c. The Inactive NG (ING)

The ING consists of NG enlisted personnel in an inactive status in the Ready Reserve, not in the Selected Reserve, and attached to a specific NG unit. These individuals must muster once a year with their unit, but they do not participate in training activities. They may not train for points or pay and are not eligible for promotion.

2. Standby Reserve

The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who are maintaining their military affiliation without being in the Ready Reserve, but have been designated key civilian employees, or have a temporary hardship or disability. They are not required to perform training and are not part of units. The Standby Reserve is a pool of trained individuals who may be mobilized as needed to fill manpower needs in specific skills.

3. Retired Reserve

This category consists of all Reserve personnel transferred to the Retired Reserve. These individuals may voluntarily train with or without pay. All members retired for having completed the requisite

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52 Id. encl. 5, para. (2)(b). The IRR also may include personnel participating in officer training programs, including Merchant Marine Academy cadets, enlisted members awaiting IADT (except for those in the National Guard) who are not authorized to perform IDT, and members of the Delayed Entry Program. Id.

53 Id. encl. 5, para. (2)(c). The Air National Guard does not have an inactive status. Officers may not be transferred to the ING. See 32 U.S.C. §303 (2018).

54 DoDI 1215.06, supra note 49, encl. 5, para. 3. The Standby Reserve consists of the active status list and the inactive status list categories. Members designated as key employees and personnel who have not having fulfilled their statutory military service obligation, or temporarily assigned for hardship reasons intending to return to the Ready Reserve, are on the active status list. Those members who are not required to remain in an active program, but who retain Reserve affiliation in a non-participating status and whose skill may be of future use to the Armed Force are on the inactive status list. These members cannot participate in prescribed training and are not eligible for pay or promotion and do not accrue credit for years of service. The Army National Guard and Air National Guard do not have a Standby Reserve.

55 Id. encl. 5, para. (4)(a). The Retired Reserve consists of the following retired categories: (1) Reserve members who have completed the requisite qualifying years creditable for non-regular retired pay and are receiving retired pay (at, or after, age 60); (2) those who have completed the requisite qualifying years creditable for non-regular retired pay and are not
years of active duty service (Regular or Reserve) may be ordered to active duty when required by the Secretary of the military department concerned. 56

D. Reserve Component Training and Support

The Service Secretaries and the Commandant of the Coast Guard are required to ensure trained and qualified RC units and individuals are available for AD throughout the entire spectrum of requirements, including war, national emergency, contingency operations, military operations other than war, operational support, humanitarian operations, and at such other times as the national security may require. 57 Each military department has its own regulations and instructions that implement these training and support duties. 58

1. Training

All RC members receive training according to their assignment and required readiness levels. This training may be conducted in Active Duty (AD), Inactive Duty for Training (IDT), or Full-Time NG status.

a. Active Duty

Active Duty for Training (ADT) consists of structured individual and unit training, including on-the-job training, or educational courses to RC members. It includes Initial Active Duty training (IADT), Annual Training (AT), and Other Training Duty (OTD). Initial ADT includes basic military training and technical skill training required for all enlisted accessions. AT is the minimum period of active duty training that RC members must perform each year to satisfy the training requirements associated with their RC assignment. By DoD policy, members of the Selected Reserve must perform AT. For all members of Selected Reserve units, except for those in the NG, that training is not less than 14 days, and not less than 12 days for the Coast Guard Reserve. IMAs and DIMAs must perform 12 days of AT each year and NG units must perform full-time military training for at least 15 days each year. OTD is used to provide all other structured training, including on-the-job training and attendance at schools. ADT is funded by the RC, but may support active component operational requirements and missions. 60

yet 60 years of age, or are age 60 and have not applied for non-regular retirement pay; (3) those members retired for physical disability; (4) members who have completed 20 years of service creditable for regular retired pay, or are 30 percent or more disabled and otherwise qualified; (5) Reserve members who have completed the requisite years of active service and are receiving regular retired or retainer pay (regular enlisted personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps with 20 to 30 years of active Military Service who are transferred to the Fleet Naval Reserve or the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve on retirement, until they have completed 30 years of total active and retired or retainer service, are not included in this category); and (6) Reserve members drawing retired pay for other than age, service requirements, or physical disability. 56


57 DoDI 1215.06, supra note 48, encl. 2, para. 5. Combatant commanders have oversight responsibility for the training and readiness of assigned guard and reserve forces.

58 Id.

59 Id. encl. 3, para. (3)(a).

60 DoDI 1215.06, supra note 48, encl. 3, para. 2.
b. Inactive Duty for Training (IDT)

This purpose of this training is to provide structured individual and unit training, or educational courses to RC members. It includes regularly scheduled training periods, additional training periods, and equivalent training. The Reserve Component funds IDT.

c. Full-time NG Duty (FTNGD)

The NG performs their Federal training in a Title 32 status. Thus, while the various terms used above also apply to the NG, there are variations. Full time NG duty (FTNGD) is training or other duty (including support), other than inactive duty, performed by a member of the NG in a member’s status as a member of the NG of a State, territory under 32 U.S.C. §§ 316, 502, 503, 504, 505. It is considered “active service” pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 101(d)(3), but it is not considered “active duty” under Title 10. However, members on FTNGD generally receive the same pay and benefits as those on active duty in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 12602, subject to some exceptions. (For other reserve components, some of the categories above are considered “active duty.”) In 2006, as a result of the increasing use of the NG for domestic missions of national importance, such as the response to Hurricane Katrina, Congress amended 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) to expressly authorize the use of the NG for “[s]upport of operations or missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense.”

2. Support

RC members may be placed on Active Duty Other than for Training (ADOT), which includes the categories of Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS), Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) duty, and involuntary AD. Support may also be provided during FTNGD, discussed above.

a. Active Duty for Operational Support (ADOS)

The purpose of ADOS is to temporarily provide the necessary skilled manpower assets to support existing or emerging requirements. Accordingly, total cumulative ADOS (and FTNGD) time per service member is limited to 1,095 days within the previous 1,460 days before the Service member is

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61 Additional IDT periods are for the use of drilling Reservists who are not military Technicians. They include additional training periods (ATPs) for units, components of units, and individuals for accomplishing additional required training; additional flying and flight training periods (AFTPs) for primary aircrew members for conducting aircrew training and combat crew qualification training; and Readiness management periods (RMPs) to support the following functions in preparing units for training: the ongoing day-to-day operation of the unit, accomplishing unit administration, training preparation, support activities, and maintenance functions. Id. encl. 3, para. (2)(a)(3).

62 Id. encl. 3, para. 2. Paid IDT periods cannot be under 4 hours. A member may not perform more than two IDT periods in any calendar day. In addition, IDT for points only (without pay) cannot be less than 2 hours with a maximum of two points authorized in any one-calendar day. Further, one retirement point in any one-calendar day can be granted for attendance at a professional or trade convention, with a minimum of four hours.

63 Some benefits statutes specifically exclude FTNGD, except when it meets certain conditions. See also 37 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) which defines active duty for purposes of that title as including FTNGD.


65 DoDI 1215.06, supra note 48, encl. 3, para. 4.
counted against active duty end strength.\textsuperscript{66} The Active Component may fund ADOS to support AC functions (ADOS-AC) or funded by the RC to support RC functions (ADOS-RC).\textsuperscript{67}

### b. Active Guard/Reserve (AGR)

This duty is funded by the RC and performed by an RC member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or FTNGD performed by a member of the NG under an order to active duty or FTNGD for a period of 180 days or more. Unless a statutory exception exists, the scope of duty for AGRs is generally limited to organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components.\textsuperscript{68}

### c. Involuntary Active Duty (IAD)

IAD is used in support of military operations when the President or the Congress determines that RC forces are required to augment the Active Component (AC). IAD is funded by the AC.\textsuperscript{69}

### 3. Military Technicians (Dual Status) (MT)\textsuperscript{70}

Military Technicians are Federal civilian employees under 5 U.S.C. § 3101 or 32 U.S.C. § 709(b) who are required to maintain military membership in the Selected Reserve. These individuals also perform administration and training for that Selected Reserve unit or maintenance and repair of supplies or equipment issued to that unit. Military and civilian positions must be compatible. Military Technician involvement with the NG is discussed further in section (G)(4)(b) of this chapter.

### E. Mobilization/Activation of Reserve Component and Calling Up the Militia

The RC provides a full-spectrum operational capability in support of the national defense strategy.\textsuperscript{71} Various authorities exist to order RC members to active/full-time duty to meet varied operational requirements. Such activations may be voluntary or involuntary. For major regional conflicts,

\textsuperscript{66} Id. encl. 8, para. 5. It is important to note the so called “1095 Rule” is not a restriction preventing members who are on ADOS orders remaining on active duty for more than three years in a four-year period. As explained in DoDI 1215.06, the 1095 Rule is only a strength accounting and reporting requirement—not a limit that precludes the performance of duty. Specifically, DoDI 1215.06, enclosure 8, paragraph (5)(b) states that, “Neither law nor DoD policy requires any RC member to leave voluntary active duty under section 12301(d) (OS Duty) …after 1,095 days. However, consideration will be given to documenting long-term tours as full-time requirement billets (AC, AGR, or civilian).”

\textsuperscript{67} For additional information on Army ADOS and FTNGD for Operational Support within the Army, as well as relevant DoD references, see ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY MEMORANDUM TO DEPUTY OF CHIEF OF STAFF G-1, POLICY FOR MANAGEMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS ON ACTIVE DUTY FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AND FULL-TIME NATIONAL GUARD DUTY FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, (21 Feb. 2008) available at: https://www.armyg1.army.mil/MilitaryPersonnel/Hyperlinks/Adobe%20Files/ASAMRA%20Memo%20dtd%2020080221.pdf.


\textsuperscript{69} DoDI 1215.06, supra note 48, encl. 3, para. (b)(3). See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301, 12302, 12304 (2018); 14 U.S.C. § 3713 (2018).


\textsuperscript{71} U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INST. 1235.12, ACCESSING THE RESERVE COMPONENT para. (1)(a) (7 June 2016) (C1, 28 Feb. 2017) [hereinafter DoDI 1235.12].
national emergencies and other crises, access to RC units and individuals through an order to AD without their consent is assumed. When RC members are involuntarily Federalized, they will be kept on AD “no longer than operationally necessary,” subject to limitations imposed by the authorizing statute (e.g., under 10 U.S.C. §12302, no more than 24 continuous months).72

Although the terms “Federalization” and “mobilization” are sometimes used interchangeably to describe the process that “Federalizes” members of the RC, the terms have different meanings. Activation is an order to active duty, for units and individuals, (other than for training) in the Federal service pursuant to statutory authority granted to the President, Congress, or the service secretaries.73 Reservists can be “Federalized” involuntarily or voluntarily (members of the NG also need the consent of their respective Governors). Mobilization is the process of bringing all national resources to a state of readiness for war or national emergency; it includes activating the RC.74 Levels of mobilization include selective mobilization, partial mobilization, full mobilization, and total mobilization. Therefore, it is more helpful to use the term “Federalize” when referring to placing a member of the RC on AD rather than using the more encompassing term “mobilize.” The statutes below provide authority for activating reservists, calling the militia into Federal service, and ordering reservists to active duty voluntarily.75

1. **Full Mobilization (10 U.S.C. § 12301(a))**

A full mobilization occurs through the duration of a war or emergency (plus six months). This section may only be invoked when there is a Congressional declaration of national emergency or war, or other authorization in law.

2. **Partial Mobilization (10 U.S.C § 12302(a))**

A presidential declaration of national emergency or “when otherwise authorized by law” allows the involuntary partial mobilization of up to one million members of the Ready Reserve for up to two years. “Any [Ready Reserve] unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit” may be mobilized under this authority.

3. **Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC) (10 U.S.C§ 12304)**

PRC authority permits the involuntary activation of up to 200,000 Selected Reserves members for up to 365 days by the President.76 Such service must be for other than training and may not exceed 365 days. This statute authorizes ordering members of the RC to active duty without their consent and without declaration of war or national emergency for “operations other than domestic disasters.” The statute provides two exceptions to the “operations other than domestic disasters” restriction: operations

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72 Id.
73 See generally id.; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning (23 Oct. 2018).
74 DoDI 1235.12, supra note 71.
75 Occasionally older cases, regulations, and instructions will reference former versions of these statutes and it is helpful to know the previous citations: In Title 10 of the U.S. Code, § 672(a) is now codified at § 12301(a), § 672(b) is now codified at § 12301(b), § 672(d) is now codified at § 12301(d), § 673 is now codified at § 12302, § 673(b) is now codified at § 12304, and § 3500 and § 8500 are now codified at § 12406.
76 These troops are excluded from active duty end strength calculations.
involving a use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction, and a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that results, or could result, in significant loss of life or property.

4. Invasions and Rebellions (10 U.S.C. § 12406)

Under 10 U.S.C. § 12406, the President can Federalize the NG under three circumstances: (1) if the United States or any U.S. State or territory is invaded or is in danger of invasion by a foreign nation; (2) there is a rebellion or danger of rebellion against the U.S. Government; or (3) the President is unable to execute U.S. laws without active forces. Any orders for these purposes are to be issued through the Governors of the States, or, in the case of the District of Columbia NG, the Commanding General.

5. Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. § 251–255)

a. 10 U.S.C. § 251

If there is an insurrection in a State, the President, at the request of the State’s legislature, or the Governor if the legislature cannot be convened, may call NGs of other States into Federal service as well as use the Federal military to suppress the insurrection.

b. 10 U.S.C. § 252

Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages or rebellion against authority of United States makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by judicial proceedings, the President may call into Federal service the militia of any State and use the Federal military to enforce the laws or suppress the rebellion. Such authority was exercised in Arkansas in 1957, Mississippi in 1962, and Alabama in 1963.

c. 10 U.S.C. § 253

The President can use the NG and/or the Federal military to suppress insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy if: (a) it so hinders the execution of law of that State and of the United States and it deprives citizens of constitutional rights (e.g., due process); or (b) it opposes or obstructs the execution of laws or impedes the course of justice. In the event of the deprivation of rights, the State is deemed to have denied its citizens equal protection of laws.

6. 15-Day Involuntary Federal Active Duty (10 U.S.C. § 12301(b))

The Service Secretaries may order “any unit and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit” to a period of duty not to exceed 15 days (with the consent of the State’s Governor, or, in the case of the District of Columbia NG, the Commanding General).

7. Voluntary Federal Active Duty (10 U.S.C. § 12301(d))

An individual can be ordered (by an authority designated by the Secretary concerned) to active duty with the consent of the individual (and, for members of the NG, with the consent of the State’s Governor or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Commanding General) for an unlimited period of time. Congress authorizes the maximum number of RC members permitted to be on active duty under this section in Sec. 414 of each National Defense Authorization Act.
8. Medical Care (10 U.S.C. §§ 12301(h) and 12322)
Reservists may be ordered to active duty for medical care, evaluation, or to complete a health care study.

The Secretary of Defense may order Army Reservists, Navy Reservists, Marine Corps Reservists, or Air Force Reservists, without their consent, onto active duty for no more than 120 days to respond to a major disaster or emergency under the Stafford Act.77

10. Active Duty for Preplanned Missions in Support of the Combatant Commands (10 U.S.C. 12304b)
Service Secretaries may order members of the Selected Reserve (including NG), without their consent, onto active duty for no more than 365 days to “augment the active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command.”

F. United States Coast Guard78
Per 14 U.S.C. §§ 101 and 102, and 10 U.S.C. § 101(a)(4), the USCG is designated as both an Armed Force and a Federal law enforcement agency. The Coast Guard is a principal Federal agency responsible for maritime safety, security, and stewardship. As such, the Coast Guard protects vital economic and security interests of the United States, including the safety and security of the maritime public, natural and economic resources, the global maritime transportation system, and the integrity of U.S. maritime borders.

The Coast Guard has 11 statutory missions divided into 2 categories: homeland security and non-homeland security.79 The homeland security missions are: (1) port, waterways and coastal security; (2) drug interdiction; (3) migrant interdiction; (4) defense readiness; and (5) other law enforcement. The non-homeland security missions include: (1) marine safety; (2) search and rescue; (3) aids to navigation; (4) living marine resources; (5) marine environmental protection; and (6) ice operations. Due to the multi-mission nature of the USCG, a member of the USCG performing a non-homeland

77 The full text states:
“(a) Authority- When a Governor requests Federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5122)), the Secretary of Defense may, without the consent of the member affected, order any unit, and any member not assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, of the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Air Force Reserve to active duty for a continuous period of not more than 120 days to respond to the Governor's request.” 10 U.S.C. § 12304a (2018).

78 Additional details about the history, unique missions, capabilities, and authorities of the Coast Guard are available in UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, PUBLICATION 1, DOCTRINE FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD (Feb. 2014).

security function, such as a recreational boating safety inspection, could have to perform a homeland security function, such as drug interdiction, during the same mission.

Commonly referred to as “America’s maritime first responder,” the USCG operates as part of the Department of Homeland Security. Presently, approximately 41,000 personnel serve on active duty in the USCG. Upon a declaration of war, if Congress so directs in the declaration or when directed by the President, the Coast Guard will operate as a Service in the Navy. When operating as a Service in the Navy, the Coast Guard is subject to the orders of the Secretary of the Navy who may order changes in Coast Guard operations to render them uniform with Navy operations. The Coast Guard operated as a component of the Navy in World War I and World War II. Both the Coast Guard and Navy have the authority to exchange resources and information at all times. The Coast Guard receives equipment, armament, and training support from the Navy, while providing the Navy vessels, personnel, and equipment with vessel security and other support in Navy operations.

Occasionally, some are confused about the Coast Guard’s authority to operate as an Armed Force. Some observers have assumed that the Coast Guard must switch from a Title 14 status to a Title 10 status when acting as an Armed Force of the United States, similar to the NG change from a State to a Federal status depending on the mission. The Coast Guard is at all times both an “Armed Force” under Title 10 and a “law enforcement agency” under Title 14. Said another way, the Coast Guard does not switch “hats” between serving as part of the Armed Forces and serving as a law enforcement agency. Instead, the Coast Guard performs both functions simultaneously.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Coast Guard has a reserve component. Presently, approximately 7,000 members of the Coast Guard comprise the total Coast Guard Ready Reserve. Additionally, the Coast Guard Auxiliary is a civilian volunteer service, but one that is specifically authorized to “assist the Coast Guard, as authorized by the Commandant, in performing any Coast Guard function, power, duty, role, mission, or operation authorized by law.” The Coast Guard Auxiliary assists both the active duty and the reserve components of the Coast Guard in search and rescue assistance missions, environmental protection, marine safety, boater safety education programs, and patrolling/regulating regattas and marine events.

Unique to the Coast Guard as an Armed Force, the Coast Guard is authorized to use its personnel and equipment to assist any Federal or State agency, to include Department of Defense, when the Coast

84 CG Statistics, supra note 82.
86 It is important to note Coast Guard Auxiliary members do not have law enforcement authority. Thus, they may not directly issue letters of warning, notices of violation, or other civil penalties, nor may they participate in law enforcement boardings. Operators supervising Auxiliary must ensure any assistance given is in accordance with the U.S. COAST GUARD, COMMANDANT INSTR. 16798.3 (series), AUXILIARY OPERATIONS POLICY MANUAL. Despite this limitation, the Auxiliary can and do provide tremendous assistance to the Coast Guard active component. During a domestic emergency or disaster, Auxiliary members may be particularly helpful in staffing an incident or unified command post, as many of them have received extensive training in National Incident Management System (NIMS) procedures.
Guard assistance sought is of the type that the Coast Guard personnel or facilities are especially qualified to provide. Thus, Coast Guard units can be attached to the Department of Defense without the entire Coast Guard being fully absorbed into the Navy under 14 U.S.C. § 103. In addition, 14 U.S.C. § 701 allows the Coast Guard to accept the assistance of any Federal agency in the performance of any Coast Guard function. This unique assistance authority makes the Coast Guard a powerful partner in domestic contingency operations.

Because the Coast Guard is at all times a Federal law enforcement agency and an Armed Force of the United States, the Coast Guard has legal authority to conduct both Maritime Homeland Security Law Enforcement (MHS) and Maritime Homeland Defense (MHD), depending on the circumstances. Coast Guard units conducting MHS operations may find themselves in an MHD situation in a matter of minutes. The ability to handle evolving scenarios as either a Federal law enforcement agency or as an Armed Force offers the Coast Guard tremendous flexibility.

MHS is a Federal law enforcement mission carried out by domestic law enforcement authorities, including the Coast Guard. The mission is to protect the U.S. Maritime Domain and the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS) and deny their use and exploitation by terrorists as a means for attacks on U.S. territory, population, and critical infrastructure. As the lead Federal agency for MHS, the Coast Guard engages in maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, tracking, and interdiction of threats to the security of the United States, and responds to the consequences of such threats. Armed and uniformed Coast Guard law enforcement operations ashore are limited to activities at waterfront facilities, public and commercial structures adjacent to the marine environment, and, to the extent necessary to protect life and property, in transit ashore between such facilities or structures.

G. NG of the Several States (ANG, ARNG)

1. Overview

Militia are authorized by the code and/or constitution of each State or territory within the United States. The definition of “militia” in the United States Code includes both the organized and the unorganized militia; the NG, along with the Naval Militia, is considered the organized militia. In the Constitution, the President of the United States (POTUS) is the Commander in Chief of the militia only when it is “called into actual service of the United States.” This section discusses the NG when it is under the control of the Governor or in “State status,” i.e., Title 32 status or State Active Duty.

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88 In the event of a threat or incident requiring the exercise of national self-defense, DoD, acting through U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and supported by other agencies, would take the lead in carrying out MHD operations, which involves the protection of U.S. territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure.
90 See 33 C.F.R. § 6 (2020).
92 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
SAD). In a State status, members of the NG are subject to the military code of the respective State to which they belong.93

Each of the States and territories has an Adjutant General (TAG) or equivalent (e.g., Commanding General for the District of Columbia), a State officer whose rank may or may not be Federally recognized.94 The Governor of the State or the TAG (depending on State law) is the Commander in Chief of the State military unless it is Federalized under Title 10 of the United States Code. In this instance, POTUS serves as the Commander in Chief of the State NG.95 Throughout the fifty States, District of Columbia, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico (the “54”), there are roughly 107,100 members of the Air NG employed across 90 Air Wings.96 In like fashion, there are roughly 335,500 members of the Army NG employed across 8 division headquarters, 27 brigade combat teams, 56 functional support brigades, 42 multifunctional brigades, 1 Security Force Assistance Brigade, and 2 Special Forces Groups.97 Each State has a joint force headquarters (State JFHQ) to provide command and control to its ANG and ARNG.

2. Title 32 Status

When performing duty pursuant to Title 32, U.S. Code, a NG member is under the command and control of the State but paid with Federal funds. The majority of NG members perform weekend drills of IDT once per month and AT two weeks per year. These traditional members of the NG are commonly referred to as “M-Day” (Mobilization Day). Each year, M-Day Service members are required to perform 48 IDT drills and 15 days of AT.98 The operations of NG units in Title 32 status are controlled by the individual States and supplemented by funding from Federal sources pursuant to Federal regulations.99 Federal recognition of NG units and associated funding is conditional upon the unit continuing to meet applicable Federal standards.100 ARNG and ANG Service members performing duty in Title 32 status have Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) coverage as long as they are acting within the scope of their Federal employment.

There are many instances of the NG performing operations (as opposed to training) in a Title 32 status (e.g., post 9-11 airport security duty, Hurricane Katrina, Southwest Border operations, counter-drug operations, and WMD-CST teams). The use of Title 32 duty for operational missions must be based on statutory authority (for example, counter-drug authority at 32 U.S.C. § 112) or upon the request of the President or the Secretary of Defense (see 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A)). Ultimately, performing Homeland Security missions in a Title 32 status, instead of a Title 10 status, may be preferable because the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) does not apply, NG troops can respond more rapidly because they are

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93 Pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 327 (2018), the President or active duty commanders may convene State courts-martial. In 2003, Congress ordered the preparation of a model State code of military justice.
97 Id. at 14.
in the local area, and NG troops typically have more situational awareness in local, domestic areas than their active duty counterparts. Furthermore, Homeland Security missions can enhance NG training through “training by doing.” The benefits of performing operations under Title 32, instead of Title 10, are continually been raised. Thus, various legislative proposals exist to modify Title 32 to improve this capability.101

Ordinarily, NG personnel in a Title 32 status should not provide civil support to a State, such as disaster assistance, unless such missions have legal authorization and receive funding. Accordingly, NG members are often in a State Active Duty (SAD) status (funded by the State) when providing civil support. If TAGs use NG members in a Title 32 status to perform civil support without appropriate authority, the State may be required to reimburse the Federal Government for the Federal funds expended during the operation.

3. State Active Duty (SAD)

Of the Armed Forces of the United States, only the NG has a status entitled State Active Duty; performance of such duty is pursuant to State constitutions and statutes.102 SAD status has no relationship to USAR/USAFR or Active Duty (AD). In a SAD status, States control their own NG personnel, subject to the command and control of the respective Governor and Adjutant General. NG units perform duties authorized by State law, such as responding to emergencies or natural disasters (floods, hurricanes, fires), and are paid with State funds. Because NG units are subject to State control unless Federalized under Title 10 of the United States Code, they are the primary military force that will respond to local disasters and emergencies. For these types of operations, the Governor may declare an emergency and call any State NG unit into SAD status. Governors can directly access and utilize the Guard’s Federally-assigned aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment as long as the Federal government is reimbursed for the use of fungible equipment and supplies such as fuel, food stocks, etc. Federal funds are not obligated for any personnel or units performing SAD. However, if the President declares a major disaster or an emergency after a Governor’s request for assistance under the Stafford Act, then the State military department may be reimbursed through FEMA for the SAD pay and allowances it has expended.103

4. ANG/ARNG Personnel Categories

On any given day in a particular State, members of the NG serve in a variety of duty types such as Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS), Fulltime NG Duty (FTNGD), Inactive Duty Training (IDT), and Annual Training (AT).

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102 For example, ARIZ. CONSTITUTION, art. 5, § 3; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-101 (2020) (Governor as commander-in-chief of State military forces when not in Federal service); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-121 (2020) (composition of militia); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-172 (2020) (mobilization of militia for emergencies and when necessary to protect life and property).

a. Title 32 AGR

Every State NG has members of the Title 32 AGR program serving under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). Section 101(d)(6)(a) of Title 10 of the U.S. Code defines “active Guard and Reserve duty” as “active duty” or “full-time NG duty” for a period of 180 consecutive days or more for the purpose of “organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the reserve components.” Members of the Title 32 AGR program receive essentially the same benefits and pay as their active duty counterparts of the same rank. Although they are required to perform drills with their units, they do not receive additional pay to do so. These Service members may also be “Federalized” and placed in a Title 10 status under appropriate sections of the Code. There is a material difference between the AGR program under Title 32 and the AGR program under Title 10. Members of the NG participating in the Title 10 AGR program (ARNGUS, ANGUS) are performing in the service of the United States, whereas those in the Title 32 AGR program (ARNG, ANG) are performing in the service of their State. Service in the Title 10 AGR program is discussed further in section (B)(6) of this chapter.

b. NG Federal Technicians (32 U.S.C. § 709)

Each State NG may employ persons as Technicians. Technicians are Federal civilian employees under the exclusive control of a State official, the Adjutant General who hires, fires, and supervises them. In terms of their civilian employment pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 709, they are military Technicians (“excepted service” civilian employees) as defined in 10 U.S.C. § 10216 during the normal workweek. They must also maintain membership in a State NG and maintain Federal recognition in the military grade associated with their Technician position. Loss of NG membership terminates the full-time Technician position.

In some States, NG Technicians are members of collective bargaining agreements. Their civilian job positions correspond with their military rank and they wear military uniforms to work. When they perform drills and other training, they are in a Title 32 status just like traditional members of the NG. These members are also subject to “Federalization” under Title 10 and can be called to serve in a SAD status.

In their civilian “excepted service” capacity, NG Technicians are responsible for organizing, administering, instructing, or training the NG and for the maintenance and repair of supplies issued to the NG or the Federal military. They are covered under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In their civilian capacity, their participation in civil support operations is limited because any participation must fall within the scope of their position as a NG Technician. To perform out of scope activities, the NG Technician may be placed in a leave status and placed on SAD orders.


109 NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, REG. 635-100, TERMINATION OF APPOINTMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF FEDERAL RECOGNITION, ch. 6 (8 Sep. 1978).
NG Technicians also have the responsibility to train and perform general military duties with their unit and to be available to enter active Federal service when their units are Federalized. In many cases, State headquarters principal staff officers also serve as Technicians. Because their Technician and NG roles are very similar, these staff officers play extremely important leadership roles in civil support operations in their non-Technician status.110

c. Full Time NG Duty - Operational Support (FTNGD-OS)111

If funding is available, NG units can place members of the NG (whether M-Day or Federal Technicians) on FTNGD-OS orders (for as little as a day to as much as a year) to perform particular functions necessary to support the NG. These orders are distinct from the “training” requirements of NG members. Most members of the NG that participate in the counter-drug program are on Full Time NG Duty – Counter Drug (FTNGD-CD) orders under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). FTNGD-CD is similar to FTNGD-OS but given a separate moniker because it is aligned against a specific statutory program (i.e., 32 U.S.C. § 112). These members are also subject to “Federalization” under Title 10 and can also be called to serve in SAD status.

d. State Civilian Employees

In addition to Federal Technicians, the State NG units employ civilians pursuant to Master Cooperative Agreements (MCAs). These personnel are authorized to use vehicles, property, and equipment provided to the ARNG by the Federal government to accomplish their duties under the MCA. Many guard units employ State employees in security and in civil engineering. These employees may or may not be members of the NG of that State. In other words, membership in the NG is not a condition of their employment as it is for Federal Technicians.

e. “Traditional” NG Members

The majority of the members of the NG within a State are “traditional” members. In other words, they hold civilian jobs in the community and are only in a military status when performing drill, training, or other military duty. These members may also be called to serve in two other statuses: (1) “Federalized” status under Title 10, and (2) SAD status under State law. Each member of the NG can be placed into different personnel categories, one at a time. These categories are important when determining matters such as command authority, benefits, discipline, and immunities.

5. Personnel with Unique HLS/HLD Missions

a. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)/Civil Support Teams (CST)

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c), WMD-CSTs support emergency preparedness programs to prepare for or to respond to any emergency involving the use of a weapon of mass destruction. These DoD-certified teams are State controlled because they perform duty pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502(f), although their missions are congressionally mandated. WMD-CSTs are trained to support civil authorities at a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) incident site by identifying the

111 Similar to Full Time National Guard Duty previously described in section (D)(1)(c), above, but here specifically for “operational support.”
agents/substances, advising on responses, and otherwise assisting with requests for State support. They are not first responders. Currently there are 57 full-time teams: at least one in every U.S. State, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. By Federal statute, the WMD-CST teams may not operate outside of the continental United States (OCONUS). Chapter 6 of this Handbook discusses WMD-CSTs greater in depth.

b. NG CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package (NG-CERFP)

The initial establishment of CERFPs placed at least one in each FEMA Region. There are currently 17 validated CERFPs.\footnote{Homeland Response Force, NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, http://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/Homeland%20Response%20Force%20Fact%20Sheet %20(Dec.%202017).pdf (last visited June 25, 2020).} NG-CERFPs typically use M-Day Soldiers to provide Governors or a combatant commander with the capabilities to locate and extract victims from a contaminated area, provide patient and casualty decontamination, and perform medical triage and treatment. These response forces may provide support to civilian first responders within the first 6 to 72 hours after a CBRN event. NG-CERFPs may operate in SAD, Title 32, and Title 10 statuses. It is important for the judge advocate to know the deployed status of these forces if required to provide them legal advice. Chapter 6 of this Handbook contains further discussion on CERFPs.

6. Miscellaneous Domestic Response Areas

a. Command and Control – Dual-Status Commanders (DSCs)

Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, the militia is under the exclusive command and control of the Governor unless and until “called into Federal service” or otherwise Federalized as a Reserve Component. Thus, Federal status military officers cannot exercise command and control over State status NG members, nor can State status NG members exercise command and control over Federal troops.\footnote{See also Perpich v. Dep’t. of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 348 (1990).} Under most circumstances, a NG officer with commission in a State or National Guard is relieved from their duty in their State’s NG while serving on Federal active duty (Title 10 orders) pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1); however, authorities pursuant to two statutes exist that authorize one officer to achieve unity of effort by having the ability to serve in both a Federal and State chain of command simultaneously. These “Dual-Status Commanders” (DSC) exercise command and control over Service members in both Federal and State statuses, under strictly prescribed circumstances, and their Federal and State authorities are exercised in a mutually exclusive manner.\footnote{Though not true military “command and control,” coordinating authority has been used by the USAF to allow a Federal status officer to control Federal and State forces. The concept works because one commander tells his forces to obey the orders of the other commander or risk discipline. The concept has been used while fighting wildfires and it has recently been accepted as Air Force doctrine as a method of promoting “unity of effort between Active, Federalized Air National Guard, Reserve, civilian, contract and Auxiliary Air Force personnel operating under Title 10 U.S. Code, and non-Federalized Air National Guard forces operating under Title 32 U.S. Code or [S]tate [A]ctive [D]uty.” It must be noted that others contend that coordinating authority cannot be used during operations but only for planning, referencing the definition of coordinating authority in DoD TERMS, supra note 7, at 50. Many contend that a State status officer cannot use coordinating authority to supervise Federal troops because of Federal supremacy.} The dual-status command option provides unity of effort and enables the maintenance of a common operating picture for both the Federal and State military chains of command. It is of critical importance to remain cognizant of the fact that a DSC is either exercising command authorities on
behalf of either the State or Federal chain of command; therefore, it is of the upmost importance that it be clear which chain of command the DSC is issuing orders on behalf of.

The first of the DSC options can be exercised pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 315, which allows a commissioned officer in the Army and Air Force, with the permission of the President and the consent of the State’s Governor, to accept a NG commission and be detailed to duty with the State’s NG.\textsuperscript{115} Although 32 U.S.C. § 104(d) allows the President to detail commissioned officers of the NG, the Regular Army, or Regular Air Force to command Title 32 troops, this detailing would not give the officer the ability to issue direct orders to those troops unless the commanding officer was also commissioned in that State’s NG.\textsuperscript{116} This implementation of a the DSC, whereby a Federal Title 10 Army or Air Force officer receives a commission in a state or territorial State ANG or ARNG, has been used sparingly and is sometimes referred to as a “reverse” DSC.

The most commonly used form of DSC occurs pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2),\textsuperscript{117} which allows a commissioned officer in a State’s NG to also serve on behalf of the Federal military as a DSC, so long as the President grants the authority and the State’s Governor consents. A DSC serving pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2) sometimes referred to as the “regular” DSC. On 14 April 2011, President Obama delegated the Presidential functions and authority under both sections 325 and 315 to the Secretary of Defense.

Required implementation documents for a DSC are a Secretary of Defense authorization, Gubernatorial consent, and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two mutually exclusive Federal and State military commands outlining the responsibilities and authority of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} A 1998 legal opinion of the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force notes that State law will determine whether a Title 10 officer who accepts such a commission may be placed in command of a non-Federalized unit. Op. JAG, AF, 1998/20, (19 Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Op. JAG, AF, 1998/20]. The legal opinion also notes that such a determination is not necessary for Federalized National Guard members serving in their own State. It also states that active duty officers, or guard officers in a Title 10 status, placed in command of non-Federalized Guard units will be subject to “two simultaneous chains of command,” a “situation that is neither legally precluded nor unusual.”
\item \textsuperscript{116} 32 U.S.C. § 104(d) does not allow such an action if it would “displace” a “commanding officer of a unit organized wholly with a [S]tate or territory.” Op. JAG, AF, 1998/20, supra note 117, opines that there would not be a displacement if the Governor, or other State authority, of the affected State concurred with the detailing of the Regular Air Force officer.
\item \textsuperscript{117} Title 32 U.S.C. § 325 currently states:
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} U.S.C. § 325. Relief from National Guard duty when ordered to Active Duty
\item (a) Relief required.—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States who is ordered to active duty is relieved from duty in the National Guard of his State or Territory, or of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, as the case may be, from the effective date of his order to active duty until he is relieved from that duty.
\item (2) An officer of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States is not relieved from duty in the National Guard of his State or Territory, or of Puerto Rico or the District of Columbia, under paragraph (1) while serving on active duty in command of a National Guard unit if—
\item (A) the President authorizes such service in both duty statuses; and
\item (B) the Governor of his State or Territory or Puerto Rico, or the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard, as the case may be, consents to such service in both duty statuses.
\item (c) Return to State status.—So far as practicable, members, organizations, and units of the Army National Guard of the United States or the Air National Guard of the United States ordered to active duty shall be returned to their National Guard status upon relief from that duty.
\end{itemize}
\end{itemize}
The DSC may receive orders from the two chains of command, and they must recognize and respect that the DSC exercises all authority in a completely mutually exclusive manner, i.e., either in a Federal or State status but never in both statuses at the same time. In a State status, the DSC takes orders from the Governor through the TAG of the State and may issue orders to NG forces serving in a State status (i.e. Title 32 or State Active Duty). As a Federal officer activated under Title 10, the DSC takes orders from the President or those Federal officers the President and Secretary of Defense have directed to act on their behalf. When acting pursuant to their Federal commission, DSCs may issue orders only to Federal forces.

Since a DSC holds both a State NG commission, as well as a Federal commission (Title 10), the Posse Comitatus Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice are relevant for the DSC’s actions taken while exercising Federal chain of command authorities, while State law and authorities would be applicable to situations where the DSC is exercising their State chain of command authorities. So called “regular” Dual-Status Commanders pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2) are placed on a Title 10 orders for Federal pay and entitlements, while “reverse” DSCs pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 315 continue to receive their pay and entitlements through their Federal military orders. There will be an appointment memorandum from the Combatant Commander (usually the NORTHCOM Commander, but also potentially the INDOPACOM Commander), as well as Title 10 orders memorializing and documenting that the DSC has command authority of Federal military forces for the mission for which they were appointed a DSC. Similarly, with regards to the requisite State authorities, there should be a similar corresponding State Active Duty order (or other state documentation pursuant to State law and State requirements) memorializing in writing that the officer appointed as a DSC for the mission at hand also has command and other required authorities over NG State forces on mission in that State. A DSC is only on orders for pay and benefits purposes under their Title 10 orders.

Given the fact that a DSC has command authority for both Federal (Title 10) and State (Title 32 and SAD) forces, the DSC needs staff officers from both the Federal and the State forces providing the DSC with relevant and accurate advice as appropriate in respect to these separate chains of command and applicable authorities. For example, when commanding Service members in a non-Federal status, the DSC receives legal advice from a State legal advisor and when commanding Service members in a Federal status, the DSC receives legal advice from a Federal legal advisor. Under most circumstances, NORTHCOM will send a Title 10 Deputy Commander, along with the rest of a Joint Enabling Capability (JEC) team to serve as the Federal (Title 10) staff for the DSC, and the State will have a cadre of State NG staff officers serving in a similar capacity for the DSC on state chain of command issues and responsibilities.

The DSC concept under 32 U.S.C. § 325 has been used since 2004 and is now the usual command and control structure when Federal (Title 10) and State (Title 32 and SAD) forces are being employed in a state or territory simultaneously supporting a mission. Section 515(c)(1) and (2) of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY12 stated that the DSC construct should be the “usual and

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118 Pre-coordinated Memorandums of Understanding between each State and the Department of Defense covering the appointment and use of qualified and vetted National Guard DSC have been executed and are available through the National Guard Bureau.

119 The DSC concept was used during the G8 Summit at Sea Island, Georgia, in June 2004. Since then, the DoD has appointed DSCs for numerous domestic operations most recently the mission in support of the national response to COVID-19.
customary” command and control arrangement when the Federal Armed Forces and the State NG forces are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities in the United States, including for missions involving a major disaster or emergency as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122 et seq.). Additionally, when a major disaster or emergency occurs in any area subject to the laws of any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, the Governor of the State affected should be the principle civil authority supported by the lead Federal agency and its supporting Federal entities. The Adjutant General of the State military, or the appropriate person with delegated authority, should be the principal military authority supported by the DSC when acting in his or her State capacity.

b. State law

State law provides the legal basis for each State NG. Moreover, State law provides the authority to perform missions, the basis for pay and benefits, rules for the use of force, liability and immunity rules, and military justice, just to name a few areas. Duty performed in a Title 32 status must also comply with Federal laws and policies. Personnel in a Title 32 status also receive protections such as the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and other Federal benefits. Additionally, Congress consented to the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) in 1996. Each State and the District of Columbia has ratified EMAC.

Matters become more complicated when NG personnel cross a State border in a State status. It is then important to remember to examine the law of both the “originating State” and “receiving State.” For example, some State codes of military justice apply even when members of a State’s NG are performing duty in another State. Moreover, State law may dictate whether non-Federalized NG units may enter or leave a State for duty, and when they can do so. For example, some States do not allow armed NG units to enter their State without permission from the Governor or legislature. Some States have specific authority that allows their militias to leave the State to perform duty.

Another very important issue to consider is that of professional licensing. Military health professionals in a Title 10 status (physicians, dentists, clinical psychologists, nurses or others providing direct patient care), properly licensed pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 1094, can practice in any DoD facility, any civilian facility affiliated with DoD, or “any other location authorized by the Secretary of Defense,” to include practice in a State, D.C., or commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States regardless of

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120 It is important to note that despite a DSC being the “usual” arrangement in such situations, this language “does not limit, in any way, the authorities of the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Governor of any State to direct, control, and prescribe command and control arrangements for forces under their command.” National Defense Authorization Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 515(c), 125 Stat. 1395 (2011); 32 U.S.C. § 317 (2020).


124 See, e.g., 44 OKLA. STAT. § 229 (2020).

125 See, e.g., KY CONST. § 225; MONT. CONST., art. II, § 33; IDAHO CODE § 46-110 (2020); KAN. STAT.ANN. § 48-203 (2020).

126 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 27-16 (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-7-7 (2020); N.Y. MIL. LAW § 22 (Consol. 2020).
where actually licensed. Arguably, this also applies to members of the NG who are in a Title 32 status. However, Service members in a Title 32 status must be acting within the scope of their employment to receive FTCA protections for those actions. Thus, an analysis of their authority to accomplish assigned tasks or duty is necessary.

For example, Federal law and directives allow Title 10 personnel to provide medical treatment to civilians (not otherwise entitled to military medical care) during emergency situations. The Stafford Act does not provide that same authority to members of the NG in a State Active Duty status. Further, under Article VI of the EMAC, out of state practitioners are considered “agents of the requesting State for tort liability and immunity purposes, [and] no party State or its officers or employees rendering aid in another State pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or omission in good faith.” Willful misconduct, gross negligence, or recklessness are outside the scope of the coverage offered under EMAC. EMAC is further discussed in Chapter 11 of this Handbook.

The Good Samaritan Laws of each State, listed in Table 3-1 below, may also provide insight on the additional protections that an out-of-State healthcare professional may have in another State.

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<th>Good Samaritan Legislation</th>
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129 EMAC, supra note 123.
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<td>Wyoming</td>
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*Chapter 3  
Status Relationships Between Components*
c. The District of Columbia NG

In 1802, the Congress of the United States enacted legislation officially establishing the District of Columbia (D.C.) Militia, which is now the D.C. NG (DCNG). In accordance with D.C. Code § 49-409, passed by Congress, the President of the United States is at all times the Commander-in-Chief of the DCNG. E.O. 11485 delegated Presidential authority to command, supervise, administer, and control the DCNG in a militia status to the Secretary of Defense. By memorandum, the Secretary of Defense further delegated this authority as it pertains to the DCARNG to the Secretary of the Army, and as it pertains to the DCANG to the Secretary of the Air Force. The Secretaries exercise this authority through the Commanding General of the DCNG. Both Secretaries may further delegate this authority to their Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Last, and in accordance with the October 10, 1969 memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force, whenever the DCARNG or DCANG are used in militia status to support civil authorities, the Secretary of the Army, through the Commanding General, exercises operational command over the Army and Air NG elements.

In accordance with E.O. 11485 and D.C. Code § 49-301, command of DCNG military operations is exercised through the Commanding General of the DCNG rather than through an Adjutant General, as is the practice in all of the States. The President appoints the DCNG Commanding General. An officer appointed to serve as the Commanding General must be recognized as a general officer grade as recognized by the U.S Senate. Last, in accordance with D.C. Code § 49-304, an Adjutant General may also be assigned by the President. The Adjutant General is subordinate to and subject to the orders of the Commanding General.

The D.C. Mayor has no formal command authority over the DCNG. As a matter of practice, whenever the Mayor desires civil support from the DCNG, the Mayor submits a request to the Commanding General, DCNG, who notifies the Secretary of the Army. Pursuant to E.O. 11485, the Department of

132 Id.
Defense and the Attorney General, by consultation, establish law enforcement policies to be used by DCNG military forces when aiding the civil authority of the District.

In his advice to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army regarding employment of the DCNG in support of civil authorities, the Attorney General routinely refers to D.C. Code § 49-404, as authority for the DCNG in its status as a subset of the enrolled militia as defined by the D.C. Code to aid civil authorities.

The DCNG performs missions in either a Title 10 or Title 32 status. Currently, the DCNG does not have a State Active Duty status. Title 49 of the D.C. Code implements the District of Columbia Militia Act of 1889. It authorizes the Mayor, the U.S. Marshal for the District of Columbia, or the National Capital Service Director, to request that the Commander-in-Chief order the militia to aid the civil authorities in suppressing a public disturbance. When the DCNG is mobilized under these circumstances, it acts in a “militia status” on behalf of the District.

Historically, the DCNG provides civil support to the District in a Title 32 training status. However, DCNG may provide civil support in a different duty status with approval by the Secretary of the Army pursuant to the delegated authorities from Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army has broad authority to determine what constitutes appropriate “training” for credit and compensation under 32 U.S.C. § 502(d)(3). The Comptroller General of the United States has also opined that, in view of the Secretary’s broad discretion in this regard, there would be no objection should the Secretary consider a State’s use of the NG for disaster relief as annual training under Title 32. The Secretary of the Army requested a decision as to whether appropriated funds for annual training are available for disaster relief, whereby it was determined the disaster relief duty constituted proper and adequate annual training. Provided the Secretaries concerned first determine that the duty in question (i.e., disaster relief) constitutes proper and adequate training for the units involved, the execution of such duties in a Title 32 status and the payment of participating NG personnel from Title 32 appropriated funds, is appropriate. Consequently, the fact that the performance of such a “training” mission produces a collateral “operational” benefit does not render the mission objectionable.

Whenever service in a Title 32 status in support of the D.C. civil authorities may involve the exercise of law enforcement-like functions, the Secretary of the Army and the Attorney General must consent to the provision of such support. Consent to the support is subject to the Mayor’s designation of members of the DCNG as special police (or “special privates”) pursuant to D.C. Code § 5-129.03. This provision of the law allows the Mayor, upon “any emergency of riot, pestilence, invasion, insurrection, or during any day of public election, ceremony, or celebration” to appoint from among the citizens “special privates without pay,” who while so serving possess the powers and privileges, and perform the duties of a District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officer. When performing such duties, DCNG personnel wear an emblem authorized by the Mayor and/or designated

141 D.C. CODE § 5-129.03 (2018). For example, the DCNG and other National Guard personnel in support of Presidential Inaugurations have received this special status.
representative. The designated representative is usually the General Counsel from the supported LEA. Title 32 orders issued to DCNG personnel include authority to act under the provisions of Title 5 of the D.C. Code. Although they have “special private” status, DCNG personnel remain under the command and control of their superior military officers at all times. The Commanding General of the DCNG and the Chief of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (DCMPD) coordinate their respective command structures and personnel with a view towards maximizing unity of effort. The designation as special private or special deputation is not limited to the DCMPD, it applies towards the other D.C. law enforcement agencies (e.g. United States Marshal Service, National Park Service, and United States Capital Police). However, law enforcement authority conferred is restricted to the jurisdiction of D.C. and for a limited duration.

Although the chain of command of the DCNG runs through the Department of Defense to the President, the applicability of the proscriptions of the PCA, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, bears comment. Applicability of the PCA depends on the status of the Service member. For instance, if the Service member is serving in a Title 10 status, then the member is considered part of the active component Army or Air Force for PCA purposes and therefore subject to the PCA’s prohibition on participation in the execution of civil laws. On the other hand, if the Service member is in a Title 32 status, the member is not considered part of the active component Army or Air Force and thus not subject to PCA restrictions. Whether in a Title 10 or Title 32 status, all members of the DCNG must comply with all applicable Department of Defense directives and instructions.

Historically, the DCNG was mobilized in a Federalized status on limited occasions. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12301, the DCNG has been Federalized in support of operations such as Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Noble Eagle, and Freedom Sentinel. In addition, the Insurrection Act was employed to order the DCNG into active Federal service to complement Federal forces deployed to quell the disorder associated with the rioting that ensued after the death of Dr. Martin Luther King in April 1968. During First Amendment Demonstrations following the death of George Floyd that erupted into civil unrest 31 May 2020 through 23 June 2020, although the Insurrection Act was not invoked, the DCNG assistance was requested by U.S. Marshals, as well as by DCMPD and the United States Park Police. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense also requested additional support from “out-of-state National Guard personnel” to protect Federal properties from destruction or defacement; protection of Federal officials, employees, and law enforcement personnel from harm or threat of bodily injury; and protection of Federal functions, such as Federal employees’ access to their workplaces, the free and safe movement of federal personnel through the city, and the continued operation of the U.S. mails.142

d. “Hip-Pocket” Activation or Changing Statuses of NG Personnel

Both the Air NG (ANG) and Army NG (ARNG) have personnel that switch from Title 32 (Federally funded, State controlled) to Title 10 status (Federally funded and Federally controlled) in order to perform Federal active duty service in furtherance of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and USNORTHCOM (N&NC) missions. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d), individuals who are members of a State NG may volunteer for Federal active duty in order to execute a Federal mission. In order for a member to volunteer for Federal service, the applicable Governor, or their designee, must consent to their NG Service member volunteering for Federal active duty service.

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For ANG Service members supporting the N&NC federal missions, Title 32 Service members convert to Title 10 automatically upon the occurrence of a specific Title 10 trigger from higher headquarters. Colloquially referred to as “hip pocket” orders, through a series of delegations, both the Commander of 1st Air Force (AFNORTH) and the Continental United States NORAD Region (CONR) have received authority to activate ANG members pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12301(d). 1st Air Force (1st AF, a numbered Air Force in Air Combat Command) developed a process to instantaneously “Federalize” ANG members who, upon the occurrence of a specified event, are called upon to perform NORAD missions. This process automatically converts consenting members of the Air NG into a Title 10 status upon the occurrence of a “triggering” event, known by 1st AF as an “air sovereignty event.”143 On June 11, 2003, authority “to order into Federal service . . . those members of [ANG] who have volunteered to perform Federal active service in furtherance of the Federal mission” was delegated to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, who has the authority to re-delegate this authority to a MAJCOM Commander, who can further delegate this authority.144 This “hip pocket” process is now used for other Air Force missions. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §12301(d), for Service members performing alert duties, the individual consent happens prior to performing the alert duty.

Prior to the activation of members, the State(s) consents on behalf of the Governor(s) via various State Agreements. ANG Instruction (ANGI) 10-203 states that “units will have Title 10 activation authority on-file for the alert mission being performed. This authority will be documented on Title 32 orders for the stated alert mission. MOAs between gaining Title 10 authority and State officials are required.” ANGI 10-203 in conjunction with 1st Air Force Instruction 38-1 (1 AFI 38-1) prescribe command relationships, policies and procedures for sovereignty operations, homeland defense and homeland security events within assigned ANG units gained by CONR-1 AF. 1 AFI 38-1 applies to both the NORAD missions of aerospace warning and control and the analogous homeland defense missions conducted under the operational command of USNORTHCOM.

This process has been examined as a model for some ARNG missions, but at present is not utilized. For ARNG missions, such as Ground-based Mid-course Defense (GMD), the “hip-pocket” orders process described above is not authorized. Instead, ARNG Title 32 Service members performing Title 10 GMD missions convert from Title 32 status to Title 10 active duty upon arrival at their specified federal duty location; they revert to Title 32 status when their commander releases them from Federal duty. AMOA among the NG Bureau (NGB), U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT), and the participating States’ NGs, outlines the specifics. The Secretary of the Army Memorandum on GMD operations also applies. Although the 100th Brigade and its subordinate units are assigned to USASMDC/ARSTRAT, the units execute the operational mission in support of USNORTHCOM. Unlike ANG units, an unusual fact about these units is that both the Brigade and Battalion Commanders are “dual status” pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2), and they can simultaneously command Title 10 personnel and Title 32 ARNG members.

143 See, e.g., ELEVENTH AIR FORCE, INSTR. 38-101, PERSONNEL STATUS WITHIN THE 176TH AIR CONTROL SQUADRON (ANG) (14 Apr. 2005). This AFI outlines the status conversion process and defines an “air sovereignty event” as “any event that involves the Federal mission of aerospace warning and control, and includes but is not limited to, the surveillance of the assigned airspace, the identification of unknown aircraft, the initiation and authorization of an active air scramble, and the control of aircraft engaged in an active air scramble or North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) mission.”

assigned to the 100th BDE or 49th BN. The President, with the consent of the governors of Alaska, Colorado, and California grants this authority.

e. Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)

State law will govern the rules for the use of force for members of the NG in a State status. Thus, the rules for the use of force must adhere to State law. In some States, NG forces have the same authority as peace officers, meaning that certain NG forces in their home State may follow RUF established for peace officers within the State. A more detailed discussion of the RUF may be found in Chapters 10 and 11, infra.

H. Civil Air Patrol (CAP)

The CAP, a volunteer organization, is a Federally-chartered nonprofit corporation under 36 U.S.C. § 40301. It also functions as an auxiliary of the USAF in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 9492. Although the CAP is not a military organization, as the USAF auxiliary it performs non-combat missions on behalf of DoD pursuant to statute and a Cooperative Agreement. The USAF provides policy and oversight of the CAP in its auxiliary status. It can provide personnel, logistical, and financial support and assistance. CAP missions are limited by internal and FA regulations, as well as by those statutes that restrict activities of military organizations (e.g., PCA). Missions accomplished by CAP in its auxiliary role normally include disaster relief, search and rescue, and counter-drug. Authorities are contemplating changes to statutes, doctrine and policy to better incorporate the CAP into the USNORTHCOM Military Assistance for Civil Authorities (MACA) force structure and thereby allow the CAP to become more active in a broader range of homeland security missions.

The CAP is organized into eight geographical regions and performs three primary programs: (1) emergency services (assisting Federal, State, and local agencies), (2) aerospace education, and (3) cadet education. Although the USAF has overall responsibility for the CAP when it performs search and rescue missions, the Army provides oversight for disaster relief missions. Civil Air Patrol-United States Air Force (CAP-USAF) is located at Maxwell AFB in Montgomery, Alabama; an Air Force judge advocate provides legal support to the Commander of CAP-USAF.

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Chapter 3
Status Relationships Between Components
CHAPTER 4

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT

KEY REFERENCES:

- 18 U.S.C. § 1385 – Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus (“The Posse Comitatus Act” (PCA)).
- Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3025.21 - Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, February 27, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, Effective February 8, 2019.
- DoDD 5200.27 - Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense, January 7, 1980.
- DoDD 5240.01 - DoD Intelligence Activities, August 27, 2007, Incorporating Change 3, November 9, 2020.
- SECNAVINST 5820.7C - Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, January 26, 2006.

A. Introduction

U.S. military resources include specialized personnel, equipment, facilities, and training that may be useful to civilian law enforcement agencies. The provision of DoD resources, however, must be consistent with the limits Congress placed on military support to civilian law enforcement through the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and other laws. Judge advocates must also weigh and advise on the political sensitivity of employing U.S. military forces in law enforcement roles involving U.S. civilians.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the PCA. It then discusses the applicable provisions of the U.S. Code addressing military support to civilian law enforcement and the DoD regulations that implement this guidance. Information relating specifically to counterdrug support is discussed separately in the Chapter 7 due to the size and complexity of this DoD mission.

B. The Posse Comitatus Act

The primary statute restricting military support to civilian law enforcement is the PCA. The PCA states:

1 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2018). The phrase “posse comitatus” is literally translated from Latin as the “power of the county” and is defined in common law to refer to all those over the age of 15 upon whom a sheriff could call for assistance in preventing any type of civil disorder. See United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112, 114, n.3 (5th Cir. 1986).
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.2

The PCA was enacted in 1878 primarily in response to the military presence in the South during Reconstruction following the Civil War.3 This military presence increased during the bitter presidential election of 1876, when the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, defeated the Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, by one electoral vote. Many historians attribute Hayes’s victory to President Grant’s decision to send Federal troops for use by U.S. Marshals at polling places in the States of South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida. Hayes won the electoral votes of these hotly contested States, possibly as a result of President Grant’s actions.4 Congress responded to these actions by enacting the PCA in 1878.5

The intent of the PCA was to limit direct military involvement with civilian law enforcement, absent congressional or constitutional authorization. The PCA is a criminal statute and violators are subject to fine and/or imprisonment.6 The PCA does not, however, prohibit all military involvement with civilian law enforcement. A considerable amount of military participation with civilian law enforcement is permissible, either as indirect support or under one of the numerous PCA exceptions.

Chapter 15 of Title 10 U.S.C (§§ 271–284), 32 C.F.R. § 182, and DoDI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies,7 discussed below, provide guidance regarding restrictions the PCA places on the military when supporting civilian law enforcement agencies.8

1. To Whom Does the PCA Apply?

On its face, the PCA only applies to active duty members of the Army and the Air Force. Accordingly, Federal courts have consistently read the plain language of the PCA to limit its application to these two

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2 Id.
4 Hammond, supra note 3, at 954. The states of South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida sent in double returns. The electoral boards of these three states, which were dominated by Republicans, certified that the states had voted for Hayes even though it was widely believed that each state had a majority of Democrats. The Democrats sent in their own returns, which showed that Tilden won each of the three states. Congress, which held a Republican majority, eventually appointed an electoral commission to recount the entire vote. Hayes was declared the winner by one electoral vote. Tilden won the popular vote with 51 percent over Hayes’ 48 percent.
5 Id.
6 Although there are harsh penalties for violators of the PCA, courts have not yet found reason to allow for the exclusion of evidence seized during a PCA violation. Courts have not found PCA violations pervasive enough to necessitate the application of this sanction. See United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 85 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 930 (4th Cir 1995); United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967, 976 (4th Cir. 1987).
7 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (27 Feb. 2013) (C1, 8 Feb. 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.21].
services. However, in 2017, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations that prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.” The current iteration of that regulation is DoDI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies. It extends the congressional restrictions placed on Army and Air Force activities through the PCA to the Navy and Marine Corps, as well. While the Coast Guard may operate in the Department of the Navy during time of war, at no time does the PCA apply to the Coast Guard.

The PCA also applies to Reserve members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who are on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive duty training in a Title 10 duty status. Members of the NG performing operational support duties, active duty for training, or inactive duty training in a Title 32 duty status are not subject to the PCA. Only when members of the NG are in a Title 10 duty status (Federal status) are they subject to the PCA. Members of the NG may also perform duties in a State Active Duty (SAD) status and are not subject to PCA in that capacity. DoD civilian employees are only subject to the prohibitions of the PCA and the DoDI 3025.21 if they are under the direct control of a military officer.

Finally, the PCA does not apply to a member of the active component Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps when they are off-duty and acting in their private capacity. A Service member is not in a private capacity if assistance is rendered to civilian law enforcement officials under the direction or control of DoD authorities.

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9 See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing congressional record that earlier version of measure expressly extended PCA to the Navy but final version deleted any mention of application to the Navy); United States v. Roberts, 779 F. 2d 565 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986).

10 See 32 C.F.R. § 182.6 (2017); See also Hayes v. Hawes, 921 F.2d 100, 102–103 (10 U.S.C. § 375 makes the proscriptions of 18 U.S.C. § 1385 applicable to the Navy). See also Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1094 (“Regulations issued under 10 U.S.C. § 375 require Navy compliance with the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act . . . .”). Exceptions to this prohibition as it applies to the Navy or Marine Corps may be granted by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of Navy on a case-by-case basis. See DoDi 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para.3.

11 See DoDi 3025.21, supra note 6.

12 See DoDi 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 1; see also SECNAVINST 5820.7C, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., para. 8(b).

13 See 14 U.S.C. §§ 102, 522 (2018) which describes the Coast Guard’s role as a domestic law enforcement agency. The specific authorities of the Coast Guard can be found infra in Chapter 3.

14 The Reserve includes Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is units or individuals liable for active duty as provided in 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301–12302. The Ready Reserve consists of: (1) the Selected Reserve, including unit members assigned to Reserve organizations and performing drill periods and annual training, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) performing drills and annual training assigned to Active component organizations, and active guard and reserve (AGR) on full time active duty or full time National Guard duty in Reserve organizations; (2) the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR); and (3) the inactive National Guard (ING). All members of the Selected Reserve are in an active status. 10 U.S.C. §§ 10142–10144. See also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 1215.06, UNIFORM RESERVE, TRAINING, AND RETIREMENT CATEGORIES FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS (11 Mar. 2014) (C1, 19 May 2015).


16 See infra Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of National Guard and Reserve status.

17 DoDi 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. 2.

18 Id.
2. Where Does the PCA Apply?

a. What the Law Says

There is no definitive statement of the scope of the PCA. Federal courts have generally held that the PCA places no restrictions on the use of the armed forces to enforce the law abroad. The courts, noting that Congress intended to preclude military involvement in domestic law enforcement activities, have been unwilling to apply the PCA extraterritorially. In addition, a 1989 Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Opinion concluded that the PCA and the restrictions in 10 U.S.C. §§ 271–284 have no extraterritorial application.

b. What Policy Says

Despite the courts and Department of Justice concluding that the PCA does not apply abroad, DoD policy, as implemented by DoDI 3025.21, states that the prohibitions on direct civilian law enforcement assistance apply to all actions of DoD personnel worldwide. Therefore, commanders must consider PCA even when contemplating military assistance in law enforcement overseas. In cases of compelling or extraordinary circumstances, the Secretary of Defense may consider exceptions to the prohibition against direct military assistance to law enforcement outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

3. When Does the PCA Apply?

10 U.S.C. §§ 271-275 outline the restrictions on military participation in civilian law enforcement activities. Under these statutes, the regulation of military activity is divided into three major categories: (1) use of information, (2) use of military equipment and facilities, and (3) use of military personnel.

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19 United States v. Kahn, 35 F.3d 426, 431 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994)


21 Chandler, 171 F.2d. at 936 (The PCA was “the type of criminal statute which is properly presumed to have no extraterritorial application in the absence of statutory language indicating a contrary intent.”).

22 Memorandum from Office of the Assistant Attorney General to General Brent Scowcroft, Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act (3 Nov. 1989). But see Kahn, supra note 18. The Kahn court cites 10 U.S.C. § 374(b)(2)(F) (mentioning “law enforcement operations outside of the land area of the United States”), § 379(a) (mentioning “naval vessels at sea”), and § 379(d) (mentioning “area outside the land area of the United States”) as evidence of limitations placed on the use of the armed forces abroad. While recognizing that several courts held the PCA only applies within the territory of the United States, the Kahn court maintained that the law contained evidence of PCA restrictions applying outside the United States. The court in Kahn ultimately held there was no PCA violation because the Navy only provided indirect assistance to the Coast Guard during the operation leading to the arrest of the defendant. Thus, Navy involvement in Coast Guard drug interdiction operations is an area for PCA challenges. See United States v. Rasheed, 802 F.Supp. 312 (D. Haw. 1992), is another example of this type of challenge. Although this is an area for potential challenge, Congress has explicitly authorized the Navy to assist in the enforcement of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. ch. 705) and these operations are conducted frequently.

23 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, at 3.

24 Id. (note that only the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense may grant such exceptions).
DoDI 3025.21 contains several enclosures discussing areas of permissible DoD activity, including: Participation in Law Enforcement (Enclosure 3), Support of Civil Disturbance Operations (Enclosure 4), Domestic EOD Support for Law Enforcement (Enclosure 5), Domestic Terrorism Incident Support (Enclosure 6), Use of Information Collected During Military Operations (Enclosure 7), and the Use of DoD Equipment and Facilities (Enclosure 8). Figure 4.1 summarizes the PCA exceptions in 10 U.S.C. §§ 271–275 and guidance from DoDI 3025.21:


In addition to the above categories, 10 U.S.C. §§ 276–277 provides further limitations on the provision of military support to civilian law enforcement. Section 276 provides an overarching restriction in the

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event “such support will adversely affect the military preparedness of the United States.” 26 Section 277 requires civilian law enforcement agencies to reimburse DoD for support provided as required by the Economy Act 27 or other applicable law. Civilian law enforcement agencies do not have to provide reimbursement for support under this statute if the support: (1) is provided in the normal course of military training or operations, or (2) results in a benefit to DoD that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained through military training or operations. 28 Waiver authority for reimbursement not required by law resides with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel). This authority may be delegated to the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies (or designees) on matters within their approval authority. 29

Figure 4-2 provides a brief overview of PCA scenarios and the applicability of the PCA thereto. It is merely a beginning point in any potential legal analysis of DoD support to civilian law enforcement.

Figure 4-2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US ARMY &amp; AIR FORCE, TITLE 10</th>
<th>APPLICABILITY OF THE PCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal Status</td>
<td>PCA applies. Title 10 personnel in normal status may not engage in direct law enforcement activities to include: interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft; search or seizure of civilian personnel and effects; arrest or detention of civilians; conduct surveillance, or as undercover investigators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Execution of a Military Purpose</td>
<td>The PCA does not apply. This is a narrowly construed exception to the PCA that exempts activity conducted to further a military interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detailed to another Federal agency subject to receiving agency’s control (Special Assistant U.S. Attorney, Special Deputy U.S. Marshal, etc.)</td>
<td>PCA does not apply as these personnel are not considered part of the Army or Air Force for PCA purposes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Federal properties and functions</td>
<td>Constitutional exception to the PCA. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response pursuant to the Insurrection Act</td>
<td>Statutory exception to PCA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26 10 U.S.C. § 276 (2018). This statute reflects congressional concern over the potential dilution of military readiness and capabilities by complying with requests for assistance from civilian law enforcement agencies.
29 See, e.g. SECNAVINST 5820.7C, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., para. 9; AFI 10-801, supra note 8, ch. 5.
30 See 32 C.F.R. § 215.4 (2017) for background on this Constitutional exception. See also DoDD 3025.18, supra at fig. 4-1. See also Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist to R. Kenly Webster, Acting General Counsel, Department of the Army, Re: Authority to use troops to prevent interference with Federal employees and consequent impairment of government functions (29 Apr. 1971) referencing In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (noting that troops can be used to prevent the obstruction of vital federal functions pursuant to the inherent authority of the President), citing In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895) (“If the emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the Nation to compel obedience to its laws.”) (upholding the use of troops for the purpose of protecting federal property and removing obstruction to federal functions).
Support to other Federal, State and local entities that are engaged in direct law enforcement activities

The PCA prohibits direct engagement; subject to DoD regulations and approvals, technical and logistical assistance may be rendered.

Response to a CBRN attack or threat

Subject to Presidential directives, DoD regulations and approvals, constitutional, or statutory exceptions to the PCA exist.

Transfer of information that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or state law within the jurisdiction of such officials

PCA does not apply, but the dissemination of information must be conducted in accordance with applicable regulations (see 10 U.S.C. § 271).

Off-duty Title 10 Personnel

PCA does not apply unless acting under the direction of DoD authorities (see DoDI 3025.21).

Homeland Defense Operations

PCA does not apply.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NG</th>
<th>APPLICABILITY OF THE PCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Active Duty (SAD)</td>
<td>The PCA does not apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 32 Status</td>
<td>The PCA does not apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title 10 Status (“Federalized”)</td>
<td>PCA applies (see 10 U.S.C. § 12405).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OTHER UNIFORMED SERVICES</th>
<th>APPLICABILITY OF THE PCA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States Navy</td>
<td>PCA does not apply by statute, but by DoD policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
<td>PCA does not apply by statute, but by DoD policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
<td>PCA does not apply (but see 14 U.S.C. § 103).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States Public Health Service</td>
<td>PCA does not apply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Oceanic &amp; Atmospheric Administration</td>
<td>PCA does not apply.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Statutory Categories of PCA Application and Policy Implementation

a. Use of DoD Information Collected During Military Operations

Section § 271 of the PCA regulates the use of information collected during military operations. The Secretary of Defense implemented the DoD requirements in Enclosure 7 of DoDI 3025.21. Under 10 U.S.C. § 271, the Secretary of Defense may provide information collected during the normal course of military operations to Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies if the information is relevant to a violation of Federal or State law within the jurisdiction of these officials. Under 10 U.S.C. § 271(b), the Secretary of Defense is required, to the maximum extent practicable, take into account the needs of civilian law enforcement officials for information when planning and executing military training and operations. Lastly, 10 U.S.C. § 271(c) provides that the Secretary of Defense shall ensure, to the extent consistent with national security, that intelligence information held by the Department of Defense and relevant to drug interdiction and other civilian law enforcement matters is promptly provided to the appropriate civilian law enforcement officials.31


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Enclosure 7 of DoDI 3025.21 implements 10 U.S.C. § 271 with some additional restrictions. Military departments and defense agencies are generally encouraged to provide law enforcement officials any information collected during the normal course of military operations that may be relevant to a violation of the law. However, the Department of Defense may not transfer information if its acquisition violated applicable law protecting privacy or constitutional rights, or if it would have been illegal for the civilian agency to obtain the information or use the procedures employed by the Department of Defense to obtain the information. While the Secretary of Defense shall take into account the needs of civilian law enforcement officials to obtain intelligence when planning and executing military training and operations in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 271, the planning or creation of missions or training for the primary purpose of aiding civilian law enforcement official intelligence-gathering efforts is prohibited. Law enforcement officials may accompany regularly scheduled training flights as observers, but point-to-point transportation and training flights for civilian law enforcement officials are not authorized. Additionally, the handling of all such information must comply with DoDD 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities; DoDD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense; DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, and DoD 5400.11-R, Department of Defense Privacy Program. For additional information concerning the use of DoD information collected during domestic operations, see Intelligence Oversight and Information Handling During Domestic Support Operations, Chapter 9, infra.

b. Use of DoD Military Equipment and Facilities

10 U.S.C. § 272 and Enclosure 8 of DoDI 3025.21 address the use of military equipment and facilities by civilian law enforcement authorities (not to be confused with the separate provisions under Enclosure 3 regarding the use of DoD personnel to operate or maintain equipment discussed below). Section 272(a) allows the Secretary of Defense to make available equipment (including associated supplies and spare parts), base facilities, and research facilities of the Department of Defense to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes. The provision of equipment and facilities must be made in accordance with all other applicable law. Enclosure 8 of DoDI 3025.21 implements this statute and allows military departments and defense agencies to make

32 See DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(g)(2).
33 See id., encl. 7, para. (1)(e). Training or missions for the purpose of routinely collecting information about U.S. citizens is prohibited as well. Id.
34 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 4515.13, AIR TRANSPORTATION ELIGIBILITY (22 Jan. 2016) (C4, 31 Aug. 2018) for guidance on this type of assistance. Flights related to counter-drug operations are permitted by this regulation. See infra Chapter 7, Counterdrug Operations.
35 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 5240.01, DO D INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (27 Aug. 2007) (C2, 22 Mar. 2019) [hereinafter DoDD 5240.01].
37 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., REG. 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DO D INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS (7 Dec. 1982) (C2, 26 Apr. 2017) [hereinafter DoDD 5240.1-R]. DoDD 5240.1-R is undergoing revision; consequently, practitioners citing this reference should first ensure DoDD 5240.1-R is still in effect.).
equipment, base facilities, or research facilities available to Federal, State, or local law enforcement authorities if the assistance does not adversely affect military preparedness.  

Approval authority under DoDI 3025.21 varies based on the type of equipment requested, the reason for the request, and whether the equipment is loaned or leased. The following is a list of the approval authorities for various types of equipment and facilities:

- Requests for equipment or facilities outside the U.S. (other than arms, ammunition, combat vehicles, vessels and aircraft) shall be in accordance with procedures established by the applicable DoD component;
- Requests from other Federal agencies to purchase equipment may be submitted directly to the DoD component at issue;
- Requests for training, expert advice, and personnel to operate and maintain equipment shall be made in accordance with Enclosure 3 of DoDI 3025.21; and
- For loans pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (the Economy Act) or 31 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6508 (the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act), which are limited to agencies of the Federal Government and for leases pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2667, which may be made to entities outside the Federal Government, this guidance applies:
  - Requests for arms, ammunition, combat vehicles, vessels, and aircraft shall be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for approval.
  - Requests for loan or lease or other use of equipment or facilities are subject to approval by the heads of the DoD Components, unless approval by a higher official is required by statute or a DoD issuance applicable to the particular disposition.

Judge advocates must be aware that other policies and statutes overlap with DoDI 3025.21 and 10 U.S.C. §§ 271–275 with regard to authorities and approvals in this area. For example, DoDD 3025.18 also discusses the approval authority of the Secretary of Defense for the assistance with assets with potential lethality, e.g., arms, vessels or aircraft, or ammunition. As discussed, approval authority for assistance from DoD intelligence components is governed by DoDD 5240.01 and other relevant authorities discussed above. 10 U.S.C. § 282 provides additional authority for the provision of certain types of equipment; it states DoD may provide resources to the Department of Justice in a weapons of mass destruction situation. Further, E.O. 13527, Establishing Federal Capability for the Timely

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39 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 8, para. 3.
41 Leases under 10 U.S.C. § 2667 (2018) may be made to entities outside the Federal Government.
42 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 8.
43 This authority of the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies may be delegated. See, e.g. SEACNAVINST 5820.7C, supra note 8, para. 6(b); AFI 10-801, supra note 8, ch.3.
44 DoDD 3025.18, supra at fig. 4-1.
Provision of Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological Attack, provides additional authority for DoD integration into plans to support the delivery of “medical countermeasures” as part of a response to a biological attack.46

Aside from authorities and approvals, the provision of military equipment to civilians is further complicated by specific procedures needed to accomplish the transfer. For the Army, these procedures are located in AR 700-131.47 In non-emergency situations, AFI 23-119, Exchange, Sale, or Temporary Custody of Non-Excess Personal Property, and AFI 32-9003, Granting Temporary Use of Air Force Real Property, set forth the Air Force process in this area.48 Judge advocates will not only need to ensure that the proper authority has approved the transaction, but that the proper Service-specific procedures are followed to effect the transaction.

c. Participation of DoD Personnel in Civilian Law Enforcement Activities

When DoD personnel are detailed to other Federal agencies, and become subject to the receiving agency’s control, those personnel are no longer considered DoD personnel for the purposes of a PCA analysis. Examples of such detailed personnel include those detailed to the Department of Transportation,49 the Department of Homeland Security,50 the Department of Justice,51 and the Department of the Interior.52 Aside, from these personnel who are excepted from the PCA by Federal statutes, the Federal courts have enunciated three tests to determine whether the use of military personnel violates the PCA.53 If any one of these three tests is met, the assistance may be considered a violation of the PCA.54

- The first test is whether the actions of military personnel are “active” or “passive.” Only the active, or direct, use of military personnel to enforce the laws is a violation of the PCA.55

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46 Exec. Order No. 13257, 75 Fed. Reg. 737 (Jan. 6, 2010). E.O. 13527 provides that the Secretaries of Homeland Security, Defense, and Health and Human Services shall develop a plan to support the U.S. Postal Service in its distribution of efforts, to include a “plan for supplementing local law enforcement personnel, as necessary and appropriate, with local Federal law enforcement, as well as other appropriate personnel, to escort U.S. Postal workers delivering medical countermeasures.”


48 AFI 10-801, supra note 8.

49 See 49 U.S.C. § 324 (1983) (allowing for the appointment, detailing, or assigning of a military member to the Secretary of Transportation for the purpose of safeguarding national defense interests).


54 United States v. Kahn, 35 F.3d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1994).

55 United States v. Rasheed, 802 F. Supp. 312, 324–25, (D. Haw. 1992) (finding that the Navy’s providing of aerial reconnaissance and intercepting a ship, as well as providing back-up security while the ship was searched and defendants arrested, was passive involvement, and consequently did not violate PCA); United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916,
• The second test is whether the use of military personnel pervades the activities of civilian law enforcement officials. Under this test, military personnel must fully subsume the role of civilian law enforcement officials.\textsuperscript{56}

• The third test is whether the military personnel subjected citizens to the exercise of military power that was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature. A power “regulatory in nature” is one that controls or directs. A power “proscriptive in nature” is one that prohibits or condemns. A power “compulsory in nature” is one that exerts some coercive force.\textsuperscript{57} Note that under DoDD 3025.21, Immediate Response Authority (IRA) may not be used when it subjects civilians to military power that is “regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.” Thus, IRA may not be used to circumvent the PCA.\textsuperscript{58}

In implementing the guidance contained in 10 U.S.C. Chapter 15 (§§ 271–284), DoDI 3025.21 divides the PCA regulation of the use of military personnel to assist civilian law enforcement into five categories: (1) permissible direct assistance, (2) use of DoD personnel to operate or maintain equipment, (3) expert advice, (4) training, and (5) other permissible assistance.

DoD support to civilian law enforcement is often subject to intense scrutiny. When advising commanders on the permissible use of military personnel in support of civilian law enforcement activities, judge advocates must not only consider possible legal ramifications of PCA violations but also the potential negative public perception that may result from certain types of legal, but controversial assistance.

\textsuperscript{56} Kahn, 35 F.3d at 431–432 (holding that Navy’s involvement in apprehension, arrest, and detention of defendant in international waters was passive and thus did not violate PCA because the FBI was in charge of operation at all times, and Navy merely provided necessary support services); Hayes v. Hawes, 921 F.2d 100, 103–104 (7th Cir. 1990) (actions of undercover NIS agent in acting as a drug buyer and signaling civilian law enforcement officers when the transaction was complete, was not so pervasive as to violate the PCA since the NIS agent did not become involved in the arrest and search of the defendant or the seizure and transportation of evidence); United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112, 115 (5th Cir. 1986) (Air Force allowing a U.S. Customs Service officer to ride aboard an AWACS aircraft, tracking defendant’s aircraft, and reporting its location to U.S. Customs Service agents on the ground was not so pervasive as to violate the PCA. The court further noted that these actions are specifically allowed by 10 U.S.C. §§ 271, 274(b)).

\textsuperscript{57} Yunis, 924 F.2d at 895–96 (The Navy’s involvement in apprehension, arrest, and transportation of defendant was not regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory use of military power because defendant was under exclusive custody and control of FBI at all times); United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the use of military equipment by civilian law enforcement officers, presence of military personnel ordered there to observe and report whether Federal military intervention would be required, drafting of contingency plans by military personnel for intervention of military, and aerial reconnaissance by military aircraft, was not regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory use of military power which would result in violation of PCA).

\textsuperscript{58} DoDD 3025.18, supra note 43, para. 4.
(1) **Direct Assistance**

(a) **Prohibited Direct Assistance**

The first category of PCA regulation of military activity with civilian law enforcement agencies addresses direct assistance. Direct assistance and participation by military personnel in the execution and enforcement of the law is the heart of the prohibition of the PCA.\(^{59}\) The restrictions on direct assistance by military personnel in civilian law enforcement activities are codified in 10 U.S.C. § 275 and are implemented as policy by DoDI 3025.21, Enclosure 3.\(^{60}\) Unless specifically authorized in enclosure 3 or 4 of DoDI 3025.21, DoD personnel are prohibited from providing direct assistance in the following forms:

- Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity;
- A search or seizure;
- An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, interview, interrogation, canvassing, questioning potential witnesses, or similar activities;
- Using force violence, brandishing or using a weapon, or threatening to discharge or use a weapon (except in self-defense, in defense of other DoD persons in the vicinity, or in defense of non-DoD persons, including civilian law enforcement personnel in the vicinity when directly related to an assigned activity or mission);
- Evidence collection, security functions, crowd and traffic control, and operating, manning, or staffing checkpoints;
- Surveillance or pursuit of individuals, vehicles, items, transactions, or physical locations, or acting as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators; and
- Forensic investigations or other testing of evidence obtained from a suspect for use in a civilian law enforcement investigation in the United States unless there is a DoD nexus or the responsible civilian law enforcement official requesting such testing declares in writing that the evidence to be examined was obtained by consent. (The Secretary of Defense may authorize exceptions).

(b) **Permissible Direct Assistance**

(i) **Military Purpose Doctrine**

The PCA permits several forms of direct assistance to law enforcement by military personnel. The first permissible direct assistance is action taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military or

\(^{59}\) *Red Feather*, 392 F. Supp. at 923 (“It is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 1385 to prevent the direct, active use of Federal troops to execute the laws.”).

\(^{60}\) DoDI 3025.21, *supra* note 6, encl. 3, para 1.c.
foreign affairs function of the United States.\textsuperscript{61} This category is often referred to as the “Military Purpose Doctrine” and covers actions the primary purpose of which is to further a military interest. These military interests include actions on all DoD installations, thereby allowing DoD personnel to perform law enforcement functions on DoD property. While civilian agencies can receive an incidental benefit, legal advisers should construe this section narrowly. It cannot be used as a subterfuge for getting around the PCA. For example, scheduling a military exercise for the sole purpose of benefiting a civilian law enforcement agency is contrary to the intent of the military purpose doctrine. Military actions under the military purpose doctrine include:

- Investigations and other actions related to enforcement of the UCMJ;
- Investigations and other actions that are likely to result in DoD administrative proceedings, regardless of whether there is a related civil or criminal proceeding;
- Investigations and other actions related to the commander’s inherent authority to maintain law and order on a military installation or facility;
- Protection of classified military information or equipment or controlled unclassified information;
- Protection of DoD personnel, DoD equipment, and official guests of the DoD; and
- Such other actions that are undertaken primarily for a military or foreign affairs purpose.\textsuperscript{62}

It is important to note that the use of military forces in the national defense of the United States is not support to civilian law enforcement agencies. Rather, it is inherent under the President’s Constitutional authority as Commander in Chief to protect the homeland.\textsuperscript{63} The use of military forces in a national defense role is not subject to the PCA and other restrictions on military participation in law enforcement.

\textbf{(ii) Emergency Authority}

A second type of direct assistance that may be permitted is action that falls under the “emergency authority” of the United States.\textsuperscript{64} This is an inherent authority of the Federal Government under the Constitution. Actions permitted in accordance with this authority are those necessary to preserve public order and to carry out governmental operations within U.S. territorial limits, or otherwise in

\textsuperscript{61} Id. encl. 3.

\textsuperscript{62} Id.

\textsuperscript{63} See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-27, Homeland Defense I-6, ¶ 3.b.(1) (10 Apr. 2018) (noting that while the PCA generally prohibits the use of DoD personnel for law enforcement within the homeland, homeland defense operations are not law enforcement activities and, therefore, not restricted by the PCA).

\textsuperscript{64} See supra note 29, which notes the Constitution authorizes “prompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and to restore governmental functioning and public order when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disasters, or calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situations.”
accordance with applicable law. In such circumstances, necessary force may be used. The circumstances when the use of emergency authority is appropriate are very rare, however; typically they will arise only during a large-scale and unexpected civil disturbance.

“Emergency authority” is reserved for extremely unusual circumstances. When authorized under the provisions of DoDD 3025.18, “Federal military commanders have the authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances because:

- Such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restore governmental function and public order; or,

- When duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal Governmental functions. Federal action, including the use of Federal military forces, is authorized when necessary to protect Federal property or functions. 65

- Presidential approval for quelling civil disturbances is not a prerequisite to the use of military forces in these two very limited circumstances. 66

(iii) Civil Disturbance Statutes

The third type of permitted direct assistance by military forces to civilian law enforcement is action taken pursuant to DoD responsibilities under the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255. This statute contains express exceptions to the PCA that allow for the use of military forces to repel insurgency, domestic violence, or conspiracy that hinders the execution of State or Federal law in specified circumstances. The Insurrection Act permits the President to use U.S. Armed Forces to enforce the law when:

- There is an insurrection within a State, and the State legislature (or Governor if the legislature cannot be convened) requests assistance from the President; 67

- A rebellion makes it impracticable to enforce the Federal law through ordinary judicial proceedings, 68 or

- An insurrection or domestic violence opposes or obstructs Federal law, or so hinders the enforcement of Federal or State laws that residents of that State are deprived of their constitutional rights and the State is unable or unwilling to protect these rights. 69

65 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(b)(3).
66 DoDD 3025.18, supra fig 4-1, para. 4
10 U.S.C. § 254 of the Insurrection Act requires the President to issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents to disperse within a certain time before using the military to enforce the laws. President George H.W. Bush was the last president to exercise his authority under the Insurrection Act (first, after Hurricane Hugo in 1989, and second, after the LA Riots in 1992). When DoD personnel are deployed under the Insurrection Act, they operate in support of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice.

(iv) Other Authority

There are several statutes and authorities, other than the Insurrection Act, that allow for direct DoD participation in civil law enforcement, subject to the limitations within each respective statute. This section does not contain detailed guidance; therefore, specific statutes and other references must be consulted before determining whether military participation is permissible. A brief listing of these statutes includes:

- Prohibited transactions involving nuclear material (18 U.S.C. § 831);
- Emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction (10 U.S.C. § 282) (see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 175a, 229E, and 233E, which authorize the Attorney General or other DOJ official to request SecDef to provide assistance under 10 U.S.C. § 282);
- Assistance in the case of crimes against foreign officials, official guests of the United States, and other internationally protected persons (18 U.S.C. §§ 112, 1116);
- Protection of the President, Vice President, and other designated dignitaries (18 U.S.C. § 1751 and the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976);
- Assistance in the case of crimes against members of Congress (18 U.S.C. § 351);
- Execution of quarantine and certain health laws (42 U.S.C. § 97);
- Protection of national parks and certain other Federal lands (16 U.S.C. §§ 23, 78, 593);
- Enforcement of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery and Conservation Management Act (16 U.S.C. § 1861(a));
- Actions taken in support of the neutrality laws (22 U.S.C. §§ 408, 461–462);
- Removal of persons unlawfully present on Indian lands (25 U.S.C. § 180);
- Execution of certain warrants relating to enforcement of specified civil rights laws (42 U.S.C. § 1989);

70 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(b)(5).
• Removal of unlawful enclosures from public lands (43 U.S.C. § 1065);
• Protection of the rights of a discoverer of a guano island (48 U.S.C. § 1418);
• Support of territorial Governors if a civil disorder occurs (48 U.S.C. §§ 1422, 1591);
• Actions in support of certain customs laws (50 U.S.C. § 220); and
• Actions taken to provide search and rescue support domestically under the authorities provided in the National Search and Rescue Plan.

(2) Training

The second main category of regulation of DoD assistance to civilian law enforcement involves training. 10 U.S.C. § 273 permits the Secretary of Defense to make DoD personnel available for the training of Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement personnel in the operation and maintenance of equipment, including equipment provided to civilian law enforcement by DoD under 10 U.S.C. § 272. The Secretary of Defense has authorized the use of this authority in DoDI 3025.21, Enclosure 3.\(^1\)

DoDI 3025.21 allows the military departments and defense agencies to provide training that is not “large scale or elaborate” and does not result in a direct or regular involvement of military personnel in activities that are traditionally civilian law enforcement operations. Training assistance is limited to situations where the use of non-DoD personnel would be unfeasible or impractical because of time or cost. Training assistance cannot involve military personnel in a direct role in a law enforcement operation, unless otherwise authorized by law. Further, this type of assistance may only be rendered at locations where law enforcement confrontations are not likely.\(^2\)

DoD personnel are prohibited from providing advanced military training to civilian law enforcement agencies.\(^3\) “Advanced” military training is defined as high intensity training, which focuses on the tactics, techniques, and procedures required to apprehend, arrest, detain, search for, or seize a criminal suspect when the potential for violent confrontation exists. Examples of advanced military training include advanced marksmanship and sniper training, military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT), close quarters battle/close quarters combat (CQB/CQC) training, and other similar training. Advanced military training does not include basic military skills such as basic marksmanship, patrolling, mission planning, medical, and survival skills.\(^4\)

A single general exception to the above policy is the U.S. Army Military Police School, which is authorized to train civilian law enforcement agencies in the Counterdrug Special Reaction Team

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\(^1\) DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(f).
\(^2\) Id.
\(^4\) DoD may allow local police organizations and other civic organizations to use military ranges. See 10 U.S.C. § 7409 (2018).
Course, the Counterdrug Tactical Police Operations Course, and the Counterdrug Marksman/Observer Course. Additionally, the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) may approve similar training by special operations forces on an exceptional basis.\(^{75}\)

(3) Expert Advice

The third main category of regulation on DoD assistance to civilian law enforcement is the provision providing for expert advice. 10 U.S.C. § 273 allows the Secretary of Defense to make DoD personnel available to provide civilian law enforcement agencies with expert advice relevant to the purposes of 10 U.S.C., Chapter 18. This does not permit direct assistance with activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise authorized in DoDI 3025.21.\(^{76}\)

(4) Use of DoD Personnel to Operate or Maintain Equipment

10 U.S.C. § 274 and DoDI 3025.21, Enclosure 3, address the use of DoD personnel for the operation or maintenance of equipment, including but not limited to equipment provided under Section 272 and Enclosure 8 to DoDI 3025.21 Enclosure 8, for Federal, State, or local law enforcement officials. DoDI 3025.21 largely mirrors 10 U.S.C. § 274, with a few additional restrictions and differences that will be highlighted as the statute provisions are set forth below.\(^{77}\)

10 U.S.C. § 274(a) allows the Secretary of Defense to make DoD personnel available for the maintenance of equipment for Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement officials, including equipment made available under 10 U.S.C. § 272.\(^{78}\) The statute does not specify from whom a request for maintenance must come. Specifics for maintenance and operation requests under DoDI 3025.21 are discussed further below.

10 U.S.C. § 274(b)(1) allows the Secretary of Defense, upon request from the head of a Federal LEA, to make DoD personnel available to operate equipment under certain laws and operations as follows:

- A criminal violation of certain specified laws;\(^{79}\)
- Assistance that such agency is authorized to provide to a State, local, or foreign government involved with enforcement of a similar law;

\(^{75}\) Training Memorandum, \textit{supra} note 71.

\(^{76}\) DoDI 3025.21, \textit{supra} note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(d).

\(^{77}\) The operation or maintenance of equipment for a civilian agency, or the assistance in operating or maintaining such equipment, is subject to the following general restrictions from DoDI 3025.21: The use of DoD personnel to operate or maintain, or to assist in the operation or maintenance of equipment, will be limited to situations where it would be impractical or unfeasible to use non-DoD personnel for this purpose. The use of DoD personnel under these provisions must not compromise military preparedness. The assistance cannot involve DoD personnel in a direct law enforcement role unless otherwise authorized, and the assistance should be provided at a location where there is not a reasonable likelihood of a law enforcement confrontation. Lastly, military aircraft for point-to-point transportation and training flights for civilian law enforcement personnel may only be provided in accordance with DoDI 4515.13.

\(^{78}\) DoDI 3025.21, \textit{supra} note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(d).

• A foreign or domestic counter-terrorism operation; or

• A rendition of a suspected terrorist from a foreign country to the United States to stand trial.

These categories are best understood as “areas” the DoD can operate in with respect to 10 U.S.C. § 274. DoDI 3025.21 repeats these areas almost verbatim, with minor changes or additions.80

10 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2) states that DoD personnel made available under 10 U.S.C. § 274(b) may operate equipment for certain purposes. This is best understood as what functions DoD personnel can perform when operating under the areas above. The following purposes are authorized under the statute:81

• Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic;

• Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of surface traffic outside of the U.S. geographic boundary and within the United States not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside of the boundary;

• Aerial reconnaissance;

• Interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of communicating with such vessels and aircraft to direct such vessels and aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials;

• Operation of equipment to facilitate communications in connection with law enforcement programs specified in 10 U.S.C. § 274(a)(4)(1); and

• Subject to joint approval by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General (and the Secretary of State in the case of a law enforcement operation outside of the land area of the United States):
  ➢ the transportation of civilian law enforcement personnel along with any other civilian or military personnel who are supporting or conducting a joint operation with civilian law enforcement personnel;
  ➢ the operation of a base of operations for civilian law enforcement and supporting personnel; and

80 For example, DoDI 3025.21 adds “including support of FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces” to the provision of 10 U.S.C. § 274 discussing operation of equipment in the case of foreign or domestic terrorism missions. DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(d)(5).

81 DoDI 3025.21 reiterates all of these approved purposes virtually identically, including those subject to joint approval. DoDI.21 adds one other authorized purpose – the detection, monitoring, and tracking of the movement of weapons of mass destruction under the circumstances described in para. (1)(d) of Enclosure 3 and when outside the United States. DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(d)(5)(b)(7).
the transportation of suspected terrorists from foreign countries to the United States for trial (so long as the requesting Federal law enforcement agency provides all security for such transportation and maintains custody over the suspect through the duration of the transportation).

Additionally, DoD personnel made available to operate equipment for the purposes stated above may continue to operate such equipment into the land area of the United States in cases involving the pursuit of vessels or aircraft where the detection began outside such land area. Lastly, 10 U.S.C. § 274(c) provides that the Secretary of Defense may make DoD personnel available to operate equipment for purposes other than those enumerated in 10 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2) so long as such support does not result in DoD personnel directly participating in a civilian law enforcement operation, unless direct participation is otherwise authorized by law.

DoDI 3025.21 contains several additional important provisions. First, DoDI 3025.21 does not prohibit the use of emergency action authority under DoDD 3025.18. Additionally, when DoD personnel are otherwise assigned to provide assistance with respect to the laws specified in subparagraph (1)(b)(5) of Enclosure 3, the participation of such personnel shall be consistent with the limitations in such laws, if any, and such restrictions as may be established by DoD policy or the Components concerned.

The process for requests for operation and maintenance of equipment differ slightly between the statute and DoDI 3025.21. No specific guidance is given regarding requests for equipment maintenance under 10 U.S.C. § 274(a). Under 10 U.S.C. § 274(b) requests for equipment operation must come from the head of a Federal law enforcement agency. DoDI 3025.21 states that a request for DoD personnel to operate or maintain equipment (or assist with these actions) must be made pursuant to section 10 U.S.C. § 274 or other applicable law that permits DoD personnel to provide such assistance to civilian law enforcement officials. It goes on to state a request that is made pursuant to section 10 U.S.C. § 274 must be made by the head of a civilian agency empowered to enforce any of the laws listed in footnote 73 above. Note that unlike 10 U.S.C. § 274, this appears to limit the circumstances under which maintenance (for 10 U.S.C. § 274 purposes) can be approved to these categories.

(5) Other Permissible Assistance

The last main category of regulation over DoD assistance to civilian law enforcement under DoDI 3025.21 is the overarching category of “other permissible assistance.” The transfer of information acquired in the normal course of military operations to civilian law enforcement agencies under 10 U.S.C. § 271 is not a violation of the PCA and falls into this category. Criteria for the provision of this information are discussed in paragraph (B)(4)(a), above.

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82 10 U.S.C. § 274(b)(3) (2018). DoDI 3025.21 differs slightly and states that personnel may operate equipment for both the detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic and the interception of vessels or aircraft in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 274(b)(2)(D) (2018).
84 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 6, encl. 3, para. (1)(d)(9).
85 Id. para. (1)(d)(4).
86 Note also the difference in request language for operation assistance—the statute uses the term “Federal agency” and DoDI 3025.21 uses the term “civilian agency empowered” to enforce certain laws.
87 Id. encl. 3, para. (1)(g).
CHAPTER 5

CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS

KEY REFERENCES:

- 18 U.S.C. § 1382, Entering Military, Naval, or Coast Guard Property.
- Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.
- DoDD 5525.13, Limitation of Authority to Deputize DoD Uniformed Law Enforcement Personnel by State and Local Governments, September 28, 2007, Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 8, 2020
- Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, February 27, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, Effective February 8, 2019.
- CJCSI 3110.07D, Guidance Concerning Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense and Employment of RIOT Control Agents and Herbicides (S), November 22, 2006.
- USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (S).
- USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3500-14, Defense Support of Civil Authorities Response.
- USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3600 (S).
- USPACOM CONPLAN 7502 (S).
• Authority to Use Troops to Prevent Interference With Federal Employees by Mayday Demonstrations and Consequent Impairment of Government Functions, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, April 29, 1971.

A. Introduction

The Code of Federal Regulations provides that within civilian communities in the United States, the local governments and the States have the primary responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law and order.1 The Constitution and laws of the United States authorize DoD to support this effort in certain circumstances.2 Generally, Federal forces are employed in support of State and local authorities to enforce civil law and order only when circumstances arise that overwhelm the resources of State and local authorities. This basic rule reflects the Founding Fathers’ hesitancy to raise a standing army and their desire to render the military subordinate to civilian authority.3 Limiting direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, is rooted in the Constitution4 and laws of the United States,5 and allows for exception only under extreme emergency conditions. The Constitution also guarantees to the States that the Federal Government will aid in suppressing civil disturbances and empowers Congress to create laws that provide Federal forces for that purpose.6

DoD policy no longer contains an official definition of civil disturbance, as the definition was removed from the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms; rather, “civil disturbances” are now referenced in the collective definition of “domestic emergencies.”7 DoD policy previously defined

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1 32 C.F.R. § 182.6(b)(1)(ii) (2017).
2 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES Encl. 4, para. 1.c. (27 Feb. 2013) (C1, 8 Feb. 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.21].
3 Among the several grounds stated in the Declaration of Independence for severing ties with Great Britain includes the fact that the King “has kept among us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the consent of our Legislature . . . [and] has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil power.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, available at https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript. This feeling resurfaced during the Constitutional Convention where Maryland Delegate Luther Martin recorded the general sentiment, “When a government wishes to deprive its citizens of freedom and reduce them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army. . . .” Luther Martin’s Letter on the Federal Convention of 1787 (1787), 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (ELLIOT’S DEBATES) 344, 372 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amem/aonline/1787-1836.html
4 The Constitution divides authority over the Armed Forces between the President as Commander in Chief, and Congress, which has the authority to “declare War . . . raise and support Armies . . . provide and maintain a Navy . . . [and] make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para. 11; art. II, § 2, para. 1.
5 See, e.g., Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012 & Supp. IV 2017) [hereinafter PCA]. This Act makes it unlawful to use any part of the Army or Air Force to act in a civilian law enforcement capacity to execute local, State, or federal laws. The language of the Act specifies that activities expressly authorized by the Constitution or by Federal statute are exempt from the restrictions expressed within the Act. For a more complete discussion of the Posse Comitatus Act, see infra in Chapter 4, Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, para. 15, art. II, § 2, para. 1, and art. IV, § 4. These sections provide authority to Congress and the President to support the States by providing forces to repel an invasion, suppress insurrections and protect the States from domestic violence.
7 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, 67 (8 January 2020) [hereinafter DoD Terms].
civil disturbance as “group acts of violence and disorders prejudicial to public law and order.” The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines civil disturbance more broadly as “[a] civil unrest activity such as a demonstration, riot, or strike that disrupts a community and requires intervention to maintain public safety.” Currently, the term is defined in Part II of Chief, NG Bureau (CNGB) Instruction 3000.04 as, “[g]roup acts of violence and disorder prejudicial to public law and order.”

This chapter discusses how DoD personnel and assets are integrated for response to civil disturbance operations (CDOs). The Federal or State authority used will determine how those forces are commanded, funded, and employed depends on the Federal or State.

1. National Response Framework (NRF) and CDOs

The NRF is the guide for how the Nation responds in the civil disturbance context and other emergencies. The NRF sets out scalable, flexible, and adaptable concepts for the national response to disasters and emergencies. While responses to civil disturbances generally begin and end locally, the NRF provides structure for the Federal response that may also be utilized by States to organize their response resources, capabilities, and authorities for managing incidents. In particular, Federal response resources and capabilities are organized by functional areas and grouped under 15 core Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). Public Safety and Security, inclusive of civil disturbance, is one of the ESFs designed to “[p]rovide Federal public safety and security assistance to local, State, tribal, territorial and Federal organizations overwhelmed by the results of actual or anticipated natural/manmade disaster or an act of terrorism.” The primary agency in support of this ESF is the

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8 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (29 October 2018) [hereinafter JP 3-28]. The 2007 edition of JP 3-28 contained this definition, the newer editions do not contain this or any other definition of the term.
9 See e.g., In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1894) (The open and active opposition of a number of persons to the execution of the laws of the United States, of so formidable a nature as to defy for the time being the authority of the government, constitutes an insurrection, though not accompanied by bloodshed, and not of sufficient magnitude to render success probable.)

10 https://training.fema.gov/programs/emischool/el361toolkit/glossary.htm#c.
13 Id. at 2.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 27. ESFs are the grouping of governmental and certain private sector capabilities into an organizational structure to provide support, resources, program implementation, and services that are most likely needed to save lives, protect property and the environment, restore essential services and critical infrastructure, and help victims and communities return to normal following domestic incidents. https://www.phe.gov/preparedness/support/ESF8/Pages/default.aspx. (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
2. The Tiered Response

“The public safety and the welfare of a State’s residents are the fundamental responsibilities of every Governor.”19 The Governor coordinates State resources to support local governments as needed and coordinates assistance with other States and the Federal Government.20 Stated very simply, when an incident occurs, local governments are the first to respond. If local resources are inadequate or exhausted, the local government may reach out to neighboring local governments through a variety of mutual assistance compacts or to the State for additional resources and capabilities. When State resources are inadequate or exhausted, the State may request and coordinate assistance from other States (through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC))21 and/or to the Federal Government. Among the resources available to a State and locality are: the affected State’s NG personnel in a State Active Duty (SAD) status and State assets, NG personnel in SAD and assets from other States (via EMAC), and other DoD personnel and assets.22

2. Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG)

Pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 182.6, the Attorney General may appoint a SCRAG for a civil disturbance. The SCRAG is responsible for the coordination of effort of all Federal agencies involved in the civil disturbance operation with the efforts of State and local agencies engaged in restoring law and order.

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17 Id.
18 Id.
19 NRF, supra note 12, at 31.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 2, Encl. 4, para. 1.e; 32 C.F.R. § 182.6(b)(5) (2012).
24 Id.
Note that the appointment of such an official does not replace the military chain of command. DoD forces employed in civil disturbance operations must remain under military authority at all times.

3. **Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)) acts as the principal point of contact between DoD and the DOJ for CDOs. ASD(HD&GS) is also responsible for the development, coordination, oversight of DoD policy for DSCA plans and activities regarding civil disturbances.

4. **Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS)**

JDOMS is the action agent within the DoD with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and directing the commitment of all designated Federal military resources during CDSs. JDOMS coordinates with the supported Combatant Commander (CC), and releases the execute order (EXORD) designating supported and supporting Combatant Commanders and tasking force providers to give the ordered support.

5. **Combatant Commanders**

The Commanders of USNORTHCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSOCOM, as the DoD planning agents for CDO, lead the CDO planning activities of the DoD Components in these areas:

- **USNORTHCOM** - The 48 contiguous States, Alaska, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

- **USINDOPACOM** - Hawaii and the U.S. possessions and territories in the Pacific area.

- **USSOCOM** - CDO activities involving special operations forces.

6. **Commander, U.S. Army North**

U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) is the Army component of USNORTHCOM. Its mission is to conduct homeland defense, civil support operations, and theater security cooperation activities. On orders,

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27 Previously known as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(AD&ASA)).
28 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 2, Encl. 2, para. 2.b.
30 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INST. 5711.02C, DELEGATION APPROVAL AUTHORITY (30 Nov. 2012). See also JP 3-28, supra note 8, Ch. III, V.
31 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 2, Encl. 4, at 26.
ARNORTH commands and controls deployed forces as a Joint Task Force or Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC).32

7. NG Bureau

The NGB is the channel of communication for all NG matters between Federal military elements (including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the DoD Components, and the Departments of the Army and Air Force) and the States.33 The CNGB facilitates and de-conflicts the use of NG forces to ensure that adequate and balanced forces are available for domestic and foreign military operations.34 The NGB maintains a 24/7 NG Coordination Center providing situational awareness and common operating picture for any CDO.

8. State Governor/Chief Executive of a U.S. Territory35

A State Governor coordinates State resources and provides strategic guidance needed to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents of all types.36 In addition, the Governor commands the State’s NG forces (in SAD or Title 32), coordinates for and provides interstate mutual aid and assistance through compacts such as the EMAC, and requests Federal assistance, as needed.37

9. State Homeland Security Advisor

“The State Homeland Security Advisor serves as counsel to the Governor on homeland security issues and may serve as a liaison between the Governor’s office, the State homeland security structure, the Department of Homeland Security, and other organizations both inside and outside of the State.”38 This role may be filled by the Director of the State Emergency Management or a dual-hatted Adjutant General of a State, depending on the organization of the State’s emergency management system.39

10. Director, State Emergency Management Agency

All States have laws mandating the establishment of a State emergency management agency and the development of emergency plans coordinated by that State.40 The director of the State emergency management agency is responsible for coordinating the State response in any incident.

11. The NG

NG units may respond to a civil disturbance in SAD.41 As stated above, the NG in a non-federalized status are not subject to the prohibitions of the PCA and can support State or Federal law enforcement

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33 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5105.77, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU (NGB) paras. 4.b, 4.c (30 Oct. 2015) (C1, Oct. 10, 2017) [hereinafter DoDD 5105.77].
34 Id. para. 5.c.
35 For this paragraph, the reference to a State Governor also references the chief executive of a U.S. territory.
36 JP 3-28, supra note 8, at II-2.
37 Id.
38 Id. at II-3.
39 Id.
40 Id.
missions. NG forces remain under the command of State NG officers, and missions are conducted through the NG chain of command, after coordination with civil authorities. In extreme circumstances, NG units may be federalized under Title 10 pursuant to a Presidential order. Once federalized, the NG conducts its mission in accordance with DoD regulations and Federal law and operate under Federal control. (See “Use of NG Forces in a Title 32 or SAD Status (Not in Federal Service)” and “Planning Considerations” in this chapter.)

C. Authorities for Use of DoD Forces for a Civil Disturbance Operation

The U.S. Federal Armed Forces, including the reserves, are governed by Title 10 of the U.S. Code. NG forces have an additional statutory authority codified in Title 32 of the U.S. Code, due to their unique status as both a Federal Reserve component and as a part of the organized militia of their respective State or territory. The “3025-series” of DoD instructions, directives, and manuals provide the guidance necessary to properly operate during civil support operations. More specifically, the following core DoD policies represent the core documents used by Federal personnel:

- Department of Defense Directive 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities;
- Department of Defense Instruction 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies;
- Department of Defense Instruction 3025.22, The Use of the NG for Defense Support of Civil Authorities; and

Employment of Federal Military Forces. The President is authorized by the Constitution and laws of the United States to employ Title 10 Federal Armed Forces to suppress insurrections, rebellions, and domestic violence under various conditions and circumstances and to provide limited support to civilian law enforcement activities. The specifics are discussed later in this chapter.

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42 See infra Chapter 4, Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, for a complete discussion on the PCA.

43 See Chapter 3 of this Handbook for a complete discussion of NG status.

44 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 2, at Encls. 3 and 4.
Employment of NG Forces. Due to the unique status of the NG, NG forces can be employed in several different ways:

- SAD status: State funded, under State command and control, when called to duty by the State Governor in accordance with State law, including support from one State’s NG provided to another State;

- Title 32 status: Federally funded, under State command and control, when properly assigned a Federal mission in accordance with Federal law; or

- Title 10 status: Federally funded, under Federal command and control, when called to Federal military service by the President.

Immediate Response Authority (IRA). DoDD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), permits Federal military commanders, heads of DoD components, and responsible DoD civilian officials to provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the United States, in response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority.\(^45\) IRA is not an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), nor does it permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.\(^46\)

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). The DoD has a broad range of capabilities that can be deployed in support of civilian authorities in emergency situations. As discussed in sections C and D of Chapter 1, DoD personnel provide Federal military assistance to civil authorities only when civil resources are insufficient, appropriate civil authorities make a request to the Federal government, and when DoD officials order their personnel to provide assistance. This DoD assistance is categorized as DSCA, which is defined in DoDD 3025.18 as, “[s]upport provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and NG forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in [a] [T]itle 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.”\(^47\)

DSCA is initiated by a request for assistance from civil authorities, qualifying entities to the Department of Defense, or by order of the President or Secretary of Defense.\(^48\) The process for requesting military assistance by civilian agencies is set out in DoDD 3025.18. As a part of the


\(^{46}\) Id. See also 10 U.S.C. § 275, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

\(^{47}\) DoDD 3025.18, supra note 45, at 18.

\(^{48}\) Id. para. 4.c.
approval process, before providing assets to support civil authorities, the Department of Defense evaluates the request based on the “CARRLL” factors also set out in DoDD 3025.18.⁴⁹

In response to the request for assistance, forces from all branches of service on Federal active duty, including NG personnel under Federal command and control (Title 10) and NG personnel utilizing Federal funds under State command and control (Title 32) can be utilized.⁵⁰ As discussed later in this chapter, the utilization of Federal military forces, for civil disturbances or law enforcement support, unless acting pursuant to The Insurrection Act or under another exception to the PCA, is restricted from performing law enforcement functions.⁵¹ While under the control of the Governor in a Title 32 or SAD, the NG is not subject to the restrictions of the PCA. Accordingly, NG forces, in SAD, are more suitable than Title 10 forces to perform civil disturbance and law enforcement support DSCA mission assignments.

D. Use of NG Forces in a Title 32 or SAD (Not Federal Service) for CDOs

NG in SAD can provide military assistance to State and local government agencies in accordance with State law during civil disturbances.⁵² This assistance may be provided for the protection of life, property and the maintenance of law and order within the territorial jurisdiction of any State.⁵³ NG units are particularly well-suited for domestic law enforcement missions and civil disturbance operations as the units are located in over 3,000 local communities throughout the nation, readily accessible, routinely performing exercises with local first responders, and have broad experience in providing support to neighboring communities through their various State missions.⁵⁴

When domestic unrest is beyond the capability of state and local law enforcement, a Governor may direct the involvement of the NG in augmenting state and/or local law enforcement agencies (LEA) in restoring public order or governmental functioning, preventing the loss of life or wanton destruction of property, or enforcing state law.⁵⁵ State forces may serve as support to essential services, establish traffic control posts, cordon off areas, release smoke and obscurants, and serve as security or quick reaction forces.⁵⁶ In their support to civil disturbance operations, NG forces may provide supplies,
services, and equipment for use in the preservation of law and property to LEAs.\textsuperscript{57} NG support to LEAs should terminate as soon as possible after the situation is within the capabilities of state and local law enforcement.\textsuperscript{58}

The following is a non-exhaustive list of standard planning considerations for CDOs:

- **Command and Control.** State laws and policies may authorize NG in SAD to support law enforcement agencies and are incorporated into State emergency operations plans.\textsuperscript{59} NG forces are generally under the control of State and local civil authorities for mission tasking; however, these forces will remain under their normal NG military chain of command. While in Title 32 or SAD, the Governor commands the NG.\textsuperscript{60}

- **Law Enforcement Functions.** NG assistance is provided in support of civil authorities, not to replace civil authority. While State law may allow NG forces to act in a law enforcement capacity, apprehending, searching, seizing, and questioning should be left to civilian law enforcement. For concrete guidance, refer to the laws of each State and the State NG’s Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) developed by the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) in partnership with the State Attorney General’s office.

- **PCA.** NG personnel supporting CDOs and LEAs are subject to the laws of their State; however, they are not subject to the restrictions of the PCA.\textsuperscript{61} Conversely, these restrictions do apply if NG forces are operating in a Title 10 status.\textsuperscript{62}

- **EMAC Requirements.** State Governors have the authority to activate their NG forces in SAD to assist other States, as requested through the EMAC. NG personnel in SAD pursuant to the EMAC outside their home State may support only civilian the LEA as specified in a memorandum approved by the sending and receiving Governors.\textsuperscript{63}

- **Rules for the Use of Force (RUF).** NG personnel engaged in civil disturbance and law enforcement operations, are governed by the laws of the State in which they are serving. Thus, each State develops its own RUF based on State law.

- **Arming and Deputation.** Employing NG forces for law enforcement functions in SAD or Title 32 may require authority under State or Federal law to arm and/or deputize the Guard personnel. If supporting a State requirement, including when employed in another State pursuant to an EMAC or other agreement, the host State would provide arming and deputation authority pursuant to that State’s law. If supporting a Federal requirement, such as a Federal protection mission (see section

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\textsuperscript{57} NGR 500-5, supra note 52, para. 5-3g.

\textsuperscript{58} Id. para. 5-3h.

\textsuperscript{59} Id. para. 3-2.

\textsuperscript{60} Id. para. 4-2.

\textsuperscript{61} Id. para. 4-3.

\textsuperscript{62} Id.

\textsuperscript{63} Id. para 8-6, See also https://www.emacweb.org/index.php/training-education/learn-about-emac-your-discipline/national-guard (last visited Sept. 15, 2020).
H.3, below), a Federal LEA could authorize arming and deputation pursuant to applicable agency statutory authorities.\(^{64}\)

- **Intelligence Oversight.** NG domestic intelligence activities are strictly limited by law, DoD procedures,\(^ {65} \) DoD directives,\(^ {66} \) NG policies,\(^ {67} \) and the Constitution.\(^ {68} \)

- **Use of Federal Equipment.** There is no specific statutory authorization that provides for the loan or lease of Federal equipment for use in the furtherance of only a State purpose, to include a loan or lease for use by NG personnel in SAD. Service regulations provide processes wherein DoD equipment may be leased or loaned to States or territories, with reimbursable costs tracked by United States Property and Fiscal Officers (USPFOs). NG forces may, in accordance with Service and NGB regulations, use general purpose Federal equipment issued to the NG during CDOs or other emergencies declared by the Governor, subject to reporting and reimbursement to the Federal government.\(^ {69} \) However, the DoD may restrict equipment from being used for non-DoD purposes. Federal intelligence equipment, such as certain unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) cannot be used without SECDEF approval.\(^ {70} \)

- **Required Training.** NG units that have been assigned the civil disturbance mission are required to conduct annual civil disturbance training and assessment.\(^ {71} \) Personnel must complete civil disturbance training in order to directly participate in CDOs.\(^ {72} \) NG personnel who have not been trained and assessed in CDOs should serve only in a support role.

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\(^{64}\) See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 0.112; 54 U.S.C. § 10271(b).


\(^{66}\) U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 5200.27, ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (7 Jan. 1980) [hereinafter DoDD 5200.27].

\(^{67}\) CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, INSTR. 2000.01C, NATIONAL GUARD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (14 Aug. 2018) [hereinafter CNGBI 2000.01C].

\(^{68}\) U.S. CONST. amend. I (granting to the people the freedom of speech, to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances). The DoD Civil Liberties Program is governed under DoDI 1000.29, which ensures that the DoD will not maintain information on how an individual exercises rights protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, including freedoms of speech, assembly, press, and religion unless maintaining the information is authorized by the person(s), by statute, or is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement, intelligence collection, or counterintelligence activity. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 1000.29, DO D CIVIL LIBERTIES PROGRAM (17 May 2012) (C1, 26 Nov. 2014). See also Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (granting to the people the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures). See also DoD 5240.1-R, supra note 41.

\(^{69}\) NGR 500-5, supra note 52, para 5-5.

\(^{70}\) DoD 5240.1-R, supra note 65; CNGBI 2000.01C, supra note 67.

\(^{71}\) NGR 500-5, supra note 52, para. 5-3. In accordance with this regulation, the training at a minimum includes: a) apprehension, search and detention, b) civil disturbance formations, c) media relations, d) non-lethal capabilities, e) riot shield and riot baton techniques, and f) use of force. Id. para. 5-3.e(1).

\(^{72}\) Id. para. 5-3.
E. Use of Title 10 Forces During a CDO

1. Use of NG Forces in a Title 10 Status (in Federal Service)

When NG Forces are ordered into a Federal status (Title 10), the Federal military chain of command is followed. When NG Forces are ordered into a Federal status (Title 10), the Federal military chain of command is followed. Also, the same Federal laws, policies, and restrictions that apply to Federal military forces, apply to the Federalized NG (e.g. the PCA).

2. Use of Federal Military Forces

**Posse Comitatus Limitations.** The PCA, DoDD 3025.18, and DoDI 3025.21 prohibit the direct, active participation of Title 10 military forces in civilian law enforcement, unless specifically authorized by Federal law or the U.S. Constitution. Certain Constitutional authorities and the Insurrection Act provide for exceptions to the PCA and serve as the basis of authority for Title 10 forces performing law enforcement duties during CDOs.

**PCA Exception: The Insurrection Act.** Chapter 13 of Title 10 of the United States Code, is entitled “Insurrection.” This chapter, the Insurrection Act, permits the commitment of Federal forces by the President to restore law and order “[w]henever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings . . . .” As the use of Federal forces to quell civil disturbances is expressly authorized by Federal statute, the proscriptions of the PCA are inapplicable when the President is exercising authority under the Insurrection Act.

**PCA Exception: Protection of Federal Functions, Persons, and Property.** The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel has “taken the position that the [PCA] applies to the use of troops to perform essentially law enforcement duties and does not impair the President’s inherent authority to use troops for the protection of federal property and federal functions.” This opinion provides limited authority for the President to employ both NG troops (pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)) and Title 10 personnel for this purpose.

3. Supporting a State or Territorial Request

The Federal Government has an obligation to protect every State in the union, upon request, from domestic violence. Pursuant to this obligation, Congress included in the Insurrection Act a provision

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73 NGR 500-5, supra note 52, para. 3-1.b.
74 NGR 500-5, supra note 52, para. 4-3.b.
75 PCA, supra note 5.
76 U.S. CONST. art. IV § 4 (tasking the U.S. Government with protecting each of the States from invasion, and upon application of the State’s legislature or the State’s Governor, against domestic violence).
77 The Insurrection Act of 1807, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-55 [hereinafter The Insurrection Act].
78 Id. § 252.
80 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
authorizing the President to use Federal forces to assist State governments. Section 251 of the Insurrection Act provides:

Whenever there is an insurrection in any State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its Governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress the insurrection.81

Responsibility for the coordination of the Federal response to civil disturbances rests with the Attorney General of the United States (Attorney General).82 The Attorney General is also responsible for receiving the State requests for military assistance, coordinating the requests with SECDEF and other appropriate Federal officials, and presenting the requests to the President, who will determine what Federal action will be taken.83 Should a request for assistance be presented to a local commander, the commander should direct the person making the request to address the request to the Attorney General.

As referenced above, prior to a State requesting assistance in the form of Federal military forces, all local and State resources, including NG personnel in SAD,84 should have been brought to bear on the civil disturbance.85

An example of a State requesting such assistance was the response to the Los Angeles riots of 1992. On May 1, 1992, pursuant to the Insurrection Act, California Governor Pete Wilson requested Federal military support from President George H.W. Bush to assist with restoring law and order in Los Angeles. Governor Wilson advised President Bush that the domestic violence exceeded the capabilities of available law enforcement resources, including NG forces mobilized a day earlier.86 In accordance with the Executive Order issued by President Bush, and to provide Federal assistance to Los Angeles in the restoration of law and order, the Secretary of Defense Federalized the California NG and deployed Soldiers of the 7th Infantry Division (7ID) at Fort Ord and Marines from Camp Pendleton.87

4. Enforcing Federal Authority

The President has a Constitutional duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws of the United States.88 Within the Insurrection Act, Congress gave the President the authority to commit the U.S. military to enforce Federal law.89 10 U.S.C. § 252 provides:

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81 The Insurrection Act, supra note 77, §251.
82 See DoDI 3025.21, supra note 2, Encl. 4, para. 1.c.
83 Id. See also Exec. Order No. 12656, 53 Fed. Reg. 47491 (Nov. 18, 1988).
84 See Chapter 3 of this Handbook, which discusses the mobilization and activation of National Guard forces.
85 CNGBI 3000.04, supra note 11, para. 4.b (which anticipates that Governors will use their State National Guards under Chief, National Guard Bureau, Instr. 3000.04 (their control when responding to incidents within their State).
88 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
89 Insurrection Act, supra note 77, § 252.
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any State or territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.\textsuperscript{90}

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Insurrection Act statute was used to enforce public school desegregation in Arkansas\textsuperscript{91} and Alabama\textsuperscript{92} and to control civil rights protests in Mississippi\textsuperscript{93} and Alabama.\textsuperscript{94}

5. Protecting Constitutional Rights

Citizens of the United States are guaranteed equal protection under the law.\textsuperscript{95} The final Congressional grant of authority to the President for the use of the U.S. military during times of insurrection is for the protection of citizens in States that cannot protect the Constitutional rights of its citizens.\textsuperscript{96} 10 U.S.C. § 253 states:

The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy, if it—

(1) so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection; or

(2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by

\textsuperscript{90} Id.
\textsuperscript{91} See Exec. Order No. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (Sept. 24, 1957) (Army and Air National Guard units were federalized to remove obstructions to justice in respect to enrollment and attendance at public schools in Little Rock, Arkansas.).
\textsuperscript{92} See Exec. Order No. 11118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9863 (Sept. 10, 1963) (Army and Air National Guard units were federalized to remove obstructions to justice in respect to enrollment and attendance at public schools in Alabama.).
\textsuperscript{93} See Proclamation No. 3497, Exec. Order No. 11053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (Sept. 30, 1962) (Army and Air National Guard units federalized to enforce federal court orders issued in Mississippi.).
\textsuperscript{94} See Exec. Order No. 11111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (Jun. 11, 1963) (Army and Air National Guard units federalized to remove obstructions to justice and to suppress unlawful assemblies, conspiracies, and domestic violence that opposed the laws of Alabama.).
\textsuperscript{95} U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 which States in part “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor to deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
\textsuperscript{96} Insurrection Act, supra note 77, § 253.
clause (1), the State shall be considered to have denied the equal protection of
the laws secured by the Constitution.97

10 U.S.C. § 253 was used as an authority by President Kennedy to send Federal military troops
to Alabama in April 1963 during the civil rights protests in Birmingham, Alabama.98

F. Taking Action Under the Insurrection Act (Procedural Considerations)

Prior to utilizing the Federalized militia or Federal troops under the Insurrection Act, the President
must issue a proclamation demanding that the insurgents cease and desist all acts of violence and retire
peaceably within a prescribed time.99 10 U.S.C. § 254 states,

Whenever the President considers it necessary to use the militia or the armed
forces under this chapter, he shall, by proclamation, immediately order the
insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time.

If the Presidential Proclamation does not end the disturbance, the President will issue an Executive
Order to the Secretary of Defense directing the Secretary to use such of the armed forces as are
necessary to restore order.100 Decisions of the President to issue Presidential Proclamations and
Executive Orders pursuant to the Insurrection Act are made solely at the discretion of the Executive101
and cannot be compelled by the courts.102 Examples of a proclamation and follow-on order are
Proclamation No. 6427 and Executive Order 12804, used during the Los Angeles riots of 1992.103

G. DoD Considerations Concerning the Insurrection Act

As referenced above, DoDD 3025.18 requires all requests for military support be evaluated against six
criteria prior to the decision to employ forces.104 The decision to employ Federal military forces for
CDOs is made in coordination between the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney
General. Although the Secretary of Defense retains approval authority for all Federal military support

97 Id.
99 Insurrection Act, supra note 77, § 254.
100 See supra notes 91-94.
aff’d, 497 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974) (decision whether to use troops or militia to quell
civil disorder is exclusively within the province of the President, and presidential discretion in exercising powers granted in
U.S. Constitution Article 2, § 2 and Article 4, § 4, and the Insurrection Act is not subject to judicial review).
102 See Consolidated Coal and Coke Co. v. Beale et al., 282 F. 934 (S.D. Ohio 1922) (ruling that court could not compel
President to issue Proclamation or exercise discretion under Insurrection Act).
103 See supra notes 91-92.
104 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 45, para. 4.e. sets out the following “CARRLL” factors: Cost – Who pays and the impact on
DoD budget, Appropriateness – Whether it is in the interest of DoD to provide the requested support, Readiness – Impact
on DoD’s ability to perform its primary mission, Risk – Safety of DoD forces, Legality – Compliance with the law,
Lethality – Potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces.
in response to civil disturbances, the above-criteria may be helpful to local commanders and their judge advocates as they may advise on formal assistance requests routed to higher headquarters for consideration.

H. Additional Exceptions to the PCA

In addition to the Insurrection Act, authority to use Federal troops in a law enforcement capacity to address civil disturbances can be found in two other major areas.

1. Emergency Authority

Under DoDD 3025.18, Federal military commanders are provided emergency authority. Under this provision, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and local authorities are unable to control the situation, Federal military commanders may exercise their emergency authority to temporarily engage in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances either because:

- Such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restore governmental function and public order; or,

- When duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions. Federal action, including the use of Federal military forces, is authorized when necessary to protect the Federal property or functions.

The commander’s decision to exercise emergency authority must immediately report the facts surrounding the request, the command’s response, and any other relevant information through the chain of command to the National Military Command Center.

2. Barment or Removal Authority

A military installation commander, exercising “inherent authority,” may take such actions that are reasonably necessary and lawful to protect military installations. This is outside the emergency authority or Insurrection Act, and is not exercised in concert with the type of force that may occur in those situations. Although it can involve civil unrest situations, it involves non-emergency situations where there is time to apply authority allowing for the removal or barment of a person from an installation to remedy a situation. Violations of such orders to stay off an installation carry civil and criminal penalties.

105 Id. para. 4.j.1 (stating that approval authority for civil disturbance operations is no lower than the Secretary of Defense level and requires Presidential authorization).
106 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 45, para. 4.i.
107 ADP 3-28, supra note 57, para 4-152.
108 The courts have approved the theory of a commander’s inherent authority, that is, authority not found in statute or regulation. See Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893 (1961) (commanders have “historically unquestioned power” to exclude persons from their installations); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976)
3. Protecting Federal Functions, Persons, and Property

As discussed above, the President has the inherent authority to use Federal forces to protect Federal function, property and personnel. This authority to use troops should not be exercised to perform routine and normal police functions. Instead, this authority is authorized in extraordinary circumstances where normal measures are insufficient to carry out or protect the performance of Federal functions. Unlike the Insurrection Act, when forces are dispatched under this authority, a President proclamation is not required to engage this authority.

I. The Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plans

The DoD works closely with other Federal agencies, in particular DHS and its subordinate organizations, when planning for DSCA. The DoD has delegated to geographic combatant commanders responsibility for developing CDO Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). Further, the DoD coordinates with interagency partners through the CNGB to States/territories on all matters pertaining to the NG, to ensure DoD planning supports the needs of those requiring DSCA.

1. The Federal Military Forces CDO Mission

The CDO mission is conducted to restore order or enforce Federal law after a major public emergency (e.g., natural disaster, serious public health emergency, or terrorist attack) when requested by the State.
Governor or when the President determines that the authorities of the State are incapable of maintaining public order.\textsuperscript{115} The restoration of law and order must be distinguished from the preservation of law and order.\textsuperscript{116} CDO mission statements do not normally allow for commanders to undertake preservation mission sets.\textsuperscript{117} Judge advocates should assist their commanders in ensuring that they do not assume missions involving the routine maintenance of civil order unless absolutely necessary and authorized by the appropriate authority.

2. Combatant Commanders’ Concept Plan (CONPLANS)

CONPLANs provide the basis for all preparation, deployment, employment, and redeployment of DoD component forces, including NG forces called to active Federal service, for use in domestic civil disturbance operations, in support of civil authorities as directed by the President.

During the employment of military forces, the Commander will maintain a liaison with the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG), State law enforcement representatives, and municipal authorities. Normally, this liaison is through the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and remains until termination of the civil disturbance mission.

3. NG Bureau and State CONPLANS

The NGB has the responsibility to develop and maintain an All-Hazards Support Plan, which describes the NG’s domestic All-Hazards response supporting Federal agencies, States, Territories and the District of Columbia. Each State NG prepares a State All-Hazards CONPLAN, which incorporates civil disturbance operations and law enforcement support. These CONPLANs provide the basis for preparation, deployment, employment and redeployment of NG Forces.

J. Federal Military Forces Civil Disturbance Operation Planning Considerations

1. The Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces

For U.S. Armed Forces operating under Title 10, civil disturbance operations are conducted in accordance with Enclosures L and N to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (SRUF).\textsuperscript{118} Guidance on how and when forces can use force in a CDO mission are detailed in the enclosures of the policy. Although the policy is classified, Annex L is not in itself a classified document. Thus, it can be shared with our mission partners. In addition to this policy, as part of operating in an inter-agency environment in support of civil authorities, judge advocates must make themselves familiar with State and local laws regarding the use of force. The NGs in each State have their own RUF, not to be

\textsuperscript{115} JP 3-28, \textit{supra} note 8, at III-3,4.

\textsuperscript{116} DoDI 3025.21, \textit{supra} note 2, Encl. 4, para. 1.b. The preservation of law and order is the responsibility of State and local governments and law enforcement authorities. \textit{Id. See also} 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-254, 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

\textsuperscript{117} DoDI 3025.21, \textit{supra} note 2, Encl. 4, para. 2.e. “DoD Components shall not take charge of any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary under conditions of extreme emergency. . . . Any commander who is directed, or undertakes, to control such functions shall strictly limit DoD actions to emergency needs, and shall facilitate the reestablishment of civil responsibility at the earliest time possible.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{118} JP 3-28, \textit{supra} note 8, App. C.
confused with the SRUF. The RUF for each State is based on State law and approved by the State’s Attorney General. Therefore, each State may have a different RUF. This is particularly important for Federal forces if joint patrols or other missions are conducted. In such a case, judge advocates, both active and reserve component, should review the RUF for the State NG and the SRUF for Title 10 forces to identify any differences in the permissible application of force. The differences should be clearly explained to commanders, thereby enabling them to proceed in accordance with the law. Additionally, if NG personnel from one State are operating in another State, the agreements memorializing the support between the States should specify what rules for the use of force the out-of-state NG will follow. In this situation, judge advocates should be prepared to train personnel on the applicable rules of another State.

2. Constitutional Considerations

State and Federal law govern search, seizure, arrest, detention, and confinement occurring during a CDO. The U.S. Attorney General is responsible for setting overall guidelines governing the conduct of civil disturbance operators when the Federal military is involved. Judge advocates should familiarize themselves with any policies and procedures set forth by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Service members should be trained in advance on proper legal procedures for search, seizure, arrest, and detention, and should be aware that actions not conforming to Constitutional standards could jeopardize prosecution of criminal actors or subject the member to civil or criminal liability.

a. Detention and Confinement

Whenever possible, any arrest or apprehension should be made by the civil police force unless they are not available or require assistance. If it is necessary for Federal military forces to make an apprehension, they should do so under the appropriate legal authority, work in support of civil authorities, and should, whenever possible, ensure that civilian authorities are present. Joint patrols with members of the State’s NG and local law enforcement officers has proven to be most beneficial.\footnote{JP 3-28, \textit{supra} note 8, at III-8.}

Unless otherwise authorized by law, Federal military forces should not operate detention facilities when supporting CDOs.\footnote{DoDI 3025.21, \textit{supra} note 2, Encl. 4, para. 2.3. ("DoD Components shall not take charge of any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary under conditions of extreme emergency.").} Civil authorities have the responsibility to provide adequate detention facilities for all subjects. If Federal military forces are committed to support local authorities with arrests, commanders should coordinate with local authorities to ensure that adequate detention facilities are available and to learn their locations and capacities. Federal military participation with the arrests must be in accordance with Federal law and DoD policy.\footnote{U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 5525.13, LIMITATION OF AUTHORITY TO DEPUTIZE DoD UNIFORMED LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL BY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS para. 6 (28 Sept. 2007) (C2, 8 Sept. 2020).}

b. Searches

Unless otherwise authorized by law, Federal forces should not be involved in warrant-backed or warrantless searched for evidence of a crime (i.e. searches of houses, crime scenes, etc.).\footnote{\textit{Id.} para. 6.2.} The same

\footnote{\textit{Id.} para. 6.2.}
holds true for a lawful stop and frisk conducted during patrols. Nonetheless, as Federal military personnel support local law enforcement to restore order, the need to search civilians may arise. In such instances, Federal military personnel should adhere to Federal law and the requirements set forth by USNORTHCOM’s plan for civil disturbance operations.123

3. Intelligence

See Chapter 9, Intelligence and Information Acquisition and Handling During Domestic Support Operations, for information regarding the proper use of intelligence elements and collection of information during domestic civil support.

4. Claims

Negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of military forces assisting law enforcement during civil disturbances may be covered under the FTCA.124 In order for claims under the FTCA to be compensable, the damage or injury must be caused by acts or omissions of employees of the United States. NG troops in Title 10 or Title 32, as well as active duty military members, are considered U.S. employees for the purposes of the FTCA. NG personnel in Title 10 or Title 32 are involved in carrying out a Federal mission and therefore will enjoy immunity from State criminal and tort law with respect to actions taken in good faith that are necessary to the conduct of their mission.125 NG forces activated pursuant to a State activation statute (i.e., SAD), are not considered employees of the United States, and potential claims arising out of the activities of these forces should be directed to State authorities.

The development of disaster and civil disturbance claims plans is the responsibility of the head of the various Area Claims Offices (ACOs) across the United States.126 The ACO in whose geographical area a claims incident occurs is primarily responsible for investigating and processing the claim.127 With the approval of Commander, United States Army Claims Service, the responsible ACO can appoint a special Claims Processing Office to handle claims arising from civil disturbance operations.128 For a major CDO, senior judge advocates should consider requesting a claims team from ACO.

Even though primary claims investigating responsibilities fall to the ACO, judge advocates deployed as part of a civil disturbance task force can assist in investigations by ensuring that potential claims are documented and available information concerning the claims is collected. Judge advocates can also assist by collecting information concerning the status of NG troops operating within the area.

5. Medical Support

The primary mission of medical support personnel deployed with a Joint Civil Disturbance Task Force is to treat military personnel requiring medical care. When possible, civilians in need of medical treatment should be seen by the healthcare providers within the civilian healthcare system. Military

123 ADP 3-28, supra note 57, para. 4-174.
125 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
127 Id. para. 2-1.d.
128 Id. para. 1-12(4)(c).
treatment facilities may be used to treat civilians only in cases of emergency when undue suffering or loss of life is a possibility. Civilians admitted to military treatment facilities should be transferred to a civilian hospital as soon as the emergency period ends.129

6. Interference with Federal Forces

Federal law makes it a crime to interfere with law enforcement officers engaged in controlling civil disorders.130 Included in the definition of “law enforcement officers” are members of the NG, in both State and Federal status, and members of the Federal Armed Forces.131

7. Loan and Lease of Military Equipment

There is no specific statutory authority to loan or lease equipment for use in civil disturbance situations. Loans to Federal agencies are completed pursuant to the Economy Act and requires a loan agreement.132 Equipment for non-Federal law enforcement agencies must be leased under the leasing statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2667, which also requires a lease agreement that may be repaid in cash or in kind. The applicable Army Regulation includes the requirement for a surety bond and the payment of a lease fee, which in the case of the Army may be waived by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation, Logistics and Environment) (ASA(I, L&E)).133

Approval authorities for the loan and lease of DoD materiel to Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities are based upon the type of equipment to be provided. Requests for the loan or lease of personnel, arms, ammunition, tactical vehicles, vessels and aircraft, riot control agents, and concertina wire for expected civil disturbances will be forwarded through HQDA ODCS, G–3 (DAMO–OD) through ASA (ALT) to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF).134 The loan or lease of fire-fighting resources, protective equipment, body armor, clothing, searchlights and use of Army facilities can be approved the installation commander, State AG, Commander, Military District of Washington, the CG of OCONUS unified commands, or Headquarters Army Materiel Command (HQAMC) by garrison, installation, or task force commanders.135 See U.S. Army Reg. 700-131, Loan

129 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 40-400, PATIENT ADMINISTRATION, para. 3-55 (8 July 2014). Persons treated under this provision will be billed for the full cost of their care. Id.
131 Id. § 232 which states:

The term “law enforcement officer” means any officer or employee of the United States, any State, any political subdivision of a State, or the District of Columbia, while engaged in the enforcement or prosecution of any of the criminal laws of the United States, a State, any political subdivision of a State, or the District of Columbia; and such term shall specifically include members of the National Guard (as defined in section 101 of title 10), members of the organized militia of any State, or territory of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia not included within the National Guard (as defined in section 101 of title 10), and members of the Armed Forces of the United States, while engaged in suppressing acts of violence or restoring law and order during a civil disorder.


134 Id. at Table 2-2.
135 Id. at Table 2-2. The senior logistics staff officer at USARC MSC headquarters is the approval authority for USAR equipment. Id. at 2-6.b(3). NGR 500-5, supra note 30, at para. 5-5, governs the loan or lease of NG equipment.
and Lease of Army Materiel (23 August 2004), for more specific guidance on the loan and lease of material.

8. Funding

DoD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation, USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations, require operating agencies and supported combatant commanders to recover all costs for CDOs. The operating agency and supported commander are responsible for collecting costs for civil disturbance operations of all components and DoD agencies, preparing cost reports for the executive agency, consolidating billings, forwarding bills to DOJ, and distributing reimbursements.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ JP 3-28, supra note 8, at App. F, para. F-3.c. Appendix F of this publication is dedicated to reimbursement for DSCA. Id. at App. F.
A. Introduction

In the wake of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed the National Response Framework (NRF). This document evolved from the National Response Plan (NRP), which was originally mandated under Homeland Security Presidential Directive five (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents. The intent of HSPD-5 was to develop a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management built on the template of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). The NRF provides a roadmap for all levels of government to respond to and manage domestic incidents. It outlines roles and responsibilities, core functions, and interagency coordination mechanisms to ensure a coordinated and effective response to incidents that affect communities nationwide.

1. Key References:

- CJCSI 3125.01D - Defense Response to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents in the Homeland, May 7, 2015.
- DoDD 3150.08 - DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Incidents, January 20, 2010, Incorporating Change 1, August 31, 2018.
- Joint Pub 3-26 - Counterterrorism, October 24, 2014.

1 This acronym used to include the term “high yield explosive” and was stated “CBRNE.” Current policies have shifted to the CBRN term and eliminated “high yield explosives.” See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3125.01D, DEFENSE RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) INCIDENTS IN THE HOMELAND (7 May 2015) [hereinafter CJCSI 3125.01D], para. 4.a(1), (noting that a high-yield explosive incident is not addressed in CJCSI 3025.01D because those incidents do not generate similar initial or residual hazards. Responses to high yield explosive incidents without CBRN elements will be provided in accordance with DoDD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and DoDD 5111.13, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY (ASD(HD&GS)) (23 Mar. 2018). CJCSI 3125.01D Encl. A, para. 3.e, Encl. E, paras. c, p. Note, however, that some publications still discuss high explosives (albeit separately from CBRN) because they may be tied to or part of the delivery for CBRN elements. See, e.g. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-41, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE (9 Sept. 2016) [hereinafter JP 3-41].


3 The term “incident management” is designed to eliminate the prior distinction between crisis and consequence management with respect to domestic incidents. HSPD-5 states that the objective of the United States government is to...
Management System (NIMS). The NRF provides national-level policy and operational direction for all Federal agencies involved in the response to domestic disasters or emergencies. While the lowest capable jurisdictional level are the first responders to incidents, the NRF and NIMS address the required needs when the responding jurisdiction’s capabilities are overwhelmed by the magnitude of a catastrophic incident.

The NRF is designed to ensure timely and effective Federal support in response to State, tribal, and/or local requests. The NRF is the product of DHS, but it applies to all Federal departments and agencies that have jurisdiction over, or responsibility to support, any response or recovery effort. When Federal resources are necessary, the Department of Defense may provide advice, assistance, and assets in support of the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). The Department of Defense plays only a supporting role (unless otherwise directed by the President) and are referred to as Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA).

The NRF and NIMS provide broad direction for any type of disaster in what is called an all-hazards approach, which allows for a “scaled response, delivery of specific resources and capabilities, and a level of coordination appropriate to each incident.” Consequently, the framework applies equally to natural disaster relief, the handling of an unintentional or negligent industrial accident, or the Federal Government’s response to a terrorist’s domestic employment of a chemical, biological, radiological, or

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4 FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (3d ed. Oct 2017) [hereinafter NIMS], https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/148019 (last visited April 20, 2021). The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a doctrinal framework for incident management designed to provide consistency at all jurisdictional levels. NIMS includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies covering the incident command system; multi-agency coordination systems; unified command; training; identification and management of resources (including systems for classifying types of resources); qualifications and certification; and the collection, tracking, and reporting of incident information and incident resources. Chapter 2, National Framework for Incident Management, contains more discussion on NIMS.

5 National Incident Management doctrine and policy has expanded significantly since the publication of the first NRF. The NRF is now part of the National Preparedness System, which includes four other Frameworks designed to achieve the National Preparedness Goal. Chapter 2, National Framework for Incident Management, contains an extensive discussion of this new model.


7 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. 3025.18, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA) (29 Dec. 2010) (C2, 19 Mar. 2018) [hereinafter DODD 3025.18] defines “DSCA” as:

Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C. status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (Id. At 19).

8 See NRF, supra note 2, at ii (noting the NRF describes specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local to large scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters).
nuclear weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Although the various levels of government have experience in responding to natural disasters, CBRN events pose some of the greatest challenges facing the United States today and underscore the importance of maintaining a DoD force that is ready and able to respond to these specialized threats.

B. CBRN Overview and Authorities

A CBRN incident is any occurrence resulting from the use of CBRN weapons or devices, or the release of CBRN hazards, to include toxic industrial materials from any source. Any action taken to address the consequences of any inadvertent or deliberate release of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear agent constitutes a CBRN Consequence Management (CM) operation. As a general proposition, a catastrophic CBRN event would quickly exceed the capabilities of local, State, and tribal governments; consequently, CBRN CM is normally managed at the Federal level, with DoD in a supporting role. Although an LFA leads and coordinates the overall Federal response to an emergency, supporting DoD entities remain under the command and control of the supported Combatant Commander (NORTHCOM or INDOPACOM). Similarly, State governors, through their adjutants general, control NG forces when performing duty in a state status or in accordance with Title.

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9 It is important to note that not all CBRN incidents may be the result of a WMD. A domestic accident on the scale of the radiation release in Chernobyl, Ukraine; Fukushima, Japan; or the pesticide release in Bhopal, India in the United States would most likely result in DoD-assisted CBRN consequence management operations.

10 The Homeland Security Council has developed fifteen scenarios depicting “a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters.” Two of the scenarios represent natural disasters, major earthquake and major hurricane; a third highlights economic and social complications resulting from a cyber-attack; and the remaining 12 scenarios focus on chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents. National Planning Scenarios, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=683091 (last visited June 15, 2020).

11 JP 3-41, supra note 1, at vii. An exception to this general classification is the Government’s response to incidents involving U.S. nuclear weapons within DoD custody or fissionable materials within Department of Energy custody. See generally FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION #10 – OIL AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RESPONSE ANNEX (June 2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1470149472600-da7148fddd4ed137534486036abba0e8/ESF_10_Oil_and_Hazardous_Materials_20160705_508.pdf (last visited Jun 15, 2020); DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL 3150.08, NUCLEAR WEAPON ACCIDENT RESPONSE PROCEDURES (NARP) (22 Aug 2013) (C1, 31 Aug 2018).

12 CBRN response includes having plans, policies, procedures, training, and equipment necessary to effectively respond to CBRN incidents. CBRN response provides the operational framework for authorized DoD measures in preparation for anticipated CBRN incidents to mitigate the loss of life and property and to assist with the response and short-term recovery that may be required. JOINT PUB 3-41, supra note 1, at viii.

13 For example, 10 U.S.C. § 283 (2018) authorizes the Attorney General to request DoD support when an emergency situation involving a biological or chemical weapon of mass destruction exists. Additionally, as an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 831(e), (f) (2018) authorizes the Attorney General—during an emergency situation—to request DoD support in enforcing laws against the unlawful dispersal of nuclear material or nuclear byproducts.

14 JP 3-41, supra note 1, at I-5. This provision specifies that active duty forces remain under the command and control of CDR, USNORTHCOM. Id. at I-5. In DSCA operations, CDRUSNORTHCOM oversees operations in CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, while CDRUSINDOPACOM oversees operations in Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands. JP 3-28, supra note 3, at II-14.
32 of the United States Code.\textsuperscript{15} SECDEF and a state governor may also agree on the appointment of a dual-status commander.\textsuperscript{16}

A request for DoD capabilities from State Governors or other Federal agencies is called a request for assistance (RFA), which are normally written and routed through a formal RFA process. The processing of an RFA varies depending upon the size and urgency of the incident, the level of Federal involvement, and the originator of the request. For small scale CBRN incidents, and during the initial stages of larger incidents, a State’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may forward requests to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region’s Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), who, in turn, forwards the RFA to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)).\textsuperscript{17} If the incident exceeds the capabilities of the State and local responders, and the President has issued an emergency or disaster declaration at the request of the Governor and advice of the FEMA Administrator, the LFA will establish a Joint Field Office (JFO), and a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) will be designated.\textsuperscript{18}

Following the establishment of the JFO, the FCO will forward RFAs from civil authorities to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Executive Secretariat. SecDef-approved RFAs are assigned to the appropriate Combatant Commander (CCDR). If a DCO is on-site (normally at the JFO), RFAs are validated through the DCO and forwarded to the designated DoD entities for approval and sourcing. Once SecDef approves a request for DoD assistance, a supported CCDR is designated. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) publishes SecDef-approved execute orders (EXORDs) to delineate support relationships, available forces, end state, purpose, and SecDef-approved scope of action.\textsuperscript{19} The CCDR will likely order the Commander, Joint Task Force–Civil Support (JTF-CS), to conduct CBRN response operations (see section D of this chapter).\textsuperscript{20}

Every RFA must undergo a legal review. DoD approval authorities shall evaluate all requests by civil authorities for DoD military assistance against the “CARRLL” factors, as discussed in other chapters, including Chapter 1:21

- Cost (who pays, impact on DoD budget);
- Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the DoD’s interest);
- Risk (safety of DoD Armed Forces);

\textsuperscript{15} JOINT PUB 3-41, supra note 1, at x, I-5, II-3.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. At I-5.
\textsuperscript{18} JP 3-41, supra note 1, at II-4, II-6.
\textsuperscript{19} JOINT PUB 3-28, supra note 3, at II-23.
\textsuperscript{21} DODD 3025.18, supra note 7, at. 4.
Military missions require legal authority. The DoD’s CBRN response operations are generally executed under the provisions of The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). The Stafford Act is the primary authority for the Federal Government to assist local and State governments with emergencies and disasters.

Occasionally, the legal authority to use DoD forces for CBRN incidents arises from other sources. Three examples are:

- DoDD 3025.18 delegates Immediate Response Authority (IRA) to heads of DoD Components, Federal military commanders, and/or DoD civilian officials (collectively “DoD officials”). This policy also recognizes the authority of State officials to call on the State’s NG operating in their State Active Duty (SAD) status under State command, control, and funding. In response to a request for assistance from a civil authority under imminently serious conditions, and if time does not permit approval from higher authority, DoD officials may provide assistance to authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. This is subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters. It is important to note that this authority is extremely fact-specific and expires immediately when the facts no longer meet the threshold.

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23 The Stafford Act is outlined in Chapter 2. The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for overall coordination of Federal Stafford and non-Stafford incident management activities. Requests for DoD assistance may occur under Stafford Act or non-Stafford Act conditions. In general, a Stafford Act incident is one in which State and local authorities declare an emergency or disaster but require and consequently request Federal assistance to adequately manage the incident.

42 U.S.C. § 5122 para. 1 (2018) defines an emergency as:

[A]ny occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.

42 U.S.C. § 5122 para. 2 (2018) defines a major disaster as:

[A]ny natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.

A CBRN incident clearly falls into the definition of emergency. Technically, a fire, flood, or explosion would have to occur to trigger a major disaster declaration for a CBRN incident. Id.

24 DoDD 3025.18, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., para. (4)(i). Within 72 hours of receipt of the request for assistance, a review of the need to continue DoD involvement in the response shall occur. These activities performed by the DoD during immediate response efforts may later transition into a Mission Assignment (MA) from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the Stafford Act.
• DoDD 3025.18 also provides Federal military commanders with emergency authority to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances.\textsuperscript{25} See \textit{Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement}, chapter 4 of this Handbook, for an in-depth discussion of this authority.

• Executive Order 13527, \textit{Establishing Federal Capability for the Timely Provision of Medical Countermeasures Following a Biological Attack}, provides authority for designated Federal agencies (including DoD) to provide support to operations that leverage the U.S. Postal Service to distribute “medical countermeasures” to the general population.\textsuperscript{26}

C. DoD Entities Responsible for CBRN Response Operations

The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2003\textsuperscript{27} established what later became the Office of The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD/GS)). Among other duties and responsibilities, the ASD(HD/GS) is DoD’s Executive Agent responsible for approving and monitoring DoD assistance to Federal, State, and local officials responding to domestic threats or events involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As a result, this office oversees DoD’s DSCA activities, including CBRN response.\textsuperscript{28}

The Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) is an action agency subordinate to ASD(HD/GS) that is located at the Pentagon. For DSCA missions, JDOMS plans, coordinates, and monitors DoD support within the U.S. and its territories in response to requests from Federal agencies. Accordingly, JDOMS produces military orders for DSCA, including consequence management operations.\textsuperscript{29} Many regularly occurring activities, called National Special Security Events, require DoD resources that can be planned in advance (e.g., Presidential inaugurations, and large sporting events). For these, JDOMS plans, coordinates, and facilitates DoD support to Federal, State, and local agencies and organizers. To set expectations and aid in planning for all DSCA responses, CJCS publishes a DSCA EXORD and a Domestic CBRN Response EXORD to allow expedited force employment in support of domestic incidents.\textsuperscript{30}

In 2002, the Department of Defense established USNORTHCOM headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado, with the specific missions of defending our homeland, conducting security cooperation activities with allies and partners in North America, and supporting civil authorities. Its “civil support”

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Id.} para. (4)(k).

\textsuperscript{26} Exec. Order No. 13,257, 75 Fed. Reg. 737 (Jan. 6, 2010).


\textsuperscript{28} DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 5111.13, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND GLOBAL SECURITY (ASD(HD&GS)) (23 Mar. 2018).

\textsuperscript{29} CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 5711.02C, DELEGATION APPROVAL AUTHORITY encl. A, para. 5(d) (30 Nov. 2012).

\textsuperscript{30} JOINT PUB 3-28, supra note 3, at II-14. The current DSCA EXORD, as of the publication of this handbook, is dated 5 June 2018. The current CBRN EXORD is dated 24 March 2016. According to DoD MANUAL 3025.01, VOL. 1, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: OVERVIEW (11 Aug. 2016) (Ch.1 13 Apr. 2017) [hereinafter DODM 3025.01], the current CBRN EXORD is dated 24 March 2016.
mission includes domestic disaster relief operations that occur during fires, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Support also includes counter-drug operations and managing the consequences of a terrorist event employing a weapon of mass destruction.”

USNORTHCOM is designated as the command to conduct CBRN response operations in support of the LFA in the 48 contiguous States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, and U.S. territorial waters inclusive of the U.S. Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and Turks and Caicos Islands.

In 2008, USNORTHCOM designated U.S. Army North (ARNORTH) as the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) for domestic CBRN response operations. ARNORTH, located at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, is responsible for developing and unifying the military response capability for CBRN incidents.

D. Specialized DoD CBRN Responders

1. Joint Task Force Civil Support

Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) will be involved in domestic emergencies and other civil support activities. Although JTF-CS is nominally linked to broader mission areas, the organization’s focus is far narrower. JTF-CS’s specific mission is to conduct CBRN response operations and other directed mission assignments in support of the LFA in order to save lives and mitigate human suffering.

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32 COMMANDER, USNORTHCOM, CONPLAN 3500-21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES (DSCA), page 4 (02 March 2021).
33 JOINT PUB. 3-41, supra note 1, at II-5.
34 About USNORTHCOM, supra note 31.
35 See infra, Chapter 8, Military Support Operations, for more examples of non-emergency or law enforcement support that JTF-CS may provide.
36 When situations are beyond the capability of the State, the Governor requests Federal assistance through the President. DoD support or assistance to restore public services and civil order may include augmentation of local first responders and equipment. It may include law enforcement support, continuity of operations/continuity of government measures to restore essential government services, protect public health and safety, and provide emergency relief to affected governments, businesses, and individuals. Responses occur under the primary jurisdiction of the affected State and local government, and the Federal Government provides assistance when required. See JOINT PUB. 3-28, supra note 3, at xi.
37 These other activities include support to special events designated by the DHS Special Events Working Group (SEWG). “National special security event” (NSSE) is a designation given to certain special events that, by virtue of their political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. The Secretary of Homeland Security, after consultation with the Homeland Security Council, shall be responsible for designating special events as NSSEs. Usually, other military operations will have priority over these missions, unless directed otherwise by the SecDef. The SEWG will assign these events a priority and they will be monitored by the Combatant Command responsible for the area in which they are conducted. The Department of Defense assigns these NSSEs a Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR). U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FACT SHEET, available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0905_ops_sear-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited June 16, 2020).
38 COMMANDER, JTF-CS, OPLAN 3500-19, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) RESPONSE, BASE PLAN, page 12 (28 March 2019).
JTF-CS is a standing joint task force headquartered at Fort Eustis, Virginia. An Army or Air Force NG Major General on Federal active duty status commands JTF-CS. The staff consists of active and reserve component military from all five Services, Federal civil service personnel, and civilian contractors. Collectively, the command possesses expertise in a wide range of functional areas including operations, logistics, intelligence, planning, communications, and medical services. Created by the Unified Command Plan for 1999, JTF-CS provides both an operational capability and an oversight mechanism that can anticipate support requirements for responding to a catastrophic CBRN incident, undertake detailed analysis, conduct exercises, and ultimately respond in support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM has command authority over JTF-CS, and ARNORTH has OPCON over the unit. It is a deployable command and control headquarters for DoD units and personnel executing CBRN response operations, and it is a critical capability of response plans for essential DoD support to the LFA. When directed, JTF-CS will deploy to the incident site and establish command and control of designated DoD forces, providing defense support of civil authorities to save lives and prevent further injury. JTF-CS may deploy in support of a USINDOPACOM incident as well. The NRF provides the coordinating framework under which JTF-CS performs its mission.

On October 1, 2008, JTF-CS received the authority to exercise operational control over various units assigned to the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) whenever those units deploy for a CBRN incident or exercise. The CCMRF transitioned to the Defense CBRN Response Force (DCRF) in 2011, and now has approximately 5,200 personnel in installations across the United States. DCRF units support the LFA in the event of a CBRN incident and operate primarily under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief, Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207), and the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. § 1535) when deployed to assist.

JTF-CS employs a three-fold process that enables the command to gain and maintain situational awareness prior to an execution order. First, JTF-CS staffs an around-the-clock operations center tasked with gaining and maintaining situational awareness. Second, the command has liaison officers who routinely interact with interagency partners to ensure familiarity with their operations, facilitate interagency communications and operations, and gain first-hand understanding of their emergency response plans. Third, when an incident actually occurs, but prior to the receipt of an execution order, JTF-CS is prepared to send an assessment element to the incident area, referred to as the Early Entry Command Post (EECP). The EECP’s purpose is to establish the “ground truth” concerning what
emergency assets and capabilities are either at-hand or available to emergency managers through intrastate or interstate compacts. The EECP provides this information to the Commander, and higher headquarters, to assist their decision-making. Additionally, the information enables JTF-CS planners to perform predictive analysis regarding the types of missions that the LFA may ask the Department of Defense to perform. These extensive planning efforts enable DoD to organize a timely flow of appropriate assets to the incident area upon request.

Upon receipt of an execution order, JTF-CS has the ability to reconfigure into two command posts to ensure continuity of operations at home station, while deploying forward to the incident site. The magnitude of the CBRN incident determines the size of the deploying command post.

Additionally, JTF-CS routinely provides support to other commands during real-world events with Joint Planning Augmentation Cells (JPACs). JPACs consist of 5 to 15 individuals with extensive consequence management planning skills that can help other staffs plan for and respond to CBRN or other incidents in their immediate area of responsibility. The organization of JPACs are tailored to fit the type of support requested by the supported organization.

2. NG Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CSTs)

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c), and additional authorizations by Congress and through SecDef validation, the Department of Defense is authorized a total of 57 WMD-CSTs. Recognizing that the NG is “forward-deployed for civil support,” the Secretary of Defense determined that the WMD-CSTs would be most effective if established in the NG. Consequently, each WMD-CST is composed of 22 full-time NG Soldiers and Airmen and contains six elements: command, operations, communications, administrative/logistics, medical, and survey.

The teams are designed to deploy rapidly to assist local first responders in the event of a CBRN incident. Specifically, the mission of each State NG WMD-CSTs is to deploy to an area of operations and:

- Assess a suspected event in support of a local incident commander;
- Advise the local incident commander and civilian responders; and

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44 U.S. SEC’Y OF DEF., REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO FY00 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT § 1036, 2 (Feb 24, 2000).

45 See Posture Statement, supra note 43.

46 Id.
• Facilitate requests for assistance to expedite arrival of additional State and Federal assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.

WMD-CSTs are specially equipped and trained. Special equipment includes the Mobile Analytical Laboratory System (MALS) for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) detection, and the Unified Command Suite (UCS) vehicle for communications.

WMD-CST capabilities are specifically designed to complement civilian responders. Community and State emergency management plans may directly incorporate WMD-CST capabilities.

WMD-CSTs operate under the command and control of the State Governor and the Adjutant General. Individual team members serve in a full-time, Title 32 NG status. If the teams are called to Federal active duty, they will normally be attached to JTF-CS.

In addition, WMD-CSTs assigned to one State are authorized to operate in another State pursuant to:

• State-to-State Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs);
• State-to-State Memoranda of Agreement; or,
• Activation under Title 10.

3. NG CBRN Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)

Each CERFP is a response capability “comprised of five operational elements staffed by personnel from already established NG units. Elements include: search and extraction, mass decontamination, medical, fatalities recovery, and command and control.” A CERFP can be utilized in SAD, Title 32, or Title 10 status. There are currently 17 CERFPs in the United States. The CERFP’s mission is to respond to CBRN incidents and assist local, State, and Federal agencies in conducting consequence management by providing capabilities to effect patient and mass casualty decontamination, emergency

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47 Id. at 3. MALS is based on system used by the Marine Corps’ Chemical Biological Incident Response Forces with enhanced biological detection capability.
48 Id. The UCS, built by the Navy, provides communication interface across the ICS frequencies, military command and control elements, and technical support assets.
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. at 5; 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c) (2018).
51 Supra note 40, at 5.
52 Id. at 6. See Chapter 3 of this Handbook for a detailed discussion of EMACs. A recent example of this was the deployment of the 24th CST from Fort Hamilton, New York to Boston, Massachusetts in support of post-Boston Marathon bombing operations. See Paula Katinas, Fort Hamilton Anti-Terror Unit Sent to Boston Bombing Site, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (July 22, 2013), http://www.brooklyneagle.com/articles/fort-hamilton-anti-terror-unit-sent-boston-bombing-site-2013-04-17-163000 (last visited 16 Jun 2020).
medical services, and casualty search and extraction. CERFP teams function as either follow-on or pre-positioned forces and work closely with WMD-CSTs.\textsuperscript{54}

4. **NG Homeland Response Force (HRF)**

DoD, based on recommendations from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), directed the NG to create 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRFs): two in FY11 and eight in FY12. Each HRF is essentially a CERFP with security and a regional command and control element. They are composed of approximately 566 personnel and bring capabilities including search and extraction, decontamination, emergency medical service, security, and command and control. There are 10 HRFs (one per FEMA region).\textsuperscript{55}

5. **USCG National Strike Force (NSF) Coordination Center and Strike Teams**

The Coast Guard’s NSF deploys specialized capabilities to support lead agency, incident commander, and Federal on-scene coordinator preparation and response to CBRN incidents, hazardous substance releases, oil discharges, and other emergencies. NSF assets include the NSF Coordination Center in Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and three strike teams: the Atlantic Strike Team in Joint Base McGuire-Dix- Lakehurst, New Jersey; the Gulf Strike Team in Mobile, Alabama; and the Pacific Strike Team in Novato, California. NSF equipment includes CBRN detection; air, water, and soil sampling; Level A, B, and C personnel protection; self-decontamination equipment; hazardous material packaging; mobile command posts; and other field operational equipment. NSF equipment is pre-packed for immediate deployment by truck or aircraft. Additionally, as elements of the Coast Guard, NSF units have the organic authority to respond domestically to many types of hazardous materials (chemical) incidents under the National Contingency Plan, either as lead responders in the coastal zone or as an assisting agency to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the inland zone.\textsuperscript{56} The NSF may also deploy detachments to support overseas military environmental response operations.\textsuperscript{57}

E. **Special Legal Considerations During CBRN Response Operations**

The parameters under which DoD operates domestically vary greatly from those involved in traditional military activities. DoD domestic CBRN response activities raise legal issues not found in typical non-civil support operations. Depending on the circumstances and location of the incident, the scope and complexity of potential legal issues will greatly vary. Below are four common legal issues that would likely arise in the context of any CBRN response operation. As operations involving these areas are largely driven by policy decisions at the SecDef level or higher—and are additionally vetted through

\textsuperscript{54} Id.


\textsuperscript{57} See JOINT PUB 3-41, supra note 1, at II-11.
the normal mission assignment process—judge advocates should receive primary guidance concerning these issues through appropriate mission OPORDs, EXORDs, FRAGOs, or relevant service-specific field guidance. Judge advocates should, however, familiarize themselves beforehand with issues they may encounter in these areas, as well as primary Federal and State authorities discussed below.

1. Quarantine/Isolation

Quarantine\(^{58}\) and isolation\(^{59}\) enforcement issues may arise most typically in pandemic scenarios. State and local health authorities are primarily responsible for decisions to impose quarantine or isolation, and the power to enforce these is generally considered to be part of a jurisdiction’s police powers.\(^{60}\) Federal power to impose quarantine and isolation measures arises with attempts to halt or impede the “introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.”\(^{61}\)

Regardless of whether the quarantine and isolation measures are imposed at the Federal, State, or local level, DoD enforcement actions may be subject to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA),\(^{62}\) absent an alternative statutory or constitutional authority. A potential exception to PCA restrictions is 42 U.S.C. § 97 (involving State quarantine laws), which is listed in DoDI 3025.21 as one of the specific laws that allows direct DoD participation in law enforcement, subject to applicable limitations.\(^{63}\) It is also possible that a quarantine or isolation actions could lead to conditions necessitating a Presidential invocation of the Insurrection Act.\(^{64}\) Typically, however, any DoD support provided to quarantine and isolation support will be limited to logistical, communications, medical, and other support commonly envisioned by the Stafford Act. Measures provided by DoD may or may not amount to direct participation in law enforcement activity, and, therefore, a strict analysis of PCA applicability should occur in all cases.\(^{65}\)

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\(^{58}\) “Quarantine” is defined as the “[s]eparation of individuals who have been exposed to an infection but are not yet ill from others who have not been exposed to the transmissible infection.” HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA: IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 209 (May 2006).

\(^{59}\) “Isolation” is defined as the “[s]eparation of infected individuals from those that are not infected.” Id. at 207.


\(^{61}\) 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2018). Additionally, in some situations, the Federal government may intervene if it deems State and local control measures to be inadequate. 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2017).


\(^{63}\) 42 U.S.C. § 97 (2018) specifically states “The quarantines and other restraints established by the health laws of any State, respecting any vessels arriving in, or bound to, any port or district thereof, shall be duly observed by the officers of the customs revenue of the United States, by the masters and crews of the several Coast Guard vessels, and by the military officers commanding in any fort or station upon the sea coast; and all such officers of the United States shall faithfully aid in the execution of such quarantines and health laws, according to their respective powers and within their respective precincts, and as they shall be directed, from time to time, by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.” See also U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES Encl. 3, para. 1.b.5(i) (27 Feb. 2013), (Ch. 1, 8 Feb. 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.21].

\(^{64}\) 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255

\(^{65}\) Chapter 4, Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement, has an extensive discussion on how to ensure compliance with the PCA.
2. Environmental Compliance

Judge advocates planning for CBRN CM operations should assume that Federal, State, and local environmental laws and regulations will remain in place, at least as they pertain to DoD response operations. Specific laws that may apply include the Endangered Species Act (ESA), Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), National Historic Preservation Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), to name a few. For example, the Stafford Act specifically states that NEPA applies to actions undertaken pursuant to the Act. There are some laws that streamline applicability of environmental regulations or exempt their application during a response. For example, to streamline the application of NEPA, actions performed under certain sections of the Stafford Act aimed at restoring facilities are not considered “major Federal actions” that would normally trigger more NEPA scrutiny.

The handling and disposal of waste from CBRN response decontamination operations will frequently implicate environmental compliance issues. In such a scenario, the EPA, operating under Emergency Support Function (ESF) 10, would be the primary agency responsible for hazardous waste management. Additionally, coordination with State authorities regarding the State’s environmental laws and regulations is essential. For example, judge advocates should ensure that appropriate staff sections and levels of command have ascertained whether the decontamination and waste disposal procedures outlined in FM 3-11 are sufficient for a specific CBRN response operation, or whether those procedures require modification pursuant to guidance from appropriate State agencies.

3. Health Care Licensure

In a domestic CBRN event, non-fatality casualties may range from minimal to overwhelming. The greater the number of casualties, the more likely there will be requests for DoD medical personnel to provide care for the affected populace. Because DoD caregivers may not necessarily be licensed/credentialed in accordance with appropriate State laws, judge advocates must be prepared to render advice on Federal and State licensure requirements during emergency support operations. Upon a command’s receipt of any mission assignments relating to the provision of health-related services (or even prior to receipt, if practicable), judge advocates on the operational and tactical levels should verify with higher headquarters that any health care licensure requirements have been met or waived by appropriate authorities, and that there is a common understanding between the various agencies.

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72 U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-11, CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (May 2019).
involved (including DoD, ESF #8, and State and local agencies) regarding the statutory portability provisions discussed below.

The primary Federal statute regarding credentialing of military personnel is 10 U.S.C. § 1094, *Licensure Requirement for Health-Care Professionals*. This law states that an Armed Forces health care professionals, who have a current license and performing authorized Federal duties, may practice his or her health care profession in any State, notwithstanding any other health care licensure laws, and regardless of whether the practice occurs in a DoD facility, a civilian facility affiliated with DoD, or any other location authorized by the Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense has promulgated qualification and coordination requirements for this statutory portability provision as it pertains to off-base duties. The various qualification/coordination with State licensing board requirements pertaining to health care personnel involved in off-base duties can be found in DoD 6025.13, Encl. 4, paragraph 2.

10 U.S.C. § 1094 only applies to those “performing authorized duties for the Department of Defense” and Title 32 forces in a section 502(f) status. NG members in State status may need to look to State laws for guidance on their status. On the State level, many jurisdictions have passed emergency management provisions containing portability of licensure provisions. For example, the Florida Governor’s proclamation of a major or catastrophic disaster provides authority for a health care practitioner licensed in another State to assist in providing health care in the disaster area according to the provisions specified in the proclamation. Similarly, California permits health care providers licensed in other States to provide health care during a statutorily defined state of emergency, if the emergency overwhelms California health care practitioners’ response capabilities and California’s Director of the Emergency Medical Service Authority requests assistance. Although during a Stafford Act response DoD support will not normally be provided absent a specific request from State authorities, judge advocates, through their technical chains, should ensure that all appropriate agencies and levels of command have a common understanding of the State laws and rules regarding licensure and how those laws complement Title 10 provisions.

Also, at the State level, judge advocates can also look to either the applicable State’s Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) or Article V of the Model EMAC legislation, which states:

> Whenever any person holds a license, certificate, or other permit issued by any State party to the compact evidencing the meeting of qualifications for professional, mechanical, or other skills, and when such assistance is requested by the receiving party State, such person shall be deemed licensed, certified, or

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74 “Off base duties” are “[o]fficially assigned professional duties performed at an authorized location outside a MTF and any military installation.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL 6025.13, MEDICAL QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CLINICAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM (MHS) 82 (29 Oct. 2013).
75 Id. at Encl. 4, para 2.
78 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 900 (2020).
permitted by the State requesting assistance to render aid involving such skill to meet a declared emergency or disaster, subject to such limitations and conditions as the Governor of the requesting State may prescribe by executive order or otherwise.\footnote{See EMAC LEGISLATION, https://www.emacweb.org/index.php/learn-about-emac/emac-legislation (last visited June 25, 2020).}

Even if the State has passed the model EMAC legislation without alteration, judge advocates must be cognizant of the particular State Governor’s limitations on this portability provision.

4. Mortuary Affairs

As with non-fatality casualties, the number of fatalities in a CBRN event may quickly overwhelm State and local capabilities. As in other aspects of emergency management, primary responsibility for mortuary affairs (MA) operations lies at the local level, normally with the local medical examiner and/or coroner. The NRF gives ESF #8 the responsibility for mass fatality management in the Federal response.\footnote{FEMA, EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION #8—PUBLIC HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES ANNEX 8-2 (June 2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1470149644671-642ccad05d19449d2d13b1b0952328ed/ESF_8_Public_Health_Medical_20160705_508.pdf.} However, in a catastrophic scenario, it is likely that DoD will be asked to provide mortuary affairs support. Types of support the DoD may be asked to provide, potentially utilizing personnel that are not MA-skilled, may include search and recovery operations, and transportation and storage of remains, among others.\footnote{JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 4-06, MORTUARY AFFAIRS VII-2, VII-7, VIII-2 (12 Oct. 2011).} DoD personnel who are not MA-skilled may require training in mortuary affairs (which the civilian agencies responding must provide) prior to engaging in decedent-related missions or activities.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at VII-8}

During operations, judge advocates should become familiar with the relevant State laws, regulations, and licensure requirements regarding the handling, transportation, and disposition of human remains, and ensure that these requirements have either been met or waived by appropriate authorities. Judge advocates should also be cognizant of the various points of contact involved in mortuary affairs operations, including the local medical examiner/coroner, local law enforcement, and the FBI.
KEY REFERENCES:

- 10 U.S.C. § 279 - Assignment of Coast Guard Personnel to Naval Vessels for Law Enforcement Purposes.
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense /CN Memorandum, Policy Definition of “Narcoterrorism”, April 12, 2004.
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense /CN Memorandum, Counter Drug Support to Counter-Narcoterrorist Activities (Memo to Chief, NGB) August, 26, 2005.
- Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense / CN Memorandum, Guidance for the States’ National Guard Counterdrug Program (Memo to Chief, NGB) May18, 2020.
- DoDI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, February 27, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, Effective February 8, 2019.
- CNGB Instruction 3100.01B, National Guard Counterdrug Support Program, March 6, 2020.
- NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, National Guard Counterdrug Support, August 28, 2008 (Currently under re-write as a CNGB Manual. Check for publishing at end of FY21).
- CJCSI 3710.01B, DoD Counterdrug Support, January 26, 2007 (current as of June 12, 2014).
- The President’s National Drug Control Strategy (February 2020).
- Department of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy, April 27, 2011.
A. Introduction

In the 1980s, Congress determined the Department of Defense (DoD) should provide increased support to civilian law enforcement agencies’ (LEA) counterdrug operations. Over the years, the congressionally mandated DoD support for counterdrug operations has increased. This support now includes both active component and National Guard full-time participation. DoD counterdrug operations\(^1\) are coordinated by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Counter Narcotics and Global Threats (DASD/CN&GT), which is located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).\(^2\) The National Guard Counterdrug (CD) program is administered through the National Guard Bureau (NGB) J3/4/7’s J32-CD Division. This chapter examines support by both the active duty military and the National Guard.

B. Title 10 Support to Counterdrug Operations

In 1981, Congress passed Chapter 15 of Title 10, Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.\(^3\) Although Chapter 15 permits general military cooperation with civilian law enforcement agencies, Congress passed the Act and its subsequent amendments with the intent of enabling the Department of Defense to provide increased counterdrug support.\(^4\)

In 1989, Congress took additional steps and assigned specific counterdrug missions to the Department of Defense. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Years (FY) 1990 and 1991,\(^5\) Congress designated DoD as the lead agency for the “detection and monitoring” of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.\(^6\) Section 1206 of this act also states that the “Secretary of Defense shall direct that the armed forces, to the maximum extent practicable, conduct military training exercises (including training exercises conducted by the reserve components) in drug-interdiction areas.”\(^7\) In FY 1991, Congress provided more specific counterdrug authority to the Department of Defense by passing Section 1004 of the NDAA, discussed further below.\(^8\)

\(^1\) The term “counterdrug operations” is defined as, “those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD.” \(\text{See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-07.4, Joint Counterdrug Operations (5 Feb. 2019)}\) [hereinafter JP 3-07.4].


\(^5\) \(\text{National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-189, 103 Stat. 1563 [hereinafter NDAA for FY90]. Although NDAA’s are typically established for a single fiscal year, this NDAA is for both 1990 and 1991. \text{See https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-103/pdf/STATUTE-103-Pg1352.pdf (last visited 8 Apr. 2021). To avoid confusion, all references to this document will be to NDAA for FY90.}\)}

\(^6\) \(\text{NDAA for FY90, supra note 5, §1202; 10 U.S.C. § 124 (2012 & Supp. IV 2017).}\)

\(^7\) \(\text{NDAA for FY90, supra note 5, § 1206.}\)

In addition to providing statutory authority for counterdrug support, Congress annually appropriates funds to the Department of Defense specifically for these operations. The money is disbursed through DASD(CN&GT) and it differs from the funding for most other military support to civilian law enforcement in that reimbursement is not required.


As a result of NDAA for FY 2017, authority for DoD support to counterdrug operations underwent significant changes. Section 1004 from the NDAA for FY 1991 was replaced by Section 1011 of FY17 NDAA and subsequently codified under 10 U.S.C. § 284. This authority was also extended through 2020 and applies to both U.S. and foreign law enforcement agencies LEAs. In addition, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-382 was administratively changed to 10 U.S.C. §§ 271-284. Types of counterdrug support to U.S. LEAs under this authority include the following:

- Maintenance and repair of loaned defense equipment to preserve the potential future utility or to upgrade to ensure compatibility of that equipment (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(1) & (2))
- Transportation support (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(3));
- Establish and/or operate bases or training facilities (includes minor military construction projects) (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(4));
- Counterdrug-related training of law enforcement personnel (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(5));
- Detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of air and sea traffic within 25 miles of and outside United States borders (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(6)(A));
- Detect, monitor, and communicate the movement of surface traffic detected outside U.S. borders for up to 25 miles within the United States (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(6)(B));
- Engineering support (roads, fences, and lights) to block drug smuggling at U.S. borders (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(7));
- Establish command, control, communications, and computer networks (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(8));
- Linguist and intelligence analysis services (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(9)); and
- Aerial and ground reconnaissance support (10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(10)).

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9 The Counternarcotics Program is financed through the Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities defense appropriation, which is a central transfer account (CTA). It is a single line that accounts for all associated counter narcotics (CN) resources with the exception of those resources for the active components’ military personnel and service OPTEMPO. In 2018, Congress authorized appropriations of $750 million for counterdrug operations. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 4501, 131 Stat. 1283 (2017). In 2019, Congress increased the authorized appropriations for counterdrug operations to $781 million for FY20. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, S. 1790 § 4501 (2019) [hereinafter NDAA for FY20].

Types of counterdrug support to foreign LEAs under this authority include the following:

- Transportation support (10 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(A));
- Establish and/or operate bases or training facilities (includes small scale construction) (10 U.S.C. § 284 (c)(1)(B));
- Detect, monitor, and communicate movement of air and sea traffic within 25 miles of and outside U.S. borders (10 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)(i));
- Detect, monitor, and communicate movement of surface traffic outside U.S. borders (10 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)(ii));
- Establish command, control, communications, and computer networks 10 U.S.C. § 284 (c)(1)(D));
- Linguist and intelligence analysis services (10 U.S.C. § 284 (c)(1)(E)); and
- Aerial and ground reconnaissance support (10 U.S.C. § 284 (c)(1)(F)).

Sections 271-284 of Title 10 also provide statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) (PCA) (with the exception of 10 U.S.C. §§ 274 and 275). Further, the Secretary of Defense may provide support that will adversely affect military preparedness in the short term in contravention of 10 U.S.C. § 276 if the Secretary determines that the importance of providing such support outweighs the short-term adverse impact. Lastly, judge advocates should be aware that the policy limits on assistance to law enforcement agencies set forth in DoDI 3025.21, Defense Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, do not apply to counternarcotics activities.

2. Detection and Monitoring

10 U.S.C. § 124 makes DoD the lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. This statute does not extend to the detection and monitoring of land transit. Although detection and monitoring is now a DoD mission per 10

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11 10 U.S.C. § 274 authorizes the Secretary of Defense to make DoD personnel available to U.S. LEAs for the maintenance and operation of DoD or LEA equipment only to the extent that such support does not involve direct participation in a civilian law enforcement operation. 10 U.S.C. §275 directed the Secretary of Defense to promulgate regulations that prohibit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.


13 U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES para. 2.f.(1) (27 Feb. 2013) (Ch. 1, 8 Feb. 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.21].

14 Note that 10 U.S.C. § 284(b)(6) authorizes “[a]erial and ground reconnaissance outside, at, or near the borders of the United States” in support of other agencies and in accordance with other provisions of § 284; Id.
U.S.C. § 124, it must still be carried out in support of Federal, State, local, or foreign law enforcement authorities.\(^{15}\)

In order to perform the detection and monitoring mission, DoD personnel may operate DoD equipment to intercept a vessel or an aircraft detected outside the land area of the United States for the purposes of:

- Identifying and communicating with that vessel or aircraft; and
- Directing that vessel or aircraft to go to a location designated by appropriate civilian officials.\(^{16}\)

In cases where a vessel or aircraft is detected outside the land area of the United States, DoD personnel may begin, or continue, pursuit of that vessel or aircraft over the land area of the United States.\(^{17}\) Notably, the DoD detection and monitoring mission does not authorize DoD personnel to conduct searches, seizures, or arrests—which are prohibited under 10 U.S.C. § 275.

3. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)**

Authority to approve counterdrug operational support to LEAs under the statutes discussed above has been delegated by the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Commanders of the Unified Combatant Commands (with the authority to further delegate to flag and general officers within their chains of command).\(^{18}\) The duration of use of active duty forces is limited.\(^{19}\)

CJCSI 3710.01B provides a specific list of the types of counterdrug missions that may be approved, such as certain types of aerial reconnaissance, transportation support, intelligence analyst support, and engineering support, among others.\(^{20}\) Authority to approve counterdrug support missions involving ground reconnaissance, detection and monitoring operations, and deployments for longer than 179 days or involving more than 400 personnel is specifically withheld from this delegation.\(^{21}\) These missions require specific Secretary of Defense approval. CJCSI 3710.01B should be consulted whenever reviewing a proposed operation.

On July 31, 2002, the Deputy Secretary of Defense published the DoD Counternarcotics Policy. This policy states that DoD will focus its counternarcotics activities on programs that: enhance DoD

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\(^{16}\) Id. § 124(b).


\(^{18}\) See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3710.01B, DoD COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT Encl. A, para. 1 (26 Jan. 2007) (current as of 12 Jun. 2014) [hereinafter CJCSI 3710.01B], U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) further delegated its authority to the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), who further delegated this authority to Commander, Joint Task Force-North (JTF-N).

\(^{19}\) Id. at Encl. A, para 8.g.

\(^{20}\) Id. at Encl. A, para 3.

\(^{21}\) Id. at Encl. A, para 5.a.
readiness; satisfy DoD’s statutory detection and monitoring responsibilities; contribute to the war on terrorism; advance DoD’s security cooperation goals; or enhance national security.\(^{22}\)

On October 2, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense published the policy on domestic counternarcotics activities.\(^{23}\) This policy established the goals of reducing the operational stress on Title 10 forces that conduct domestic counternarcotics activities through utilization of Title 32 National Guard forces; focusing DoD’s support on areas of unique military skills and capabilities that domestic law enforcement agencies lack or cannot practically replicate; and employing those measures designed to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity reasonably related to narcotics trafficking. This policy directed that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall be responsible for reviewing and approving Title 10 counternarcotics support, except where that authority was delegated pursuant to CJCSI 3710.01B.

USNORTHCOM reviews all domestic counternarcotics support requests. Commander, USNORTHCOM, will first ensure a National Guard unit cannot provide the support. If the NGB determines that Title 32 National Guard forces cannot provide the support, USNORTHCOM will determine whether the requested support is feasible, supportable, and consistent with DoD policy. If approval is authorized under CJCSI 3710.01B, Commander, USNORTHCOM, or his or her delegated authority, may approve the request and will request Title 10 forces through the Joint Staff from the appropriate service. All other requests will be forwarded through the Joint Staff deployment order process, to the DASD/CN&GT and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for consideration.

Detailed rules governing the use of force by military forces engaged in counternarcotics support operations within the United States are provided in CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, Appendices L and O.\(^{24}\)

\section{Counterdrug Support Task Forces}

Counterdrug support operations are planned, coordinated, and controlled primarily via three headquarters: Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, located in Key West, Florida, (under the command and control of U.S. Southern Command (USOUTHCOM)); JIATF West, located in Honolulu, Hawaii, (under the command and control of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)); and Joint Task Force North (JTF-N), located in El Paso, Texas, (under the command and control of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM)). While the two JIATFs do provide some support to LEAs in their Areas of Responsibility (AORs),\(^{25}\) their primary focus is on detection and monitoring of illicit traffic in the source and transit zones of South and Central America, Southeast and Southwest Asia, and in international waters and airspace. This enables interdiction by

\begin{itemize}
\item Memorandum from Dep. Sec’y of Def. to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al., subject: Department of Defense Counternarcotics Policy (31 Jul. 2002).
\item Memorandum from Dep. Sec’y of Def., subject: Department Support to Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies Performing Counternarcotics Activities (October 2, 2003). This memorandum was cancelled in 2020 and replace by U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INSTR. 3000.14, DO-D COUNTERDRUG AND COUNTER-TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME POLICY (28 Aug. 2020) [hereinafter DoDI 3000.14].
\item JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT/STANDING RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR U.S. FORCES (13 June 2005) [hereinafter CJCSI 3121.01B].
\item For example, Hawaii falls within INDOPACOM’s AOR, and Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands fall within NORTHCOM’s AOR. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-28, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES II-14 (29 Oct. 2018) [hereinafter JP 3-28].
\end{itemize}
law enforcement in the source and transit zones consistent with priorities outlined in the President’s National Drug Control Strategy.26

To de-conflict and identify interim and long-term solutions for command and control arrangements between USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and UINDOS PACOM, the ASD (SO/LIC) established specific areas of responsibility for JIATF-S, JIATF-W, and JTF-N.27 While the JIATFs focus their attention on international AORs, the bulk of domestic counterdrug support is provided by JTF-N.

Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6), activated on November 13, 1989, was designated as the lead DoD organization responsible for planning and coordinating all DoD support to civilian drug law enforcement agencies in the continental United States (CONUS). Joint Task Force Six’s original AOR, composed of the four southwest border States of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, was expanded in 1995 to cover all of CONUS, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.28 On 28 September 2004, Joint Task Force Six was officially renamed Joint Task Force North (JTF-N).29 JTF-N’s mission includes synchronizing and integrating DoD operational, technological, training, and intelligence support to domestic law enforcement agency counterdrug efforts in CONUS to reduce the availability of illegal drugs.

Located at Fort Bliss, Texas, there are approximately 175 personnel assigned to JTF-N, including civilians, contractors, and service-members from all five services. Unlike the JIATFs, JTF-N has no LEA representatives assigned to or working in the command. Joint Task Force North has no assigned units and no tasking authority. It solicits volunteer units from all four DoD branches to execute the support missions requested by the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security. From its inception as JTF-6, JTF-N has completed over 6,000 counterdrug support missions throughout CONUS. These included aerial and ground reconnaissance missions, detection and monitoring, use of mobile training teams, and engineer support missions.30 JIATF-S and JIATF-W are both under the direction of Coast Guard Rear Admirals with DoD, DHS, and DOJ representatives in other senior leadership positions. JIATF-S conducts detection & monitoring operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific source and transit zones.31 JIATF-W combats drug-related transnational organized

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26 The 2020 National Drug Control Strategy, published by the Trump administration, focuses on drugs that enter the country across the Southern border, although it acknowledges that drugs enter the country by the mails. It does not acknowledge the previously discussed transit zones. 2020 National Drug Control Strategy, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/2020-NDCS.pdf (last visited 18 Jun. 2020). At the date of publication of this handbook, the Biden Administration had not released their National Drug Control Strategy.

27 Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict) Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) Area Responsibilities (21 Aug 2003).


31 When JIATF-S locates suspect vessels, it transfers TACON of surface assets to the U.S. Coast Guard Seventh District (Caribbean operations) or Eleventh District (Eastern Pacific operations), at which point the U.S. Coast Guard conducts interdiction and apprehension operations. In cases in which evidence of maritime drug trafficking or other illegal activity is discovered, the Coast Guard coordinates case disposition with JIATF-S and DOJ or with foreign partners, as appropriate. JIATF-S works closely with ongoing DOJ Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force investigations such as Operation Panama Express to synthesize and evaluate available information about suspected maritime and aerial drug movement to detect, monitor, and facilitate the interdiction of suspect vessels and aircraft.
crime to reduce threats in the Asia-Pacific region in order to protect U.S. national security interests and promote regional stability.32

5. **Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments**

As the primary enforcer of U.S. maritime law, the U.S. Coast Guard plays a critical role in drug enforcement. The Coast Guard has the lead role in maritime drug interdiction and shares the lead role in air interdiction with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency. The Coast Guard conducts extensive maritime counterdrug operations year-round. These operations range from enforcing drug possession and use laws during routine recreational and other vessel boardings in all areas where the Coast Guard operates, to conducting sustained multi-unit operations targeting major drug traffickers far from U.S. shores. Since the PCA does not apply to the Coast Guard, the PCA restrictions on arrest, search, seizure, and the interdiction of vessels and aircraft are inapplicable to Coast Guard operations and personnel. Moreover, the Coast Guard has broad law enforcement authority under 14 U.S.C. §§ 521-528 to enforce U.S. laws in waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction and over vessels subject to U.S. jurisdiction wherever they may be located.34

To capitalize on the Coast Guard’s expertise and uniquely broad maritime law enforcement authority, 10 U.S.C. § 279 requires the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to assign Coast Guard law enforcement detachments (LEDETs) to every appropriate naval surface vessel operating at sea in a drug interdiction area.35

Coast Guard personnel assigned to LEDETs are trained in law enforcement and have the powers of arrest, search, and seizure in accordance with 14 U.S.C. §§ 521-528. Coast Guard personnel assigned to U.S. Navy vessels under 10 U.S.C. § 279 will perform functions which are agreed to by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security and which are otherwise within the Coast Guard’s jurisdiction.36 No fewer than 500 active duty Coast Guard personnel will be assigned duties under 10 U.S.C. § 279, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, after consulting with the Secretary

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34 14 U.S.C. § 522(a) states: The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized.
35 10 U.S.C. § 279(a). A “drug interdiction area” is defined as “an area outside the land area of the United States . . . in which the Secretary of Defense, (in consultation with the Attorney General) determines that activities involving smuggling of drugs into the United States are ongoing.” 10 U.S.C. § 279(d).
36 Id. § 279(b).
of Defense, determines that there are not enough naval surface vessels to support this number of personnel. If this is the case, these Coast Guard personnel may be assigned duties to enforce the laws listed under 10 U.S.C. § 274(b)(4)(A). U.S. Navy ships transporting Coast Guard LEDETs under TACON of the Coast Guard will follow the Use-of-Force Policy issued by the Commandant, USCG, regarding use of warning shots and disabling fire.

Specific rules governing the use of Coast Guard LEDETs are provided in Commandant, United States Coast Guard Instruction (COMDTINST) M16247.1G, Maritime Law Enforcement Manual. The primary Federal statute that the Coast Guard enforces in counterdrug operations is the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA). The MDLEA prohibits any person on board a U.S. vessel, or a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S., from knowingly or intentionally manufacturing or distributing, or possessing with the intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance. The term “U.S. vessel” includes:

- Federally documented or State numbered vessels;
- Vessels owned in whole or in part by:
  - the U.S. or a territory, commonwealth, or possession of the U.S.;
  - a State or political subdivision thereof;
  - a citizen or national of the U.S.; or
  - a corporation created under the laws of the U.S. or any State, the District of Columbia, or any territory, commonwealth, or possession of the U.S.; and

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37 Id. § 279(c).
38 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION 3121.01B, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, Encl. H, Counterdrug Support Operations Outside the U.S. Territory, para. 1(b) (13 June 2005). CJCSI 3121.01B is classified in part. Enclosure H is confidential in part. The provision cited is unclassified. See also 14 U.S.C. § 526, Stopping Vessels; Indemnity for Firing at or Into Vessel.
39 U.S. COAST GUARD, COMDTINST M16247, U.S. COAST GUARD MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT MANUAL ch. 3 para. b.2 (2017) (FOUO) (copy on file with CLAMO) [hereinafter MLEM]. The MLEM is also available at the Maritime Operations Resources web portal at the CLAMO website (AKO account required). See also Memorandum, Commander, Atlantic Area, U.S. Coast Guard, to Commanding Officers, Regional TACLETs North, South, and Gulf, Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Deployment of Law Enforcement Detachment (5 Aug. 1993) (on file with CLAMO).
40 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70508. In 2010 Congress passed the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2285 (the DTVIA) at the urging of the Coast Guard and Department of Justice. This law makes the operation of or embarkation in a stateless self-propelled semi-submersible or submersible vessel beyond any State’s territorial sea (or having crossed from one State’s territorial sea into another) a felony punishable by up to fifteen years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 2285. Although not an anti-drug-trafficking statute per se, the Coast Guard uses this law to combat the threat posed by maritime drug traffickers who have increasingly resorted to the use of semi-submersible vessels to avoid detection while transporting multi-ton loads of cocaine. This was necessary because the crews of these vessels would frequently scuttle them to avoid prosecution, but under the DTVIA merely being on board is a criminal violation. Many of the jurisdictional provisions and definitions in the MDLEA are included in the DTVIA as well.
42 Id. § 70502(b); 14 U.S.C. § 123.
• U.S. documented vessels sold or registered in a foreign country in violation of U.S. law.\textsuperscript{43}

“Vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction” includes a foreign vessel if located:

• In U.S. customs waters;

• On the high seas and the flag State has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of U.S. law; or

• In the territorial waters of another nation and that coastal State consents to the enforcement of U.S. law.\textsuperscript{44}

In addition to placing LEDETs on U.S. Navy ships, the Coast Guard also relies on extensive bilateral and multilateral agreements between the United States and other nations to place LEDETs on the ships of foreign countries. These agreements can take various forms—from standing formal memoranda of agreements to \textit{ad hoc} verbal agreements.\textsuperscript{45}

The United States and most countries in South America, Central America and the Caribbean are parties to the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Article 17 of that Convention requires parties to cooperate with each other to suppress illicit trafficking by sea. Pursuant to this mandate, the United States has entered into dozens of bilateral agreements or understandings with partner States in the region. These standing bilateral maritime counterdrug agreements typically address various aspects of enforcement including: deployment of shipriders from foreign navies and coast guards on U.S. surface assets; over flight by U.S. air assets within the territory or territorial seas of foreign partners; patrols and pursuit of suspect vessels in the territorial seas of foreign partners; combined operations; flag State authorization to board, search, seize, or make arrests; and procedures by which foreign partners may waive jurisdiction over vessels and persons in favor of prosecution in the United States when appropriate. As with all international agreements, these bilateral and multilateral agreements can only be negotiated by following Department of State approval procedures.

C. National Guard Support to Counterdrug Operations

National Guard (NG) forces are authorized by 32 U.S.C. § 112(a) to use CD funds for “drug interdiction and counterdrug activities.” This includes:

• Pay, travel, allowances, clothing, subsistence, gratuities, travel, and related expenses, as authorized by State law, for NG personnel used for drug interdiction and counterdrug activities while not in Federal service;


\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.} § 70502(c).

\textsuperscript{45} For a list of current counterdrug bilateral agreements, see USCG OPLAW FAST ACTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, series (2012) (For Official Use Only manual) (copy on file with CLAMO) [hereinafter FARM]. The FARM is also available at the Maritime Operations Resources web portal at the CLAMO website (AKO account required).
• The operation and maintenance of NG equipment and facilities used for drug interdiction and counterdrug activities; and

• The procurement of services and equipment, and the leasing of equipment, by the NG for the purpose of drug interdiction and counterdrug activities.46

Funds provided by the Secretary of Defense under 32 U.S.C. § 112 are part of the DoD counterdrug appropriation and cannot be used for purposes other than the NG counterdrug support program.47 Authority to spend CD funds depends on whether the primary purpose of the mission is to conduct CD activities. Evidence that CD is a purpose, but not the primary purpose, is insufficient to justify the expenditure. For example, a Purpose Act violation occurred when the Texas National Guard used counterdrug funds in January 1993 in support of the joint ATF-FBI operation concerning the Branch Davidians near Waco, Texas. The finding was returned despite evidence that a former Branch Davidian had stated to the ATF that there was a methamphetamine lab in the compound, and David Koresh had stated to an undercover ATF agent that the compound would be an ideal location for a meth lab.48 The Anti-Deficiency Act49 (ADA) violation was based on the fact that the operation’s primary purpose was to investigate potential Federal firearms violations—not narcotics violations.50

CD funds may also be used for the purpose of drug interdiction and counterdrug activities in which (1) drug traffickers use terrorism to further their aims of drug trafficking, or (2) terrorists benefit from or use drug trafficking to further their aims of drug trafficking.51 In order to qualify for Federal funding under 32 U.S.C. § 112(a), the Governor of the State requesting such funding must annually submit a State drug interdiction and counterdrug activities plan (State Plan) to the Secretary of Defense.52 A State drug interdiction and counterdrug activities plan shall:

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46 Procurement of equipment cannot exceed $5,000 per purchase order unless approval is granted by the Secretary of Defense. 32 U.S.C. § 112(a)(3). Further, equipment purchased, loaned, leased, or otherwise obtained using 32 U.S.C. § 112 funds will only be used for the Counterdrug Support Program except in very limited circumstances. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, REG. 500-2/ANGI 10-801, NATIONAL GUARD COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT paras. 7-10, 7-11 (29 August 2008) [hereinafter NGR 500-2]. At the time this handbook was published, this regulation was being re-drafted as a CNGB Manual.

47 This is the general rule; however, on rare occasions NG CD personnel and/or equipment may be used for State immediate response missions. Contact your State SJA or NGB-GC for additional guidance on this exception.


52 State drug interdiction and counterdrug support plans must be submitted through the Counterdrug Office of the National Guard Bureau. NGR 500-2, supra note 46, para. 2-5.
• Specify how personnel of the NG of that State are to be used in drug interdiction and counterdrug activities;

• Certify that those operations are to be conducted at a time when the personnel involved are not in Federal service;

• Certify that participation by NG personnel in those operations is service in addition to training required under 32 U.S.C. § 502;\(^53\)

• Certify that any engineer-type activities (as defined by the Secretary of Defense) under the plan will be performed only by units and members of the NG;

• Include a certification by the State Attorney General that the use of the NG for the activities proposed under the plan is authorized by, and is consistent with, State law; and

• Certify that the Governor or a civilian law enforcement official of the State designated by the Governor has determined that any activities included in the plan that are carried out in conjunction with Federal law enforcement agencies serve a State law enforcement purpose.\(^54\)

The NG Counterdrug Coordinators for each State or territory must submit their State Plan to the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for review. The NGB submits all 54 State Plans, complete with original certifying signature from the respective Adjutant General, Attorney General, and Governor, to the DASD CN&GT. DASD CN&GT reviews the State Plans and, in coordination with the Comptroller, ASD (HD & ASA), the Joint Staff, the Commander, USNORTHCOM, and other appropriate offices within the department, recommends approval or rejection to the Secretary of Defense.\(^55\)

To ensure that the use of NG units and personnel participating in counterdrug operations does not degrade training and readiness, the following requirements apply in determining what activities NG personnel may perform:

• The performance of the activities may not adversely affect the quality of that training or otherwise interfere with the ability to perform the military functions of the member or unit;

• NG personnel will not degrade their military skills as a result of performing the activities;

• The performance of the activities will not result in a significant increase in the cost of training; and

• In the case of drug interdiction and counterdrug activities performed by a unit organized to serve as a unit, the activities will support valid unit training requirements.\(^56\)

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\(^{53}\) See 32 U.S.C. § 502 (addressing annual drill and field exercise requirements of National Guard personnel).

\(^{54}\) Id. § 112(c).

\(^{55}\) Memorandum, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department Support to Domestic Law Enforcement Agencies Performing Counternarcotics Activities (2 Oct 2003).

The Secretary of Defense will examine the State Plans in consultation with the Director of National Drug Control Policy. If the Governor of a State submits a plan substantially similar to the one submitted the prior fiscal year, and funds were provided to the State under the prior plan, consultation by the Secretary of Defense with the Director of National Drug Control Policy is not required. NG units can execute only those missions approved by the Secretary of Defense in the State Plans.57

Although Federally funded, NG members performing counterdrug missions under 32 U.S.C. § 112 are under State command and control. In fact, 32 U.S.C. § 112(c)(2) specifically requires the State drug interdiction and counterdrug activities plan to certify that “operations are to be conducted at a time when the personnel involved are not in Federal service.” 32 U.S.C. § 112(b) also requires that CD personnel serve in a full-time NG duty (FTNGD) status pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). As with all NG personnel performing duties pursuant to 32 U.S.C. §§ 115, 316, 502, 503, 504, or 505, NG members performing CD activities in FTNGD status are employees of the Federal government for purposes of Federal Tort Claims Act58 coverage.59 If the appropriate United States Attorney determines that a Title 32 NG member was acting within the scope of employment when an alleged tort occurred, then the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy would be against the United States, which would accordingly be substituted as the defendant in any FTCA litigation.60 Conversely, for actions not cognizable under the FTCA, such as a constitutional or Bivens61 action against a NG member in his or her individual capacity, the United States could not be substituted as the defendant in the action. In such cases, the NG member may request representation from the Department of Justice pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 516.30 and AR 27-40, para 4-462 or AFI 51-301, chapter 1, para 5.19.63 The process of determining representation is separate and distinct from the determination of FTCA coverage. If representation is granted, NG personnel remain individually-named defendants in the action and are responsible for any criminal convictions, fines or civil judgments. The Department of Justice is not obligated to indemnify NG personnel for any adverse monetary judgments or sanctions in these cases, but may, in its sole discretion, do so upon request.64

The PCA does not apply to NG counterdrug missions performed under 32 U.S.C. § 112, even though these units are performing missions using Federal funds and operating under Federal fiscal oversight.65

59 See id. § 2671 (defining “employee of the government”).
60 See id. § 2679(b). See also NGR 500-2, supra note 46, para. 2-4a (“National Guard members acting within the scope of their authority and performing approved support (listed in the Governor's State Plan and approved by the SECDEF) are immune from suit except for certain constitutional torts, i.e., when a negligent act or omission constitutes a violation of the constitutional rights of the injured party, including persons suspected of criminal activity, and certain intentional torts, such as assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment.”).
63 U.S. DEP’T OF AIR FORCE, INSTR. 51-301, CIVIL LITIGATION chapter 1, para. 5.19 (2 Oct. 2018) [hereinafter AFI 51-301].
64 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(12)(c).
65 Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473-474 (6th Cir. 1999) (Where a State used National Guard members for purpose of carrying out drug interdiction and counterdrug activities, in accordance with Federal statute, the National Guard members were found to be exempt from the Posse Comitatus Act); United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 25-26 (3rd Cir. 1993) (The use of a National Guard unit that was not in Federal service for civilian law enforcement involving surveillance of possible drug operation was not a violation of Federal law, where under Pennsylvania law the Governor could place members of National Guard on special state duty to support drug interdiction programs).
This allows Title 32 NG personnel more flexibility than Title 10 forces in conducting domestic counterdrug missions. Nonetheless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD(CN&GT)) and the NGB have imposed several policy restrictions on NG counterdrug operations in NGR 500-2. As a matter of policy, NG personnel will not directly participate in the arrest of suspects, conduct searches which include direct contact of NG members with suspects or the general public, or become involved in the chain of custody for any evidence, except in exigent circumstances, or when otherwise authorized. The NG defines exigent circumstances as situations where immediate action is necessary to: protect police officers, NG personnel, or other persons from death or serious injury; prevent the loss or destruction of evidence; to prevent the escape of a suspect already in custody.

Current DASD(CN&GT) guidance establishes that the following missions have been approved for Federal funding by the Secretary of Defense under 32 U.S.C. § 112:

- **Program Management** – Counterdrug Coordination, Liaison, and Management. Planning and coordinating state drug interdiction and counterdrug activities support;

- **Linguist/Transcription Services Support** – Providing post-collection transcription and translation of audio files, seized documents, and other analog or digital media (active/real-time intercepts or interviews is not permitted; direct participation in interrogations is not allowed; translator services include near real-time transcription and translation counterdrug support, but does not include cryptologic support, direct participation in interview or interrogation activities, or conducting counterintelligence activities for counterdrug purposes; near real-time transcription or translation support must be directly supervised by appropriate officials from a LEA);

- **Analyst Support** – Personnel may process, categorize, and evaluate criminal information, within the immediate scope of the supported law enforcement investigation, in support of law enforcement counterdrug activities;

- **Communications Support** – Providing personnel to establish, operate and maintain communications stations, bases, and equipment in support of LEA counterdrug operations;

- **Engineer Support** – Providing engineer support to Federal, State, local, and tribal authorities to construct roads and fences and install lights at United States borders to block drug-smuggling corridors (will be performed only by trained units and members of the NG);

- **Diver Support** – Conducting subsurface visual inspections of LEA secured commercial vessel hulls within U.S. territorial waters or maritime ports of entry through the use of Service-trained divers to inspect and report any unusual physical hull configurations but NG personnel may not

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66 This regulation does not address National Guard counterdrug activities performed under the authority of Title 10, United States Code.

67 NGR 500-2, *supra* note 46, para. 2-1e.

68 *Id.*

69 Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def Counter Narcotics and Global Threats to Chief, National Guard Bureau, subject: Guidance for the States’ National Guard Counterdrug Program (CDP) (18 May 2020).
attempt entry, search, removal, or alteration of features detected (permissive dive status is not permitted for the conduct of operational missions);

- **Transportation Support** – Providing ground transportation and airlift to support controlled deliveries and tactical logistics where there is a counterdrug nexus (does not include administrative movements or logistic transport that can be organically or commercially resourced by LEAs);

- **Training** – Training provided in militarily unique capabilities and skills not readily available outside DoD to Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement, community-based organizations (CBOs), and military personnel to improve drug interdiction and drug-demand reduction activities;

- **Reconnaissance and Observation** – NG personnel, in support of LEAs, may use ground, maritime, and aerial platforms within the United States to conduct reconnaissance and observation to detect, characterize, locate, track, and assess specific people, objects, or areas, in real- or near-real time (Law enforcement officers (LEO) must be present for all missions);

- **Aerial/Ground Reconnaissance** – Law enforcement support mission undertaken to obtain, by visual, ground sensor, or electro-optical infrared (EO/IR) means, information about the activities and resources of an LEA-developed target, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area;\(^70\)

- **Aerial/Ground Observation** – a law enforcement support mission involving the observation of LEA-developed targets that may include suspicious buildings, vehicles, vessels, or persons in the United States and to provide precise and continuous coordinates to LEAs. While conducting observation support, a LEO must be present, on board the aircraft or in direct contact with the NG Service Members, and the observation support will always be conducted under the continuous and immediate direction of a LEO;

- **Use of UAS** – must be staffed through NGB and the Joint Staff for Secretary of Defense approval in accordance with DoD Policy Memorandum, "Guidance for the Domestic Use for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in U.S. Airspace," dated August 18, 2018. The approval of a State Plan does not constitute Secretary of Defense approval of UAS support missions; and

- **Drug Demand Reduction Civil Operations** – NG service members may provide training and support concerning militarily unique skills in leadership, mission analysis, planning, decision-making, and cross-organization coordination to promote community-led efforts to develop and execute counterdrug supply and demand reduction strategies for State, local, and tribal organizations and CBOs with a substance abuse prevention nexus. The State Plan must specifically identify all supported CBOs. Support to a CBO is contingent upon that CBO having been specifically identified in a State Plan approved by the Secretary of Defense or his designee.

\(^70\) An additional requirement for aerial reconnaissance (otherwise known as “Mission 5a") is that at least one person involved in either the operation or training of the mission must attend the National Counterdrug Civil-Military Institute (NICI) Mission 5a course. NGR 500-2, *supra* note 46, para. 5-16.
National Guard personnel carrying out the above missions serve in a support role to LEAs and will not be directly involved in law enforcement duties. Consequently, NG members will only be armed at the request of the supported law enforcement agency and after meeting certain criteria. A mission risk analysis will be conducted by The Adjutant General (TAG) of that State to determine whether National Guard personnel should be armed as a force protection measure.\footnote{Id. para. 3-3. This authority may be delegated in accordance with para. 3-3b of NGR 500-2.}

Since National Guard personnel providing counterdrug support under 32 U.S.C. § 112 are acting under State command and control, they operate under their own State Rules for the Use of Force (RUF). CJCSI 3121.01B, Encl. O, Counterdrug Support Operations Within U.S. Territory, is not applicable to the National Guard unless they are in Federal service (Title 10 status). \textbf{Sample National Guard RUF cards are on file with CLAMO.} Consequently, judge advocates must be aware of the application of the law of the State in which personnel operate.

If National Guard personnel are armed, NGR 500-2 requires the State’s TAG to consider the following:

- All personnel authorized to carry firearms must have received qualification training and testing on the type of firearm to be carried, in accordance with current regulations. Training will include instruction on safety functions, security, capabilities, limitations, and maintenance of the firearms. Testing will include qualification firing in accordance with current qualification standards;

- Arms and ammunition will be secured at all times in accordance with appropriate regulations and policies. Rounds will be chambered only on order of the commander/senior officer/senior noncommissioned officer present, in coordination and in conjunction with the supported LEA, except in cases of exigent circumstances;

- Firearms will not be discharged from moving vehicles (except in self-defense or to defend other persons);

- Pilots in command of aircraft have the authority to override an order to chamber rounds while on board an aircraft;

- Possession and use of non-issued or personally-owned firearms and/or ammunition during counterdrug support operations are prohibited. NG personnel will not accept offers of weapons or ammunition from LEAs except for use on LEA operated ranges for training purposes only. The only weapons used for counterdrug support operations will be Federally owned military weapons listed on the unit’s property books;

- Federally-owned military weapons will not be secured in private dwellings at any time;

- The counterdrug coordinator will direct additional weapons training when, in his/her judgment, it is advisable, regardless of the level of training indicated by training and qualification records;

- National Guard units may use minimum force for the following purposes:
• To defend themselves or other persons;

• To protect property, or prevent loss/destruction of evidence;

• To make arrests if they have arrest powers pursuant to State law and exigent circumstances require such action;

• The discharge of any firearm is always considered deadly force; and

• National Guard members must receive thorough training on the Rules of Engagement and Use of Force prior to the commencement of any operation.72

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72 NGR 500-2, supra note 46, para. 3-3.
CHAPTER 8

MILITARY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

KEY REFERENCES:

- 10 U.S.C. § 2012 - Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities Outside DoD.
- National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.
- E.O. 12333 - United States Intelligence Activities (as amended by E.O. 13355 and 13470).
- E.O. 12580 - Superfund Implementation (as amended by E.O. 12777, 13286, and 13308).
- E.O. 12656 - Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities (as amended by EO. 13074, 13286) (See also amendments contained in EO 13753, Dec. 9, 2016).
- DoDD 3150.08 - DoD Response to Nuclear and Radiological Accidents, January 20, 2010, Incorporating Change 1, August 31, 2018.
- DoDD 4500.09 - Transportation and Traffic Management, December 27, 2019.
- DoDD 5105.60 - National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), July 29, 2009.
- Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) Policy Memorandum (PM) 16-002, Cyber Support and Service Provided Incidental to Military Training and National Guard Use of DoD Information Networks, Software, and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities, 24 May 2016
- CNGBI 3000.04, National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations, January 24, 2018.
A. Support to Special Events or Organizations

1. Introduction

The Department of Defense (DoD) supports a wide variety of special events held within the United States. Judge advocates must carefully analyze requests, approvals, and types of support when advising commanders on these kinds of operations. In addition to the sources cited within, the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) at the Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School (TJAGLCS) has numerous after action reports providing lessons learned from the DoD’s support to domestic events that judge advocates will find very helpful.

Generally, there are two established means in which to provide DoD support to special events (1) support to designated special events under statutory authority and (2) community support as part of Innovative Readiness Training (IRT). Designated special events include the Boy Scout Jamboree and “National Special Security Events” (NSSEs)\(^1\) such as major sporting events (e.g. the Olympics or Super Bowl), Presidential inaugurations, and international meetings like the 2012 NATO Summit. The IRT program allows commanders to conduct training in the civilian community, provided the training primarily benefits the participating unit notwithstanding incidental benefits to the community.

Congress has expressly authorized military support to specific events.\(^2\) Additionally, support to a variety of unspecified designated NSSEs may be approved in accordance with DoDI 3025.20.\(^3\)

2. Types of Events and DoD Support

a. Sporting Events

10 U.S.C. § 2564 authorizes the security and safety support for certain sporting events to include the World Cup Soccer Games, the Goodwill Games, the Olympics, and other events when special security and safety needs exist as authorized by the Attorney General.\(^4\) The Department of Defense has previously supported the World Alpine Ski Championships and the Special Olympics. Military forces also provided extensive support during the 1996 and 2002 Olympic Games held in Atlanta, Georgia and Salt Lake City, Utah, respectively. Since its establishment in 2002, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for the DoD support mission for these events.

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1. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, INST. 3025.20, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF SPECIAL EVENTS, Glossary (6 Apr. 2012) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.20] defines National Special Security Event as “An event of national significance as determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These national or international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or meetings, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant target, and therefore warrant additional preparation, planning, and mitigation efforts. The USSS, FBI, and FEMA are the Federal agencies with lead responsibilities for NSSEs; other Federal agencies, including DoD, may provide support to the NSSE if authorized by law.”

2. 10 U.S.C. § 2564(a) (2018) states: Security and Safety Assistance. At the request of a Federal, State, or local government agency responsible for providing law enforcement services, security services, or safety services, the Secretary of Defense may authorize the commander of a military installation or other facility of the Department of Defense or the commander of a specified or unified combatant command to provide assistance for the World Cup Soccer Games, the Goodwill Games, the Olympics, and any other civilian sporting event in support of essential security and safety at such event, but only if the Attorney General certifies that such assistance is necessary to meet essential security and safety needs.


b. Non-athletic Events

The Secretary of Defense may also direct that non-athletic events receive support. Non-athletic events include large events such as Presidential Inaugurations and International Summits hosted domestically. Many of these events are designated as National Special Security Events (NSSEs).

The Secretary of Defense is authorized, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2554, to lend support for the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) by providing equipment to include cots, flags, tents, and other equipment such as expendable medical supplies without reimbursement from BSA Jamborees.\(^5\) This support may be provided to the BSA in support of both national and world scout jamborees.\(^6\) Further, if the venue of the Jamboree is on a military installation, the Secretary may authorize logistical and personnel support on the military installation.\(^7\) Certain expenses such as those associated with transportation must be reimbursed and in some cases a payment bond must be secured before the support is rendered.\(^8\)

c. NG Assistance for Certain Youth and Charitable Organizations

NG members and units, in conjunction with required military training,\(^9\) may provide services to certain eligible youth and charitable organizations.\(^10\) The eligible organizations are:

- Boy and Girl Scouts of America;
- Boys and Girls Clubs of America;
- Young Men’s and Young Women’s Christian Associations (YMCA/YWCA);
- Civil Air Patrol;
- U.S. Olympic Committee;
- Special Olympics;
- Campfire Boys and Girls;
- 4-H Clubs; and
- Police Athletic Leagues.\(^11\)

\(^5\) 10 U.S.C. § 2554.
\(^6\) Id. § 2554(a).
\(^7\) Id. § 2554(g).
\(^8\) Id. § 2554(b–f).
\(^10\) Id. § 508.
\(^11\) Id. § 508(d).
Authorized services include ground transportation, administrative support, technical training, emergency medical assistance, and communications services. Additionally, the Special Olympics is authorized air transportation.\textsuperscript{12}

When providing authorized services, NG facilities and equipment, including General Services Administration (GSA) vehicles, may be used.\textsuperscript{13} As with other types of domestic support operations, the provision of services must not adversely affect the quality of NG training or otherwise interfere with the member or unit’s ability to perform its military functions. Furthermore, the support should result in the enhancement of military skills of participating NG personnel and should not significant increase costs. Additionally, the requested services must not be commercially available. If the requested services are available commercially, the commercial entity affected can approve, in writing, that the NG provide such services.\textsuperscript{14}

(1) NG Civilian Youth Opportunities Program

The Secretary of Defense, through the Chief, NGB, conducts a NG civilian youth opportunities program, known as the “National Youth Guard Challenge Program” (Challenge Program).\textsuperscript{15} The program’s purpose is to improve life skills and employment potential of civilian youth by providing military-based training and supervised work experience. It provides participants assistance with earning a high school diploma, or equivalent, leadership development, promoting community service, developing life coping and job skills, and improving physical fitness and health and hygiene.\textsuperscript{16} It consists of a 22-week residential program followed by a 12-month post residential mentoring period.\textsuperscript{17}

To carry out the Challenge Program, the Secretary of Defense enters into an agreement with a State Governor or, in the case of the District of Columbia, with the commanding general of the DCNG.\textsuperscript{18} Usually, the Governor will delegate the establishment, organization and administration of the Program to The Adjutant General (TAG) of the State.

The Challenge Program is not cost-free.\textsuperscript{19} Since 2009, a State must provide at least 25 percent of the annual Challenge Program operating costs. NG equipment and facilities, including U.S. military property issued to the NG, may be used to carry out the Challenge Program.\textsuperscript{20} A State may supplement its cost-share out of other resources, including gifts. It is also permissible for the Program to accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of money, other property, or services.\textsuperscript{21}

Individuals selected for training in the Challenge Program may receive the following benefits: allowances for travel; quarters; subsistence; transportation; equipment; clothing; recreational services

\textsuperscript{12} Id. § 508(b).
\textsuperscript{13} Id. § 508(c).
\textsuperscript{14} Id. § 508(a).
\textsuperscript{15} Id. § 509.
\textsuperscript{16} Id. § 509(a).
\textsuperscript{17} Id.
\textsuperscript{18} Id. § 509(c).
\textsuperscript{19} Id. § 509(d).
\textsuperscript{20} Id. § 509(h).
\textsuperscript{21} Id. § 509(j).
and supplies; and, a temporary stipend upon the successful completion of the training (GS-2 minimum rate of pay under 5 U.S.C. § 5332). 22 A person receiving training under the Challenge Program is considered a U.S. employee for the purposes of Title 5 (relating to compensation of Federal employees for work injuries) and Title 28, and any other provision of law relating to Federal liability for tortious conduct of employees. 23

d. National Special Security Events (NSSE)

The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), after consultation with the Homeland Security Council, has the authority to designate an event a NSSE. 24 The Department of Homeland Security may categorize other events that may not normally arise to the level of a NSSE through the special events assessment rating (SEAR) process. 25 Military assets provided in support of NSSEs may include explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, technical escort units (TEU), 26 geospatial intelligence support, 27 and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat identification and response forces. 28

The designation of an NSSE by the Secretary, DHS, is based upon an analysis of several factors. These factors include: the anticipated attendance of United States and foreign officials, the size of the event, and the significance of the event. Certain events not designated as NSSEs may still receive DoD support in accordance with DoDD 3025.20. The 2004 G-8 meeting was an event approved for DoD support, but not designated as an NSSE. For a list of designated NSSEs in recent years, see Table 8-1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2017 Presidential Inauguration</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Jan. 20, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Bowl LI</td>
<td>Houston, TX</td>
<td>Feb. 5, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Presidential Address to Congress</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Feb. 28, 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018 State of the Union Address</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Jan. 30, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Bowl LII</td>
<td>Minneapolis, MN</td>
<td>Feb. 4, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Funeral of George H. W. Bush</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Dec. 3-5, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 State of the Union Address</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Feb. 5, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super Bowl LIV</td>
<td>Miami Gardens, FL</td>
<td>Feb. 2, 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020 State of the Union Address</td>
<td>Washington, DC</td>
<td>Feb. 4, 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22 Id. § 509(f).
23 Id. § 509(i).
26 TEU teams are capable of detecting, rendering safe, and transporting chemical and biological devices.
28 DoDI 3025.20, supra note 1, at Encl. 3, 2.b.(7).
3. Requests for Support and Coordination

a. Processing Requests for Support

Federal, State, or local authorities, or a qualifying entity, may make a request for assistance (RFAs) to the Department of Defense.29 Often, this means that local police or a FBI field office requests the military support; if the request comes from law enforcement, note that it must comply with DoDI 3025.21.

If the initial engagement is not a written RFA, representatives of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security (ASD (HD&GS)) and the Joint Staff will confer to determine actual requirements. This may involve meetings between DoD representatives and event organizers, civil authorities, or qualifying entities. Once an RFA is received, it will be routed to the ASD (HD&GS) and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) simultaneously for staffing and recommendation. Additional engagement with the requestor may be required to quantify the scope of the support requested.30 If the authority for the event is 10 U.S.C. § 2564 (sporting event support), and safety and security support is sought, the Attorney General must certify that the DoD assistance is necessary to meet “essential security and safety needs” (unless an event excepted under the statute, such as the Special Olympics, is involved).31

For NSSEs and events that may require the employment of military forces and centralized command and control, the CJCS will issue a planning order requesting a Combatant Commander initiate planning and notify potential supporting commands and the Chief, NGB, as appropriate. When possible, the Combatant Commander will use established CJCS-directed planning procedures to provide an assessment and request for forces. Normally, the State or local government hosting the event will initiate the formal NSSE designation process by making a formal written request to the Secretary, DHS. In other situations, where the event is Federally-sponsored, an appropriate Federal official will make the request. As stated above, Secretary, DHS, makes the final determination to designate an event as an NSSE pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.32

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29 DoDI 3025.20, supra note 1, at Encl. 3. A qualifying entity is a non-governmental organization that DoD can assist by virtue of a statute, regulation, policy, or other approval by SECDEF or an authorized designee.

30 Id.


32 DoDI 3025.20, supra note 1, at Enc. 3.
b. Types of Support\textsuperscript{33}

Types of support that the Department of Defense can provide includes, but is not limited to:

- Aviation;
- Communications;
- Security equipment;
- Operations and command centers;
- Explosive ordnance detection and disposal;
- Logistics (transportation, temporary facilities, food, lodging);
- Ceremonial support (in coordination with the ASD(PA));
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat identification, reduction, and response capabilities; and
- Incident response capabilities.\textsuperscript{34}

c. Funding Support

Military support may be provided on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis depending on the authority involved. Logistical and security support for certain international sporting competitions may be paid, in part, from the support for international sporting competitions (SISC) defense account.\textsuperscript{35} Events which may be funded out of the SISC account include the Special Olympics, the Paralympics, and other events meeting the criteria of paragraph 2.b.(5)(d) of Enclosure 3 in DoDI 3020.25.

If there is no separate funding or authority for the Department of Defense to provide the type of support requested, the support must be approved by the Secretary of Defense and must be provided on a reimbursable basis in accordance with the Economy Act or other applicable reimbursement authorities.\textsuperscript{36} It is important to note that for a single event, certain types of support may require reimbursement, while other types of support may not. For example, essential safety and security support to the Olympics need not be reimbursed, but other logistical support provided to the same

\textsuperscript{33} Id.

\textsuperscript{34} This is done in coordination with the Department of Justice, DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services, and in consultation with appropriate State and local authorities.


\textsuperscript{36} DoDI 3025.20, supra note 1, Encl. 3; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 272-274, 277 (sections 372-384 were amended to 271-284 in 2016), 2012, 2553-2555, and 2564; 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535, 1536.
event must be reimbursed. In some cases, Congress has provided specific appropriations to fund support to NSSEs, like the Presidential Nominating Conventions.

B. Innovative Readiness Training

Through innovative readiness training (IRT), military units and personnel can sometimes be used to assist eligible organizations and activities in “addressing community and civic needs” in the United States, to include U.S. territories and possessions. The purpose of IRT is to build upon the long-standing tradition of the Armed Forces of the United States, acting as good neighbors at the local level, in applying military personnel to assist worthy community needs. Although IRT missions simultaneously support the unit and the local community, regulations require that steps be taken to ensure that IRT activities do not impermissibly compete with local commercial enterprises. This is accomplished by either a determination that there is no reasonably available commercial alternative, or, by providing a certification of non-competition from the requesting official that “the commercial entity that would otherwise provide the services agrees to the provision of such services by the Armed Forces.”

IRT projects include, but are not limited to, constructing rural roads, providing medical and dental care to medically underserved communities, and performing small building and warehouse construction or re-assembly. The scope of IRT projects is open to all career fields and can include cybersecurity projects. While active components may conduct IRT programs, the NG and Reserve elements primarily provide this support.

1. Innovative Readiness Training Procedures

Military units may provide IRT support to certain eligible organizations in the United States, its territories and possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Such assistance must be provided incidental to training or be otherwise authorized by law. Assistance is primarily provided by combat service support units, combat support units, and personnel serving in the areas of health-care services, general engineering and infrastructure support, and assistance services.

37 10 U.S.C. §§ 2564(a), 2564(b).
40 DoDI 1100.24, supra note 38, para. 3.3.
41 See infra Chapter 12: Cyberspace Operations in the National Guard.
a. Requests for IRT Assistance

Requests for IRT assistance must come from a “responsible official” of an “eligible organization.” Each request must include certification that the requestor has authority to commit resources and enter into binding agreements on behalf of the organization. There are three categories of eligible organizations:

- Any Federal, regional, State, or local government entity;
- Youth and charitable organizations as specified in 32 U.S.C. § 508; and
- Any entity that the Secretary of Defense may determine is an eligible organization.

An organization may request IRT assistance from a military unit or individual members. In determining whether assistance from a commercial entity is reasonably available, it is permissible to consider whether the requesting organization “would be able, financially or otherwise, to address the specific civic or community needs without the assistance of the military.” If commercial assistance is reasonably available, the requesting individual must certify the commercial entity agrees to the provision of such services by the military.

b. IRT Provision Requirements

Requested IRT assistance must meet three requirements. First, it must relate to military training. In the case of a military unit, the requested assistance must accomplish valid unit training requirements, unless there is a specific exemption. In the case of assistance provided by an individual Service member, the requested assistance must involve tasks directly related to the individual’s military occupational specialty (MOS). Second, the provision of assistance cannot adversely affect the quality of training or otherwise interfere with a unit or its members’ abilities to perform military functions. Third, the provision of assistance cannot result in a significant increase in training costs.

2. Legal Considerations for IRT Projects

a. Approval Authority for IRT Projects

All IRT applications must be approved by an O-6 or above with training responsibilities for the participants. IRT projects that seek additional funding from OSD require additional approval by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA). Major Commands (MACOMs) otherwise have the authority to approve Army-funded IRT projects submitted by

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45 DoDI 1100.24, supra note 39, para. 5.1.a.
47 Id. § 2012(e)(3).
48 DoDI 1100.24, supra note 39, para. 5.3.
49 10 U.S.C. § 2012(c)(2); DoDI 1100.24, supra note 39, para. 5.3.
qualifying entities that do not meet the above criteria. This approval authority may be delegated to commanders of major subordinate commands.51

b. Processing Requests for IRT Projects

(1) How the IRT Project Request Process Begins

First, a representative from an eligible organization will submit an application for an IRT mission before 30 September of each fiscal year. Military commanders who wish to use IRT to satisfy a training requirement may then review community applications and submit an application to support the proposed IRT. The proposed IRT is then reviewed at the appropriate level to ensure it complies with policy and satisfies a valid training requirement for the military unit.

(2) Contents of IRT Community Applications

Community applications are completed by eligible entities, and at a minimum must contain information on the organization requesting the partnership and the requested activity. This includes:

- Information on the organization requesting the partnership;
- The expected community contributions and resources to support the activity;
- A hold harmless agreement that releases DoD from any liability or claim arising in connection with the IRT mission
- Certification of authority to commit resources and enter into binding agreements
- Adherence to noncompetition requirements; and
- Organizational eligibility information.52

(3) IRT Selection

Once a community application is complete, military participants may then identify their training requirements and determine if the proposed support meets a valid training need. The military application includes information on whether the component will fund the training or request OSD funding.53

c. Claims Arising From IRT Projects

Claims involving Active Duty, Reserve, or NG Soldiers that arise from IRT projects are cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) despite the fact that a non-DoD or private entity derives a benefit from the project. Community applications, however, must contain a hold harmless agreement that releases the DoD, its subordinate units, Service members, employees, and agents from any claim,

51 DoDI 1100.24, supra note 38, Table 1.
52 Id. para 5.1.
53 Id.
demand, action, liability, or suit of any nature in connection with military support; excluding those arising solely from intentional torts or gross negligence.\textsuperscript{54} Community assistance undertaken by NG units is accomplished in a State Active Duty (SAD) status and is not IRT. Therefore, the State is responsible for any claims incident to projects accomplished solely by members in a SAD status.

C. Miscellaneous Domestic Support Operations

Domestic support operations supplement the efforts and resources of State and local governments, and can include a variety of lesser-known types of support. This section will address the areas that may not frequently arise in domestic support operations, but nonetheless contain significant legal implications and thus are worthy of discussion.

1. Disaster and Domestic Emergency Assistance

Search and Rescue Operations (SAR)

USNORTHCOM and INDOPACOM have day-to-day SAR responsibilities.\textsuperscript{55} For typical SAR cases, the 1st Air Force is the recognized as the single Federal agency coordinating SAR for the continental U.S. Aeronautical SAR Region; 11th Air Force is the recognized SAR coordinator for the Alaskan Aeronautical SAR Region, and the U.S. Coast Guard is the recognized SAR coordinator for all other aeronautical and maritime SAR regions. The following paragraphs in this section address when DoD resources may be applied in a Stafford Act or other civil support event, outside these normal day-to-day SAR operations.

If the Federal Government has activated the Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) (typically during a Stafford Act response), the Department of Defense typically has a large role in land-based search and rescue as ESF #9 identifies it as a primary agency for land SAR. During a Stafford Act or other civil support incident, the Department of Defense may provide SAR support following a request by FEMA as directed by Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) and approved by Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{56} In this capacity, under the NRF, DoD personnel assist civil authorities by conducting SAR missions on a reimbursable basis (pursuant to the Stafford Act or Economy Act as appropriate).\textsuperscript{57} Note that local commanders may also provide SAR support when an “imminently serious” threat to “public health and safety” exists and time does not permit prior approval.\textsuperscript{58}

When requested, DoD personnel, through U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and/or USINDOPACOM, coordinates facilities and resources according to applicable directives, plans, 

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{54} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} FEMA, ESF #9, supra note 56.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} See DoDI 4515.13, supra note 56, para. 12.3.
\end{itemize}
guidelines, and agreements. Per the National SAR Plan, the Combatant Commands provide resources for the organization and coordination of civil SAR services and operations within their assigned SAR regions and, when requested, to assist Federal, State, tribal, and local authorities.59

If DoD SAR capabilities deploy at the direction of an Air Force Rescue Coordination Center in support of the National SAR Plan (during a typical SAR mission) and the Stafford Act is subsequently invoked,60 those capabilities will then be administered under the NRF and ESF #9. As soon as practical, a DHS/FEMA or other department/agency mission assignment will then be submitted to the Department of Defense for continued support of those capabilities.61

2. Employment of DoD Resources in Support of the U.S. Postal Service (USPS)

When ordered by the President, the Department of Defense may be called upon to provide materials, supplies, equipment, services, and personnel to enable the USPS to safeguard, process, and deliver the mail in areas affected by postal work stoppages. Authority to support the USPS rests in the President’s authority to use the Armed Forces to prevent interference with transporting the mail62 and the authority for interdepartmental transfer of services and equipment prescribed by the Economy Act,63 as implemented by DoD Instruction 4000.19, Support Agreements.64 Upon Presidential declaration of a national emergency, selective mobilization of reserve components to support the USPS would occur under 10 U.S.C. § 12302.65 Army and Air NG units would be called under authority granted in 10 U.S.C. § 12406. Note also that, consistent with this use of authority, E.O. 13527 directs the integration of DoD into plans to provide support to the USPS delivery of medical countermeasures in the event of biological attack.66

3. Public Health or Medical Emergencies

In a large-scale public health or medical response, the Department of Defense will likely provide civil support to the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), which is the primary agency responsible for this mission under ESF #8. The Department of Defense may be asked to provide support for casualty clearing and staging, patient treatment, and services such as laboratory diagnostics. DoD resources may be needed to assist with the protection of food and water, the provision of medical supplies, coordination of patient processing, and/or the management of human remains, among other items. All activities would be coordinated through the mission assignment process under ESF #8.67

59 FEMA, ESF #9, supra note 56.
60 This could occur in the case of a large airline crash or large vessel casualty, requiring the need for a mass rescue.
61 FEMA, ESF #9, supra note 56.
62 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
The Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) is another element of the response framework for public health emergencies. The PHEMCE as an interagency coordinating body led by the DHHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and comprises the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as interagency partners at the Departments of Veterans Affairs (VA), Defense (DoD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Agriculture (USDA). It coordinates the development, acquisition, stockpiling, and use of medical products to effectively respond to a variety of potential high-consequence public health emergencies.68

4. Animal and Plant Disease Eradication

Under ESF #8, USDA is responsible for providing the resources to control and eradicate an outbreak of highly contagious or economically devastating animal disease.69 The DoD’s role under ESF #8 is to support this function when requested by providing available military medical personnel for the protection of public health (to include food and water supplies), and for the support of the medical treatment of animals.70

5. Mass Migration Emergency

The Department of Homeland Security is charged with enforcing the laws of the United States regarding immigration.71 The majority of this responsibility is fulfilled by the routine daily operations of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)72 under DHS. When individuals enter the United States illegally, they are subject to apprehension by law enforcement authorities. ICE then takes action to deport or resettle these immigrants. If the number of illegal immigrants exceeds the capacity of the ICE, the President may declare a Mass Immigration Emergency and call upon the Department of Defense to provide support to DHS.73

6. DoD Support to Wildfires

State and local governments have the primary responsibility to prevent and control wildfires.74 DoD support for wildland firefighting operations are the same as those for other natural disasters and

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69 ESF # 8, supra note 87, 8-10, 11.
70 Id. at 8-11.
72 ICE is the investigative arm of the DHS. It is comprised of several components from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the U.S. Customs Service, and the Federal Protective Service (FPS). The agency combines the investigative, detention and removal, and intelligence functions of the former INS with the investigative, intelligence, and air & marine functions of the former Customs Service. All the functions of the former FPS are also part of ICE.
73 For example, during the Mariel Boatlift approximately 124,000 Cuban migrants entered the United States between April and September of 1980. See Mariel Boatlift GLOBAL SECURITY.ORG, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/mariel-boatlift.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2018).
emergencies. DoD provides disaster and emergency support of FEMA pursuant to approved FEMA mission assignments (MAs).

The primary Federal entity responsible for coordinating the Federal response to wildfires is the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), located in Boise, Idaho. The NIFC evolved from the “Boise Interagency Fire Center,” established in 1965. The Boise Interagency Fire Center began as an effort to consolidate fire planning and response among the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, and National Weather Service. In 1993, the name changed to the National Interagency Fire Center to reflect a national mission.

The NIFC sits on 55 acres and “has areas for refurbishment of firefighting equipment, aircraft ramp operations, aircraft retardant tanker operations, as well as administrative functions serving the mission of wildland fire and other emergencies.” Eight agencies and organizations are in the NIFC:

- U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA);
- U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management (BLM);
- U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service (USFS);
- U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS);
- National Park Service (NPS);
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA);
- Department of Homeland Security United States Fire Administration;
- National Association of State Foresters; and
- Department of Defense.

These agencies use interagency cooperation concept, as the NIFC does not fall under a single director. Together, the NIFC not only responds to wildland fires, but other types of emergency responses to include floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, riots, terrorist attacks (9/11 and Oklahoma City bombing). If a national fire situation escalates, the National Multi-Agency Coordinating (NMAC) Group is activated, which comprises of members from each of the agencies. Depending on the national fire situation, the

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75 DoDM 3025.01, supra note 74, Sec. 4, para. 4.4.
76 Id.
77 ESF #4, supra note 74. See also DoDM 3025.01, supra note 78, Sec. 7, para. 7.1; NATIONAL INTERAGENCY FIRE CENTER (NIFC), https://www.nifc.gov/about-us/what-is-nifc [hereinafter NIFC] (last visited May 3, 2021).
78 NFIC supra note 77.
79 Id.
80 See About Us, NATIONAL INTERAGENCY COORDINATION CENTER, http://www.nifc.gov/nicc/about/about.htm (last visited July 15, 2020).
NMAC group helps set priorities for critical, and occasionally scarce, equipment, supplies, and personnel. 81

The National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) is located within the NIFC. The NICC was established in 1975 to provide logistical support and intelligence for wildland fires across the nation. Because NICC is an “all-risk” coordination center, it can also provide support in response to other emergencies such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes. The NICC coordinates supplies and resources across the United States and provides support to incidents in foreign countries. The NICC includes the National Multi-Agency Coordination Group (NMAC). 82

Subordinate to the NICC are ten “Geographic Area Coordination Centers” (GACCs). Each GACC is composed of Federal and State wildland fire agencies. See Figure 8-1. 83

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82 Id.
The NICC uses a three-tiered coordination system to respond to wildland fires. First, a wildland fire is initially managed by the local agency that has fire protection responsibility for that area. Engines, ground crews, smokejumpers, helicopters with water buckets, and air tankers may all be used for initial suppression. Various local agencies may work together, sharing personnel and equipment, to fight new fires and those that escape initial action. If a wildland fire grows to the point where local personnel and equipment cannot contain the fire, the responsible agency contacts one of the ten GACCs, which is the second tier of response. The GACC will locate and dispatch additional firefighters and support personnel throughout the geographic area. The third tier is triggered when GACCs can no longer meet requests because they are supporting multiple incidents, or GACCs are competing for resources. When this occurs, requests for equipment and supplies are referred to NIFC.

NIFC can request DoD assistance through several key authorities. Requests for DoD assistance is coordinated with the FEMA Region 10 DCO or the DoD Liaison at NIVC headquarters with the NICC. Only the NIFC Director, Deputy Director, or the NICC Director may sign a request for DoD assistance. All requests for DoD assistance to support wildland firefighting operations are submitted to the Combatant Commander. NIFC normally requests a specific number of firefighters and/or items of equipment. NIFC taskings will provide the necessary information, such as incident name, location, agency representation, and duration of assignment.

Normally, as part of the efforts of State and local governments to prevent and control wildfires, the NG will respond in SAD status. However, when State resources are exhausted, neighboring States may send NG assistance. The Department of Defense may also send Title 10 resources to assist local firefighting efforts. For example, during the fall of 2020, approximately 1400 NG Service members from several States mobilized to assist local fire departments battle wildfires burning across Washington, Oregon, and California. Service members performed many services to include hand crews to support the Department of Natural Resources, assisted with SAR, aircraft fire retardant drops, and brush and debris removal. Additionally, at the request of the NIFC, and in support of the USDA Forest Service, USNORTHCOM’s Joint Forces Land Component Command (JFLCC) provided approximately 250 Marines and Sailors to respond to the Creek Fire in Central California and 250 Soldiers to support to the Augusta Complex Fire Response in Northern California.

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85 See id.
86 DoDM 3025.01, supra note 74, Sec. 7, para. 7.2.
87 Id. para. 7.4.
88 Id.
89 DoDM 3025.01, supra note 74, Sec. 7.
90 This is different from Title 32 or Title 10 status for National Guard personnel. See infra Chapter 3, Reserve Components, for further information on National Guard member status.
The Department of Defense can provide Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) capable C-130 aircraft, MAFFS-certified aircrews, and appropriate support personnel to conduct aerial dispersal of fire retardant on a reimbursable basis when requests for this type of assistance comply with the requirements of the June 2010 interagency agreement.93 Congress established the MAFFS Program in the early 1970s as a joint effort between U.S. Forest Service and the Department of Defense.94 The objective of the MAFFS program is to provide emergency capability to supplement the existing commercial air tanker support on wildfires.95 The NICC can activate the MAFFS when all other contract air tankers are committed, or are otherwise unable to meet requests for air operations.96 Approval for use of MAFFS equipment must be obtained from the FS Assistant Director for Operations, NIFC, prior to this activation.97 Governors of States where NG MAFFS units are stationed, may activate MAFFS missions within their State boundaries when covered by a memorandum of understanding with the USFS. In accordance with military requirements for initial qualification and recurrent training, MAFFS crews are trained every year with Forest Service national aviation operations personnel.

There are eight MAFFS units for operational use.98 There are currently four airlift wings (AW) that provide MAFFS-equipped C-130s and certified crews:

- 146th Airlift Wing (AW), Channel Islands, CA (ANG);
- 152nd AW, Reno, NV (ANG);
- 153rd AW, Cheyenne, WY (ANG); and
- 302nd AW, Peterson AFB, Colorado Springs, CO (AF Reserve).99

The mobilization of MAAFS resources requires a pre-deployment analysis. Prior to deployment of these assets, local foresters are responsible for ensuring that regional, commercially-available assets are unavailable or already committed to a mission. Similarly, if assets are sought by the NICC, commercial assets must be unavailable at the national level. A Memorandum of Understanding—

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93 DoDM 3025.01, supra note 74, Sec. 7.3; see also Aviation, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire/aviation (last visited May 3, 2021). A MAFFS is a self-contained and pressurized, reusable 3,000 gallon aerial fluid dispersal system that allows Lockheed C-130 cargo/utility aircraft to be converted to wildland firefighting air tankers without structural modification to the aircraft. The 3,000 gallons of retardant are discharged in about five seconds through two tubes exiting the rear ramp of the plane. Most MAFFS are “single-shot” systems, meaning the full load is discharged at one time. One load may lay down a “line” about one-quarter-mile-long and sixty feet wide. The units are loaded with either water or retardant—a chemical that inhibits the combustion potential of vegetation on the ground. This allows firefighters on the ground to rapidly take advantage of the retardant effect, which helps in line-building efforts. The retardant’s bright red or fuchsia color helps pilots observe the accuracy of their drops on the edge of the fire.


96 Id.

97 Id.

98 Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems, supra note 98.

99 DoDM 3025.01, supra note 78, para. 7.3(b).
Collection Agreements govern payments. These agreements are between the military authority and the Forestry Service. ¹⁰⁰

B. Environmental Missions¹⁰¹

Military services carry out environmental compliance programs focused internally on DoD facilities. The Department of Defense may provide assistance during domestic contingency operations involving a major Federal response to an environmental disaster. It has representation on the national and regional response teams that oversee response planning for oil and hazardous materials incidents under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act or Clean Water Act of 1972.¹⁰² The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, sets forth the responsibilities of all State and Federal entities with a role in environmental response under these laws.¹⁰³

Executive Order 12580 directs creation of a National Response Team (NRT) for national planning and coordination of preparedness and response actions. The NRT is composed of representatives of appropriate Federal departments and agencies, including the Department of Defense.¹⁰⁴ Regional Response Teams (RRTs), the regional counterpart to the NRT, plan and coordinate regional preparedness and response actions. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) chairs the standing NRT, and the EPA, U.S. Coast Guard, and regional States chair the RRTs. RRTs coincide geographically with FEMA and EPA regions. At the local level in the coastal zones are the Area Committees, co-chaired by Coast Guard Captains of the Port¹⁰⁵ and their geographic State counterparts.

The NCP is the Federal Government’s plan for emergency response to discharges of oil into the navigable waters of the United States or releases of chemicals into the environment.¹⁰⁶ Under the NRF, the EPA is the coordinator for ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁰ Id.; see also Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems, supra note 98.
¹⁰¹ Chapter 2, infra, contains additional information on environmental response and how this mission fits within the National Response Framework.
¹⁰⁵ Per 33 C.F.R. § 1.01-30 Coast Guard “Captains of the Port and their representatives enforce within their respective areas port safety and security and marine environmental protection regulations, including, without limitation, regulations for the protection and security of vessels, harbors, and waterfront facilities; anchorages; security zones; safety zones; regulated navigation areas; deepwater ports; water pollution; and ports and waterways safety.”
¹⁰⁶ It is important to note that the NCP is a separate response regime from the NRF and the Stafford Act, yet there can be overlap between them. Large oil or hazardous materials incidents will be addressed under the NCP, and not the Stafford Act, because this allows the Government to direct the “responsible party” (entity responsible for the incident) to take response action in addition to Government efforts (thus meeting Congressional intent of the “polluter pays” under CERLA and the FWPCA). Nonetheless, elements of the NRF (in particular ESF #10) can be activated in addition to the NCP to address the response. See the discussion of the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, infra, as an example.
The NCP provides that a predesignated on-scene coordinator (OSC) shall direct response efforts at the scene of a discharge or release. Inland, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the lead response agency and provides OSCs for responses. In coastal areas, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead response agency for coordinating the Federal response and provides the OSC. States typically have concurrent jurisdiction with the EPA/USCG, and will provide a State OSC with significant authority granted under the NCP and State law. The Department of Defense provides the OSC, who directs and supervises the response for all hazardous substance releases, except oil spills, that originate from DoD facilities or vessels.108

For incidents where the Department of Defense does not provide an OSC, it will normally provide hazardous materials, or oil spill-incident response, expertise and resources from the Navy and/or Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), both of whom have a representative attending NRT, RRT, and/or Area Committee meetings. USACE oil spill cleanup capabilities include recovery of oil using USACE reserve fleet vessels, contracting, construction management, real estate support services, engineering, environmental review and monitoring, and regulatory permitting, among other items. The Navy Sea System Command’s Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) has an extensive array of specialized equipment and personnel for use in ship salvage, shipboard damage control, and diving – all of which may be critical needs during a spill occurring from a large oil-carrying cargo vessel.109

With the exception of support provided under Immediate Response Authority, the use of DoD resources to support requests for assistance is subject to the approval of the Secretary of Defense.110 JDOMS will then coordinate any DoD support under the NCP. Such support will typically be requested through the RRT by the U.S. Coast Guard or EPA OSC overseeing the response.

1. The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill – Use of the NCP vs. Stafford Act

Major environmental contingency operations within the United States are addressed exclusively under the NCP without a Stafford Act Presidential declaration. Because the President did not issue an emergency or major disaster declaration during the Deepwater Horizon crisis in 2010, there was substantial confusion regarding the applicability of the Stafford Act to respond to the crisis.

Despite the magnitude of the emergency, all operations were conducted under the President’s delegable authorities under the Clean Water Act111 and the NCP. Those authorities specifically provide mechanisms by which the “Responsible Parties” for the discharge112 directly pay all removal costs and certain damages arising from the discharge.113 Consequently, a Stafford Act declaration was not necessary during Deepwater Horizon because the primary responsible party, British Petroleum

108 40 C.F.R. § 300.120.
110 ESF #10, supra note 107.
111 33 U.S.C. §1321(c).
112 Among the Responsible Parties in DEEPWATER HORIZON were BP and Transocean.
113 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2018). In oil discharge situations, the Federal government may use the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund to pay costs related to oil spill removal activities. Responsible Parties reimburse the fund for these costs. The statute recognizes that reimbursement may not be available when a Responsible Party is insolvent or cannot be identified.
(BP), directly funded all removal costs. The National Incident Commander, Admiral Thad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard, and the FOSC managed the response and directed BP’s activities in close coordination with State and local leaders. If other events caused or exacerbated damage to the Gulf Coast during the Deepwater Horizon clean-up efforts, e.g., a hurricane or similar event, a Stafford Act response could have been directed for those contingencies in addition to the environmental response already ongoing pursuant to the Clean Water Act and the NCP.

C. Miscellaneous Missions in Support of Law Enforcement

1. Support to United States Secret Service

DoDD 3025.13 provides and identifies procedures for reimbursable support for the employment of DoD capabilities in support of the U.S. Secret Service. Requests for assistance are routed through the White House Military Office or DoD Executive Secretary. Note that, under the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, DoD support to the Secret Service to protect the President, Vice President, or other officer immediately next in order of succession is provided without reimbursement.

2. Imagery Intelligence and Geospatial Support

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is tasked with organizing, directing, and managing NGA and all assigned resources to provide peacetime, contingency, crisis, and combat geospatial intelligence support to the operational military forces of the United States. Although the use of intelligence assets are subject to extensive regulation, NGA capabilities can provide appropriate Federal agencies access to real-time and near real-time imagery and geospatial support.

Intelligence activities in the United States are governed broadly by E.O. 12333, which prohibits directed collection on U.S. persons through the use of overhead reconnaissance by intelligence agencies. E.O. 12333, however, grants broad authority to U.S. intelligence agencies to provide direct support to other Federal agencies. This support may be extended to local law enforcement in circumstances where lives are at risk. Such support requires approval of the General Counsel of the Supporting Agency. Chapter 9, infra, contains specific guidance regarding intelligence oversight during domestic operations.

114 40 C.F.R. § 300.323(c) (2017) provides that a National Incident Commander (NIC) may be appointed for a “Spill of National Significance.” The NIC assumes the role of the FOSC in communicating with effected parties and the public and coordinating Federal, State, local and international resources at the national level.
116 Id. at Encl. 3.
117 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 5105.60, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, para. 6 (29 July 2009).
119 Id. para. 2.6(c).
3. **Critical Asset Assurance Program**

E.O. 12656 requires that every Federal department and agency identify and develop plans to protect facilities and resources essential to the nation’s defense and welfare, in order to minimize disruptions of essential services during national security emergencies. Such security emergencies could result from natural disasters, military attack, or any other event that seriously degrades the security of the United States.  

4. **Continuity of Operations Policies and Planning**

E.O. 12656 requires heads of Federal agencies to ensure the continuity of essential functions during a national security emergency. DoDD 3020.26, tasks DoD components to prepare plans for the continuity of its operations and of government during an emergency. Continuity of Operations (COOP) is defined as, “[a]n internal effort within each DoD Component to ensure that essential functions continue to be performed during disruption of normal operations.” DoD and OSD Component heads will develop, coordinate, and maintain a DoD Component continuity program in accordance with this directive to ensure the continuation of Component essential functions across the spectrum of threats. DoDD 3020.26 outlines the minimum requirements for continuity planning.

5. **Explosive Ordnance Disposal**

DoDD 5160.62 establishes that the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) program is under the authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, under the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). Army Regulation 75-14/OPNAVINST 8027.7/AFI 32-3002-O/MCO 8027.1E, *Inter-Service Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal*, delineates EOD areas of responsibilities for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. The Army has EOD responsibility on Army installations and on landmass areas not specifically assigned to the Navy, Marine Corps, or the Air Force. The Navy is responsible for EOD activities on Navy installations and in assigned operational areas, within the oceans and contiguous waters, up to the high water mark of sea coasts, inlets, bays, harbors, rivers, canals and enclosed bodies of water, and for explosive ordnance in the Navy’s possession. The Air Force and the Marine Corps have EOD responsibility on their own installations, for explosive ordnance in their physical possession, and in assigned operational areas.

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123 *Id.*, at Glossary.

124 *Id.* para. 2.13.


126 Army Regulation 75-14/OPNAVINST 8027.7/AFI 32-3002-O/MCO 8027.1E, *Inter-Service Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal* [hereinafter AR 75-14]. *Id.* paras. 1-1, 2-1.

127 AR 75-14, *supra* note 126.
D. Public Health Emergencies (PHE)

1. Background

The scientific community and the Federal Government first recognized a need for a national response to pandemics in 1976 when a novel swine-origin influenza emerged. National, State and local public health authorities began planning efforts to respond to future pandemics. Several events since then have stimulated progress in the PHE planning realm.

In 1997, avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses first spread from poultry directly to infect humans in Hong Kong. The virus had a high mortality rate among affected persons. Concerned about the possibility that this virus could be widespread, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Federal Government, amplified pandemic preparedness planning. In the decade that followed, there were several outbreaks of novel influenza A viruses. These outbreaks increased concern that an influenza pandemic would place extraordinary demands on public health and health care systems, as well as on essential community services, across the globe.

In response to the potential threat, the Homeland Security Council issued the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza in November 2005. Several years later, on June 11, 2009, the WHO declared that the H1N1 influenza had become a pandemic. Despite failing to manifest as a serious pandemic threat in the United States, the threat of a H1N1 pandemic in the United States emphasized the need for the Nation to be prepared to support efforts to respond to pandemic threats.

The Department of Defense issued the DoD Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza in August 2006. This “Implementation Plan” included several assumptions that manifested in 2020 due to the Coronavirus 19 (COVID-19), including civilian medical facilities becoming overwhelmed with patients, the Department of Defense receiving interagency requests for mortuary affairs, and local authorities becoming overwhelmed and unable to provide essential services—all requiring DoD augmentation of civilian response efforts.

The Implementation Plan outlines nineteen planning categories recognized by the Homeland Security Council’s (HSC) five planning priorities and thirteen priority areas. DoD support in the following fifteen categories requires legal analysis prior to execution:

- Category 1: Intelligence;
• Category 2: Force Protection;
• Category 4: Interagency Planning Support;
• Category 5: Surge Medical Capability to Assist Civil Authorities;
• Category 7: Patient Transport and Strategic Airlift;
• Category 8: Installation Support to Civilian Agencies;
• Category 10: Security in Support of Pharmaceutical/Vaccine Production (Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP));
• Category 11: Security in Support of Pharmaceutical/Vaccine Distribution;
• Category 12: Communications support to Civil Authorities;
• Category 13: Quarantine Assistance to U.S. Authorities;
• Category 14: Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances;
• Category 15: Military Assurance: Defense Industrial Base;
• Category 16: Mortuary Affairs;
• Category 17: Continuity of Operations & Continuity of Government; and,
• Category 19: Public Affairs support to Civil Authorities.134

Ultimately, the DoD’s first major effort to support the nation’s response to a pandemic was the result of the COVID-19 global pandemic rather than pandemic flu. Nevertheless, the guidance laid out in the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza and the Department of Defense Implementation Plan for Pandemic Influenza remains the framework for how the United States and the Department of Defense responded to the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic.

2. Authorities

Congress has granted the Federal Government a variety of legal statutory authorities designed to restrict modes of transportation, control immigration, close borders, and manage plant and animal infections in response to threats to public health. Federal authorities authorizing Federal support for a pandemic influenza contingency include the Public Health Service Act and the Stafford Act. For example, in response to COVID-19, the Secretary of the HHS relied on Section 319 of the Public

134 Id. at 10–11.
Health Service Act (PHSA)\(^{135}\) to issue a PHE Declaration for the entire United States to aid the nation’s healthcare community in responding to COVID-19.

Under section 319 of the PHSA, HHS may determine that: (a) a disease or disorder presents a PHE; or (b) that a PHE, including significant outbreaks of infectious disease or bioterrorist attacks, otherwise exists.\(^{136}\) The declaration lasts for the duration of the emergency or 90 days, whichever occurs first, and the Secretary may extend the declaration. Congress must be notified of the declaration within 48 hours, and relevant agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, must be kept informed.

The PHE Declaration gives State, tribal, and local health departments more flexibility to request that HHS authorize them to temporarily reassign State, local, and tribal personnel to respond to a PHE if their salaries normally are funded in whole or in part by PHSA programs. These personnel may assist with public health information campaigns and other response activities.

### 3. Quarantines and Isolation (Q&I)

These authorities also involve the establishment of quarantines and isolation facilities at borders or of an interstate nature.\(^{137}\) DoD planning guidance directs consideration be given to the potential for the Department of Defense to provide quarantine support to other U.S. agencies.\(^{138}\) This would be in support of HHS’s authority “to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.”\(^{139}\) The Director of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) administers the foreign and interstate quarantine authorities and the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine executes them, as necessary.\(^{140}\) Further, DHS supports the CDC through three of its agencies: U.S. Customs & Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and, the United States Coast Guard.\(^{141}\)

#### a. Primary Responsibilities for Q&I

A **quarantine** is a restriction of individuals exposed to a disease or agent, but who are not yet ill. **Isolation** is restriction of individuals who are infected. State and local authorities have primary responsibility for establishing and enforcing **intrastate** Q&I restrictions. Similarly, Federal authorities have primary responsibility for Q&I restrictions on Federal property and foreign and **interstate** situations. The lead individual responsible for a Federal Q&I is the Secretary of HHS.\(^{142}\) Q&I orders

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\(^{135}\) 42 U.S.C. § 247d.

\(^{136}\) *Id.*

\(^{137}\) *Id.* at summary.


\(^{139}\) 42 U.S.C. § 264(a).

\(^{140}\) KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN & NANCY LEE JONES, The 2009 Influenza Pandemic: Selected Legal Issues, CRS REP’T TO CONG. (October 29, 2009) [hereinafter “CRS REP’T”].

\(^{141}\) *Id.* at 7.

\(^{142}\) Communicable diseases over which Secretary, HHS, and the Director, CDC, have authority are listed in Executive Order (E.O.) 13295, dated 4 April 2003: Cholera, Diphtheria, Infectious Tuberculosis, Plague, Smallpox, Yellow Fever, Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers, and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). On 1 April 2005, E.O. 13375 added
issued by SHHS may be enforced by the “Federal law enforcement community,” which does not include the DoD.143

b. DoD Support to Enforce Q&I during PHE

DoD assistance to State and local PHEs is a DSCA mission, and therefore subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) and DoD policy related to assisting law enforcement agencies.144 Thus, DoD forces may support a Q&I, but the PCA prevents DoD forces from enforcing Q&I restrictions.145

Congress has resisted several attempts to enact legislation that would authorize either the President or the Secretary of Defense to employ DoD forces to enforce a quarantine, as an exception to the PCA. In the absence of specific quarantine enforcement authority from Congress, if circumstances justify it, the President may rely on the following authorities to order DoD forces to enforce a Q&I: (1) the President’s inherent authority; or (2) statutory authority under the Insurrection Act, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, or the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act.146

Influenza caused by novel or re-emergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic. COVID-19 is a “severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Thus, it qualifies as a “communicable disease.”

143 In accordance with 34 U.S.C. § 50102, the community of Federal law enforcement agencies is composed of 110,000 agents and officers in the following organizations: U.S. Coast Guard; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug Enforcement Administration; Criminal Division of the Department of Justice; Internal Revenue Service; U. S. Custom Service; Immigration and Naturalization Service; U.S. Marshals Service; National Park Service; U.S. Postal Service; U.S. Secret Service; National Security Division of the Department of Justice Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; and other Federal agencies with specific statutory authority to investigate violations of Federal criminal laws.

144 See supra Chapter 4.

145 18 U.S.C. § 1385; Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (27 Feb. 2013, inc. Ch. 1, 8 Feb. 2019). When a request is submitted to DoD to “assist” Federal or State authorities with its isolation or quarantine of groups of people in order to minimize the spread of a disease, great care should be taken to understand what is meant by “assist.” The PCA prohibits DoD personnel from enforcing a quarantine/isolation order, but it does not prohibit providing logistical and administrative support. As long as DoD “assistance” is limited to logistical and administrative support, there would be no violation of the PCA. DoD support for a Q&I may include medical screening and monitoring the health of civilians; providing medical treatment, ground and air transportation of medical supplies and personnel, and technical and advisory assistance; distributing food and consumable supplies; building temporary shelters and roadways; and disseminating public information.

146 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-255; 10 U.S.C. § 282. Currently, there is no Act of Congress that specifically authorizes DoD personnel to enforce any type of quarantine/isolation restriction as an exception to the PCA. Congress has been reluctant to pass such legislation. Before relying on the Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Act (EFLEAA) (34 U.S.C. § 50101 et seq.) to employ DoD forces to enforce a State quarantine order, a Governor must first request the Attorney General provide federal law enforcement assistance to his State. Under the EFLEAA, the Attorney General would request the SECDEF “detail” DoD personnel to a Federal law enforcement agency, which would have the effect of not only removing them from the restrictions of the PCA, but also from the command and control of the DoD. Upon detail, such DoD personnel would be deputized as a State law enforcement official with specific instructions to assist State law enforcement authorities to enforce a State Q&I order. State laws and regulations governing the use of force would apply. See U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney General Memorandum for the President, Subject: “Summary of Legal Authorities for Use in Response to an Outbreak of Pandemic Influenza,” 25 April 2009.
4. Department of Defense PHE Authorities

DoDI 6200.03 governs how military commanders address PHEs on Federal installations under their control. It is DoD policy that all persons and property on a military installation be protected against communicable diseases associated with biological warfare, terrorism, or a PHE. Situations that may constitute a PHE include the occurrence or imminent threat of an illness or health condition with a high probability of significant deaths or serious, long-term disabilities; widespread exposure to an infectious agent that poses a significant risk of future harm; health care needs that exceed available resources; and/or severe degradation of mission capabilities or normal operations.147

DoDI 6200.03 authorizes DoD installation commanders to declare a DoD PHE, and subsequently exercise certain emergency health powers, to protect lives, property, and infrastructure and enable DoD installations and military commands to sustain mission-critical operations and essential services.148 Notification procedures following a PHE Declaration are set forth in Section 3.3 of the instruction.

DoDI 6200.03 also requires DoD installation commanders to designate in writing a Public Health Emergency Officer (PHEO), who must be a uniformed or DoD civilian clinician with specific qualifications and training.149 The PHEO, in coordination with their judge advocate, advises the installation commander on the declaration of a PHE and the implementation of emergency health powers in accordance with relevant public health laws, regulations, and policies. When the commander and PHEO determine that a PHE Declaration is necessary, the commander will complete a written declaration, with the support and guidance of the SJA and in consultation with the PAO, which outlines the situation and specific actions to be taken. The PHEO is responsible for developing the HPCON framework150 for a specific health threat, and updating recommended HPCON measures as a situation evolves based on guidance from DoD and appropriate civilian public health sources. Although the PHEO develops the HPCON framework, the installation commander, in consultation with the PHEO and MTF commander, makes the decision to change the HPCON level for his or her installation.151

The installation commander’s emergency health powers, described in Section 3.2 of DoDI 6200.03, apply to Service members and other persons on a DoD installation, including DoD civilian personnel,

147 Id. para. 3.1.
148 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 6200.03, PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT (PHEM) WITHIN THE DOD (28 Mar. 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 6200.03].
149 In joint basing and tenant organization situations, the installation commander will designate the PHEO. On installations where a joint medical center is a tenant, the commander of the joint medical center will make a qualified individual available to serve as PHEO for the host installation.
150 DoDI 6200.03 establishes the framework for setting DoD HPCON Levels (Fig. 8). HPCON Levels provide a framework to inform decisions by installation commanders charged with implementing appropriate force health protection (FHP) measures for the installation population in response to specific health threats. The HPCON framework includes categories (0, A, B, C, D), category descriptions, and specific FHP measures associated with each HPCON level, based on the scope and severity of the threat in question. HPCON levels should be synchronized with the installation FPCON level, and can include installation access, appropriate FHP measures, and limitation of non-critical activities. DoDI 6200.03, Figure 8 provides a conceptual framework for HPCON levels, and examples of FHP measures associated with each level. To supplement this general guidance, OUSD(P&R) issued a memorandum (“FHP Supplement 2”) on 25 February 2020, which provides COVID-19 specific guidance for HPCON levels and associated FHP measures. This document is available at https://intelshare.intelink.gov/sites/clamo/.
151 DoDI 6200.03, supra note 168, para 4.1.
contractors, beneficiaries, and any other person within the scope of the installation commander’s authority. Examples of the commander’s powers include:

- Directing Service members to submit to medical examinations or testing necessary for diagnosis or treatment;

- Persons other than Service members may be required as a condition of exemption or release from restrictions of movement to submit to a physical examination or testing, as necessary, to diagnose and prevent the transmission of a communicable disease and enhance public health and safety;

- Using facilities, materials, and services for purposes of communications, transportation, occupancy (e.g., emergency shelters or quarantine/isolation), fuel, food, clothing, health care, and other purposes, and controlling or restricting the distribution of commodities as reasonable and necessary for emergency response;

- Taking measures as reasonable and necessary, pursuant to applicable law, to obtain and control the use and distribution of needed health care supplies. Closing, directing the evacuation of, or decontaminating any asset or facility that endangers public health; decontaminating or destroying any material that endangers public health; including quarantine and isolation of animals on the installation;

- Controlling evacuation routes on, and ingress and egress to and from, the affected DoD installation or military command;

- Restricting movement to prevent the introduction, transmission, and spread of communicable diseases or any other hazardous substances that pose a threat to public health and safety; and

- Detaining any person who refuses to obey or otherwise violates an order during a declared PHE. Violators of procedures, protocols, provisions, or orders issued in conjunction with a PHE may be charged under the UCMJ or under 42 U.S.C. § 271. Those not subject to military law may be detained until civil authorities can respond.

In areas outside the United States, PHE declarations may be limited to U.S. personnel and subject to the requirements of applicable treaties, agreements, and other arrangements with foreign governments and allied forces, particularly in the case of non-U.S. installations and field activities.152

### 5. Executing the Federal Mission During a PHE

The question often arises whether State-level restrictions apply to military members of Federal employees while executing their Federal missions. In general, these State-level orders do not prevent Federal employees from carrying out their Federal missions. For example, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the governors of several States issued public health quarantine orders restricting the travel and movement of personnel within their jurisdictions. The U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy

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152 Id. para. 3.5.
Clause prohibits State quarantine laws and related travel restrictions from interfering with Federal agency missions and the acts, duties, travel, and movement of federal personnel engaged in official business. In accordance with the Supremacy Clause, both the U.S. Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense affirmed that despite State quarantine restrictions, Federal employees must be allowed to travel and conduct Federal business in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

In conclusion, State quarantine restrictions on movement and similar “stay-at-home” orders do not prevent DoD and Federal employees from executing their Federal missions. They may continue mission-essential activities without fear of violating state quarantine, travel, and movement restrictions or similar “stay at home” orders.

153 See U.S. Const. Art VI, Cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”).

154 On 20 March 2020, the U.S. Attorney General confirmed that State and local coronavirus quarantine restrictions do not hinder Federal employees in the conduct of official business and ordered the U.S. Attorneys to “ensure that local law enforcement officials enforcing travel restrictions are aware of the fact that Federal employees must be allowed to travel and commute to perform law enforcement and other functions and should not be prevented from doing so, even when travel restrictions are in place.” U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney General Memo, Subject: “Memorandum for All United States Attorneys,” 20 March 2020; see also Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Travel Restrictions for DoD Components in Response to Corona virus Disease 2019” March 11, 2020; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, “Force Health Protection Guidance (Supplement 2) “Department of Defense Guidance for Military Installation Commander' Risk Based Measured Responses to the Novel Coronavirus Outbreak” February 25, 2020; see also DoDI 6200.03 supra note 168, para. 1.2.e (noting military commanders will act in accordance with the applicable provisions of public health emergency declarations made by U.S. public health officials while maintaining operational effectiveness).
CHAPTER 9

INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION ACQUISITION AND HANDLING DURING DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

REFERENCES:

- Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (as amended), 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.
- The Immigration and Nationality Act (as amended), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.
- The Privacy Act (as amended), 5 U.S.C. § 552a
- DoDD 5143.01, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), October 24, 2014, Incorporating Change 2, April 6, 2020.
- DoDD 5148.13, Intelligence Oversight, April 26, 2017.
- DoDD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense, January 7, 1980.
- DoDD 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities, August 27, 2007, Incorporating Change 2, March 22, 2019.
- Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, February 27, 2013.
- DoDI 3115.15, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), December 6, 2011.
- DoDI 5400.11, DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs, January 29, 2019.
- DoDM 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of DOD Intelligence Activities, August 8, 2016.
- Supplement to 1979 FBI/DoD Memorandum of Understanding: Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters Between the FBI and DoD, (S) June 20, 1996.
- Joint Publications Intelligence series 2-0.
- AFI 14 series on Intelligence.
A. Introduction

With the ever-increasing number of domestic military missions conducted in the Homeland, there has been a concurrent search for appropriate assets and capabilities to best perform those missions. Although domestic military missions are no different than overseas missions in that a key requirement for mission success is maintaining a commander’s situational awareness, the operating environments are completely different. In a deployed or overseas location, the commander must be aware of the situation on the ground and have a complete picture of the “battle space” within which the unit is operating. Overseas, the Department of Defense has the lead for U.S. personnel, and is in charge of most operational activities. The intelligence assets available to the commander normally provide him or her with the common operating picture that will establish situational awareness.

On the other hand, the domestic operational domain is complicated by Federal statutory and constitutional restrictions and protections, which effectively preclude, or in a best-case scenario, limit use of intelligence assets, capabilities and platforms, and even the use of intelligence personnel. In the absence of a homeland defense scenario or otherwise directed from the President, the Department of Defense will not be the lead Federal agency conducting operations. Further, in the absence of a homeland defense initiation order, there is no “battlespace” in the homeland; to the contrary, the domain is called the “operational environment.” Due to subtle distinctions such as these, the conduct of domestic military operations can be extremely challenging, and in some cases, fraught with legal or political peril.

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1 The National Guard Incident Awareness and Assessment Handbook was undergoing rewrite as of the date of publication of this handbook.

In this regard, the judge advocate is critical to the conduct of domestic operations utilizing intelligence assets and components. Judge advocates must recognize that collecting domestic intelligence, may include collecting information on U.S. persons, or persons not affiliated with the Department of Defense. Therefore, DoD oversight program rules regarding information and intelligence collection in the United States are quite strict and more than a little complex. This is because these rules are designed to strike a balance between the rights of U.S. persons and the Government’s legitimate need for essential information. In so doing, protection of an individual’s constitutional rights and privacy remains paramount while enabling collection of authorized information by the least intrusive means, and by restricting dissemination of this information for lawful government purposes only.

As a result, balancing the commander’s need for information against this domestic framework of protections can pose unique issues in the information and intelligence-gathering arena. This chapter provides a broad overview of the rules for collection of information on U.S. persons. If you are addressing an issue involving the collection of information in the homeland, seek out additional expertise to assist you in this complicated area.

Before discussing the details of collecting information or intelligence on U.S. persons and non-DoD-affiliated persons, it is important to understand first that there are two distinct DoD activities which are involved in the collection of information in the homeland:

- The first endeavor consists of collecting data that will be processed into intelligence. These are intelligence activities, which are comprised of the collection, production and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence in accordance with E.O. 12333 and E.O. 13470, as implemented by DoDD 5240.01, (policy documents governing collection, retention and dissemination by DoD intelligence components of information that identifies U.S. persons). This activity is accomplished by members of the DoD Intelligence Community (DoDIC), as defined in E.O. 12333, and amended by E.O. 13470. In simple terms these are the Title 10 intelligence specialists—J2s, G2s, A2s, etc. This activity is governed by one set of rules referred to as Intelligence Oversight (IO). (Title 32 NG intelligence specialists—though not technically members of the intelligence community—follow NG policies concerning intelligence oversight.)

- The second activity deals with the acquisition of information necessary for the conduct of domestic military missions, for other than intelligence purposes. Those persons involved in

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3 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL 5240.01, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF DO D INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 54 (8 Aug. 2016) [hereinafter DoDM 5240.01].


5 Raw data by itself has relatively limited utility. However, when data is collected from a sensor and processed into an intelligible form, it becomes information and gains greater utility. In other words, raw data is collected from the operational environment. Raw data that is processed and exploited turns into information. Information that is analyzed and undergoes production into a product turns into intelligence. See U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 381-10, ARMY INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (3 May 2007) [hereinafter AR 381-10].

this activity consist of everyone else in the Department of Defense, including various force protection, investigative units and police forces, who are not part of the DoDIC. Equally important however, is that with a growing increase in other-than-traditional military missions such as the provision of humanitarian aid, disaster assistance, and disaster consequence management within the United States, the demand for information has significantly increased to ensure effective and timely mission accomplishment. This activity is subject to a different set of rules known as “Sensitive Information” (SI) program rules, which are governed by DoDD 5200.27, and AR 380-13.

Commanders must direct their need for information or intelligence to the right component—the component with the mission and authority to achieve the commander’s intent. To do so effectively, the commander must not only determine for what purpose the information or intelligence will be used, but also the context under which it will be used. Determining the nature of the data and the right unit to gather it often requires judge advocate input. Therefore, you must ensure that two questions are asked and answered when considering collection in the homeland: 1) Who is collecting the information or data? (intelligence assets or non-intelligence assets); and 2) What is the purpose of the information or data needed? (for intelligence or non-intelligence purposes). The analysis will then lead to the oversight rules that govern the collection effort.

Section B of this chapter examines the proper use of DoD intelligence components during domestic support operations. Section C examines collection of information on non-DoD-affiliated persons (NDAPs) by DoD components that are not part of the DoDIC, and are not involved in intelligence operations. Section D discusses Title 10 Domestic Imagery (DI) activities and restrictions. Section E briefly addresses the policies and restrictions applicable to the NG when collecting information on U.S. persons during domestic operations.

B. The Role of DoD Intelligence Components in Domestic Support Operations

DoD intelligence components are governed by four primary references. The National Security Act of 1947 establishes a comprehensive program for national security and defines the roles and missions of

7 For example, a task force commander charged with supporting civil authorities during a natural disaster may identify the need for domestic imagery of the ingress and egress routes to determine if the roadways are congested with the civilian population fleeing the disaster zone, or seeking medical aid, food, and water. While intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and packages may afford the most effective means of acquiring situational awareness, military commanders are prohibited from using intelligence assets for such purposes absent SecDef authorization. In a Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) event, a limited set of ISR platforms and capabilities have been approved for use. ISR conducted for DSCA purposes is called Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA). When IAA is conducted, it must still be employed consistent with Intelligence Oversight program rules, and still requires authorization by the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or the Secretary of Defense. The same products may, however, be available commercially or from other Federal agencies. In this example, the commander was not seeking “intelligence.” The commander was seeking “information” to enhance situational awareness and establish a common operating picture (COP). The value of this distinction is discussed further in this chapter.

8 DoDM 5240.01, supra note 3, at 46-47 (defining the DoD intelligence components are as the NSA/CSS, the DIA, the NGA, the NRO, the intelligence and CI elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, the Intelligence and Counterintelligence elements of the Coast Guard when operating within the Department of the Navy, and the other offices within the DoD for the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance
the intelligence community and accountability for intelligence activities. Executive Order (E.O.) 12333, *United States Intelligence Activities*, lays out the goals and direction of the national intelligence effort, and describes the roles and responsibilities of the different elements of the U.S. intelligence community.\(^9\) E.O. 12333 was further amended by E.O. 13470 and refined to provide a more uniform approach to the conduct of U.S. government intelligence activities. This was achieved by forming of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and addressing each facet of intelligence responsibilities respective members of the Intelligence Community (IC) now hold.\(^10\) Pursuant to paragraph 1.7.(f)(1), the DoDIC is limited to conducting “defense and defense-related” foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities, thereby necessitating a DoD nexus for all foreign intelligence (FI) and counterintelligence (CI) activities conducted.\(^11\) This limitation is further buttressed by paragraph 4 of DoDD 5240.01, *Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence Activities*.

Presently, DoDD 5240.01,\(^12\) DoD 5240.1-R,\(^13\) DoDM 5240.01,\(^14\) and DoDD 5148.13\(^15\) implement the guidance contained in E.O. 12333, as amended, pertaining to the Department of Defense (see Diagram 1). Further, each Service also has its own regulations and policy guidance. These authorities establish the operational parameters and restrictions under which DoD intelligence components may conduct intelligence activities. “Intelligence activities” are defined in DoDD 5240.01 as, “the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence pursuant to [DoDD 5143.01 and E.O. 12333].”\(^16\) Therefore DoD intelligence activities are limited to the conduct of defense-related foreign intelligence (FI)\(^17\) and counterintelligence (CI)\(^18\) activities. FI and CI are the only authorized intelligence mission sets for the Department of Defense.

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\(^10\) Exec. Order No. 13470 sec. 2 pt. 1. (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter EO 13470].

\(^11\) E.O. 12333, *supra* note 9, at para. 1.7.f.1.

\(^12\) U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 5240.01, DOD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (27 Aug. 2007) (incorporating change 2, March 22, 2019) [hereinafter DoDD 5240.01].


\(^14\) DoDM 5240.01, *supra* note 3.

\(^15\) DoDD 5148.13, *supra* note 8.

\(^16\) DoDM 5240.01, *supra* note 3, at 49 (defining intelligence activities as “[a]ll activities that the DoD Components conduct pursuant to E.O. 12333.” This definition reflects a more liberal approach to the conduct of intelligence activities than in the past.).

\(^17\) Id. at 48 (defining foreign intelligence as, “[i]nformation relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorists.”).

\(^18\) Id. at 45 (defining counterintelligence (CI) as, “[i]nformation gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.”).
Judge advocates may find use of the “Legality Formula” instructive when assisting their clients, especially those in leadership roles, by helping them to shift their respective paradigms from outside the continental United States (OCONUS) to Domestic Operations (DOMOPS).

Legal Intelligence Activity = Lawful DoD Mission + General/Technical Intelligence Authority to perform that mission.

Simply, to conduct a legal intelligence activity in the homeland, the activity must be rooted in a lawful DoD mission, and supported by authority granting intelligence policies.

As stated in E.O. 12333 (as amended by E.O. 13470), unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the only authorized DoD intelligence activities (lawful missions) are defense-related foreign intelligence (FI) and counterintelligence (CI) activities. Further, all lawfully-assigned DoDIC missions must be based on the existence of a DoD nexus, a relationship between the intelligence or information sought and the performance of national defense responsibilities assigned to the DoD. General authorities to conduct intelligence activities are rooted in Articles I and II of the U.S. Constitution, Titles 5, 10, and 50 of the U.S. Code, and Presidential EOs assigned to the SecDef as further delegated to service secretaries, military departments, and combatant commanders (CCDRs). Finally, Technical Intelligence Authority (TIA) is based on authority bestowed by the office or agency involved, such as the Secretary of Defense, relevant Service Secretary, or CCDR. TIA is also derived from the legal authority to conduct missions assigned and managed by the agency or office that is responsible for conducting or overseeing the particular mission(s). For example, The National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS) has primary statutory TIA for the conduct of signals intelligence (SIGINT).

Overall, these intelligence mission sets address the activities of international terrorists or foreign powers, organizations, persons, and their agents. Moreover, to the extent that DoD intelligence components are authorized to collect FI or CI within the United States, they may do so only upon coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has primary responsibility for intelligence and counterintelligence collection within the United States.

In short, whenever DoD Intelligence Components are conducting defense-related FI or CI, Intelligence Oversight (IO) rules apply. These rules govern the collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning U.S. persons. A U.S. person includes any unincorporated associations and U.S. corporations (e.g., “Joe’s Diner”). Special emphasis is given to the protection of the

19 E.O. 12333, supra note 9, at paras. 1.7.f, 1.10.
20 Id. para 1.14(a); Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities in Conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (5 Apr. 1979); and Supplement to 1979 FBI/DoD Memorandum of Understanding: Coordination of Counterintelligence Matters Between the FBI and DoD (20 Jun. 1996).
21 DoDD 5240.01, supra note 12, at para 2; DoDM 5240.01, supra note 3, at para. 1.2(a).
22 Judge advocates should consider reading these authorities before advising a commander on the collection of information in a domestic support operation. Further, DoDD 5240.01 and DoD 5240.1-R should be consulted when advising members of the intelligence community or if a questionable intelligence activity is identified.
23 “United States person” is a term of art for the Intelligence Oversight program which consists of a United States citizen, an alien known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens or permanent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments. E.O. 12333, supra note 9, para. 3.4(i). A person or organization in the United States is presumed to be a U.S. person, unless specific information to
constitutional rights and privacy of U.S. persons, thus the IO rules generally prohibit the acquisition of information concerning the domestic activities\(^{24}\) of any U.S. person. Questionable intelligence activities (QIA) that run afoul of these and other restrictions must be reported in accordance with DoDD 5148.13.\(^{25}\)

For many DoD personnel who have been deployed OCONUS, these CONUS restrictions may be somewhat challenging considering the broad range of intelligence and information support available through DoDIC channels overseas. Upon returning to assignments and operations within the United States, many may be unaware of the restrictions placed upon DoD personnel while operating within the homeland; this is especially true when considering collection activities of any sort. While oversight rules are the same whether used OCONUS or CONUS, impacts and effects, and more importantly, applications, are quite different between the two locations. This is because intelligence, information, and data collection conducted overseas are foreign by nature and definition.

On the other hand, all such activities conducted within the homeland and its territories, are, by definition, “domestic.” Therefore, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, such activities conducted within the homeland do not normally fall within the authorized foreign intelligence and counterintelligence mission sets. Further, since the purpose of DoD intelligence and information collection oversight rules is to protect the constitutional and privacy rights of U.S. and non-DoD-affiliated persons, the likelihood of inadvertently (or intentionally) collecting information on such persons in violation of these rules within the U.S. is significantly higher than would be the case overseas.\(^{26}\) This likelihood is due to the relatively few non-DoD-affiliated U.S. persons encountered overseas. For these reasons, application and enforcement of these rules domestically is much more stringent.

The key regulatory authority for the IO program is DoDM 5240.01. This manual defines ten separate procedures that govern the collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence. Collection of information on U.S. persons must be necessary to the functions (FI or CI) of the DoD intelligence component concerned.\(^{27}\) Procedure 1 establishes the scope and administrative provisions for implementing DoDM 5240.01. Procedures 2 through 4 provide the sole authority by which DoD components may collect, retain, and disseminate information concerning U.S. persons. Procedures 5 through 10 set forth the applicable guidance for the use of certain collection techniques to obtain information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes. Additionally, DoD 5240.1-R contains procedures 11 through 13, which govern other aspects of DoD intelligence activities including classified contracting, assistance to law enforcement authorities, and prohibitions on experimentation.

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\(^{24}\) The term “domestic activities” refers to activities that take place within the United States that do not involve a significant connection with a foreign power, organization, or person. DoDM 5240.01, supra note 3, at 54.

\(^{25}\) DoDD 5148.13, supra note 8, at para. 4.1(a) (stating that “DoD personnel must identify any QIA or S/HSM to their chain of command or supervision immediately. If it is not practical to report a QIA or S/HSM to the chain of command or supervision, reports may be made to the DoD Component legal counsel or IG; the GC DoD; the DoD SIOO; the Joint Staff IG or intelligence oversight officer; the Legal Counsel to the CJCS; the IG DoD; or the Intelligence Community IG.”).

\(^{26}\) E.O. 13470, supra note 10, at pt. 1 para. 1.1(b); DoDD 5240.01, supra note 12, at para. 4.1; DoDM 5240.01, supra note 3, at para. 1.2.b.2.

\(^{27}\) DoDM 5240.01, supra note 3, at sec. 3.2.
on human subjects for intelligence purposes. Finally, DoDD 5148.13 contains Procedures 14 and 15 governing employee conduct, questionable intelligence activities (QIAs), and significant or highly sensitive matters (S/HSMs), respectively. See Diagram 2 for an overview of these procedures.

In addition to the procedures themselves, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has published an instructive manual entitled The Intelligence Law Handbook (September 1995), to provide additional interpretive guidance to assist legal advisers, intelligence oversight officials, and operators in applying DoD 5240.1-R. In the absence of any foreign nexus, DoDICs generally perform non-intelligence activities. A non-intelligence activity would be any activity that is conducted by or with a DoDIC asset or capability, but which does not involve FI or CI; for example, the collection, retention, production, and dissemination of maps, terrain analysis, and damage assessments for a DSCA mission. When intelligence assets fly planned or disaster support missions, such as post-hurricane operations, they are termed “incident awareness and assessment” (IAA) missions. [see Section D below for a more complete discussion of Domestic Imagery (DI) and IAA missions.]

When Title 10 DoDIC personnel, assets or capabilities are needed for a non-intelligence activity, specific authorization from the Secretary of Defense is required for both the mission and use of the DoDIC capability or asset. Depending on the mission undertaken, and whether intelligence platforms, packages personnel or capabilities are used, IO rules may or may not apply to DoD non-intelligence activities. For this reason, requests for SecDef authorization must be sure to include whether intelligence capabilities are sought and what additional restrictions shall be placed upon the assets or capabilities used in the domestic support operation.

C. Information Handling and the Role of DoD Non-Intelligence Components

DoD organizations that are not part of the DoDIC must also comply with strict procedural restrictions. These restrictions relate to the acquisition of information concerning the activities of persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense. This type of information is needed every day for force protection missions, to include force protection in domestic support operations. Within the Department of Defense, the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) have primary responsibility for gathering and disseminating information about the domestic activities of U.S. persons that threaten DoD personnel or property.

DoD units, other than the intelligence components, may only acquire information concerning the activities of persons and organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense only in the limited circumstances authorized by DoD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons

28 The DIA Handbook was published well before the new DoDM 5240.01 was written, and is therefore based solely on DoD 5240.1-R. Although it is an outstanding resource, it is somewhat dated. Judge advocates are therefore cautioned to be aware of the changes that occurred moving from the latter Regulation to the new Manual. However, the content of the explanatory information remains quite useful. See also Kevin W. Kapitan, An Introduction to Intelligence Oversight and Sensitive Information: The Department of Defense Rules for Protecting Americans’ Information and Privacy, THE ARMY LAW. 3, 3-42 (Apr. 2013) (providing more in-depth explanations and practice tips based on pre-DoDM 5240.01 policies).

29 Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002 should be consulted before use of any Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs).
and Organizations Not Affiliated with the Department of Defense. Unlike the Intelligence Oversight Program, programs affiliated with DoDD 5200.27 are premised on the concept of collection by exception. By policy, DoD may only collect, report, process, or store information on individuals or organizations affiliated with the Department of Defense. To collect information on others, the information must be essential to the accomplishment of a specific DoD mission, and a clear DoD nexus must exist which permits the use of an exception. Non-DoD-affiliated person information (NDAPI) is information (including data and imagery/likenesses) on identified or identifiable NDAPs, that is acquired for non-intelligence purposes by DoD elements or organizations not part of the DoDIC nor performing intelligence tasks.

While the term, “collection” is not defined by DoDD 5200.27, it is defined by AR 380-13 as “[t]he acquisition of information in any manner, including, direct observation, liaison or solicitation from official, unofficial or public services.” Also, the term “information” is not defined by DoDD 5200.27 nor AR 380-13. However, current custom and practice in this regard at U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), and OSD is consistent with IO Program rules. IO Program rules protect any information, data, personally identifying information (PII), or imagery of the individual or individuals that identifies or could reasonably lead to the identification of an NDAP. In this regard, the Privacy Act and related analogous legal parameters provide the requisite standard.

So, what exactly is an NDAP? An NDAP is anyone who has no affiliation whatsoever with the DoD. Thus, the NDAP classification is not exclusive to U.S. citizens in the homeland. Basically, an NDAP has no relationship, professional, personal, or otherwise, with the DoD or the Armed Forces.

The basic DoDD 5200.27 analysis may be useful to judge advocates unfamiliar with this area of law and policy. The questions to be asked:

- Has a collection gathering or acquisition of information occurred, and by whom?
- Who/what is the target of collection? (DoD or NDAP?)
- Is the collection authorized or sanctioned?
- Is the NDAP’s information essential to the accomplishment of specific DoD missions?
- Is there a DoD nexus, or a relationship between the info, the NDAP collected on, and a reasonable and articulable threat or impact upon the DoD, its missions, personnel or resources?

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30 U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., DIR. 5200.27, ACQUISITION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS NOT AFFILIATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (7 Jan. 1980) [hereinafter DoDD 5200.27].

31 Id. at para. 3.1.

32 AR 380-13, supra note 4, at 7.

33 As of the publication of this Handbook, debate continues at the Service and OSD levels as to whether unidentified imagery or likenesses of persons constitutes a form of PII. DoDD 5400.11, The DoD Privacy Program, defines PII as “[i]nformation used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, biometric records, home phone numbers, other demographic, personnel, medical, and financial information. PII includes any information that is linked or linkable to a specified individual, alone, or when combined with other personal or identifying information. For purposes of this issuance, the term PII also includes personal information and information in identifiable form.”
Is there an applicable exception permitting collection?

DoDD 5200.27 provides limitations on the types of information that may be collected, processed, stored, and disseminated about the activities of persons and organizations not affiliated with DoD.\(^{34}\) As a result, there are only three possible mission exceptions that will permit the acquisition of NDAP information.\(^{35}\) These mission exceptions consist of the acquisition of information essential to accomplish the following DoD missions: 1) protection of DoD functions and property; 2) personnel security; and 3) civil disturbance operations (CDOs). If the collection on an identified or identifiable NDAP does not fall within one of these exceptions, it is not authorized under DoDD 5200.27 nor AR 380-13.

The most commonly used exception in DoDD 5200.27 falls under circumstances protecting DoD functions and property. Initially this seems like a broad exception that would allow for the collection of information on U.S. persons in multiple situations. However, DoDD 5200.27 further defines an activity that threatens defense personnel, activities, and installations as “direct threats” to DoD personnel in connection with their official duties.\(^{36}\) Understanding the difference is crucial. For instance, it is not uncommon for protests to occur outside the main gate of an installation. Under the broad brush of “protecting” DoD property, it might seem appropriate to report the name of the protesting group to installation personnel. Yet, further analysis is required to determine whether the group poses a direct threat to the installation. If the group is quietly and calmly protesting, it is unlikely that they pose a direct threat. Therefore, information should not be collected on them by name.\(^{37}\)

Judge advocates must also be aware of a series of restrictions that are imposed by both DoDD 5200.27 and AR 380-13, which are otherwise absent in intelligence oversight programs. Specifically, there are no exceptions available for publicly available information, which permit collection or acquisition of information on NDAPs because the information is readily available from public sources. Similarly, there is no stated exception for information provided by NDAP consent. Further, unlike the new IO rules,\(^{38}\) there is no DSCA exception or exclusion. However, the Department of Defense may acquire information on NDAPs if that information consists of contact lists of Federal, State, and local officials with responsibilities related to the control of civil disturbances; e.g., public officials’ emergency contact info or business cards,\(^{39}\) and information on geospatial physical data relating to vital public or

\(^{34}\) See also AR 380-13, supra note 4 (implementing the original and early versions of DoDD 5200.27).

\(^{35}\) DoDD 5200.27, supra note 30, at sec. 4.

\(^{36}\) The challenge of understanding exactly what constitutes a “threat” versus a “direct threat” is further complicated by not only the lack of a definition of the term “direct threat” in DoDD 5200.27, but also the numerous definitions of the term “threat” found in various DoD polices. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., INST. 5505.17, COLLECTION, MAINTENANCE, USE, AND DISSEMINATION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION BY DOD LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 6 (19 Dec. 2012) (C1, 29 Nov. 2016) [hereinafter DoDI 5505.17] and U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., INST. 5525.18, LAW ENFORCEMENT CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE IN DOD (18 Oct. 2013) (C2, 9 Aug. 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 5525.18].

\(^{37}\) Note that while it would be counter to DoD 5200.27 to collect information on the activities of the group by stating “Group Against the Military (the name of the group) is protesting outside the front gate,” one could report all the necessary information without naming the group and therefore collecting on its activities. For example, one could report that “a group not in support of the military is protesting outside the front gate” without losing relevant information and without violating the DoD policy.

\(^{38}\) See DoDM 5240.01, supra note 3, at para. 3.1.a.3.b.

\(^{39}\) DoDD 5200.27, supra note 30, at para. 6.2.1.
private installations, facilities, highways, and utilities necessary to carry out an assigned DoD mission where geographical reference points or staging areas are necessary.40

Judge advocates should also be mindful of historical problem areas that have led to specific prohibitions under DoDD 5200.27.41 The directive specifically prohibits acquisition of information about a person or organization solely because they protest government policy, or support racial interests or civil rights.42 The directive also prohibits covert or deceptive surveillance of civilian organizations without specific authorization from the Service Secretary or the Secretary’s designee.43 Finally, the directive does not permit assignment of Army military or civilian personnel to attend an organization’s public or private meetings, demonstrations, or other similar activities held off-post, without approval by the Service Secretary or the Secretary’s designee.44

Similar caution should be exercised when considering such activities in the context of the cyber domain. Both DoDD 5200.27 and AR 380-13 impose prohibitions on the maintenance of “computerized data banks,” similarly indicating that none “shall be maintained relating to individuals or organizations not affiliated with the Department of Defense, unless authorized . . . .”45 In like fashion, infiltration or surveillance of chat room groups, or other forms of social, by failing to disclose one’s DoD affiliation, or other similar acts, cannot occur without proper authorization.46

D. Title 10 Domestic Imagery Activities and Restrictions

1. Domestic Operations

Whenever the DoDIC is providing support in the homeland, special care must be taken to comply with IO program rules and the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). Unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef, anytime an aspect of the DoDIC is used in an information gathering capacity, even for non-intelligence purposes, IO rules apply whether the usage is for DSCA or homeland defense (HD).47 These rules are complemented by Domestic Imagery (DI) program rules, which are quite similar since DI rules are derived from IO program rules. Understanding the interplay of these procedures and restrictions is critical when intelligence assets are used for non-intelligence purposes.

Whether DoDIC Components (DoDICC) are conducting an intelligence activity or a non-intelligence activity, certain rules universally apply to data and imagery collected from overhead and airborne sensors. Geospatial data, commercial imagery, and data or domestic imagery collected and processed

40 Id. at para. 6.
41 Id. at para. 5.
42 Id. at para. 5.1.
43 Id. at paras. 5.3, 5.4., and 5.5.
44 Id. at para. 5.6.
45 DoDD 5200.27, supra note 30, at para. 5.7; AR 380-13, supra note 4, at para. 9.g.
46 Activities like failure to disclose one’s DoD affiliation in an attempt to infiltrate a chat group is under scrutiny at the HQDA and OSD levels in an effort to develop effective policy to ensure that NDAP constitutional and privacy rights are adequately protected, while at the same time fulfilling DoD mission and force protection requirements.
by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is subject to specific procedures covering the request for geospatial data or imagery and its use. Judge advocates should ensure that they are familiar with NGA policy on requests for geospatial data or imagery and its authorized use. Additionally, DoDI 3115.15, *Geospatial Intelligence* provides specific guidance on mandatory security classification review of all data collected by airborne sensor platforms to determine whether it can be disseminated.\footnote{See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., INST. 3115.15, GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE (GEOINT) (6 Dec. 2011) (C1, 10 May 2018) [hereinafter DoDI 3115.15].}

In providing guidance to commanders on authorized use of DoDIC capabilities and assets, and the products derived from the data collected, it is important for judge advocates to understand the various platforms, their sensors, and how they operate. Whether an activity is subject to IO is determined by the “5 P’s”: process, people, pipelines, platforms, and purpose. Issues to consider include: whether the sensor is fixed or moveable; whether the platform with the sensor can have its course altered during a mission; how is the data collected, transmitted, and processed; and the specific purpose of its mission. For example, an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) may transmit data by live feed only to a line-of-sight receiver, or by satellite to a remote location.

In this example, evidence of a criminal act “incidentally” collected during an authorized mission using DoDIC capabilities should be forwarded to the appropriate civilian law enforcement agency (CLEA). However, altering the course of an airborne sensor (such as an UAS) from an approved collection track to loiter over suspected criminal activities would no longer be incidental collection. Thus, unless specifically authorized in advance, such an act could result in a PCA violation.\footnote{U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., INST. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (26 Feb. 2013) (Incorporating Change 1, February 8, 2019) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.21]; DODD 3025.18, supra note 2.} Certain data contains classified metadata which may need to be stripped at a remote site before it can be disseminated in an unclassified manner. Different platforms require different operational support, which requires preposition planning as well as intended use consideration.

A domestic support operation using DoDIC capabilities, which includes support to CLEAs,\footnote{DoD 5240.1-R, supra note 13, at proc. 12.} requires a separate mission review and authorization by SecDef. Those planning the mission should consider whether the data is to be exclusively transmitted to the CLEA, and whether the CLEA personnel are properly located to control or direct use of the assets. To determine whether the collection platform and data transmission are wholly owned, operated, and received by a DoDIC, a DoD non-IC, or a combination of both, judge advocates will need to carefully consider the applicable rules and operational restrictions for the mission.

### 2. Domestic Imagery and Intelligence Oversight Programs

There are complexities inherent in the domestic operating environment (OE) regarding the use of intelligence assets. Any use of intelligence capabilities for purposes other than “traditional intelligence” uses (support of combat operations) must be approved by the SecDef. “Traditional intelligence activities” include the collection, retention and dissemination of defense-related foreign intelligence (D-FI) and counterintelligence (D-CI) products by the DoDIC. The exception to permit use of intelligence assets, personnel and capabilities for other than traditional intelligence purposes first became prevalent in the DSCA context.\footnote{DSCA EXORD, supra note 47, at para. 4.D.2.} In an effort “to save lives, prevent human suffering, or...
mitigate great property damage within the United States . . . ,” the Secretary of Defense permitted the use of DoD intelligence assets for other than traditional intelligence activities. In so doing, DI capabilities were among the first to be considered for such uses. However, immediate challenges followed these decisions due to the complexities involved in employing DI assets in the homeland.

There are two core regulatory authorities that provide structure and procedure with regard to DI: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National System for Geospatial Intelligence Functional Manager for Foreign Affairs 1806 (NSGM FA 1806) and related series of policies; and, when operating in support of USNORTHCOM, or within the USNORTHCOM area of operations (AO), North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command Instruction 14-3 (NNCI 14-3). These policies are straightforward, but somewhat complicated procedurally. The complications become exacerbated due to the necessity to include IO program rules into the mix. Together, the interplay of all these rules may be summarized by the following:

DI captured in the homeland, and/or processed, exploited, analyzed or disseminated by any component or element of the DoDIC must comply with IO program restrictions, unless otherwise directed by the President, SecDef or his designee; this compliance is certified by executing a Proper Use Memorandum (PUM).

The PUM is an integral part of the DI mission process, arguably as equally important as the platform and packages used to capture imagery. A PUM is a memorandum submitted by an organization’s Certifying Government Official and reviewed by its legal advisor. The Imagery user organization will submit this PUM to NORAD and USNORTHCOM Collection Management (N-NC/J23M) for approval. The PUM “defines their requirements, intended use, and contains a proper use statement which acknowledges their awareness of the legal and policy restrictions regarding domestic imagery.” What a PUM is not is an authorization to collect DI. However, a PUM will specify the authority to collect imagery, the location, intended use, analysis or exploitation of the imagery, retention, security and declassification (DCLAS) review, and authorized recipients of the DI captured. The core purpose of the PUM is to certify compliance with IO program rules by providing a statement of compliance by the Certifying Intelligence Official. The PUM also contains a legal opinion as to whether compliance is certifiable and legally sufficient, which helps to ensure that the DI to be collected will be used for proper and lawful purposes consistent with law and policy.

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52 Id. at paras. 10.L.2., 4.D.2.
53 Id. at para 4.D.2.
55 N. AM. AEROSPACE DEF. COMMAND/U.S. N. COMMAND, INS’T 14-3, DOMESTIC IMAGERY (22 June 2020) [hereinafter NNCI 14-3]. The instructions for the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) are on the intranet for those commands. However, NNCI 14-3 is also on file with the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO).
56 NNCI 14-3, supra note 55, at 23.
57 Id.
58 Id.
3. Incident Awareness and Assessment versus Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

DI and related data are most frequently captured during the course of DSCA missions. Since, by definition, DSCA only occurs within the U.S. and its territories, DoD personnel must carefully review and adhere to IO rules, DoDD 5200.27, Federal laws, DoD policy, and the U.S. Constitution. DoD (Title 10) forces involved in DSCA operations may conduct incident awareness and assessment (IAA). IAA is similar to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations used by DoD forces in combat. However, the differences are material as expressed through the next several paragraphs.

ISR is “an integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations.” Therefore, ISR is an integrated intelligence and operations function that is conducted by using intelligence assets, systems, resources, or capabilities consisting of platforms and packages.

Incident awareness and assessment (IAA) is a subset of ISR because it constitutes the domestic use of ISR assets and capabilities for DSCA purposes. Based on the same concepts as ISR, IAA differs in its geographic scope, governing laws, and regulations. Further, IAA is a term of art used only during domestic operations. Because IAA only occurs domestically, it is also a subset of Domestic Imagery (DI), and subject to all DI rules and policies. IAA is the DoD’s term for ISR-type operations conducted during DSCA operations in the homeland. Therefore, when you read “IAA,” think ISR in CONUS, employed only for DSCA purposes. National ISR resources are limited and allocated among the combatant commands. In like fashion, IAA assets are limited as well. For this reason, IAA assets should only be used when necessary. Finally, because IAA is only employed to support DSCA, and is not used in homeland defense (HD) operations, when intelligence activities are conducted during HD, those activities are considered to be ISR, not IAA. For this reason, ISR conducted within the United States is strictly regulated and requires specific SecDef approval on a case-by-case basis.

Since, by definition, IAA uses intelligence assets, platforms, capabilities and databases, it is subject to IO restrictions, and any additional limitations imposed by SecDef or the combatant commander. In the instances when there is no intelligence interface, then IAA does not exist. Instead, there is only DI capture subject to Sensitive Information rules, the Privacy Act, civil liberties considerations, and the Fourth Amendment. ISR, IAA, and DI are different tools for different missions.

Because IAA and its relationship to ISR can be confusing, the following formulaic explanations and are offered:

- **Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance (ISR) = Collection of foreign intelligence (FI) + counterintelligence (CI) information/imagery:**

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59 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 2, at para. 2.c.; see also U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., DIR. 5100.46, FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF (6 July 2012) [hereinafter DoDD 5100.46]; and JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-29, FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (3 Jan. 2014) [hereinafter JP 3-29].

60 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOJ DICTONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 116 (June 2020) [hereinafter DoD TERMS].

61 NNCI 14-3, supra note 55, at 22.
• ISR is conducted outside the U.S. and its territories, or inside the U.S. in support of homeland defense operations;

• Any domestic use of ISR requires SecDef approval of each mission and all assets used;

• Any DI missions including ISR require a Proper Use Memorandum (PUM) approved by Higher Headquarters (HHQ);

• All domestic ISR missions are subject to Intelligence Oversight (IO) limitations on collection of information on U.S. persons.62

**Domestic Imagery (DI) = Collection of Imagery within the U.S. and its territories that may or may not involve use of DoDICC:**

• A Domestic Imagery Legal Review (DILR) is required if no DoDICC are used;

• All DI is subject to limitations on collection of information on persons not affiliated with DoD (NDAPs), the Privacy Act, civil liberties considerations, and Fourth Amendment rules.63

**Incident awareness and assessment (IAA) = DI using DoDICC for DSCA missions:**

• To determine applicability of IO Program rule sets, use the “5 Ps” test: People, Pipes (uplink, downlink), Process, Platforms, and Purpose;

• All IAA missions require SecDef approval;64

• All IAA missions require a Proper Use Memorandum (PUM) approved by HHQ;65

• All IAA missions are subject to IO limitations on collection of information on U.S. Persons.66

4. **Domestic Imagery and Sensitive Information Programs (DoDD 5200.27 and AR 380-13)**

Consider this scenario:

Your operations center is full of people passing reports and DI around various workstations. Some individuals are intelligence technicians and analysts, some are operations personnel, and others are DoD law enforcement. All personnel have been mobilized under the DSCA EXORD. The intelligence personnel are using their technical expertise to assist in the interpretation of DI captured in a disaster zone, and

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62 E.O. 12333, supra note 9.
63 DoDD 5200.27, supra note 30.
64 DSCA EXORD, supra note 46, at paras. 3.C.4.J.1, 3.B.5., and 3.I.10.C.
65 NNCI 14-3, supra note 55, at para. 2.2.
66 DSCA EXORD, supra note 46, at paras. 3.C.4.J.1., and 3.I.10.A.
they are doing so in non-intelligence capacities for other than traditional intelligence purposes.

Which Oversight Rules will apply, and to whom, with respect to DI?

If DI is being captured, processed, exploited and disseminated by the DoD for non-intelligence purposes, and the activities are conducted by personnel not within the command and control of an intelligence organization or unit, then DoDD 5200.27 and all related regulatory authorities apply. Therefore, non-DoDIC produced DI, or DI produced for non-intelligence purposes, is always subject to DoDD 5200.27 and AR 380-13.

Another real-world example of this situation may be illustrative:

During DSCA operations after a natural catastrophe, ingress and egress routes to establish lines of communication are critical to relief efforts. The joint operating area (JOA) commander, an active component officer, desires to get an aerial view of the routes. To do so, the commander wants to use rotary wing platforms from Title 10 assets. Rotary wing assets available with the NG are another alternative. The chief of staff and the operations officer are available to advise the commander. However, they are not intelligence personnel. Once airborne, the JOA commander wants to use a U.S. Government smartphone to take photographs of possible routes and of the general area for purposes of situational awareness and damage assessment. The commander turns to you and asks your opinion. What do you say?

As long as the photographs are not used for intelligence purposes (FI or CI), and no intelligence assets, personnel or databases are used to process any images or reports, only DoDD 5200.27 and AR 380-13 will come into play. However, if the DSCA mission is being conducted in support of, or under direction by, USNORTHCOM, a Domestic Imagery Legal Review (DILR) will be required to be accomplished before the mission is flown.67

Specifically, a DILR is a memorandum submitted by an organization’s Certifying Government Official and reviewed by its legal advisor for proper use of domestic imagery collection that does not include use of DOD intelligence component capabilities. The imagery user organization should submit the DILR to NORAD and USNORTHCOM Collection Management (N-NC/J23M) for approval that defines their requirements, the intended use of the imagery, and contains a proper use statement, which acknowledges awareness of the legal and policy restrictions regarding domestic imagery.68 In so doing, DILRs certify compliance with basic DI rules IAW DoDD 5200.27, and other pertinent regulatory authority. Recall also that a DILR does not constitute authority to collect domestic imagery; there it should specify what the authority is to collect the imagery, the location of the imagery and its intended use, analysis or exploitation of the imagery, retention of the imagery, security and declassification review of the imagery (if required), authorized recipients of the imagery, and any further restrictions on dissemination of the imagery, and it will certify compliance with legal and policy requirements.69 Whenever possible, the DILR should state whether the imagery will be used in

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67 NNCI 14-3, supra note 55, at paras. 2.5, 2.5.3, 2.6 -2.8, 2.11, 3.1-3.3, and Attachment 4.
68 Id. at Attachment 1.
69 Id. at para. 2.5.3
briefings or publications and identify the likely audiences.\textsuperscript{70} The proper completion and filing of a DILR is necessary to create accurate and timely audit trails ensuring the DI captured and its dissemination does not violate DoDD 5200.27 or AR 380-13, while conforming to a proper use statement, which acknowledges awareness of the legal and policy restrictions regarding capture of the domestic imagery.

5. Domestic Imagery Summary

While DI rules, regulations and procedures may seem complex, and at times, counterintuitive, they are formulated to ensure that the maximum protection of privacy and constitutional rights is afforded to U.S. Persons and NDAPs during the conduct of domestic imagery capture missions within the United States and its territories. Here are some tips to keep it all straight:

Any time any form of air or space-borne imagery is captured within the United States, its territories or protectorates, the imagery and/or data is considered Domestic Imagery (DI), and certain pertinent program rules will apply. Depending on who is conducting the DI capture, how it is collected, processed, exploited, analyzed or disseminated and for what purpose, will indicate which oversight program(s) and legal restrictions must be followed. When DoDIC resources are involved in the DI production process, Intelligence Oversight rules will apply. If the DI capture does not involve the DoDIC, then Sensitive Information program rules apply.

As a general rule, whenever members of the DoD are involved in the collection of intelligence for intelligence purposes that could affect the privacy or Constitutional rights of U.S. persons, Intelligence Oversight rules apply. Whenever members of the DoD are involved in the acquisition of information for non-intelligence purposes that could affect the privacy or Constitutional rights of NDAPs (for non-intelligence purposes), Sensitive Information Program rules (DoDD 5200.27 and AR 380-13) will apply. Regardless of situation, unless otherwise authorized by law, whenever a DoD action involves collection of intelligence, one of the programs will apply.\textsuperscript{71}

E. The NG

The NG presents a different set of challenges for the judge advocate as the NG’s mission regularly focuses on domestic threats or providing situational awareness. Notwithstanding, the NG does not generally conduct domestic intelligence operations. Primarily, domestic intelligence involving U.S. persons is a law enforcement matter and is the responsibility of State/local law enforcement and the FBI. The Joint Force Headquarters at the State (JFHQ-State) will have an intelligence officer (J2) that is responsible for coordinating intelligence requirements for intelligence preparation of the environment (IPE) in support of State and Federal missions. The J2 serves as the State’s executive agent for foreign threat information sharing between the local, State, and the national levels to ensure

\textsuperscript{70} Id. at para. 2.6.

\textsuperscript{71} Conflict has arisen between the new DoDM 5240.01 and the CJCS 2013 Standing DSCA EXORD. The new manual has created an exclusion for DSCA operations. Specifically, it states that DoDM 5240.01 is inapplicable to such activities because DoDIC resources and personnel used during a DSCA operation are not being used for intelligence purposes (see Section 3, paragraph 3.1.a.(3)(b)). However, the CJCS 2018 Standing DSCA EXORD consistently orders that Intelligence Oversight program rules are applicable to all IAA activities. (see, e.g., paragraphs 3.A.7., and 3.1).
situational awareness and a common operating picture (COP). The J2 also interprets, develops, and implements intelligence and security guidance and policy for the JFHQ-State. The NG judge advocate must work in conjunction with the J2 and the Inspector General for Intelligence Oversight (IG-IO) in reviewing all intelligence plans, proposals and concepts, to include Proper Use Memoranda (PUMs – the use of which is explained below), for legality and propriety. The State Provost Marshal (PM) also plays a vital role in developing the situational picture by being the lead liaison to the civilian law enforcement community. Thus in this area, NG judge advocates need to determine four facts: 1) the status of the person doing the collecting; 2) whether that person is operating as part of an intelligence activity; 3) how the information is being collected; and, 4) the purpose behind the collection.

1. Status: State Active Duty, Title 32 or Title 10

NG personnel can serve in three statuses: State Active Duty (SAD), Title 32, or Title 10, as explained in detail in Chapter 3. A Soldier’s status has a direct impact on the authorities at issue regarding the collection of information on a U.S. Person. Therefore, this determination must be made first.

Members of the NG perform their normal “drills” and “annual training” under Section 502(a) of Title 32. When an emergency or disaster occurs within a State, the State’s NG may be called upon to provide civil support (NG Civil Support (NGCS); not to be confused with DSCA). Because the disaster or emergency is first the State’s responsibility, versus that of the Federal government, the Governor may not initially call up the NG in their T-32 status without the approval of SecDef. Instead, the State’s Governor or The Adjutant General (TAG) may call up members of the NG to provide civil support by placing them in State Active Duty (SAD) status. With that said, there is another option under Title 32. Pursuant to Section 502(f) of Title 32, the NG may perform “additional training other duty” for their Federal mission or provide “operational support” as directed by POTUS or SecDef but with the concurrence of the State’s Governor. In this status, and subject to the proper authorities, the NG may be called upon to support a Federal DSCA mission. The State’s Governor retains command and control authority. NG status under Section 502(f) should not be improperly referred to using the blanket term “Title 32 status” because such a reference is misleading and often leads to confusion. Instead, the proper sections of Title 32 should be used. As noted above, status under Section 502(a) is materially different from status under Section 502(f) in both purpose and approval authority.

72 32 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2018) (“(a) under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, each company, battery, squadron, and detachment of the National guard, unless excused by the Secretary concerned, shall (1) assemble for drill and instruction, including indoor target practice, at least 48 times each year; and (2) participate in training at encampments, maneuvers, outdoor target practice, or other exercises, at least 15 days each year.”).


74 32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (2012) (“(f)(1) Under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the Air Force, as the case may be, a member of the National Guard may (A) without his consent, but with the pay and allowances provided by law; or (B) with his consent, either with or without pay and allowances; be ordered to perform training or other duty in addition to that prescribed under [section 502(a)]. (f)(2) The training or duty ordered to be performed under paragraph (1) may include . . . (A) Support of operations or missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or Secretary of Defense.”).

75 DoDI 3025.22, supra note 73, at paras. 3.d., and 3.e.
Finally, the NG may be called into the service of the United States under Title 10 of the United States Code. In this instance, NG personnel fall under Federal command and control. As stated previously, USNORTHCOM has separate IO rules and processes in place that must be considered for Title 10 missions.

Members of the NG intelligence community serving in a SAD or Title 32 status are not included in the definition of DoDIC, and therefore are technically not regulated by IO. The Chief of the NGB established an IO policy that applies to all members of the NG serving in Title 32 status. This IO policy requires that NG intelligence personnel operating in a Title 32 as members of the DoD intelligence component, must also “comply with all DoD guidance and Federal laws applicable to the component, including all intelligence oversight (IO) rules.” Furthermore, the NG’s Inspector General Intelligence Oversight policy recognizes that while NG intelligence personnel operating in a SAD status are not members of the DoDIC, they are limited by their State law—to include State privacy laws—and are “prohibited from engaging in DoD intelligence and CI activities” as well as “using DoD intelligence and ISR equipment.” In most States, the collection, use, maintenance, and dissemination of information related to individuals by State agencies is strictly regulated. Therefore, the practical affect is that even in a SAD status, and unless authorized by law, members of the NG cannot collect information on U.S. Persons.

In addition to being prohibited from using DoD intelligence resources and equipment while in a SAD status, unless authorized by SecDef or SecDef’s designee, NG personnel in a SAD status are also prohibited from: 1) engaging in DoD intelligence operations; and 2) gaining access to DoD classified systems (SIPRNet/JWICS - Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System) or equipment (MQ-1, border sensors). Further, NG personnel while in a SAD status may only access classified information if sponsored by a Federal executive agency pursuant to E.O. 13549. This includes NG personnel with a DoD security clearance.

### 2. Collection via an Intelligence Activity

The responsibilities of the NG member, not the AFSC/MOS or duty title per se, determine whether they are part of an “intelligence activity.” Many States will either reassign intelligence personnel to a non-intelligence mission to assist the J34 force protection section, or will assign them to a unit that is specifically tasked to assist local law enforcement and authorized to provide intelligence support—such as the NG Counter Drug Units operating under 32 U.S.C. § 112 authority. While serving in a non-intelligence role, these individuals should not have access to intelligence-related equipment.

If the person collecting the information is a part of the intelligence activity and is conducting missions as a member of an intelligence activity without separate special authority, then the person must follow the rule for IO as provided in section B of this chapter. If the person is not collecting the information

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76 CNGBI 2000.01C, supra note 6; CHIEF, NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, MANUAL 2000.01 NATIONAL GUARD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES para. 2 (26 Nov. 2012) [hereinafter CNGBM 2000.01C].
77 Id. at para. 4.
78 Id. at para 4.d.
79 Id. at para. 4.e.
80 Id. at para 4.d.
as part of, or for, an intelligence activity then the person must follow rules for the handling of U.S. Person information as provided in section C of this chapter.

An example of this latter group would be military law enforcement personnel. They are governed by the provisions of DoDD 5200.27. They are responsible for tracking and analyzing criminal and domestic threats to DoD and domestic threats to DoD. LE personnel liaise with other law enforcement agencies to develop the criminal threat situational picture.

3. Method of Collecting

Military Intelligence Equipment may only be used to conduct counter- and foreign-intelligence related missions unless separate authorizations have been granted. This equipment therefore may only be operated by NG intelligence personnel serving in a Title 10 or Title 32 status. States wishing to utilize this equipment for other than counter-and foreign-intelligence purposes must request authorization from SecDef or his designee. Legal review by the Office of the General Counsel at NGB is required prior to such authorizations. Military intelligence equipment includes, but is not limited to, JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System) and ASAS-L (All Source Analysis System-Light).

The NG has a variety of incident awareness and assessment tools within its arsenal, many of which are not DoD Intelligence Assets. Some of the tools are considered to be both an intelligence asset and a non-intelligence asset and therefore a thorough analysis will look at not only the capability of the asset but also the sourcing and the authorized use to determine whether or not it is a true intelligence asset subject to IO and limitations applicable to intelligence equipment. A perfect example of this is the RC-26 fixed wing aircraft used by the NG. The RC-26 in most States is a counter-drug asset, not an intelligence asset, even though it is capable of collecting imagery of U.S. persons. In accordance with each respective State counter-drug plan, the RC-26’s mission is to assist law enforcement in the capture of personnel involved in drug activities. When disaster strikes the RC-26 is often called upon to assist in life-saving situations. The RC-26 provides an aerial surveillance capability that enables a commander to understand their area of operations. While conducting damage assessments, obstacle and hazard assessments, and other such non-intelligence missions the incidental collection of information on U.S. persons is not a per se violation. Commanders must be reminded that this information should not be retained and must be purged from military records as soon as possible. Likewise, a platform that uses a fixed or movable camera may limit incidental collection, and the careful planning of aerial surveillance routes when possible (such as to avoid populated areas) may accomplish this as well. Any incidental collection of U.S. person information along the planned route that is criminal in nature can be passed along to the appropriate law enforcement officials, but information should be purged from the retention platform as soon as possible.

Domestic imagery collected by NG aerial imagery sensor platforms must be properly documented and approved via a PUM prior to collection. These PUMs must be in accordance with applicable Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) policy, “Proper Use Statements for Domestic Imagery.”

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81 Id.
82 Incident awareness and assessment (IAA) is the use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) DoD intelligence capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities approved by the SecDef, such as search and rescue (SAR), damage assessment and situational awareness.
83 Note CNGM 2000.01C allows an exception for SAR whereby the PUM is filed after mission conclusion.
Diagram 2

4. Purpose of the Collection

A judge advocate must also determine whether information is being collected for an intelligence purpose or whether it is being collected to help the commander gain situational awareness. As

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NGB-J2 publishes a PUM handbook to assist JFHQ-J2 on the protocol for submitting a PUM. NG judge advocates are responsible for reviewing these PUMs for compliance with Federal and State law and NG policy (Diagram 2 outlines determination process as to whether a PUM is required).
mentioned earlier, information is often acquired in response to a NG commander’s need to establish a common operating picture. If the information is for situational awareness, then the judge advocate should assist the command by helping shape the collection such that it is limited to the information actually needed to accomplish the mission. For example, if the mission requires imagery of ingress and egress routes, it is unnecessary for cameras to collect information regarding the license plate numbers of those individuals traveling on the roads. Therefore, the recommendation can be to remind the collector not to focus on specific PII.

The chart below illustrates the proper flow of information to remain compliant with IO regulations. It depicts how the State’s J2 and provost marshal share and handle sensitive information in accordance with both IO regulations and DoDD 5200.27.

### Sensitive Information Handling JFHQ States

5. **Dissemination**

DoDM 5240.01, Sec 3, Procedure 4 governs the dissemination of USPI collected or retained by an intelligence component. Generally, information may be disseminated to a variety of organizations if it was properly collected or retained. Dissemination to “Other DoD Elements,” “Other Federal Government Entities,” and “State, Local, Tribal, or Territorial Governments” is permissible if the recipient is reasonably believed to have a need to receive such information for the performance of its lawful missions or functions.
F. Judge Advocate Responsibilities

Judge advocates are responsible for the following: advising the commander and staff on all intelligence law and oversight matters within their purview; advising on the permissible acquisition and dissemination of information on non-DoD affiliated persons and organizations; recommending legally acceptable courses of action; establishing, in coordination with the Head Intelligence Officer (J-2/G-2/S-2/N-2) and the Inspector General (IG), an intelligence oversight program that helps ensure compliance with applicable law and policy; reviewing all intelligence plans, proposals, and concepts for legality and propriety; and training members of the command who are engaged in intelligence activities on all laws, policies, treaties, and agreements that apply to their activities.

In order to properly perform these duties, judge advocates advising commanders on collecting intelligence and information should know and understand a variety of key types of information. Judge advocates must be familiar with the missions, plans, and capabilities of subordinate intelligence units, and all laws and policies (many of which are classified) that apply to their activities. At a minimum, judge advocates should be familiar with the restrictions on the collection, retention, and dissemination of information about U.S. persons and non-DoD persons and organizations, the approval authorities for the various intelligence activities performed by subordinate units, and the requirement to report and investigate questionable activities and certain Federal crimes. Judge advocates must also be familiar with the jurisdictional relationship between intelligence and counterintelligence activities as well as the parallel jurisdictions of force protection and law enforcement activities. Finally, judge advocates should establish close working relationships with the legal advisors of supporting intelligence agencies and organizations, all of whom can provide expert assistance.

G. Conclusion

This chapter has but scratched the surface of Intelligence Oversight and Sensitive Information processes and authorities. The two programs are separate and independent, although in an era of domestic operational up-tempo, the lines between the two are becoming blurred because the distinctions between intelligence and information have become equally blurred. Which program applies depends on the user, the user’s mission, the type of information or intelligence being used, whether U.S. persons or NDAPs are identified, and what will be done with the information. Judge advocates must be aware of these distinctions and know where answers may be found to the difficult questions posed by commanders. Familiarity with, and understanding of, this chapter is a good start, but it is only the beginning. A careful review of all referenced materials is therefore suggested. See Table 1 for a summary of the applicable DoD policies referenced in this chapter.

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84 DoD 5240.1-R, supra note 13, Procedure 15.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PLATFORM / CAPABILITY</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
<th>OVERSIGHT PROGRAM</th>
<th>AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL</th>
<th>CERTIFICATION INSTRUMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Imagery</td>
<td>Domestic imagery—imagery covering the land areas of the 50 United States, the District of Columbia, and the territories and possessions of the United States as assigned by the JCP, extending 11 nautical miles seaward from land areas.</td>
<td>Intel Oversight on DoDD 5200.27/AR 380-13, depending on who is capturing or processing it. Consider also DoD 3025.18, para. 4.c. DoD 3025.21, End.; 7/NIAC 14-3; and, NGN NSG 60 FA 1B06 restrictions.</td>
<td>Depending on platform or capabilities, and/or involvement of DoDIC, either SECDEF, CDDR or Mission Cmndr. DoDIC involvement usually requires SecDef approval, especially if outside of DISCA realm.</td>
<td>If DoDIC is involved, a Proper Use Memorandum (PUM); if not, then a Domestic Imagery Legal Review (DILR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAA (DSCA)</td>
<td>Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA)—The approved use of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) DOD intelligence capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities approved by the SecDef for DISCA missions. [NIAC 14-3, End.]</td>
<td>Intel Oversight program requirements, DoD 5240.1-R, DoDM 5240.01, NIC 14-103; Domestic Imagery restrictions under 7/NIAC 14-3; and, NGN NSG 60 FA 1B06 restrictions.</td>
<td>SECDEF, NORTHCOM/CC (limited authority by delegation, predominantly for NIIC-specific mission set or SRR)</td>
<td>PUM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-IAA, Non-DODIC</td>
<td>Domestic imagery captured in support of assigned DISCA missions that does not involve DoDIC assets, capabilities, people or databases.</td>
<td>DoDD 5200.27, AR 380-18</td>
<td>Depending on breadth of mission, usually the Mission Cmndr if UAS are not involved</td>
<td>DILR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAS and Others</td>
<td>Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) that system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft.</td>
<td>10 or DoDD 5200.27/AR 380-13, depending... See also, DoD 3025.18, para. 4.c, and Policy Memorandum 15-002, &quot;Guidance for the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems&quot;</td>
<td>Depending on platform or capabilities, and/or involvement of DoDIC, either SECDEF, or CDDR.</td>
<td>Depending on whether DoDIC is involved at all, most likely a Proper Use Memorandum (PUM)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1
CHAPTER 10

RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE (RUF) FOR FEDERAL FORCES

KEY REFERENCES:

- U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1–3 (Executive, Commander in Chief, and Execution of the Laws Clauses, respectively).
- U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
- U.S. CONST. amend. V.
- U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
- FORSCOM and USARC Force Protection OPORDs.
- DoDI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, Encl. 4 (DoD Support of Civil Disturbance Operations), February 27, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, Effective February 8, 2019.

A. Introduction

The Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, which contains the Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF), provides operational guidance and establishes fundamental policies and procedures governing actions taken by U.S. military forces performing civil support missions and routine service functions (including AT/FP) within the States. Per CJCSI 3121.01B, the SRUF also apply to land-based homeland defense missions within the United States and its territories. With respect to personnel, the SRUF apply to U.S. military forces, civilians, and contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DoD installations worldwide, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. The document is classified overall Secret, however the portions discussed and referenced in this chapter are unclassified.

1 CJCSI 3121.01B - Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, (13 Jun 2005) (S). As of the publishing of this Handbook, the current SROE/SRUF remains under revision. Judge advocates should ensure they check for updates.
The SRUF apply to Title 10 forces performing both homeland defense (HD) and defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions. These rules do not apply to NG forces in either State Active Duty (SAD) or Title 32 status. For information concerning NG rules for the use of force (RUF), see Chapter 11, infra. When operating in a joint environment, Title 10 judge advocates should coordinate with their NG judge counterparts to ensure compatibility in joint operations.

Before beginning any discussion on the use of force in an operational setting, members need to understand the basic legal, policy, and practical limitations for the use of force. The use of force for domestic mission accomplishment is constrained by Federal law and the SRUF. Members should also be aware of the practical ramifications their actions may have on the overall mission; they must understand the commander’s intent and ensure they understand specific limitations that apply to the mission, in addition to normal policy and legal limitations.

Overall, the SRUF provide the template for training on the RUF for domestic operations. The development of hypothetical scenarios will assist in posing the ultimate question of whether Service members may use force, up to and including deadly force. While there are some very significant differences between the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and SRUF, SROE training concepts for overseas operations can be useful in developing training for SRUF application.

A Service member may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent unless a unit commander otherwise directs. Individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense; thus, a commander may limit individual self-defense as they retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense. It is imperative to ensure commanders, as well as the Service members who execute the commander’s plans, understand any limitations on individual self-defense.

Use of force practice is one of the areas in which the legal competence of judge advocates can have potential life or death consequences for Service-members and civilians. Therefore, it is vital that judge advocates understand and apply appropriate legal and practical considerations when practicing in this area.

This chapter will provide the reader with an introduction to use of force and its key legal references. It will discuss the role of judge advocates in use of force training and implementation, the practical realities involved in use of force incidents that are often not included in legal references, the legal standard for Federal use of force, the existing Army policies on use of force, and the potential legal liability involved in use of force.

B. The Judge Advocate’s Role in the Use of Force

Judge advocates frequently practice domestic use of force law in routine legal duties, as well as in domestic operations. This need commonly arises when attorneys advise on routine force protection

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2 See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces, Enclosure L (U) para. 4.a. (13 June 2005) [hereinafter CJSI 3121.01B]. Note that the SRUF supersede CJSI 3121.02, RUF for DoD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States.
and law enforcement activities on military installations. Judge advocates should be prepared to advise commanders and train units on use of force policies for law enforcement and security operations. They often advise on investigations and disciplinary matters regarding use of force violations.

There are differing opinions as to whether judge advocates should be primarily responsible for drafting mission-specific RUF, or if the drafting is a function of the operations personnel requiring a review by a judge advocate. The fact remains, commanders may directly task an attorney to draft RUF, so judge advocates should be prepared to do so. Drafting RUF should be a coordinated effort among unit staff, to include law enforcement professionals (when applicable) and higher headquarters.

In drafting or reviewing RUF, judge advocates have to understand both the substantive law that governs the use of force, as well as the procedures necessary to modify the SRUF. Efforts to either augment or restrict the current SRUF must follow precise staffing requirements, and, in the case of augmentation, require advanced planning and should be initiated (if not already done by higher headquarters) as soon as the need is identified.³

Judge advocates performing these duties must know the controlling law for domestic use of force. For operations in areas subject to U.S. jurisdiction, the appropriate constitutional law standards as interpreted by the courts and the executive branch regulate the use of force. As important, the policies or RUF issued by higher headquarters further define the legal requirements for use of force.

RUF drafters involved in planning or executing a domestic operation should consider critical factors that are similar to those involved in SROE development. These factors include the following.

- What is your mission and your commander’s concept of operation?
- What type of unit is involved?
- What weapons and equipment, if any, will be deployed? What is the level of training of members with the assigned weapons?
- What threat could your command face?⁴
- What kind of interaction and exposure to the general public will your Service members face?
- What training resources are available for pre-deployment RUF training?
- Does the training program properly address the issues involved with RUF or do training deficits raise the potential for misapplication of the rules?
- Does the existing RUF suit the planned mission or should the commander initiate a process to seek augmentation of the SRUF by submitting a request for a mission specific RUF?⁵

³ See CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 2, Enclosure L (U) para. 3.a.–3.b. and Enclosure P (U). The SRUF requires Combatant Commanders desiring to augment the SRUF to staff such actions through the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Restrictions to the SRUF require notification to higher headquarters, although there is a provision for limited flexibility for time critical situations. Enclosure P provides the template for requests for mission-specific SRUF.

⁴ Judge advocates should consider basing their draft SRUF and legal guidance on the worst feasible scenario. For example, attorneys often advise on detention or migrant and refugee camp operations. In most cases, no one expects the detainees to violently riot. Unfortunately, rioting can occur in extended detention operations. Structuring your SRUF assuming the detainees will remain passive will leave your security force without adequate guidance on how to respond to a potentially dangerous situation.

⁵ If such a need is identified, Enclosure P to CJCSI 3121.01B should be used as a template. The request must be staffed to the appropriate Combatant Commander via the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for approval. It is imperative that this action be initiated upon the identification of the need.
C. Practical Realities of Use of Force Situations

Judge advocates need to understand practical aspects of deadly force confrontations in order to be competent in use of force law. Understanding the law and policy of use of force is not enough. Judge advocates must recognize that the real world does not always allow for dispassionate, reflective, and judicious decision-making on whether to use force. Thus, judge advocates should consider a number of critical factors when advising on civil support missions. These include: the capabilities and limitations Service members bring to a potential deadly force confrontation, what is known about potential attackers, and what physical reactions may affect Service members during and after use of force incidents.

1. Capabilities and Limitations

   a. Soldier Equipment

   When drafting RUF for a particular mission, commanders must decide whether to issue members firearms or other non-lethal weapons for the mission. Further, if the commander authorizes non-lethal weapons or non-standard weapons or ammunition, it is critical that the members be well-trained in the proper employment of this equipment.

   b. Skill and Training

   Due to Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) restrictions, and the DoD’s implementation of the PCA, many Title 10 Service members have limited exposure to domestic operations. Consequently, they may be unfamiliar with DoD and Service policy requirements. In addition, they may have limited experience with the types of confrontations their units may encounter in these missions. Service members may require focused training on RUF in order to effectively and appropriately respond to domestic threats. Specifically, judge advocates should ensure Service members receive training on de-escalation techniques and the employment of lesser means of force, to include non-deadly force, prior to a domestic operation. Judge advocates should assist commands in ensuring members not only get the right legal and policy training, but also the appropriate operational training specific to the mission.

2. Potential Threat

Judge advocates must also consider the nature of the threat that Service members might face since this can factor into advice given for an operation. Service members must be able to correctly apply force and distinguish between threats and innocent civilians. In order to provide accurate legal advice, Judge advocates should be aware of any background information on a threat in an operating area in order.

3. Physical and Psychological Effects

It is also important to keep in mind that the physical and psychological effects resulting from a life or death situation can be critical. The stress of a life or death encounter will often trigger the “fight, flight, or freeze” response. Accompanying this, the body and mind undergo a number of changes that

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6 Military police and members of the special operations community are exceptions as they routinely learn and understand these rules due to the nature of their missions.
can affect performance. Judge advocates may have to research these reactions and consider their effects if tasked to investigate a use of force incident.

D. SRUF and Areas of Confusion and Concern

In a domestic operation response, judge advocates will advise and train on the SRUF and mission-specific RUF that higher headquarters has approved. Judge advocates should be cognizant of common issues that often are a source of confusion or error. For example, state law may impose a duty to retreat as it relates to the use of force by private citizens. Judge advocates should ensure Federal military forces and their RUF are not improperly limited by concepts that are not applicable to Federal RUF. Other topics that often lead to confusion are, but not limited to: the concept of “minimum force,” the general prohibition on the use of warning shots by land forces, and the use of warnings to include verbal warnings.

Another potential source of confusion for the Army can specifically flow from an effort to reconcile portions of AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law Enforcement and Security Duties7 with the SRUF. The SRUF applies broadly both on and off installations and specifically provides that its provisions apply to “DoD forces, civilians and contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DoD Installations.”8 AR 190-14, Chapter 3, was revised in 1993 to synchronize with the use of force guidance contained in a contemporary publication of DOD Directive 5210.56. Subsequently, the use of force guidance contained in DoDD 5210.56 was superseded by the SRUF.9 Judge advocates advising in a variety of areas related to law enforcement and security missions, to include the development of provisions for contract security forces, need to be aware of this disconnect between AR 190-14 and the SRUF. They also must do due diligence to ensure that the most updated regulations, directives, and authorities are used. When two or more provisions cannot be reconciled, the SRUF will control as its provisions cannot be augmented without the approval of the Secretary of Defense and cannot be further restricted without providing notice to the same.

E. Legal Authority and Standard for U.S. Military Use of Force in Domestic Operations

The domestic use of force authority is ingrained in the constitutional role of the Executive branch, and are tempered by the Bill of Rights. Against this backdrop, Congress has imposed a number of statutory provisions that help define and limit this authority. Judge advocates must understand these underlying authorities,10 just as the judge advocate needs have a working knowledge of public international law and law of war authorities to understand rules of engagement. It is imperative to

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8 CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 2, para. 1.a.
9 CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 2, para. 1.b.
10 Since domestic operations have generated very few reported cases involving Service members, we must look to civilian agency law enforcement case law to help define the limits of military use of force.
have an understanding of the differences between these two distinct bodies of law in order to avoid transposing terms and concepts, which may confuse Service members.

The President has a constitutional duty to execute the laws and to protect the States against domestic violence.\textsuperscript{11} As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to enforce Federal law, order installation force protection, and order the military to execute DSCA operations.\textsuperscript{12} Service members conduct operations and derive their authority from the President’s constitutional authorities.\textsuperscript{13} Whenever the military uses force to execute the orders of the President or those he appoints, that use of force must derive from these constitutional authorities.\textsuperscript{14}

The authority to use force by personnel under must be balanced against the civil rights of the public. While three primary provisions of the Bill of Rights limit the use of force by Federal military personnel in domestic operations, the focus is on the Fourth Amendment.\textsuperscript{15} The constitutional standard is whether the use of force violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures.\textsuperscript{16} The U.S. Supreme Court has described this standard as an objective measurement based on the facts and circumstances known to the Service member at the time of the use of force.\textsuperscript{17} This rule is the very heart of the standard for governmental use of force.

The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight…The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. \textit{As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the “reasonableness” inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.}\textsuperscript{18}

The courts have long recognized the authority to use force, including deadly force, in the performance of Federal Governmental duties.\textsuperscript{19} Judge advocates must how the commander intends to execute the mission and any limitations on execution of the mission, in order to advise on the RUF that support the operation. This makes the mission analysis portion of planning critical. The phrasing of operations

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item U.S. CONST., art. II and IV.
\item U.S. CONST., art. II.
\item See e.g., In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
\item See DoDI 3025.21; See also, DoDD 3025.18.
\item The other two are the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which limits the ability of Federal officers to use force after an arrest has occurred, and the Eighth Amendment, which defines the rights of a prisoner when corrections personnel use force.
\item U.S. CONST., Amend. IV, provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons…against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”
\item \textit{Id.} (emphasis added).
\item In Re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
orders or other directives that define the mission and operation are vital to defining the limits of this authority.

Judge advocates involved in drafting mission-specific RUF should carefully consider where to balance the interests of force protection and the lives of Service members against the important interest of not risking an excessive use of force incident involving the military. Further, judge advocates involved in the development of RUF training must be careful that the training does not introduce procedures that introduce tactically dangerous or unsound practices.

Such errors can occur because judge advocates are mistaken in their understanding of the law or less familiar with the application of the RUF. Specifically, judge advocates should never apply Law of War to the domestic law on the use of force. Likewise, judge advocates should not confuse the law of individual self-defense of a private individual with the authority of self-defense for government officials.

1. Minimum Force Necessary or Deadly Force as a Last Resort

The SRUF states, “Normally, force is to be used only as a last resort, and the force used should be the minimum necessary.” The SRUF further states that, “Deadly force is to be used only when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably employed.” Lastly, the SRUF imposes a reasonableness requirement stating that the force used must be “reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude” based on the totality of the circumstances to counter the threat.

Federal courts, however, do not require that Service members employ “minimum force necessary” or that they employ deadly force as only a “last resort.” The courts have generally held that the issue is solely whether deadly force was reasonably necessary; they have declined to impose a requirement to use minimum force. Additionally, courts have not imposed a requirement for the use of feasible lesser force alternatives to avoid the use of justified deadly force. Judge advocates involved in planning domestic operations that carry a significant risk of potentially lethal encounters with armed or dangerous elements, should evaluate whether the SRUF meets the task or whether augmented mission-

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20 As discussed above, the underlying substantive law applicable to domestic governmental use of force is the Constitution, not the Law of War.

21 While related, these legal standards are significantly different. A common example of this confusion is a requirement to retreat. Government officials using force in the performance of their duty have no duty to retreat and in some instances could be in breach of their duty if they do retreat. It is also possible to inadvertently lose the authority to use force under governmental authority by wording the RUF to invoke the law of individual right of self-defense of the state law or Federal common law. For example, a provision that says, “Service-members retain their right to use force in self-defense as defined by local and state law” reduces the service-member’s right to use force in self-defense to the level of a private citizen under State law. This is a significant (and unnecessary) concession of otherwise lawful defensive authority. Conversely, as of the publishing of this documents, some States have pending litigation regarding the application of so-called “stand your ground” laws and whether they apply to law enforcement.

22 CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 2, Encl. L, para. 5.b.1.

23 Id. para. 5.c.

24 Id. para. 5.b.1.

25 See e.g., O’Neal v. DeKalb County, Ga., 850 F.2d 653, 666 (11th Cir. 1988).

26 See e.g., Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 1999).
specific RUF that more closely resembles the standards of case law (and therefore may provide more flexibility) should be developed and staffed for approval by the Secretary of Defense.27

2. Mandatory Verbal Warnings

Federal courts require the issuance of a verbal warning, where feasible, in the case of using deadly force against a fleeing criminal. This is clearly required in the seminal case of Tennessee v. Garner.28 The SRUF does not specifically require a verbal warning, but does state that “[w]hen time and circumstances permit, the threatening force should be warned and given the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions.”29 Although the type of warnings that Service members may employ is not specifically established, it cannot take the form of a warning shot.30 Exceptions to this restriction on warning shots general apply to Naval vessels. Judge advocates should consult Navy, as well as Coast Guard authorities, to determine the application, if any, of such exceptions apply to their current mission.

3. Denial of Deadly Force in Self-Defense

There is a common misunderstanding that if there is no authority to arm Service members, then there is no authority to use deadly force. Current law does not support this presumption. Federal courts have not denied unarmed Service members to use deadly force in self-defense situation. In reference to self-defense, however, judge advocates must ensure that Service members, acting as part of a unit, understand that the SRUF specifically provides that the individual right of self-defense may be restricted, as discussed above.

4. Operational Orders/Execution Orders

For those operations that were not thoroughly planned or anticipated, the judge advocate may first see the RUF through message traffic with an OPORD or EXORD. Often judge advocates will have to wait for RUF guidance from higher headquarters because the decision on whether to draft new RUF or adopt an existing template has yet to be announced.

5. SRUF Authority to Use Deadly Force

In RUF, the authority to use deadly force exists for limited purposes. The SRUF provides uniform guidance on domestic use of force.

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27 Staffing of the request should be initiated using Enclosure P to CJCSI 3121.01B as a template. As this must be staffed to the Combatant Commander for staffing through the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for approval; it is imperative that this staffing process be initiated upon the identification of the need.

28 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985). Garner provides a three prong analysis under the Fourth Amendment for the evaluation of whether the use of deadly force is reasonable. These prongs include: whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual suspect is dangerous; whether the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the suspect’s escape; and, whether, if feasible under the circumstances, a verbal warning was given.

29 CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 2, Encl. L para. 5.a.

30 Id. para. 5.b(3). There are some limited exceptions to this restriction, but these exceptions are unlikely to be encountered by most U.S. Army personnel.
a. Inherent Right of Self-defense

As discussed above, unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to hostile acts or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless otherwise directed by the unit commander, service members may use deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to respond to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Individual self-defense is a subset of unit self-defense and as such may be limited by the unit commander when an individual service-member is acting as part of a unit. Unit self-defense includes the defense of other DoD forces in the vicinity.

b. Defense of Others

The use of deadly force extends to the use of force to defend non-DoD persons in limited circumstances. Service members may use deadly force in defense of non-DoD persons who 1) are in the vicinity when there is probable cause to believe the target of that force poses an actual or imminent threat of death or bodily harm, and 2) when the use of force is directly related to the assigned mission.31

c. Protection of Assets Vital to National Security

Service members may use deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage to assets vital to national security. The SRUF defines assets vital to national security as President-designated non-DoD or DoD property, the actual theft or sabotage of which the President determines would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission and would create an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm.32 The SRUF provides a list of potential examples: nuclear assets, nuclear command and control facilities, and other designated areas that contain sensitive codes or involve special access programs. Planners and commanders need to determine the existence of such assets in their anticipated area of operations in order to apply the SRUF properly and safeguard these designated assets.

d. Protection of Inherently Dangerous Property

Service members may use deadly force when reasonably necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of inherently dangerous property. The SRUF defines “inherently dangerous property” as property that, in the hands of an unauthorized individual, would create an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm.33 Examples include portable missiles, rockets, arms, ammunition, explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material. On-scene DoD commanders are authorized to classify property as inherently dangerous.34 Command guidance in this area is critical. Without clear and proper guidance, the commander’s intent could easily be frustrated. For example, a commander may not want to have lethal force deployed against looters who steal small arms ammunition. Failure to provide guidance on this could lead to an engagement that was consistent with the SRUF, but is inconsistent with the on-ground commander’s intent. Likewise, a commander may consider all crew-served weapons as “inherently dangerous,” but a failure to make such designations may lead to confusion over what is “inherently dangerous property” by members on the ground. As a reminder, if

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31 Id. para. 5.c.2. See also, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5210.56, ARMING AND THE USE OF FORCE (18 Nov. 2016).
32 Id. para. 4.e.
33 Id. para. 4.f.
34 Id.
a subordinate commander chooses to emplace restrictions that go beyond the mission-specific RUF issued by higher headquarters, notification of these restrictions to the Secretary of Defense is required per the SRUF.

e. National Critical Infrastructure

Service members may use deadly force when reasonably necessary to prevent the sabotage of national critical infrastructure. National critical infrastructure for DoD purposes is President-designated public utilities, or similar critical infrastructure, vital to public health or safety, the damage to which the President determines would create an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury. Commanders and planners need to identify the existence of such infrastructure when preparing for a domestic operation.

6. Other Mission-Related Circumstances for Use of Deadly Force

As with the circumstances described above, commanders may authorize deadly force under limited circumstances, and when directly related to the assigned mission. Further, such force may only be used “when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed.” These additional circumstances, where such force may be used when directly related to the assigned mission, are discussed below.

a. Prevention of Serious Offenses against Persons

Service members may use deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to prevent a serious offense involving the threat of imminent death or serious bodily harm. Examples of such crimes include murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault. Further, attempting to set fire to an inhabited building or sniping would constitute offenses that involve the threat of imminent death.

b. Escape

Service members may use deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided there is: 1) probable cause to believe that the prisoner committed or attempted to commit a serious offense involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical injury or death; and 2) that escape of the subject would pose an actual or imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to DoD personnel or others in the vicinity. Serious offense is defined as one that involves an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm, or an offense that would pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to DoD forces or others in the vicinity.

c. Arrest/Apprehension of Persons Believed to have Committed a Serious Offense

Service members may use deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to arrest or apprehend a person who they have probable cause to believe has committed a serious offense as defined above.

35 Id., para. 4.g.
36 Id., paras. 5.c & 5.d.
37 Id., para. 5.d.1.
38 Id., para. 5.d.2.
39 Id., para. 5.d.3.
7. Augmentation of the RUF

A unit commander that desires to augment the SRUF must staff the action to the appropriate combatant commander. The combatant commander must then staff the request through the CJCS to the Secretary of Defense for approval. Requests for augmentation must be prepared using the template provided at Enclosure P, RUF Messaging Process, to CJCSI 3121.01B. Unit commanders may further restrict the SRUF without prior approval; however, if a unit commander implements a restriction on a Secretary of Defense-approved RUF, the Secretary of Defense must be notified through the Joint Staff. When confronted with time critical situations, commanders can notify the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense concurrently, or if not possible, may notify the CJCS as soon as possible after the Secretary of Defense notification.

F. Liability for Service-Members, Leaders, and RUF Drafters in Use of Force Situations

Service members, their leaders, and the planners who draft the RUF for domestic operations face potential personal liability for any unlawful use of force by a service member during a domestic operation. This includes Federal or State civil and/or criminal proceedings after an incident. In addition, incidents of unlawful use of force often result in a variety of investigations that could justify adverse administrative consequences for Service members. Therefore, it is important that judge advocates be aware of this liability as they draft RUF, disseminate the RUF, and participate in training for and the execution of domestic operations under RUF. Appropriate attorney involvement can reduce the risk of the burdens of litigation.

1. Federal Civil Liability

A person who is injured by unlawful use of force could seek damages in a Federal civil suit against the Service member and others involved in the RUF incident. If the person is dead, the family members of the decedent could file the suit. This private cause of action for damages—caused by a Service member’s unlawful use of force—is based on deprivation of a constitutional right. In most cases, this will involve the Fourth Amendment standard of objective reasonableness. The seminal case that created this cause of action is *Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics*, a civilian law enforcement case. There is caselaw concerning DoD civil support that addresses this issue. One reported Supreme Court case (discussed below) involves an Army soldier and use of force against a civilian.

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40 *Id.*, para 3.a.

41 *Id.*, para. 3.b.

42 *Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In that case, the Court held that the warrantless entry of Federal agents into the petitioner’s apartment, under color of Federal authority, provided a Federal cause of action for damages under the Fourth Amendment.

43 *See Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). In *Saucier*, Katz attempted to unfurl a protest banner in close proximity to Vice President Gore’s speaking stand on the Presidio of San Francisco. Katz brought a *Bivens* action against the military police that apprehended him. Katz alleged that the military police violated his Fourth Amendment rights by use of excessive force in forcibly removing him from the immediate vicinity of the podium and in placing him into a van. The Court held the military police member was entitled to qualified immunity.
Litigation can also occur in situations where a Service member’s decision not to use force resulted in a death or injury to a civilian. A Service member’s decision not to use force, or a commander’s decision to limit the use of deadly force, would likely be a “discretionary function” defense to claims made under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). However, if the decision not to engage an otherwise lawful target was a result of a failure to train or the use of ill-conceived training materials, the Federal Government may be liable under the FTCA.

a. The Application of Qualified Immunity

Judge advocates serving as advisors, investigators or litigators should understand that qualified immunity is a critical dispositive measure to forestall unnecessary burdens on the Government and its representatives, and it can serve as a bar to trial. Pertinent case law provides guidance on how courts apply qualified immunity.

Saucier v. Katz, a 2001 Supreme Court decision, is a noteworthy case in the context of military support to domestic operations. Donald Saucier, who was a military police officer assigned to protect the Vice President, apprehended Katz during a speech by the Vice President. Elliott Katz later accused Saucier of using excessive force. Pursuant to Bivens, Katz filed suit against Saucier on the grounds that Saucier had violated Katz’ Fourth Amendment rights. The Court held that the military police officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, a 2009 Supreme Court decision, is now the key case from which to analyze issues of qualified immunity. (Pearson involved an accusation of a Fourth Amendment violation for a warrantless search and seizure conducted by Utah State law enforcement officers.). Both cases are relevant for judge advocates and discussed below.

For judge advocates vis-à-vis their roles as RUF practitioners, it is first necessary to understand the analysis handed down in Saucier, as it may still be used by lower courts. In Saucier, the Court mandated a two-prong analysis to determine whether an official was entitled to qualified immunity. First, a court was required to decide: 1) “whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) if so, whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” This analysis was to be strictly applied and provided an analytical paradigm that often served to direct early disposition of cases in favor of the official without the need for extensive and costly pretrial discovery and litigation.

In Pearson however, the Supreme Court effectively reversed its position in Saucier by holding that lower courts were no longer bound to the rigid two-prong analysis. The Court noted, however, that the Saucier case could still be used as an appropriate analytical paradigm by lower courts in their discretion, but that lower courts were no longer required to use the Saucier procedure.

Saucier remains an important qualified immunity case; however, in light of Pearson and the difficulties lower courts have had with the Saucier analysis, it is uncertain how effective its analysis will be for those attempting to assert its procedure to establish qualified immunity.

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45 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). The Court held that the officer’s entry into a home, based on the consent of an informant, did not violate clearly established law, and they were thus entitled to qualified immunity.
46 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 194.
47 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 223.
b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as the Basis of State and Local Government Use of Force Civil Causes of Action

42 U.S.C. Section 1983 has evolved into an effective basis for citizens to seek damages for alleged violations of their rights by governmental organizations or their employees under the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 1983 also extended liability so it is applicable to those who are involved in use of force policy and training decisions. This resulted in civil liability if official decisions and actions contributed to an improper use of force by an individual law enforcement or security person. As the SRUF specifically directs that commanders at all levels must train their subordinates on the use of both deadly and non-deadly force, failure to do so may expose commanders, their Soldiers, their advisors, and the U.S. Government to a host of legal consequences as discussed below.

2. Federal Criminal Liability

Service members could be held criminally liable for unconstitutional or illegal use of force before a court-martial, a Federal district court, and in some cases, State courts. A Federal statute prohibits use of force under the color of law that deprives any person of their constitutional or legal rights. Accordingly, DOJ has investigated use of force during a domestic military operation with a view toward seeking a grand jury indictment for violation of this statute.

3. State Civil and Criminal Liability

Immunity from Federal liability (under the Supremacy Clause) will not always prevent a Service member from having to face trial in state civil or criminal proceedings. In fact, in the “Ruby Ridge” use of force incident, a Federal officer was not granted immunity from a state criminal proceeding for the shooting of a civilian involved in an armed confrontation with the FBI.

48 A supervisor who causes a constitutional violation by a “deliberate indifference” to constitutional standards in proper training for officers may be liable under a Section 1983 cause of action. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989). While agencies can be found liable for a lack of proper training on deadly force, agency officials have also been found liable for a lack of training on non-deadly force (Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991)) and for training conducted that was insufficient (e.g., Berry v. city of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1345 (6th Cir. 1994)). The judge advising a commander on RUF for a domestic operation should compare the difference in effort and attention to law between military RUF practice and the comparable efforts of Federal law enforcement agencies. While Section 1983 may provide plaintiffs with a compensable claim after a use of force encounter as a result of a failure to train, the FTCA could also provide a potential remedy when a training requirement existed and it was either not accomplished or it can be demonstrated that the training was inadequate or failed to apply the proper standards. Ironically, it is conceivable that a third party that could have been covered under “defense of others” could argue the government failed to protect him or her from other civilians and attempt to bring a claim under the FTCA alleging that the Government was negligent in its training of RUF and it contributed to the injury suffered.

49 CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 2, Encl. L para. 1.b.


51 For a comprehensive overview of the liability issues resulting from a Marine shooting that was authorized and proper under the ROE (the correct term at the time, now RUF) for JTF-6, see Lieutenant Colonel W.A. Stafford, How to Keep Military Personnel from Going to Jail for Doing the Right Thing: Jurisdiction, ROE & the Rules of Deadly Force, ARMY LAW., Nov. 2000, at 1.

52 State of Idaho v. Horiuchi, 215 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2000). Interestingly, one of the critical factors in the Court’s analysis was the fact that a supervisor had published unlawful use of force guidance. This became an issue, even though Special Agent Horiuchi based his decision to shoot on the lawful pre-existing RUF, rather than the flawed rules published by his team commander.
G. Other Trial or Litigation Issues

Judge advocates involved in post-use of force procedures and litigation should be prepared to address a number of other issues. First, be prepared to advise commanders on the many investigations that could occur. Second, be aware of their Service’s procedures on civilian litigation. Finally, know that Service members potentially have less legal protection against use of force liability than a Federal law enforcement agent due to potential charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Service administrative options.

Judge advocates should know that if a Service member kills or injures a civilian during a domestic operation, a number of agencies could initiate investigations of the incident that would affect both the Service and the Service member. The various units involved, their parent services, any joint command, and the NG Bureau or State NG authorities could initiate an administrative investigation or Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM) 303 inquiries. Commanders and judge advocates should be aware that the following investigations could occur in addition to their own Service’s criminal or administrative investigation:

- An investigation by DOJ or the U.S. Attorney for potential Federal civil or criminal disposition;
- An investigation by state, county, or municipal law enforcement authorities for state criminal disposition; and
- An administrative investigation by an inspector general or internal investigative element of a federal law enforcement agency, if the command was providing support to that federal agency.

Judge advocates also need to know the procedures and considerations involved when dealing with potential civil litigation. Army Regulation 27-40 (Litigation), Air Force Instruction 51-301, (Civil Litigation), and Navy Instruction 5800.7G (Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN)) outline Service guidelines on civil litigation matters. These Service instructions provide guidance on issues such as whether a Service member will be entitled to Government-provided representation, investigation of potential litigation cases, whether the Government will indemnify the Service member for damages in civil cases, and the key points of contact when the Service may be involved in litigation. Further, Army Pamphlet 27-162, Claims Procedures, provides guidance on the management of potential claims against the U.S. Government under a variety of theories and statutory authorities. Finally, they should contact the litigation divisions of their respective Services for further information.

53 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, R.C.M. 303 (2012).
58 Claims have been paid in recent history for shootings by U.S. military personnel engaged in the performance of their duties. For example, in 1997 U.S. Marines were sent to support the U.S. Border Patrol in Texas along the Mexican border during a period of escalating border violence and drug related activity. Although the facts are disputed, a U.S. person of Hispanic ancestry was under observation by U.S. Marines. The Marines claimed that the individual under surveillance
Finally, judge advocates need to recognize that Service members and commanders involved in use of force incidents may have less legal and practical protection than their counterparts in Federal law enforcement. Case law defining the role of Service members using force during Homeland Security operations is extremely limited. Many of the cases interpreting governmental use of force have expressly or impliedly based their interpretations of the “reasonableness” of the force on the law enforcement status of the federal officers involved. These were qualified and credentialed law enforcement officers with clear statutory investigative jurisdiction and duties to uphold federal law and confront criminals. Service members performing non-traditional Homeland Security operations may not have the benefit of this well-defined case law. Finally, Congress has not extended immunity that is routinely applied to Federal law enforcement to military domestic operations.59

H. Training of Judge Advocates

Ideally, attorney training should include the study of executive, congressional, and judicial authorities and constraints on the use of force by government and military personnel, and tactical skills training using both lethal and non-lethal measures. Leaders should seek opportunities for their judge advocates to obtain basic training in the deployment of weapons in tactical engagements under the RUF as compared to the rules and training for ROE/LOAC.60 If available, training with police may provide them with great insight into the challenges confronted by a member in a use of force situation. Although training such as this is resource intensive and time consuming, it is difficult for judge advocates, who have limited or no exposure to tactical scenarios involving the use of weapons, to provide comprehensive advice and support to training the force.

If resources or time do not allow for “hands on” training, the development of scenario training packets can assist in developing better appreciation for application of the RUF. An analysis of likely scenarios done in conjunction with a robust discussion of controlling legal authority can help illuminate the challenges that members may face during the use of force, and thus better inform judge advocates. Further, these scenarios can be developed to highlight the challenges that often face RUF drafters, and thus improve upon their ability to understand and apply the RUF.

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59 Congress, recognizing that the scope of duties for Federal law enforcement officers does not typically extend to enforcing laws against simple assaults, homicides, and other types of violent crime, extended the scope of employment for Federal officers having to use force to prevent such violent crimes. The language of this statute does not make it applicable to the majority of service-members engaged in domestic operations. See Pub. L. 105-277, Section 101(h), as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-58, Title VI, sect. 623, Sept. 29, 1999, often referred to as the Federal Good Samaritan Statute.

60 Although the law that governs RUF is different than that which governs ROE, this training will assist judge advocates that are called to assist in the development or training of either RUF or ROE, as an appreciation of the tactical use of small arms and other lethal and non-lethal weapons will improve a judge advocate’s ability to support members and the command significantly.
CHAPTER 11
RULES FOR THE USE OF FORCE FOR THE NG

KEY REFERENCES:
• Chief, National Guard Bureau 3000.04, National Guard Bureau Domestic Operations, January 24, 2018.

A. Introduction

The National Guard (NG), or organized militia, is a Federally-recognized State government entity, except when called or ordered to Federal active duty as an element of the NG of the United States. The effect of this constitutionally-derived status is perhaps the most apparent on the rules for the use of force (RUF) for the NG. Some DoD policies and Service regulations apply to the NG when they are in Federal status, but not when they are commanded by State authorities. As a result, the law that

1 “State,” as indicated in the introduction to this Handbook, and used here includes the fifty States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, all of which have National Guard (NG) organizations headed by an Adjutant General (or a Commanding General in the case of the District of Columbia National Guard) governed by State law. For example, the New York National Guard is governed by NY Consolidated Laws Service, Military Law and the Virginia National Guard is governed by the Code of Virginia, Title 44.
2 Members of the NG are called to duty under 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–333 and are ordered to duty under 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301–12304.
4 The NG derives its State status from the Militia Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 15, 16.
5 The law forming the bases for the RUF by the NG is the general criminal law of the States. There is, therefore, no single term used to describe those rules as States have referred to them variously as rules of engagement (ROE), rules for the use of force (RUF), rules on the use of force (ROUF), and rules of interaction (ROI). “RUF,” as used in this chapter, is used as a generic term intended to encompass those rules of the 54 NG jurisdictions, which are based upon the criminal laws of those individual jurisdictions. Compare this to the standing rules on the use of force (SRUF) in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces (13 Jun. 2005) [hereinafter CJCSI 3121.01B]. CJCSI 3121.01B is classified overall secret; the portions regarding SRUF discussed herein are unclassified.
is the basis for NG RUF is the criminal law of the State in which a NG unit is performing the mission.\(^7\) The drafting and application of State NG RUF, derived from State law and NG Bureau policy,\(^8\) is the subject of this chapter.\(^9\)

### B. RUF and State Criminal Laws

#### 1. State Law Applicable to Both Title 32 and SAD Statues

Most NG operations in support of civil authorities are in support of State civil authorities and are undertaken on a State-funded basis, usually referred to as “State Active Duty” (SAD).\(^{10}\) These operations include response to natural disasters, providing security during civil disturbances, and assistance to civil authorities during other State emergencies, such as strikes at State institutions. The notable operational exceptions include National Special Security Events (NSSE) as discussed in Chapter 8 \textit{infra},\(^{11}\) the 2001–2002 NG airport security mission (hereinafter airport security mission),\(^{12}\) the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, and the Democratic and Republican National Conventions of 2016. These operations were performed in Title 32 status.\(^{13}\) As explained in Chapter 3 \textit{infra}, both

\(^7\) See \textsc{National Guard Regulation} 500-5/ANGI 10-802 - National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support and Mission Assurance Operations (18 Aug. 10) [hereinafter NGR 500-5], para. 4-4. A more in-depth explanation is that the criminal law of the States applies to both members of the National Guard operating in a State status and to off-post operations (and in some instances, some on-post activities) of the active components of the U.S. armed forces (including the NG called or ordered to active Federal service). See Lieutenant Colonel Wendy A. Stafford, \textit{How to Keep Military Personnel from Going to Jail for Doing the Right Thing: Jurisdiction, ROE & the Rules of Deadly Force}, \textsc{Army Law}, Nov. 2000, at 1. The active component, because of its Federal mission, is however largely protected from the impact of State criminal law by the doctrine of Federal Supremacy Clause immunity. Judicial opinions dealing with the application of that doctrine to the military are discussed in the text \textit{infra} at subparagraph C.2.

\(^8\) National Guard Bureau (NGB) policy states that use of force is governed by State law. NGR 500-5, supra note 7, para. 4-4.b.

\(^9\) This chapter does not include consideration of State rules for the use of force applied as part of the NG counter-drug program, for that see \textit{infra} Chapter 7, Counterdrug Operations.

\(^10\) See NGR 500-5, supra note 7, para. 4-1. \textsc{Dept of Defense, Dir. 5101.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG JFHQS-State)} (5 Jan. 2011) (C2, 31 Mar. 2020). State active duty [SAD] is a status pursuant to State law only and is funded by the State, unlike the status in which the NG trains for its Federal mission pursuant to Title 32 of the United States Code [Title 32 status], which is Federally funded and regulated. The NG in an SAD status may, however, use certain Federal equipment, subject to a requirement for reimbursement for that use. In SAD status, many NGB and Active Army regulations may not apply unless the State has adopted those regulations as a matter of State law; for more information, see Chapter 3 \textit{infra}.

\(^11\) For example, the NG provided security support for the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia, and the 2002 Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City, Utah.

\(^12\) The airport security mission was served as “other duty,” pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). On September 27, 2001, the President made a request to all of the State Governors that they call their NG personnel to duty, to be paid for by the United States, according to a White House press release. Between four and five thousand NG personnel served at approximately 450 commercial airports around the United States in response to the President’s request. Additionally, New York National Guard personnel in a Title 32 status after the 9/11 terrorist attacks performed another mission in the form of armory security. See Transcript of After Action Review Conference, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, State Area Command (STARC), New York Army National Guard, and the Center for Law and Military Operations, at 17–18 (17–18 May 2002) [hereinafter NYARNG Transcript] (on file with CLAMO).

\(^13\) \textsc{National Guard Reg. 350-1, Army National Guard Training}, para. 3-9.j.4 Aug. 2009) [hereinafter NGR 350-1] (providing that Title 32 status may be used by an Adjutant General for what would otherwise be a State (SAD) mission if
SAD and Title 32 statuses are non-Federal and State law applies. As such, it is criminal law of the States hosting the events (i.e. the Olympics, convention, etc.) that govern the RUF. In the case of airport security, the NG executes missions in many of the 54 NG jurisdictions. Each jurisdiction in which NG personnel secured an airport, applied its own criminal law. Consequently, multiple sets of RUF were used during the airport security mission. Although most rules addressed similar subjects, the specific implementation of these rules varied depending on the jurisdiction. Examples of State RUF referred to throughout this chapter are, unless otherwise indicated, the RUF of the airport security mission.

2. Subjects for Inclusion in State RUF for the NG

When the NG executes a Title 32 or SAD mission that utilizes RUF, the subjects appropriate for the RUF are derived from the mission operation plan or operation order (OPLAN/OPORD). The RUF covers core State criminal law subjects such as the right of self-defense (including the retreat doctrine) necessary warning, proportionality, and location issues (for instance the defender’s home or workplace). The RUF should also address the right to carry and discharge firearms, the authority of NG personnel as peace officers, and the authority for apprehension, search, and seizure. Whether, and the extent to which, these basic RUF subjects are included in a given OPLAN/OPORD are mission-dependent decisions.

a. Subjects Appropriate for Inclusion in All RUF

(1) RUF Change Authority

A vital element appropriate for virtually all State NG RUF is an explanation of the authority to modify the RUF. If Adjutants General have delegated that authority to subordinate commanders, then the RUF must clearly state which part(s) of the RUF may be changed, in what manner and by whom. If the RUF contains no delegation of authority, either the Adjutant General or State level task force commander retains the authority. If the authority to change the RUF is wholly denied, including the authority to further restrict the RUF, then that should also be made clear.

(2) Right of Self-Defense

Note that this may not always be the case in Federal use of force law liability. For example, if NG personnel in a Title 32 or SAD status are inadvertently made subject to the orders and authority of a Federal commander, they could be held to a use of force standard as defined by applicable Federal law.

The 1996 Summer Games in Georgia and the 2002 Winter Games in Utah are two examples.

In 2003, the Operational Law and Counterdrug Team of the Chief Counsel’s Office, NGB, collected and reviewed virtually all of the State RUFs used in the airport security mission. All these RUFs are retained by that office in both paper and electronic format. The Operational Law and Counterdrug Team has continued to collect and review the State RUFs since 2003, including those used in hurricane responses such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Nate in 2018.

For example, if the mission includes the security of certain real property, then the right to search and seize and amount of force necessary to undertake the inspection of persons and personal property entering and leaving that location should be included in the OPLAN/OPORD or RUF.
Another element appropriate for inclusion in all RUF, even for unarmed security missions, is the right to exercise reasonable and necessary force in self-defense. Mission analysis and State law will determine whether, as part of the general right of self-defense, NG personnel will be armed. Judge advocates should help determine that appropriate procedural requirements regarding the carriage of weapons have been met well before a mission. One of the early concerns for New York Army NG judge advocates after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks was the New York National Guard personnel’s authority to carry weapons. Under New York law “[p]ersons in the military service of the State of New York when duly authorized by regulation issued by the adjutant general” are authorized to carry firearms. Unfortunately, such regulations were not previously promulgated. Consequently, the judge advocates drafted Department of Military and Naval Affairs (DMNA) Regulation 27-13, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force, which the Governor’s Counsel Office approved on 29 September 2001.

The RUF must also address State law topics such as the right to defend others, the duty to retreat, the use of deadly force to prevent escapes, the requirement or limit on the use of warnings before the employment of deadly force in self-defense, the requirement for the use of proportionality, and whether the place where the right of self-defense is exercised imposes additional legal implications.

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18 See CJCSI 3121.01B, supra note 5, Encl. L(U), para. 4.a. It provides that service-members may exercise individual self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent, except as limited by a commander as part of unit self-defense. The SRUF provide that a unit commander may limit the use of individual self-defense by members of their unit. Whether State National Guard RUF may, like the SRUF, deny the right of individual self-defense in some instances, is open to question, especially because many States have statutes applicable to all persons within the State, including National Guard personnel, providing for the right of self-defense. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-3-102. It is likely that NG commanders could lawfully place restrictions on the use, for self-defense purposes, of weapons issued by the NG; however, if a weapon is issued for the purposes of mission accomplishment, it may make little tactical sense to deny the use of the same weapon for purposes of individual self-defense.

19 As used herein, “mission analysis” refers to the commander’s vision of the execution of the mission, a determination of the amount of force necessary for mission accomplishment, and a determination, in light of known factors such as intelligence on the nature of the threat presented to State forces, of whether NG personnel could be the subject of any type of physical attack in executing the mission.

20 It is important to distinguish between the citizen’s individual right of self-defense from the right of a government official to use force in self-defense. The rights and duties for these two different legal theories are similar, but contain critical differences. RUF drafters must decide which legal authority they wish to invoke, and then ensure that the description of this authority remains consistent. Ambiguities created by confusing the two authorities could lead to confusion by members. Almost all of the topics listed in this section will allow for different conduct by a member acting in self-defense under the two theories.


22 NYARNG Transcript, supra note 12, at 51.

23 The right to defend others is frequently the subject of the same State statutes that provide for an individual’s right to defend him or herself. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(a); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-704(1).

24 The laws of several States require the duty to retreat, so, for the airport security mission, those States included the duty in the RUF. See, e.g., Connecticut airport security mission RUF para. IIIC(b) and CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b).

25 For a detailed discussion of the Fourth Amendment aspects of this topic in the context of FBI RUF, see Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997).

26 Many, if not most, States included the necessity for a warning (if possible) before resorting to the use of deadly force in the airport security mission RUF.

27 Some State RUF used for the airport security mission specifically required that action taken in self-defense must be proportional to the force used in the attack necessitating the defense. It is unclear whether this duty was imposed in the
(3) Special Orders

Many RUF include discussion of issues not directly related to the use of force. These issues are called “special orders” and cover such matters as: training (including training scenarios), military bearing and appearance, immunity, standards of conduct and treatment of civilians, safety, handling news media, discussion of the mission with others, and handling of suspicious persons, vehicles, and activities. Usually, The Adjutant General (TAG) of the State or the task force commander will decide whether to include them in the RUF or in the OPLAN/OPORD.

b. Role of State Law in Determining RUF for Law Enforcement, Law Enforcement Support, and Security Missions

There are variations between the States regarding NG authority to apply force during law enforcement response, law enforcement support, or security operation. For example, some States by statute give the NG the full authority of peace officers. In other States, the NG has only those peace officer-type powers enjoyed by the population at large. While others provide that the NG has certain specific authorities in limited situations. Depending upon the State statutes, the NG’s authority to act as peace officers may apply to operations in a Title 32 status or SAD status. Regardless, the NG judge

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28 In some States, the right of self-defense is greater when exercised in the defender’s home or place of work. In those places there is often no duty to retreat. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b); N. D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07.

29 Because the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2016) [hereinafter PCA] does not apply to the NG when not in Federal status or under Federal control, there is no Federal law prohibiting the NG from participating in direct law enforcement actions. Whether the NG forces of any State may otherwise participate in such actions therefore depends upon the law of the individual States. Concerning application of the PCA to the NG, see also infra subparagraph C.2.

30 For the purposes of the NG, “law enforcement support” usually means assistance provided to civilian law enforcement agencies at their direction or request – a meaning which may differ for purposes of the PCA regarding Federal military forces.

31 For example, Arkansas law at ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-61-112(a) provides the following:

(a) Whenever such forces or any part thereof shall be ordered out for service of any kind, they shall have all powers, duties, and immunities of peace officers of the State of Arkansas in addition to all powers, duties, and immunities now otherwise provided by law.

32 See, e.g., Iowa RUF for the airport security mission “Task Force Freedom Flight - Airport Security Instructions,” para. 4 and its reliance, for the purposes of arrest of civilians committing crimes in the presence of National Guard personnel, on Iowa Code § 804.9, granting ordinary citizens the power of arrest; Nebraska Rules of Interaction (ROI) #02, 2 Oct. 2001, para. 7 (“You must apply the use of force rules that apply to a private citizen under State law”); and Use of Force and Arrest Powers of New York National Guard Soldiers, para. 5 (“a National Guardsman’s power and authority under New York State law are the same as any other citizen”). When conducting SAD missions in the wake of the 11 Sept. 2001 terrorist attacks, the NYARNG had no greater power than the normal citizen regarding arrest authority. Although a New York State Emergency Act provided a mechanism for the NYARNG to be designated as peace officers, the provision was not used because the Act also required a lengthy training period. See NYARNG Transcript, supra note 12, at 52.

33 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-6–38-2-6.1.

34 For example, Ark. Code Ann. § 12-61-112 applies “Whenever” NG forces are ordered to “service of any kind,” but Ga. Code Ann. § 38-2-6 to 38-2-6.1, when read in toto, provide that the Governor has the power “in case of invasion, disaster, insurrection, riot, breach of the peace, combination to oppose the enforcement of the law, or imminent danger thereof” to declare an emergency ordering the National Guard into “the active service of the State” and granting the National Guard the authority to “quell riots, insurrections, or a gross breach of the peace or to maintain order.”
advocate must participate in the effort to tailor the RUF to the particular mission, State law, and policies of the TAG.  

**c. Subjects Appropriate for Inclusion in Law Enforcement, Law Enforcement Support, and Security Mission RUF**

**(1) Use of Force and Level of Force Generally**

If the NG mission is law enforcement, law enforcement support, or security the mission OPLAN/OPORD or its RUF must specify what type of government weapons, if any, may be used to accomplish the mission. Additionally, the mission OPLAN/OPORD or its RUF should include instructions on self-defense, the use of weapons, what law enforcement-type actions (such as search and seizure) may be taken, and the degree of force authorized to address incidents that may arrive during the mission. If authority is not granted for any law enforcement-type action, the RUF or mission OPLAN/OPORD should expressly deny the use of force for that specified purpose. Conversely, if NG personnel are allowed to take law enforcement-type actions as a last resort, such as the power to detain and question and/or search persons when civilian law enforcement personnel are unavailable or where NG personnel have been directed to do so by civilian law enforcement personnel, this should be stated.

For example, if a law enforcement support or security mission includes guarding buildings or real property, the RUF must address whether persons entering or leaving the property may be detained, questioned, or searched by NG personnel. If detention, and questioning and/or search are authorized, then the RUF must state whether and to what degree force may be used to enforce the action.

Moreover, for missions that include guarding buildings or real property, the RUF must address whether force, up to and including deadly force, may be used to defend the property. Some airport security mission RUF, for instance, provided that deadly force could only be used to defend specially designated property. When this device is used, NG judge advocates must ensure that a statutory or other system exists for the designation of such property.

**(2) Definitions**

Definitions may be appropriate for inclusion in all RUF but they are particularly necessary for armed law enforcement, law enforcement support, or security operations. Using law enforcement-type terms that NG personnel may not be familiar with may create confusion and may have unintended consequences. Terms commonly defined include: deadly weapon; firearm; reasonable, necessary, or minimum force; peace officer; probable cause; reasonable suspicion; reasonable belief; deadly and non-deadly force; arrest (civilian or military term); apprehension; detention; property vital to public health or safety (or other similar phrases); forcible felony (when defense is predicated on commission of a forcible felony); hostile act; hostile intent; proportionality or proportional force; felony; and misdemeanor.

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35 For the purposes of the airport security mission, some States adopted more restrictive RUF than State law allowed.

36 On the other hand, the NYARNG RUF did not allow the use of deadly force to protect property. Deadly force was only authorized in self-defense “if there was a threat of death or grievous bodily harm.” See NYARNG Transcript, supra note 12, at 70.
(3) Arming Orders

If firearms or other weapons with the capability to kill or severely injure another will be issued, then the RUF should provide for positive control by experienced NCOs or officers. One method of accomplishing this is to specify how members will carry their weapons, ammunition, and other ancillary equipment, expressed through arming orders. Arming orders are a state of preparedness to use force. They should not be confused with the authority to use force once a member is faced with a threat. Arming orders are typically written in a chart or matrix format, specifying where or how the weapons will be carried and where ammunition will be kept, including when and where loaded magazines should be carried and when rounds should be chambered. The use of weapons other than firearms should also be addressed if those weapons will be issued.37 Below is an example of arming orders used by the Indiana NG for the airport security mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arming Order</th>
<th>Rifle or Shotgun</th>
<th>Pistol</th>
<th>Baton</th>
<th>Chamber</th>
<th>Ammo</th>
<th>Bayonet</th>
<th>Weapon/Safety</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AO-1</td>
<td>Sling</td>
<td>Holster</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>In Pouch</td>
<td>Not issued</td>
<td>ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-2</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>Holster</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>In Pouch</td>
<td>Not issued</td>
<td>ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-3</td>
<td>Sling</td>
<td>Holster</td>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>In Pouch</td>
<td>Not issued</td>
<td>ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-4</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>Holster</td>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>In Pouch</td>
<td>Not issued</td>
<td>ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-5</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>Holster</td>
<td>Hand</td>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>In Weapon</td>
<td>Not issued</td>
<td>ON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO-6</td>
<td>Port</td>
<td>In Hand</td>
<td>Belt</td>
<td>Locked &amp; Loaded</td>
<td>In Weapon</td>
<td>Not issued</td>
<td>ON*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Leave safety on until ready to fire

(4) Special Orders

Other potential subjects appropriate for inclusion in NG RUF for armed law enforcement, law enforcement support, or security missions concerning use of force include: the relationship of NG personnel to civilian law enforcement personnel,38 acting at the direction of civilian law enforcement,39

37 Other weapons may include use of water, batons, pepper spray, or tasers (electric stun guns). In airport security mission RUF, some States began their use of force matrix at a much lower level than would usually be the case, such as with an unarmed member first attempting verbal persuasion, then using “unarmed defensive techniques,” then using non-deadly physical force to restrain the aggressor, then stating that a weapon would be drawn if the aggressor continued his or her aggression, then drawing and displaying the weapon, then stating that a round would be chambered, etc. Commanders using this technique must of course explain that in a true tactical situation, the command does not expect that each service-member must always use each and every incremental increase in the use of force; in some instances, it would be futile and could risk injury to do anything except for, drawing and firing a weapon.

38 In a mission supporting civil authorities, NG personnel are typically instructed to rely upon civilian law enforcement personnel to detain and question persons, conduct searches and seizures, and to apprehend offenders, and to take any of
defense of others, pursuit of suspects, retention of evidence,\textsuperscript{40} use of restraints, reports of firearm
discharge,\textsuperscript{41} or other use of deadly force, accountability of weapons and ammunition, and a prohibition
against use of non-issued weapons and ammunition.

C. Specific RUF Issues

1. RUF in Interstate (Cross Border) Operations

NG forces may cross State borders both for training in a Title 32 status for their Federal mission and
for assisting neighboring States in SAD status. Naturally, for many of these operations, the units carry
their organic weapons. In some States, however, State code or constitutions may complicate this
practice. For example, § 33 of the Montana Constitution provides that no “armed persons . . . shall be
brought into this State for the preservation of the peace . . . except upon application of the legislature . . .” and § 437.209 of Texas Statutes provides that a “military force from another State . . . may not enter
the State without the permission of the Governor.” Statutes or constitutional provisions like these can
impede the timely flow of NG forces from one State to another.

Federal Supremacy Clause immunity\textsuperscript{42} may be a viable defense should a violation of State law arise in
the case of a NG force crossing a State border for Federal training purposes (this concept is discussed
more below). If Federal Supremacy Clause immunity is successful in defense of a violation of State
law, then the use of one State’s RUF would not be an issue in cross-border operations (unless the RUF
themselves are unconstitutional),\textsuperscript{43} unless operations undertaken in an SAD status are involved.\textsuperscript{44}

The best approach is to work and obtain the proper approval to enter a State border in advance of a
cross-operation. Cross-border operations by State NG units in a SAD status for the purposes of
disaster relief or other State emergencies within a second State have typically been accomplished

\textsuperscript{39} Actions taken at the direction of Federal personnel will help support the argument that NG members are shielded by
Federal Supremacy Clause immunity from State criminal charges. See text infra, subparagraph C.2.; also see, West
(D. Md. 1955), in which persons who otherwise had no Federal or other governmental status were given Federal
Supremacy Clause immunity by judicial opinion because they acted at the behest of Federal officials. Note also that NG
members taking law enforcement-type action at the express request or direction of law enforcement personnel may be
provided with State immunity from civil or criminal prosecution. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404; CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 53a-22(d)–(e).

\textsuperscript{40} DA Form 4237-R (Detainee Personnel Record) may be used to inventory items taken from detainees.

\textsuperscript{41} ARNG Airport Security Instruction, supra note 41, para. 3-17a(3), required that the discharge of firearms, among other
matters, by NG personnel serving in that mission be reported to the NGB as a serious incident.

\textsuperscript{42} See text infra subparagraph C.2.

\textsuperscript{43} For an example of unconstitutional RUF, see Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997).

\textsuperscript{44} It is even more likely that an armed National Guard force would be seen as a threat if entering the State in a SAD status
to control civil unrest, rather than under a pure training mission pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). Also note that some civil
support missions undertaken for State purposes may be counted as training; however, under NGR 350-1, supra note 13,
para. 3-9.j., and Federal Supremacy Clause, immunity may be available to protect that mission or part of that mission.
pursuant to the several disaster-related or “NG-only” interstate compacts. The latest of these compacts available for use during disaster relief or other State emergencies by the NG, and most recently approved by Congress, is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). As table 11-1 demonstrates below, all States now have codified the EMAC, most without change. Since its approval by Congress in 1996, many States have used EMAC for various State emergencies.

EMAC, like all congressionally-approved interstate compacts, is Federal law. As such, it is applied in the same manner as other Federal legislation. This position in the legal hierarchy provides a basis to overcome State constitutional provisions that would otherwise serve to prohibit the entry of NG members from other States. Further, requesting States may grant sending state NG forces peace officer powers (in accordance with requesting State’s statutes) via EMAC supplemental agreements. Under most situations, NG cross border operations are usually limited to providing law enforcement support to civil authorities, rather than providing direct law enforcement service. However, NG can in some instances be used for domestic law enforcement operations.

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45 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); the Interstate Civil Defense and Disaster Compact; the Interstate Emergency Management Compact; the Interstate Mutual Aid Compact; and the National Guard Mutual Assistance Compact. This on-line list includes neither the Massachusetts Compact with New York for Military Aid in an Emergency nor the New England States Emergency Military Aid Compact.

46 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) was approved by Congress in October of 1996, see Pub. L. No. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877 (1996) [hereinafter EMAC]. At the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, New York was not a member of the EMAC. New York did, however, have a 1951 Mutual Aid Compact with New Jersey, Vermont, and Massachusetts. A major issue that arose was what State would have command and control over service-members from other States. NYARNG Transcript, supra note 12, at 35-6.


48 See, e.g., Skamania County v. Woodall, 16 P.3d 701 (Wash. 2001).

49 The EMAC provides that a request by one party State for mutual aid from a second State is mandatory in that the request must be honored, subject only to the second State’s right to retain within that State those resources as are necessary for self-protection. EMAC, supra note 49, art. IV, para.1.

50 The EMAC provides that the power of arrest is granted to the emergency forces of the sending State if that power is “specifically agreed to” by the receiving State. EMAC, supra note 49, art. IV, para. 2. If the statutes of the receiving State grant only the NG forces of that State the authority of a peace officer, that limitation might be overcome by providing for the expanded authority of those forces from the sending State into one or more supplementary agreements pursuant to EMAC Article VII. Including this authority in a supplemental agreement could overcome the limitations to a State’s own National Guard units because an agreement implementing an interstate compact that has been approved by Congress has been held also to have the force and effect of Federal law. See Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency v. McKay, 769 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1985). A related issue is whether the executive branch emergency forces of two States whose legislative branches have granted no peace officer authority to either of their respective NG forces can nevertheless give themselves those powers and their supporting RUF by the inclusion of those powers in an EMAC Article VII supplementary agreement.

51 See NGR 500-5, supra note 7, para. 4-2. The National Guard instruction governing the airport security mission contemplated cross border operations but provided that NG forces were not to participate in law enforcement operations unless in exigent circumstances. ARNG Airport Security Instructions, supra note 41, paras. 2-1e, 2-8.

52 See generally, NGR 500-5, supra note 7, Chapter 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>EMAC Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Ala. Code § 31-9-40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Alaska Stat. § 26.23.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Ark. Code § 12-49-402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 179-179.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-60-2901</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Del. Code tit. 20, § 3401</td>
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<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>D.C. Code § 7-2331</td>
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<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Fla. Stat. §§ 252.921-933</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Ga. Code § 38-3-81</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>Guam Pub. L. 29-29</td>
</tr>
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<td>Idaho</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Ind. Code §§ 10-14-5-1 to 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Iowa Code § 29C.21</td>
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<td>Kansas</td>
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<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>Ky. Rev. Stat. § 39a.950</td>
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<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>La. Stat. § 29:733</td>
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<td>Maryland</td>
<td>Md. Code, Pub. Safety § 14-702</td>
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<td>State</td>
<td>Code Reference</td>
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<td>Michigan</td>
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<td>Minnesota</td>
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<td>Missouri</td>
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<td>New Mexico</td>
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<td>New York</td>
<td>N.Y. Exec. Law § 29-g</td>
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<td>North Carolina</td>
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<td>North Dakota</td>
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<td>Oregon</td>
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<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>P.R. Laws tit. 1, §§ 621-633</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
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<td>South Dakota</td>
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<td>Tennessee</td>
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<td>Texas</td>
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<td>State</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Utah Code §§ 53-2a-401 to 403</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virgin Islands</td>
<td>V.I. Code tit. 23, §§ 1051-1064</td>
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<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>Va. Code § 44-146.28:1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Wash. Rev. Code § 38.10.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>W. Va. Code § 15-5-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>Wis. Stat. § 323.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11-1. State EMAC Legislation

2. State Criminal Liability of NG Members for Use of Force

Immunity from State criminal charges for wrongful use of force by NG personnel was addressed by some NG RUF for the airport security mission.\(^5\) The subject is addressed here in the context of NG personnel on active duty for the purpose of Federal domestic law enforcement support or Federal security mission,\(^5\) for both Title 32\(^5\) and SAD status, for the purposes of a State emergency.

a. Active Duty Federal Mission

Although the early history of the doctrine of Federal Supremacy Clause immunity\(^5\) began before the case was decided,\(^5\) the opinion of the Supreme Court in *In Re Neagle*, 135 U.S. 1 (1890), is regarded as the seminal Federal Supremacy Clause immunity case. It established the theory that employees of the United States cannot be limited by prosecution under State criminal laws, by the States in their good faith, rightful, and proper execution of their Federal duties.

Mr. David Neagle, who served as a Deputy U.S. Marshal and bodyguard to Mr. Justice Stephen Field, then a sitting member of the U.S. Supreme Court, was charged with murder by the State of California after killing another individual, Mr. David Terry. At the time of the incident, Mr. Neagle thought Mr Terry was reaching for a weapon in an attempt to kill Mr. Justice Field. Neagle successfully argued that in killing Mr. Terry, he (Neagle) did no more than was required of him by his Federal position as

\(^5\) Such as during the 2002–2003 Air Force security mission, in which approximately 8,100 Army National Guard Soldiers were mobilized under 10 U.S.C. § 12302 for the purposes of providing security at U.S.A.F. and Air National Guard installations.
\(^5\) This was the case in the airport security mission.
\(^5\) See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
\(^5\) A U.S. Supreme Court case predating *Neagle* is Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880).
Deputy Marshal and bodyguard and that California should not be allowed to proceed in its prosecution lest that State by implication be allowed to control the proper execution of his Federal duties.

Since that case, the defense that proved so valuable to Mr. Neagle has been applied successfully numerous times in judicial opinions on behalf of Federal employees and other persons carrying out Federal missions, including Federal military personnel carrying out Federal military missions. Those Federal active duty military defendants have successfully employed the “Neagle defense” of Federal Supremacy Clause immunity against State criminal charges for improper operations of a motor vehicle,\(^{58}\) defamation,\(^{59}\) assault,\(^{60}\) and murder in the course of guarding prisoners of the U.S. Army.\(^{61}\) There is no limitation expressed in any of those opinions as to the type or character of the State offense to which the doctrine might be applied on a service-member’s behalf.\(^{62}\)

In only one reported military-related case has anything like Federal military RUF been clearly the subject of a Federal Supremacy Clause defense to State criminal charges. In United States v. Lipsett, 156 F. 65 (W.D. Mich. 1907), a case involving the shooting of an innocent bystander by a military guard, the Court examined the manual of guard duty used for training guards assigned to military prisoners. The Court found that per the manual, the guard’s duty in response to an attempted escape was to first call for the escapee to halt, and if the escapee did not halt, to then fire upon the prisoner.\(^{63}\) In this case, based largely on the court’s understanding of the guard’s Federal duties, the guard was acquitted of manslaughter.

The only case involving Federal RUF is a non-military civil case involving the RUF used by the FBI during the standoff between alleged weapons trafficker Randy Weaver and the FBI at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in 1992. In Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1997), the Court held the “shoot any armed male” FBI RUF to have been overly broad and to have deprived the plaintiff of his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. Thus, not only may a Federal officer, in the performance of his duties under a set of rules unlawfully deny the victim his constitutional rights, but the RUF at issue may be considered unconstitutional on their face as well.

### b. Title 32 or SAD Status and Mission

The holding of Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense,\(^{64}\) supra, stated that NG personnel in a Federal training or “other duty” status under 32 U.S.C. 502 are a State military force, and consequently, their RUF are

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61 See In re Fair, 100 F. 149 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900) and United States v. Lipsett, 156 F. 65 (W.D. Mich. 907).

62 The only limitation is that the act in question be taken in good faith and that the act be truly necessary for the purposes of the Federal mission. Thus, the defense has not been judicially applied in defense to State charges of unintentional death where the particular maneuver of a government vehicle was not required by the Federal military mission. See State v. Ivory, 906 F.2d 999 (4th Cir. 1990).


derived from State criminal and civil law. Under this analysis, the best defenses to the possibility of a State criminal charge resulting from good faith compliance with State RUF include:

- A State statute providing criminal immunity for NG personnel.

- An agreement with the State Attorney General (possibly at the time the State Attorney General gives any approval of the RUF) that NG personnel will not be prosecuted criminally for good faith compliance with the NG RUF.

- Extension of the doctrine of Federal Supremacy Clause immunity to NG personnel acting under Federal control.

The application of Federal Supremacy Clause immunity to a State military force may rest upon the accumulation of indicia of a Federal mission such as: Federally-funded orders, use of Federal equipment, governance by Federal regulations, execution of the mission on a Federally-owned or governed facility, application of the State RUF through execution of supplemental agreements under EMAC, execution of the mission details at the direction of Federal authorities such as Department of Homeland Security personnel, contracts or memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with Federal officials, or orders to Title 32 duty at the request of Federal Government officials. Case law clearly indicates that Federal Supremacy Clause immunity should be applied to cases involving a Federal mission whether or not the subject of that protection is a Federal employee.

3. RUF in Mixed NG and Active Component Operations

Given the doctrine of Federal Supremacy Clause immunity, Federal active duty Soldiers have less reason to consider themselves bound by the exact restrictions of a State’s criminal law and more reason to follow the requirements of the SRUF than do NG personnel in Title 32 or SAD status. For this reason, in domestic law enforcement support or security operations involving both active component

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65 Of course, because the subject is the possibility of State criminal charges, there is no value to tort law “hold harmless” agreements or the possible application of both the Federal Tort Claims Act and State tort claims laws.

66 New York, for example, has a statute that grants civil and criminal immunity to members of the New York National Guard ordered into active service of the State for “any act or acts done by them in the performance of their duty.” N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235. See also, NEV. REV. STAT. 412.154(1). In the case of the statutory immunity predicate for NG missions for which firearms are issued, the most basic statute providing for use of force may be a statute providing for immunity for the carrying of firearms. See, e.g., N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C: 39-6(1).

67 The ARNG airport security instruction required the National Guard RUF used for that mission be reviewed by the State Attorney General. ARNG Airport Security Instructions, supra note 41, para. 3-6a.

68 This type of agreement would have to be predicated upon the approval of the NG RUF by the State Attorney General. It also must be based upon the Attorney General’s statutory or common law powers of supervision over county or district prosecutors; the more independent the local prosecutor, the less value of any agreement with the State Attorney General. Where local prosecutors are mostly independent, assurance can only come from the agreement(s) of the local prosecutor(s).

69 Thus making the supplemental agreement and the RUF contained therein a matter of Federal law. See, e.g., Tahoe Regional Planning Agency v. McKay, 769 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1985).

70 For cases in which defendants, who had no Federal employee status, were subject to State criminal charges successfully argued the application of Federal Supremacy Clause immunity based upon a Federal mission, see, e.g., West Virginia v. Lang, 133 F. 887 (4th Cir. 1904) (member of U.S. Marshal’s posse made of ordinary citizens charged with murder); Connecticut v. Marra, 528 F. Supp. 381 (D. Conn. 1981) (informer cooperating with FBI charged with attempting to bribe a city policeman).
and NG members, judge advocates must pay close attention to their RUF (in particular to ensure compatibility with Federal SRUF) if each group has similar duties. The RUF applicable to NG personnel must respect State limitations on law enforcement-type activities by the NG (such as searches and seizures) and the use of force to support those activities.71

D. Role of the NG Judge Advocate

1. Drafting RUF

While RUF are an S-3/G-3 and commander responsibility, judge advocates should assist in drafting them (and may be tasked directly to draft them nonetheless). In addition, judge advocates should be directly involved in the production of RUF-related documents, such as information papers, memoranda of law, and memoranda of agreement with supported civil authorities.72 Some MOAs may contain hold harmless provisions, which the judge advocates should review, negotiate, and advise upon. If the RUF used by the NG in a law enforcement, law enforcement support, or security mission refers the reader to, or adopts the RUF currently used by a State law enforcement agency, judge advocates must review the documents relied upon for the RUF. The documents should be carefully reviewed to ensure compatibility with member skills, training, capabilities, weapons, and mission. It may be necessary to add provisions specifically applicable to the NG.

2. Negotiating RUF with State Agencies

Judge advocates will want to determine whether the RUF, MOA, OPLAN/OPORD, training documents, and other matters relating to the RUF are comprehensive, legally accurate, and well understood by the drafters and commanders. At times, other State officers or agencies, such as the Attorney General, district attorneys, or State law enforcement agencies may be involved in drafting or approving the RUF. In such cases, judge advocates may find it necessary to educate and negotiate issues that meld legal requirements with operational imperatives. For example, in New York after September 11th, New York Army NG judge advocates assisted in drafting the Governor’s airport security plan, including RUF. The plan and RUF were staffed through the Adjutant General and the Governor’s Counsel Office, and approved by the Governor on 29 September 2001.73

3. Providing Legal Advice on Liability

Counseling decision makers on the legal requirements necessary to protect members from civil and criminal liability can be a complicated task. The primary focus of the judge advocate’s counseling will

71 This does not necessarily imply that State RUF will always be more restrictive than the SRUF. For example, in civil disturbance support operations in which NGR 500-5 applies. See NGR 500-5, supra note 7, para. 404. In contrast, the analogous provision of the draft SRUF, CJCSI 3121.01B supra note 5, Encl. L para. 5.c.(2), authorizes the use of deadly force to protect president-designated assets vital to national security, which by definition is property the theft or sabotage of which must create an “imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm.”

72 The National Guard Bureau Instruction governing the airport security mission required that States execute memoranda of understanding or memoranda of agreement (MOU/MOA) with supported airports for missions longer than thirty days. See ARNG Airport Security Instructions, supra note 41, para. 2-8a.

73 NYARNG Transcript, supra note 12, at 184.
be State’s TAG; the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; the Plans, Operations, and Training Officer; and the Task Force or other commanders.

4. Training

Judge advocates should seek opportunities to assist trainers responsible for ensuring that individual members learn and apply the correct standards for force. In this role, they can write or assist in writing information papers, training vignettes, and legal memoranda. Also, the use of a training certification process may be useful.

E. Conclusion

When the NG operates in a State status, either Title 32 or SAD, the rules for the use of force are based on the State law where the mission is taking place. Developing these rules for the use of force requires knowledge of the relevant State law, including the level of law enforcement authority given to the NG, and the criminal laws relating to self-defense. Judge advocates providing advice on the drafting of the RUF must also tailor their RUF to the specific mission, and determine the appropriate level of coordination with the State Attorney General’s Office, the local district attorney, and other law enforcement agencies. Finally, judge advocates should assist commanders in developing appropriate training so that all NG service-members are fully aware of the State’s RUF prior to engaging in operations.
CHAPTER 12

FUNDING DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

KEY REFERENCES:

- 10 U.S.C. § 2556 - Shelter for Homeless; Incidental Service.
- 10 U.S.C. § 2558 - National Military Associations; Assistance at National Conventions.
• DoDD 3025.18 - Defense Support of Civil Authorities, September 21, 2012 (C2, March 18, 2018).
• DoDD 5200.31E - DoD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program, August 10, 2011 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective September 21, 2020).
• DoDI 3025.20 - Defense Support of Special Events, April 6, 2012 (C1, May 24, 2017).
• DoDI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, February 27, 2013, Incorporating Change 1, Effective February 8, 2019.
• CJCSI 3710.01B, DoD Counterdrug Support, January 26, 2007 (current as of June 12, 2014).
• CNGBI 3000.04 - NG Bureau Domestic Operations, January 24, 2018.
• NGR 500-2/ANGI 10-801, National Guard Counterdrug Support, August 28, 2008 (Currently under re-write as a CNGB Manual. Check for publishing at end of FY21).
• AR 75-14/OPNAVINST 8027.7/AFI 32-3002-0/MCO 8027.1E, Inter-Service Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, March 17, 2020.
• AR 75-15, Policy for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, December 17, 2019.
• AR 190-12, Military Working Dogs, October 23, 2019.
• SECNAVINST 5820.7C - Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, January 26, 2006.
• OPNAVINST 3440.16D - Navy Defense Support of Civil Authorities Program.
A. Introduction: Basic Fiscal Law Framework

The principles of Federal appropriations law permeate all Federal Government activity. Fiscal issues arise frequently during domestic operations, and the failure to understand fiscal nuances may lead to the improper expenditure of funds and sanctions against those responsible for funding violations.

Under the U.S. Constitution, Congress raises revenue and appropriates funds for Federal agency operations and programs. Courts interpret this constitutional authority to mean that Executive branch officials, e.g., commanders and staff members, must find affirmative authority for the obligation and expenditure of appropriated funds. To that end, the Comptroller of the United States at the Government Accountability Office (GAO) developed a three-part “necessary expense” test to ensure the proper expenditure of Federal funds. That test is:

- The expenditure must have a logical relationship to the appropriation charged;
- The expenditure must not be prohibited by law; and
- The expenditure must not be otherwise provided for. Likewise, in many cases, Congress has specifically limited the ability of the Executive branch to obligate and expend funds, in annual authorization or appropriations acts or in permanent legislation.

In domestic operations, the Department of Defense (DoD) supports requesting local and state civil authorities in response to disasters and emergencies. This Federal Government support is coordinated with and through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As such, military assistance is provided to civil authorities on a reimbursable basis. In the case of some authorized activities such as counterdrug support, Congress annually appropriates money to the Department of Defense for this purpose. For other authorized activities, Congress has established special “no year” accounts (such as the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) and the Support for International Sporting Competitions (SISC) account) into which the Department of Defense can transfer part of its annual appropriation of Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funds. Once O&M funds are transferred to such an account, the funds are available for the same purposes and for the same time period as the appropriation to which

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1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
2 See, e.g., U.S. v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (“The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless prohibited by Congress.”). An obligation arises when the government incurs a legal liability to pay for its requirements, e.g., supplies, services, or construction. For example, a contract award normally triggers a fiscal obligation. Commands also incur obligations when they obtain goods and services from other U.S. agencies or a host nation. An expenditure is an outlay of funds to satisfy a legal obligation. Both obligations and expenditures are critical fiscal events. See 31 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012).
4 See DoDD 3025.18 - Defense Support of Civil Authorities, September 21, 2012 (C2, March 18, 2018) [hereinafter DoDD 3025.18].
6 CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTR. 3710.01B, DOD COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT (26 Jan. 2007) [hereinafter CJCSI 3710.01B].
transferred. In providing some types of support, the Department of Defense has the authority to act directly and expend O&M funds. As a result, of these various types of situations, it is important to understand that the purpose, time, and amount rules apply in domestic support operations.

B. Basic Fiscal Controls

Congress imposes fiscal controls through three basic mechanisms, each implemented by one or more statutes. The controls are as follows:

- Obligations and expenditures must be for a proper purpose (the purpose of the funds appears in the language of the appropriation and normally follows the word “for”);
- Obligations must occur within the time limits applicable to the appropriation (e.g., O&M funds are available for obligation for one fiscal year) (remember, “current year funds for current year needs”); and
- Obligations must be within the amounts authorized by Congress (no spending in advance of nor in excess of an appropriation).8

With that said, there are certain statutory exceptions to these fiscal controls. When dealing in a domestic operations scenario, most of the expenditures are unplanned and emergent. It is the responsibility of the judge advocate to work with the Contracting Officer, or in the case of the National Guard (NG), the United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO), to identify legal courses of action then properly advise the commander.

1. Purpose

Although each fiscal control is important, the “purpose” control is most likely to become an issue during military operations. The Purpose Statute provides that “[a]ppropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.”9 Thus, expenditures must be authorized by law (permanent legislation or annual appropriations act) or be “reasonably related” to the purpose of an appropriation. Judge advocates should ensure, therefore, that an expenditure fits an appropriation (or permanent statutory provision), or is for a purpose that is necessary and incident to the general purpose of an appropriation; the expenditure is not prohibited by law; and the expenditure is not provided for otherwise, i.e., it does not fall within the scope of some other appropriation.

A corollary to the “purpose” control is the prohibition against augmentation.10 Appropriated funds designated for a general purpose may not be used for another purpose for which Congress has appropriated other funds.11 If two funds are equally available for a given purpose, an agency may elect

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8 See 2020 Fiscal Law Deskbook, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School.
11 Secretary of the Navy, 20 Comp. Gen. 272 (1940).
to use either, but once the election is made, the agency must continue to charge the same fund.\textsuperscript{12} This concept is known legally as the “election doctrine,” and the election is binding even after the chosen appropriation is exhausted.\textsuperscript{13}

Unless otherwise authorized by law, a Federal unit’s O&M funds, cannot be used to provide support to civil authorities. The same holds true for equipment procured with Federal funds. So, the question becomes, “What law or policy authorizes a unit to expend funds or incur expenses when providing support to civil authorities?” This chapter discusses the answer in depth. Likewise, if a Federal agency accepts funds outside the normal appropriations process, then the agency is augmenting the funds that Congress has appropriated. In addition, retaining those funds violates the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute.\textsuperscript{14} When an agency retains these funds, this also violates the Constitutional requirement for an appropriation.\textsuperscript{15} These legal principles prohibit unauthorized DoD expenditures to further State missions. These principles also prohibit units from accepting resources directly from State and local entities.

There are, however, statutory [and GAO-sanctioned] exceptions to the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute. For example intra- and inter-governmental acquisition authorities allow agencies to retain and use funds from sources other than those appropriated by Congress directly to that particular agency.\textsuperscript{16} The Economy Act authorizes a Federal agency to order supplies or services from another Federal agency. For these transactions, the requesting agency must reimburse the performing agency fully for the direct and indirect costs of providing the goods and services.\textsuperscript{17} This stage is where misunderstandings arise regarding the NG in terms of State Active Duty (SAD) missions. That is, when a State performs a SAD mission using Federal equipment (e.g., vehicles and helicopters), the United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) is required under NG Regulation NGR 500-5 to seek reimbursement from the State.\textsuperscript{18} However, the request from the USPFO to the State is not an Economy Act transaction, and therefore the reimbursement authority at 31 U.S.C. § 1536 is not applicable. Judge advocates may wish to consult agency regulations for order approval requirements.\textsuperscript{19}

Congress also has authorized certain expenditures for military support to civil law enforcement agencies (CLEAs) in counter-drug operations. Support to CLEAs is reimbursable unless it occurs during normal training and results in a benefit to the Department of Defense that is substantially

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{12} See Funding for Army Repair Projects, Comp. Gen. B-272191, Nov. 4, 1997, 97-2 CPD P141.
\item\textsuperscript{13} Honorable Clarence Cannon, B-139510, May 13, 1959, available at http://www.gao.gov/products/403911 (Rivers and Harbors Appropriation exhausted; Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, unavailable for used to dredge channel to shipyard).
\item\textsuperscript{14} See 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2012); Interest Earned on Unauthorized Loans of Fed. Grant Funds, B-246502, 71 Comp. Gen. 387 (1992).
\item\textsuperscript{18} U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE, NAT'L GUARD, REG. 500-5, NATIONAL GUARD DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MISSION ASSURANCE OPERATIONS para. 5-5.c (18 Aug. 2010) [hereinafter NGR 500-5].
\item\textsuperscript{19} See, e.g., GEN. SERVS. ADMIN. ET AL., FEDERAL ACQUISITION REG. Subpart 17.5 (Aug 2018) [hereinafter FAR]; Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Subpart 217.5; Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement Subpart 17.5.
\end{footnotes}
equivalent to that which otherwise would be obtained from routine training or operations.\textsuperscript{20} Another statutory provision authorizes operations or training to be conducted for the sole purpose of providing CLEAs with specific categories of support.\textsuperscript{21} In 10 U.S.C. Section 124, Congress assigned the operational mission of detecting and monitoring international drug traffic (a traditional CLEA function) to the Department of Defense. By authorizing DoD support to CLEAs at essentially no cost, Congress has authorized augmentation of CLEA appropriations.

2. \textbf{Time}

The “time” control has two major elements: (1) appropriations have a definite life span; and (2) appropriations normally must be used for the needs that arise during their period of availability. Most appropriations are available for a finite period. For example, O&M funds, the appropriation most prevalent in an operational setting, are available for one year; procurement appropriations are available for three years; and construction funds have a five-year period of availability. If funds are not obligated during their period of availability, they expire and are unavailable for new obligations (e.g., new contracts or changes outside the scope of an existing contract). It is possible to use expired funds, however, to adjust existing obligations (e.g., to pay for a price increase following an in-scope change to an existing contract). The “bona fide needs rule” provides that funds are available only to satisfy requirements that arise during their period of availability, and will affect which fiscal year appropriation you will use to acquire supplies and services.\textsuperscript{22} This is commonly referred to as using current year funds for current year needs.

The bona fide need for supplies normally exists when the Government will actually be able to use the items. Thus, a command would use a currently available appropriation for computers needed and purchased in the current fiscal year. Conversely, commands may not use current year funds for computers not needed until the next fiscal year. It is proper to use year-end spending for computers if the delivery is within a reasonable time after the new fiscal year begins. However, commands must document the current year need. Note that there are “lead-time” and “stock-level” exceptions to the general rule governing purchases of supplies.\textsuperscript{23} In any event, there is a prohibition of “stockpiling” items.\textsuperscript{24}

Normally, severable services are bona fide needs of the period in which they are performed. Grounds maintenance, custodial services, and vehicle/equipment maintenance are examples of recurring services considered severable. The general rule is to obligate current year funds for recurring services performed in the current fiscal year. As an exception however, 10 U.S.C. § 2410a permits funding a contract (or other agreement) for severable services using an appropriation current when the contract is executed, even if some services will be performed in the subsequent fiscal year. Conversely, non-severable services are bona fide needs of the year in which a contract (or other agreement) is executed. Non-severable services are those that contemplate a single undertaking, e.g., studies, reports, overhaul

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\textsuperscript{22} See 31 U.S.C. § 1502(a) (2013).

\textsuperscript{23} See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE, DFAS-IN Reg. 37-1, DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE REG. INDIANAPOLIS 37-1 ch. 8 (Jan. 2010) [hereinafter DFAS-IN 37-1].

of an engine, painting a building, etc. For non-severable services, the command should fund an entire undertaking with fiscal year appropriations when the contract (or agreement) is executed.\textsuperscript{25}

The issue in the performance of domestic operations is two-pronged. First, when it comes to major disasters and emergencies, the request for DoD assistance is normally planned with little lead time. Thus, it is likely that no funds with a period of availability were appropriated for the specific purpose requested. Second, hurricanes normally hit near the end of the fiscal year. In this case, there are two concerns that a judge advocate should remember: 1) Current year funds should be used for current year needs; and 2) Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 18, \textit{Emergency Acquisitions}, is a good resource to use.

3. **Amount**

The Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA) prohibits any Federal Government officer or employee from: 1) making or authorizing an expenditure or obligation in advance of or in excess of an appropriation;\textsuperscript{26} 2) making or authorizing an expenditure or incurring an obligation in excess of a formal subdivision of funds, or in excess of amounts permitted by regulations prescribed under 31 U.S.C. § 1514(a);\textsuperscript{27} or 3) from accepting voluntary services, unless authorized by law.\textsuperscript{28}

Commanders must ensure that fund obligations and expenditures do not exceed amounts provided by higher headquarters. Although over-obligation of an installation O&M account normally does not trigger a reportable ADA violation, an over-obligation locally may lead to a breach of a formal O&M subdivision at a higher echelon level.\textsuperscript{29}

Commanders must investigate suspected violations to establish responsibility and discipline violators. Regulations require “flash reporting” of possible ADA violations.\textsuperscript{30} If a command confirms a violation, the cause of the violation, as well as the senior responsible individual, must be identified. Investigators file reports through finance channels to the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management & Comptroller (ASA (FM&C)). Further reporting through Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the OMB, GAO, President, and Congress is required if ASA (FM&C) concurs with a finding of a violation.

By regulation, commanders must impose administrative sanctions on responsible individuals. Criminal action also may be taken if a violation was knowing and willful.\textsuperscript{31} In previous cases, lawyers, commanders, contracting officers, and resource managers have been found to be responsible for violations. Common problems that have triggered potential ADA violations include the following:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{25} See DFAS-IN 37-1, \textit{supra} note 23.
\item \textsuperscript{26} See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
\item \textsuperscript{27} See 31 U.S.C. § 1517 (2012).
\item \textsuperscript{28} See 31 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012).
\item \textsuperscript{29} See 31 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2012) (requiring agencies to subdivide and control appropriations by establishing administrative subdivisions); 31 U.S.C. § 1517 (2013); DFAS-IN 37-1, \textit{supra} note 23.
\item \textsuperscript{30} See \textsc{Department of Defense}, DoD 7000.14-R, \textsc{Financial Management Regulation} vol. 14 (May 2015) [hereinafter DoD 7000.14-R]; DFAS-IN 37-1, \textit{supra} note 23.
\item \textsuperscript{31} 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349 -1350 (2012).
\end{itemize}
• Without statutory authority, obligating (e.g., awarding a contract) current year funds for the bona fide needs of a subsequent fiscal year. This may occur when activities stockpile supply items in excess of those required to maintain normal inventory levels;

• Exceeding a statutory limit (e.g., funding a contingency construction project in excess of $2M with O&M; acquiring investment items in excess of an aggregate $250K with O&M funds);

• Obligating funds for purposes prohibited by annual or permanent legislation; and

• Obligating funds for a purpose for which Congress has not appropriated funds (e.g., personal expenses where there is no regulatory or case law support for the purchase or where Congress has placed a funding prohibition).

C. Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

The Federal military’s primary mission is to fight and win the nation’s wars. From time to time, the Department of Defense will provide support to civil authorities while the civil authorities retain primary responsibility for and control over the incident. The starting point for all DoD support to civil authorities is DoDD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). When speaking of the NG, it is important to separate NG Civil Support (NGCS) from DSCA. NGCS is, “[s]upport provided by the NG while in a State Active Duty status or Title 32 status to civil authorities for domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement, and other activities.”32 In contrast, DSCA is, “[s]upport provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and NG forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.”33 The NG may perform DSCA when supporting a mission that has been assigned to the Department of Defense by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and when performing this mission, the NG personnel are in their 32 U.S.C. 502(f)(2) status.34 Otherwise, when providing civil support, the NG is performing NGCS where DoDD 3025.18 does not apply.

The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. § 1385) provides limitations on the types of support that the Federal military may provide to civil authorities. The following are areas of common allowable military support and their governing policies and authorities:35


35 See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., INSTR. 3025.21, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (27 Feb. 2013) (C1, 8 Feb. 19) [hereinafter DoDI 3025.21].
• Civil disaster and emergencies (Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 5121, et seq.), DoDD 3025.18).

• Civil disturbances; Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. §§ 251-255, DoDI 3025.21).

• Support to civilian law enforcement (DoDI 3025.21).
  o Loan of equipment and use of facilities (10 U.S.C. § 272, DoDI 3025.21).
  o Maintenance and operation of equipment. (10 U.S.C. § 274, DoDI 3025.21).

• Counterdrug support:
  o Training and other support. (10 U.S.C. § 1004, Fiscal Year (FY) 91 NDAA, as amended by § 1021, FY 02, NDAA; CJCSI 3710.01B).


Department of Defense Support to Special Events to include support to International Supporting Events. 10 U.S.C. § 2564(a)-(c), DoDI 3025.20


• Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD): AR 75-14, AR 75-15.

• Military Working Dogs. DoDD 5200.31E, AR 190-21.

• Miscellaneous support:
  o Sensitive support. DoDD S-5210-36.
  o Emergencies involving chemical or biological weapons. 10 U.S.C. § 382.
D. DoDD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

This Directive governs DoD military assistance provided to civil authorities within the 50 States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and U.S. possessions and territories. This policy provides the six criteria, known as the CARRLL factors, against which commanders should evaluate all requests for support shall be evaluated:

- **Cost** - who pays and the impact on DoD budget;
- **Appropriateness** - whether conducting the requested mission is in the DoD’s interest;
- **Readiness** - impact on the DoD’s ability to perform its primary mission;
- **Risk** - safety of DoD forces;
- **Legality** - compliance with the law; and
- **Lethality** - potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces.

Per DoDD 3025.18, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is the approval authority for DoD assistance in civil disturbances, responses to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events, defense assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies (except as authorized by DoDI 3025.21 as discussed below), and support that has the potential for lethality.

When Combatant Commands use their assigned, they must coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). SecDef approval is not required when immediate response authority of the local commander under DoDD 3025.18 is used, but a reassessment of the appropriateness of the use of this authority is required within the first 72 hours of a response.36

As noted above, DoDD 3025.18 is the DSCA policy for the DoD. Distinction must be made when considering the usage of the NG to support a DSCA mission assigned to the DoD by FEMA. At this juncture, DoDI 3025.22 must be reviewed because this policy and DoDD 3025.18 become applicable to members of the NG when serving in their 32 US.C. § 502(f) status.37

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36 “The DoD official directing a response under immediate response authority shall reassess whether there remains a necessity for the Department of Defense to respond under this authority as soon as practicable but, if immediate response activities have not yet ended, not later than 72 hours after the request for assistance was received.” DoDD 3025.18, *supra* note 33, para 4.g.(2).

37 DoDI 3025.22, *supra* note 34.
E. Disaster and Emergency Relief

The Stafford Act provides four means by which the Federal Government may become involved in a disaster and relief effort: the President may declare the area a major disaster; the President may declare the area an emergency; the President may send in DoD assets on an emergency basis to “preserve life and property”; and the President may send in Federal assets where an emergency occurs in an area over which the Federal Government exercises primary responsibility by virtue of the Constitution or Federal statute.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), through FEMA, directs and coordinates the Federal response on behalf of the President. DHS has prepared the National Response Framework (NRF), which defines fifteen Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) for which certain Federal agencies have either a primary or supporting role. The Corps of Engineers is the primary agency for ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering. DoD is a supporting agency for all others.

FEMA appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), typically the senior FEMA official on-scene. Because of the likelihood of DoD involvement, a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is assigned to the FCO. The DCO, an O-6 or above, is identified from a Training Support Brigade (TSB). Training Support Brigades are located throughout the continental United States (CONUS). Training Support Brigade commanders are dual-hatted as DCOs. The DCO will be the FCO’s single point of contact for DoD support. The FCO issues Mission Assignments (MA), defining the task and maximum reimbursement amount, to the Federal agencies responding.

The DoD is reimbursed by FEMA for the incremental costs of providing support pursuant to the DCO’s tasking in response to the FEMA mission assignment. Incremental expenses are reimbursed, or those expenses incurred by the agency providing the military assistance that—would not otherwise have incurred these expenses. The Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMR) 7000.14-R, vol. 12, ch. 6, para. 060204, lists the following costs as eligible for reimbursement:

- Overtime, travel, and per diem of permanent DoD civilian personnel;
- Wages, travel, and per diem of temporary DoD civilian personnel assigned solely to performance of services directed by the Executive Agent;

40 See 42 U.S.C. § 5191 (2012) (same criteria as for a major disaster, except it also requires that the governor define the type and amount of federal aid required, and total federal assistance may not exceed $5 million).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(c) (2012).
42 See 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b) (2012).
• Travel and per diem of active duty military, and costs of reserve component personnel called to active duty by a federal official who is assigned solely to the performance of services directed by the Executive Agent;

• Cost of work, services, and material procured under contract for the purposes of providing assistance directed by the Executive Agent;

• Cost of materials, equipment and supplies (including transportation, repair and maintenance) from regular stocks used in providing directed assistance;

• All costs incurred which are paid from trust, revolving, or other funds, and whose reimbursement the law requires; and

• Other costs submitted with written justification or otherwise agreed to in writing by the Joint Director of Military Support or appropriate Service representative.

Requests for reimbursement are made using an SF-1080, Voucher for Transfers between Appropriations or Funds. It is important to note that Federal agencies, which exceed the reimbursement amount, or execute tasks not within the MA, may not be reimbursed.

For the DoD response, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) is the DoD lead for disaster relief operations. As such, they are the approval authority for all such support, unless it involves Combatant Command-assigned forces. The Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) is the ASD(HD&ASA) agent. The JDOMS coordinates and monitors the DoD effort. The JDOMS normally produces the Execute Order and obtains the SecDef’s signature for a given mission. USNORTHCOM (CONUS, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) and USINDOPACOM (Hawaii, and Pacific possessions and territories) are responsible for developing disaster response plans and for the execution of those plans needed for a response. They may form a Joint Task Force for this purpose.

1. Immediate Response Authority (IRA)

IRA permits local military commanders to act immediately to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage in imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from higher headquarters. Types of support authorized include rescue, evacuation, and emergency treatment of casualties; emergency restoration of essential public services; emergency removal of debris and explosive ordnance; and recovery and disposal of the dead. This type of support is provided on a reimbursable basis, but assistance should not be denied because the requester is unable or unwilling to commit to reimbursement. Reimbursement is routed to the Department of the Treasury.

43 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 33, para 4.i.
44 DoD MANUAL 3025.01, VOL. 2. DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: DO D INCIDENT RESPONSE (11 Aug. 2016) (Ch.1 13 Apr. 2017), sec. 5.3 [hereinafter DODM 3025.01, VOL 2.].
45 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 33, at para. 4.i.6.
IRA is very limited and should be invoked only for bona fide emergencies. Contemporaneous coordination with JDOMS and ASD(HD&ASA) should always occur in these scenarios, and in any other case potentially involving this type of assistance to civil authorities. The commander must reassess the need for immediate response not less than 72 hours after the civil authority submitted the request for assistance. To obtain reimbursement for costs incurred as a result of an immediate response, the Department of Defense should request reimbursement from the State or local government to whom assistance was provided. In some cases, the State and local governments may not have the available funding to reimburse. With that said, all is not lost. “Ongoing [S]tate and local response activity may be reimbursed if a declaration is issued, including for evacuations, sheltering and other emergency protective measures.” Should the State have funding available to reimburse the Department of Defense, funding is not sent directly to a unit account. Instead, “States must reimburse the United States Treasury in accordance with section 9701 [Fees and Charges for Government Services and Things of Value] of [Title 31 of the United States Code].”

If authorized by law, for instance under the Stafford Act, and approved by the appropriate DoD official (i.e. Secretary of Defense or the President), the support may be provided on a non-reimbursable basis. Even if the civil authority was unaware of this rule, and paid the money directly to the unit, Federal military personnel must still comply with the rules governing “money for the Government” more commonly referred to as the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute, 31 U.S.C. 3302(b). The same applies to mutual aid agreements. (see DoDM 3025.01 Vol 2; DoDI 6055.06 Encl 2; and 42 USC Section 1855(d)).

2. Emergency Response Fund (ERF)

Since November 2003, the ERF has been closed out. Congress created the ERF in the FY90 National Defense Appropriation Act, Pub. L. 101-165, in response to Hurricane Hugo. Under this provision, “the Fund is available for providing reimbursement to currently applicable appropriations of the [DoD] for supplies and services provided in anticipation of requests from other Federal Departments and agencies and State and local governments for assistance on a reimbursable basis to respond to natural and manmade disasters.”

In FY94, § 8131 of the National Defense Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-139, amended the FY90 provision giving DoD the ability to request reimbursement from the ERF for its own disaster response efforts. Specifically, the language provides, “the Fund may be used, in addition to other funds available to DoD for such purposes, for expenses of DoD which are incurred in supplying supplies and services furnished in response to natural or manmade disasters.”

46 Id. at para. 4.i.5.
47 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DISASTER OPERATIONS LEGAL REFERENCE VER. 3.0 1-3 (20 Jan. 2017) [hereinafter Disaster Ops Legal Reference 3.0].
48 DoDD 3025.18, supra note 33, at para. 4.d.
49 Id.
50 Closed out in § 1105 of the FY04 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act.
Prior to November 2003, if the State and local government were unable or unwilling to reimburse the Department of Defense, the command would forward a request for reimbursement to the ERF. This fund was available for providing reimbursement to currently applicable DoD appropriations for supplies and services provided in anticipation of requests from other Federal departments and agencies and from State and local governments for assistance on a reimbursable basis to respond to natural or manmade disasters.

The Act that closed out the ERF provided that, effective November 1, 2003, adjustments to obligations that before such date would have been properly chargeable to the ERF shall be charged to current appropriations available for the same purpose. Now, it may be possible to seek reimbursement through FEMA. In some instances, FEMA has provided reimbursement to the DoD for IRA assistance by “ratifying” the DoD action after the fact. Such ratification, however, is done on a case-by-case basis. What a commander may find is the support previously provided under the commander’s immediate response authority rolled under a mission assignment from FEMA for which reimbursement is available via the disaster relief fund in accordance with the Stafford Act. Another option is the usage of DoD resources to perform emergency work “during the immediate aftermath of an incident which may ultimately qualify for assistance under [the Stafford Act].” The Governor may request the President to direct the Secretary of Defense to use DoD assets to perform emergency work for up to 10 days before the formal declaration of a major disaster or emergency. Thus, even though the ERF no longer exists, there are multiple ways to reimburse Federal military units for expenditures while providing legal support to civil authorities before a declaration or mission assignment.

F. Civil Disturbance Operations (CDOs)

The maintenance of law and order is primarily vested in State and local officials. Involvement of military forces will only be appropriate in extraordinary circumstances. Use of the military under these authorities to conduct law enforcement activities is a specific exception to the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). The probable order of employment of forces in response to a certain situation will be (1) local and State police; (2) NG in their SAD status; (3) Federal civil law enforcement officials; and (4) Federal military troops, to include, if necessary, NG personnel called to active Federal service.

The insurrection statutes permit the President to use the Federal Armed Forces domestically under certain circumstances. The Attorney General coordinates all Federal Government activities relating to civil disturbances. If the President decides to respond to the situation, he must first issue a proclamation to the insurgents, prepared by the Attorney General, directing them to disperse within a

53 See DoD 7000.14-R, supra note 30, ch. 6.
54 Id.
56 Id.
57 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4: “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence”; Insurrections, 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255 (2012); DODI 3025.21, supra note 35.
limited time.\textsuperscript{59} At the end of that time-period, the President may issue an executive order directing the use of Federal Armed Forces. The Attorney General appoints a Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG) as his action agent.

For the DoD response, the Secretary of Defense has reserved the authority to approve support in response to civil disturbances.\textsuperscript{60} Although the civilian authorities have the primary responsibility for civil disturbances, Federal Armed Forces shall remain under Federal military command and control at all times. Federal Armed Forces shall not be used for civil disturbances unless specifically directed by the President (pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 251-255), except for emergency employment of Federal military forces in the following limited circumstances:\textsuperscript{61}

- To prevent the loss of life or wanton destruction of property or to restore governmental functioning, in cases of civil disturbances, if the duly constituted authority local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior Presidential authorization; and

- When duly constituted State or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or functions.

Although employment under these authorities permits direct enforcement of the law by military forces, the military’s role in law enforcement should be minimized as much as possible. The DoD’s role is to support the civilian authorities, not replace them. Once the President directs the employment of Federal military forces, the Department of Defense may use O&M funds to cover the cost.

G. Support to Civilian Law Enforcement\textsuperscript{62}

Although certain activities may be law enforcement-type activities, they will not violate the PCA when Federal military personnel to provide indirect assistance. With proper approval, DoD activities may make equipment (including associated supplies and spare parts) or facilities available to Federal, State, or local law enforcement officials for law enforcement purposes.

Under 10 U.S.C. § 274(a), the Secretary of Defense may make DoD personnel available for the maintenance of equipment provided, to include equipment provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 272. Under 10 U.S.C. § 274(b)(1), the Secretary may also, upon a request from the head of a Federal law enforcement agency, make DoD personnel available to operate equipment with respect to criminal violations of the Controlled Substances Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the Tariff Act of 1930, the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, and any law, foreign or domestic, prohibiting terrorist


\textsuperscript{60} See DoDD 3025.18, supra note 27, para. 4.j.

\textsuperscript{61} The Insurrection Act, supra note 58.

activities; a foreign or domestic counter-terrorism operation; or a rendition of a suspected terrorist from a foreign country to the United States to stand trial.

Under 10 U.S.C. § 274(b)(2), DoD personnel made available to a civilian law enforcement agency may operate equipment for the following purposes:

- Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of air and sea traffic;

- Detection, monitoring, and communication of the movement of surface traffic outside of the geographic boundary of the United States and within the United States not to exceed 25 miles of the boundary if the initial detection occurred outside the boundary;

- Aerial reconnaissance;

- Interception of vessels or aircraft detected outside the land area of the U.S. for the purposes of communicating with and directing said vehicle to a specific location;

- Operating equipment to facilitate communications;

- Subject to joint approval by the Secretary of Defense and Attorney General:
  - Transportation of civilian law enforcement personnel along with any other civilian or military personnel who are supporting, or conducting, a joint operation with civilian law enforcement personnel;
  - Operation of a base of operations;
  - Transportation of suspected terrorists from foreign countries to the U.S. for trial (so long as the requesting Federal law enforcement agency provides all security for such transportation and maintains custody over the suspect through the duration of the transportation).

1. Economy Act

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 277, the support provided between Federal agencies under these authorities is reimbursable under the Economy Act, unless the support is provided in the normal course of training or operations, or the support results in a substantially equivalent training value. Under 31 U.S.C. § 1535, an Economy Act order may be placed by the head of an agency (delegable down to a warranted contracting officer) with another agency. The order may be a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR), a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for support, or an interagency agreement. Form is not the key—content is the critical matter. The definition of “agency” includes military departments. The content defines the type of support to be rendered and the reimbursement to be provided.

63 FAR, supra note 19, at pt. 2.101.
2. Miscellaneous Receipts

The Miscellaneous Receipts Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b), requires that any dollars received by an agency must go into the general treasury, without any deduction for any charges or claims, unless there is a positive legal authority, like the Economy Act, that allows an agency to retain the money. The Economy Act does not apply to NG in the performance of SAD missions. Further, although the language in 10 U.S.C. § 272 et seq. authorizes support to State and local civilian law enforcement agencies, the reimbursement provision in 10 U.S.C. § 277 provides no mechanism for reimbursement except for support between Federal agencies. If commanders loan equipment to State or local CLEAs under this authority, any reimbursement obtained would go to the U.S. Treasury as a Miscellaneous Receipt. It is important to note that reimbursement is required, unless the law allows a waiver. The only way to avoid this problem is for the commander to lease the equipment under 10 U.S.C. § 2667. The Leasing Statute provides a mechanism for reimbursement. If a loan is authorized, there must be no adverse impact on national security or military preparedness. (Specific details regarding the Leasing Statute are in Section L of this Chapter)

The Secretary of the Army has statutory authority to approve loans, leases, and donations of Army material. The Chief, Integrated Logistics Support Division (DALO-SMP) is responsible for acting on loan and lease request and loan and lease extensions forwarded for Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) review by major Army Commands (MACOMs). AR 700-131 contains detailed procedures on the loan or transfer of Army property. For the Navy and Marine Corps, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) may approve requests for non-lethal equipment for more than sixty days.64 All other requests may be approved as specified in SECNAVINST 5820.7C. For the Air Force, AFI 10-801 states that in circumstances not immediately threatening to human life, causing human suffering, or threatening great property damage, requests for equipment or facilities for Federal, State, or local civilian officials (including law enforcement) should be addressed in accordance with AFI 23-119 and AFI 32-9003. For the NG, the loan of weapons, combat/tactical vehicles, vessels and aircraft require approval of the service secretary or their designee. Requests for loan/lease of NG equipment, which require HQDA or HQAF approval, will be reviewed by National Guard Bureau (NGB));65 however, it must be remembered that the Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for all DoD support to counterterrorism operations, emergency support to civil disturbances, and law enforcement agencies that will result in a planned event with the potential for confrontation with named individuals/groups or use of lethal force.

3. Excess Property

In addition to loan/lease authority, The National Defense Authorization Act of 1997 added a new section to Title 10. Section 2576a, “Excess Personal Property; Sale or Donation for law enforcement activities,” permits DoD to provide excess personal property suitable for use in counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities to Federal and State agencies. The program is commonly referred to as the “1033 Program” because it fell under Section 1033 of the 1997 NDAA (PL 104-181). 10 U.S.C. § 2576 authorizes the surplus sale of military equipment to state and local law enforcement and firefighting agencies. 10 U.S.C. § 2576(a) authorizes the surplus sale of military equipment to Federal

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64 SECNAVINST 5820.7C, supra note 62.
65 NATIONAL GUARD REG. 500-5, NATIONAL GUARD DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT AND MISSION ASSURANCE OPERATIONS para 4-8 (Aug. 2010) [hereinafter NGR 500-5].
and State agencies suitable for carrying out law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and emergency management services. The State or local agency must initiate a request for the equipment. The program is managed by the Defense Logistics Agency Law Enforcement Support Office at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. 10 U.S.C. § 2576a and § 2576b provide additional mechanisms for the transfer of excess property (without sale) to law enforcement and firefighting agencies.

4. Expert Advice and Training

DoD components are authorized to give expert advice and/or training to Federal, State, and local law enforcement in certain cases. Overarching policy regarding the provision of this assistance is found at 32 C.F.R. § 182, and more specific policy is found in DoDI 3025.21.

DoD components may provide, subject to approval limitations in DoDI 3025.21, expert advice to Federal, State, or local law enforcement officials in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 373. A specific example of this type of support is military working dog team support to civilian law enforcement. The dogs are analogous with equipment, and their handlers to providers of expert advice. Direct assistance by DoD personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations is not permitted, except as specifically authorized by DoDI 3025.21.

DoD components may also provide, subject to approval limitations in DoDI 3025.21, training to Federal, State, and local civilian law enforcement officials. This does not permit large-scale or elaborate DoD training, and does not permit regular or direct involvement of DoD personnel in activities that are fundamentally civilian law enforcement operations, except as otherwise authorized by DoDI 3025.21.

DoD personnel may only provide training when the use of non-DoD personnel would be unfeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective, and when it would not otherwise compromise military preparedness of the United States. It may not involve DoD personnel participating in a law enforcement operation, unless specifically authorized under DoDI 3025.21. DoD personnel must conduct the training assistance at a location where there is not a reasonable likelihood of a confrontation between law enforcement personnel and civilians, unless otherwise authorized by law.

DoDI 3025.21 does not permit the provision of “advanced military training.” Advanced military training includes advanced marksmanship training, sniper training, military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), advanced MOUT, close quarters battle/close quarters combat, and similar training. The

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66 See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 273, 275, 277 (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 2316; DODI 3025.21, supra note 35, Encl. 5; SECNAVINST 5820.7C, supra note 62, paras. 9.a.(4)–(5); AFI 10-801, supra note 38.
67 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 35, Encl. 3.
69 Specific examples where direct assistance is permitted include the case of the execution of a quarantine under 42 U.S.C. §97, when such actions are necessary to prevent significant loss of life and wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restoring governmental function, and when action is needed to protect national parks and other certain federal lands, among many other instances. DoDI 3025.21, supra note 35, Encl. 3.
70 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 35, Encl. 3.
71 Id.
72 Id.

The Secretary of Defense is the approval authority for requests for direct assistance in support of civilian law enforcement agencies, including those responding with assets with the potential for lethality, except for the use of emergency authority as provided for under DoDD 3025.18 or under one of the exceptions provided in DoDI 3025.21. Requests that involve Defense Intelligence and Counterintelligence entities are subject to SecDef approval and the guidance in DoDD 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities and DoD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons (see Chapter 9 infra for further guidance).

Otherwise, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Directors of the Defense Agencies may, in coordination with the ASD(HD&ASA), approve the use of DoD personnel: (1) to provide training or expert advice in accordance with DoDI 3025.21; For equipment maintenance in accordance with the specific provisions of DoDI 3025.21, enclosure 3; to monitor and communicate the movement of air and sea traffic in accordance with the specific provisions of DoDI 3025.21, enclosure 3. All other requests, including those in which subordinate authorities recommend disapproval, shall be submitted promptly to the ASD(HD&ASA) for consideration by the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate.

Support provided under these authorities to a Federal agency is reimbursable under the Economy Act, unless the support is provided in the normal course of training or operations, or the support results in a substantially equivalent training value. It is important to note that pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 6505, under the “Intergovernmental Cooperation Act,” Federal agencies are authorized to provide to State and local governments “statistical and other studies and compilations, development projects, technical tests and evaluations, technical information, training activities, surveys, reports, and documents and other similar services that an executive agent is especially competent and authorized by law to perform.”

Two common requests the Department of Defense may receive under this statute are for the provision of “technical information and training activities.” OMB Circular A-97 defines these two as follows: 1) training of the type which the Federal agency is authorized by law to conduct for Federal personnel and others or which is similar to such training; and 2) technical information, data processing, communications, and personnel management systems services which the Federal agency normally provides for itself or others under existing authorities.

A reimbursement mechanism is provided under 31 U.S.C. § 6505 between the Federal and State/local level. Reimbursements received by the Federal agency for the costs of services provided will be deposited to the credit of the principal appropriation or other account from which the costs of providing the services have been paid or are to be charged. It is important to remember that these reimbursed dollars do not go into the Miscellaneous Receipts account.

73 Id.
74 Id., Encl. 9.
5. **Sharing Information**

Any information collected in the normal course of military operations may be provided to appropriate civilian law enforcement agencies. Collection must be compatible with military training and planning. To the maximum extent practicable, DoD personnel should take into account the needs of civilian law enforcement officials when planning and executing of military training and operations.

H. **Counterdrug Support**

Counterdrug support operations have become an important activity within the Department of Defense. All DoD support is coordinated through the Office of the Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (DEP&S), which is located within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)). DoD support to counterdrug operations is funded through annual DoD appropriations unlike other support provided by DoD, which must be reimbursed by the agency receiving support. The Office of the Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support channels this appropriated money to the providers of counterdrug support.

1. **Detection and Monitoring**

The Department of Defense is the lead Federal agency for detection and monitoring (D&M) of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. D&M is therefore a DoD mission. Although a military mission, D&M is to be carried out in support of Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities. Note that the statute does not extend to D&M missions covering land transit (i.e., the Mexican border). Interception of vessels or aircraft is permissible outside the land area of the U.S. to identify and direct the vessel or aircraft to a location designated by the supported civilian authorities. Detection and monitoring missions involve airborne (Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), aerostats), seaborne (primarily U.S. Navy (USN) vessels), and land-based radar (to include Remote Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR)) sites. Federal funding for NG counterdrug activities, to include pay, allowances, travel expenses, and operations and maintenance expenses is provided pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 112. The State must prepare a drug interdiction and counter-drug

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75 10 U.S.C. § 371 (2013); DoDI 3025.21, supra note 35, Encl. 7; SECNAVINST 5820.7C, supra note 62, para. 7; AFI 10-801, supra note 38, Attachment 1, ch. 3.


77 10 U.S.C. § 124 (2013); 32 U.S.C. § 112 (2013); Sec. 1004, FY91 NDAA as amended by sec. 1021, FY02 NDAA; sec. 1031, FY97 NDAA; sec. 1033, FY98 NDAA; OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT, POLICY OF 26 JAN. 1995, PRIORITIES, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (26 Jan. 1995); CJCSI 3710.01B, supra note 6; NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU, REG. 500-2/ANGI 10-801, NATIONAL GUARD COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT (29 August 2008) [hereinafter NGR 500-2]. At the time this handbook was published, this regulation was being re-drafted as a CNGB Manual.


79 DoDI 3025.21, supra note 35, Encl. 3.
activities plan. The Office of the Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support reviews each State’s implementation plan and disburses funds.

2. Additional Support

Congress has given DoD additional authorities to support Federal, State, local, and foreign governments that have counterdrug responsibilities. These are in addition to the authorities contained in 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–377 (discussed above). These have not been codified, however, so it is necessary to refer to the public laws instead. Many of these are reproduced in the notes following 10 U.S.C. § 374 in the annotated codes. Section 1004 of the 1991 NDAA, as amended, is the primary authority used for counterdrug operations. The statute permits broad support to Federal, State, and local as well as foreign authorities (when requested by a federal counterdrug agency, typically the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or a member of the State Department country team that has counterdrug responsibilities). These authorities are not exceptions to the PCA, and any support provided must comply with the PCA restrictions. Additionally, any domestic training provided must comply with the Deputy Secretary of Defense policy on advanced training.

Types of permitted support include maintenance and repair of equipment; transportation of personnel (United States and foreign), equipment, and supplies CONUS/OCONUS; establishment of bases of operations CONUS/OCONUS; training of law enforcement personnel, to include associated support and training expenses; detection and monitoring of air, sea, surface traffic outside the United States, and within 25 miles of the border if the detection occurred outside the United States; construction of roads, fences, and lighting along U.S. border; linguist and intelligence analyst services; aerial and ground reconnaissance; and establishment of command, control, communication, and computer networks for improved integration of law enforcement, active military, and NG activities.

Approval authorities are contained in CJCSI 3710.01B. Non-operational support—that which does not involve the active participation of DoD personnel—including the provision of equipment only, use of facilities, and formal schoolhouse training, is requested and approved in accordance with DoDI 3025.21 and implementing Service regulations, discussed above. For operational support, the Secretary of Defense is the approval authority. Approval will typically be reflected in a CJCS-issued deployment order.

The Secretary of Defense has delegated approval authority for certain missions to Combatant Commanders, with the ability for further delegation, but no delegation lower than a flag officer. The delegation depends on the type of support provided, the number of personnel provided, and the length of the mission. For example, delegation runs from the Secretary to NORTHCOM to Joint Task Force North (JTF North) for certain missions along the southwest border of the U.S. Requests for DoD support must meet the following criteria:

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81 CJCSI 3710.01B, supra note 6.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
• Support request must have a clear counterdrug connection;

• Support request must originate with Federal, state or local agency having counterdrug responsibilities;

• Request must be for a type of support that the Department of Defense is authorized to provide;

• Support must clearly assist with counterdrug activities of agency;

• Support is consistent with DoD support of the National Drug Control Strategy;

• DEP&S Priorities for the provision of support;

• Multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency task forces that are in a high intensity drug trafficking area (HIDTA);

• Individual agencies in a HIDTA;

• Multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency task forces not in a HIDTA;

• Individual agencies not in a HIDTA; and

• All approved CD operational support must have military training value.

Under § 1206, of the FY 1990 NDAA, Congress directed the Armed Forces, to the maximum extent practicable, to conduct training exercises in declared drug interdiction areas. In § 1031 of the FY 1997 NDAA, Congress authorized and provided additional funding specifically for enhanced support to Mexico. The support involves the transfer of certain non-lethal specialized equipment such as communication, radar, navigation, and photo equipment. Under § 1033, FY 1998 NDAA, Congress authorized, and provided additional funding specifically for, enhanced support to Colombia and Peru. Section 1021 of the FY 2004 NDAA, expands the list of eligible countries to include Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This authority is subject to extension by the annual National Defense Authorization Act; and was extended by § 1021 of the FY 2009 NDAA.

I. Innovative Readiness Training (IRT)86

IRT is primarily a guard and reserve program and is similar in appearance to 10 U.S.C. § 401, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) for overseas operations. It is military training conducted off-base in the civilian community that utilizes the units and individuals of the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department or a combatant commander, to assist civilian

efforts in addressing civic and community needs of the United States, its territories and possessions, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as provided for within 10 U.S.C. § 2012. Examples of IRT activities include constructing rural roads and aircraft runways, small building and warehouse construction in remote areas; transporting medical supplies, equipment and material to medically underserved areas of the country; and providing medical and dental care to Native Americans, Alaska Natives, and other medically underserved communities.87

Any Federal, regional, State, or local governmental entity is eligible to receive the assistance, as are youth and charitable organizations specified in § 508 of Title 32, and any other entity as may be approved by the Secretary of Defense on a case-by-case basis. There must be a relationship to military training. Assistance may be provided only if: (1) the assistance provided accomplishes valid unit training requirements; or (2) the assistance provided by an individual involves tasks that directly relate to the specific Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of the military member.88

O&M funding expenditures are authorized for expendable readiness training items only. These may include, but are not limited to, the following: fuel; equipment lease; travel; training supplies; and incidental costs to support the training not normally provided for a deployment. IRT O&M funds are not authorized for the payment of civilian manpower contracts, e.g., contracting a civilian labor force to perform duties related to IRT activities.89 DoD policy memorandum dated August 24, 2000, provides guidance that annual NDAAs will authorize the transfer of a certain amount of defense-wide O&M funds ($20 million in FY03) to be transferred to fund pay and allowances for personnel working on IRT program projects. In April 2002, the Department of Defense issued additional guidelines to include the requirement for a Certification of Non-Competition with other public or private sector organizations. This comports with the statutory language that “the assistance is not reasonably available from a commercial entity.”90 IRT assistance is not authorized in response to natural or man-made disasters or in support of civilian law enforcement.91

J. DoD Support to Special Events92

Upon the request of a Federal, State, or local government agency responsible for providing law enforcement services, security services, or safety services, the Secretary of Defense may authorize a Combatant Commander, a commander of a military installation, or a commander of another DoD facility, to provide assistance for special events. This includes international sporting events such as World Cup Soccer Games, the Goodwill Games, the Olympics, and any other civilian sporting event. The Attorney General must certify that such assistance is necessary to meet essential security or safety needs.

87 DOD MANUAL 3025.01, VOL. 3. DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES: PRE-PLANNED DoD SUPPORT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, SPECIAL EVENTS, COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT, AND OTHER NON-DoD ENTITIES (11 Aug. 2016) (Ch.1 13 Apr. 2017), sec. 10.3 [hereinafter DODM 3025.01, VOL 3.]
88 Id., 3.1.
91 DoDI 1100.24, supra note 86.
Additional conditions are that such assistance cannot reasonably be met by another source or agency, that there is no adverse impact on military readiness, and that the requesting agency agrees to reimburse the Department of Defense.\(^{93}\) It is important to note that the applicable statutory provision for these events does not apply to Special Olympics and The Paralympics because the assistance is authorized and funded under a different authority, the Support for International Sporting Competitions (SISC) account that funds support of International Sporting Competitions. Support provided under this statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2564, is reimbursable under the Economy Act, unless the support is provided in the normal course of training or operations, or the support results in a substantially equivalent training value.

The SISC account is a “no year” account that consolidated appropriations of previous events. As noted earlier, the Department of Defense transfers O&M into this account. Because the account is set up as a “no year use until expended account,” that rule applies to any money transferred into the account. The account authorized the funding of logistical and security support (other than pay and non-travel-related allowances of members of the Armed Forces of the United States, except for members of the reserve components thereof called or ordered to active duty in connection with providing such support).

In the NDAA for fiscal year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 302, Congress amended the law to include state active duty and full-time NG to be included in the definition of “active duty.” Under this change, the SISC account could fund the pay and non-travel-related allowances of these two groups of individuals when they provided essential security and safety support during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games and the 2002 Paralympic Games. In the same provision, Congress waived the requirement that the Attorney General had to certify that support was necessary for the 2002 Winter Olympic Games. It is important to note that this waiver was event-specific, and ordinarily certification by the Attorney General is required.

**K. Support to Private Organizations and Individuals**

1. **Boy Scouts of America**

10 U.S.C. § 2554 allows the Department of Defense to provide equipment and transportation to the Boy Scouts for National and World Jamborees. Support is provided on a no-cost basis to the U.S. Government and requires bonding to ensure reimbursement.

2. **Girl Scouts of America**

10 U.S.C. § 2555 allows the Department of Defense to provide transportation only to Girl Scouts to support international Girl Scout events. Support is provided on a no-cost basis to the U.S. Government and requires bonding to ensure reimbursement.

3. **National Veterans’ Organizations**

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2551, the Department of Defense may provide equipment and barracks to national veterans’ organizations to support state and national conventions or national youth athletic

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\(^{93}\) *Id.*, Encl. 3.
tournaments. Support is provided on a no-cost basis to the U.S. Government and requires bonding to ensure reimbursement.

4. American Red Cross

10 U.S.C. § 2552 allows the Department of Defense to provide equipment for instruction and practice to the American Red Cross. Support is provided on a no-cost basis to the U.S. Government and requires bonding (twice value of equipment loaned) to ensure reimbursement.

5. National Military Associations

Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2558, the Department of Defense may provide specified support to designated “National Military Associations” for their national conventions. Specified support includes limited air and ground transportation, communications, medical assistance, administrative support, and security support. Support is provided under the following conditions: (1) the Service Secretary concerned has approved the support in advance; (2) the support is provided in conjunction with training in appropriate military skills; and (3) support can be provided within existing funds otherwise available to the Service Secretary concerned, i.e., O&M funds.

6. Homeless Individuals

10 U.S.C. § 2556 allows for DoD provision of incidental services to shelter homeless individuals. These incidental services include utilities, bedding, security, transportation, renovation of facilities, minor repairs to make facility available, and property liability insurance. Support is on a non-reimbursable basis and may not have an adverse impact on military readiness or interfere with military operations.

L. Loan or Lease of Non-Excess Property of a Military Department

1. Authorized Loan or Lease of Non-Excess Property

Generally, the Economy Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1535, governs the loan of DoD supplies and other equipment to other Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The leasing statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2667, governs the lease of DoD property to organizations outside the government when a determination has been made that: (1) for the period of the lease, the materiel is not needed for public use; (2) it is not excess property; and (3) the lease will promote the national defense or be in the public interest.

The Army is the only Service that has a regulation specifically governing the loan or lease of its materiel: AR 700-131. Army Policy is that Army materiel is intended for the Army mission, and may only be loaned or leased under compelling circumstances and when the material sought is not otherwise needed for mission requirements. Agencies loaning or leasing materiel from an Army activity are responsible for all costs associated with the loan or lease to include shipping, return, and repair of the materiel. The primary determining factors for loans and leases are (1) the basis of their

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purpose and (2) the duration. Consider the following factors in determining whether to approve a loan or lease:

- Military requirements and priorities;
- Stocks and programmed Army requirements;
- Type classification with pending changes;
- Minimum diversion of Army stocks;
- The adequacy of the borrower’s resources;
- The availability of alternative resources such as commercial leases; and
- The eligibility of the recipient.

The approval authority for a loan or lease of Army materiel varies based on the category of the requested equipment. Table 2-1, AR 700-131 provides a comprehensive list of the categories of equipment that may be loaned or leased, and the proper approval authority. A command must report any Army material loaned or leased in response to a natural or manmade disaster to JDOMS as soon as possible. The property officer who is accountable for the equipment loaned or leased will keep all records of loans of DoD material. Loans are made at no additional cost to the government. Borrowers are responsible for all incremental costs (costs above the normal Army operating expenses) and these will be identified and added into the loan agreement.

Agencies loaning or leasing materiel from an Army activity are responsible for all costs associated with the loan or lease to include shipping, return, and repair of the materiel. Reimbursable incremental costs include the following:

- Any overtime pay and pay of additional civilian personnel required to accompany, operate, maintain, or safeguard borrowed equipment;
- Travel and per diem expenses of Army personnel (military and civilian);
- Packing, crating, handling, and shipping from supply source to destination and return, to include port loading and off-loading;
- All transportation, including return for repair and renovation;
- Hourly rate for the use of Army aircraft;
- Petroleum, oils, and lubricants (including aviation fuel);
- The cost of material lost, destroyed, or damaged beyond economical repair;
- Utilities (gas, water, heat, and electricity);
• Any modification or rehabilitation or real property that affects its future use by the Army;
• Overhaul of returned material;
• Repair parts used in maintenance and renovation;
• Price decline of borrowed stock fund material at which returned property can be sold;
• Issue and turn-in inspection labor costs;
• Charges for the use of vehicles, except petroleum, oils, and lubricants and per diem costs;
• Use of real property;
• Restoration costs for historical property; and
• Lease fees.

It is important to note that in addition to the above reimbursable costs, leases require the borrower to pay a lease fee equal to the fair market value of the lease interest in the property.

2. Emergency Exceptions

Emergency loans or leases are those made to prevent “loss of life, grave bodily harm, or major destruction of property, and when the lack of communications facilities prevents the use of normal procedures.” Emergency loans and leases will not be withheld because a formal reimbursement agreement has not been negotiated and concluded. Additionally, loans or leases that would otherwise be permitted by service regulations may be approved under emergency conditions at the local level, vice the approval level designated in Table 2-1 of AR 700-131. Emergency requests for the loan or lease of Army materiel may be verbal or electronic in nature. The borrower must send a formal written request to the lending agency as soon as possible, and must complete a loan or lease agreement within five days of the original transaction.

3. Additional Requirements

Leases carry additional requirements under AR 700-131. Army materiel will not be leased if a reasonable counterpart can be purchased or leased in the commercial market. Leases are limited to a maximum five-year term unless the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY), or one of his designees, approves an extended lease term. The SECARMY also has the authority to revoke a loan or a lease at any time. Lessees must post a surety bond to cover damage or loss of the leased property and, if necessary, show proof of either vehicular or hull insurance. In an emergency a lease may be made without a bond, but the bond must be posted within five days of the lease. FAR Part 28 governs the bonding requirements. The SECARMY must approve any bond forfeiture. Bonds are normally forfeited when the materiel is not returned at the end of the lease period or the lessee refuses to pay for damage or other lease expenses.

Once a loan or lease is approved, a loan or lease agreement will be entered into before the materiel is delivered. The agreement will reflect the statutory basis for the loan or lease, and will describe in
detail all terms of the loan or lease and the responsibilities of both parties. The official accountable for the property of the borrowing activity must sign the loan or lease agreement. The loan or lease agreement will be held by the activity that issues the material until final settlement. When the Department of Defense has made a lease of personal property, the costs associated with the lease are placed into a special account established for the respective defense agency whose property is subject to the lease. Amounts in the account are available solely for maintenance, repair, restoration or replacement of leased personal property.

M. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)\textsuperscript{95}

EOD is the detection, identification, field evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposition of unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO).\textsuperscript{96} Explosive Ordnance Disposal operations outside of DoD installations are primarily the responsibility of civil authorities. DoD assistance may be provided in the form of EOD actions and/or advice, upon request from Federal agencies or civil authorities at any level, when the Service concerned determines that such assistance is required or desirable in the interest of public safety.\textsuperscript{97} Each Service is responsible for all self-caused Explosive Ordnance contamination on its own installations and operation bases.\textsuperscript{98}

N. Military Working Dogs\textsuperscript{99}

Military working dogs include patrol dogs, and patrol dogs with specialized training in either narcotic/contraband detection or explosive detection.\textsuperscript{100} Explosive Detector Dog team assistance may be provided to Federal agencies or civil authorities. Upon a request from a Federal agency or State or local civilian authority at any level, the installation commander concerned determines that the “provision of the requested assistance is lawful, required in the interest of public safety and meets the requirements of DoDD 3025.18 or DoDI 3025.21.”\textsuperscript{101}


\textsuperscript{96} AR 75-14, supra note 95.

\textsuperscript{97} Id. para. 4-3.

\textsuperscript{98} Id. para. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{99} DoDD 5200.31E, supra note 68; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 190-12, MILITARY WORKING DOG PROGRAM (23 Oct. 2019) [hereinafter AR 190-12].

\textsuperscript{100} AR 190-12, supra note 99.

\textsuperscript{101} AR 75-15, supra note 95, para. 3-15.
O. Miscellaneous Support

To respond to an emergency involving biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction that is beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities to handle, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security may request DoD assistance directly. Available assistance would include monitoring, containing, disabling, and disposing of the weapon. For weapons of mass destruction, Federal funding is provided to the Department of Defense to develop and maintain domestic terrorism rapid response teams (Civil Support Teams) to aid Federal, State, and local officials and responders. Civil Support Teams are composed of full time Army and Air NG members. These teams are Federally resourced, trained, evaluated, and they operate under Federal doctrine. They perform their missions, however, primarily under the command and control of state governors.

P. Funding Issues Related to the Use of NG in Domestic Operations

The NG is both an “organized militia” of a State, as well as a reserve component of both the Army and the Air Force. When referring to the NG’s Federal reserve component status, the appropriate term is “NG of the United States.” In terms of domestic operations, it is important to recognize that NG members are in one of three statuses: (1) Title 10, (2) Title 32 and (3) State Active Duty (SAD). When NG members are mobilized and placed on Title 10 orders, they are Federally-funded and under a Federal chain of command like any other active component Airman or Soldier. Typically, this is seen when a NG unit is mobilized for OCONUS military operations. When they are serving in a Title 32 capacity, they are Federally funded, but operating under a “State” chain of command up to the State’s Governor. The most typical use of NG members in a Title 32 status is when they are performing their required weekend training or their two-weeks of Annual Training. When they are serving in a SAD status, they are funded by the State, and are under a State chain of command. That is, often times when a NG unit is performing a State emergency response (e.g., flood, wildfires, etc.) they are often in a purely State status, and being paid out of that State’s funding (as opposed to Federal funding).

In terms of Domestic Operations, there is a specific DoD Instruction that covers the employment of NG personnel in a Title 32 status—DoDI 3025.22, “The Use of the NG for Defense Support to Civil Authorities.” It explains that the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the affected Governors, is the “sole authority” to authorize DoD funding of the NG for DoD operations or missions, including DSCA. If authorized by SecDef to perform Federally-funded (Title 32) domestic operations, the NG personnel are typically performing such operations pursuant to 32 U.S.C § 502(f). Accordingly, the NG Service members performing such operations are paid out of the Army NG and Air NG personnel accounts. If this type of Title 32 duty is pursuant to a Mission Assignment from FEMA, FEMA may reimburse those military personnel accounts under the Stafford Act. That is, if the Secretary of Defense determines that the NG is the appropriate sourcing solution for a FEMA mission assignment and authorizes the use of NG personnel to perform the mission in a Title 32 status, FEMA may reimburse the accounts from Disaster Relief Funds. This use of Federal funding for a SecDef-


103 See supra Chapters 3 and 6 for more information on these teams.
authorized use of the NG is not to be confused with the use of a State’s NG in a SAD status. Again, when NG members are performing operations in a SAD status, the costs of that type of mission are borne by the State, and not by the Department of Defense.

Finally, in order to understand the Federal funding for the NG, it is important for judge advocates to understand the role of the NG Bureau (NGB), and NGB’s United States Property and Fiscal Officers, (USPFOs). NGB is a “Joint Activity of the Department of Defense,” with statutory authority stemming from 10 U.S.C. § 10501-10508. The primary DoD-level implementation of that authority is set out in the NGB Charter—DoDD 5105.77. The NGB is led by the Chief of NGB (CNGB), who is a four-star general and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CNGB is responsible for planning and administering the budgets of the Army NG and the Air NG of the United States. CNGB is also responsible for supervising the acquisition/supply/accountability for Federal property issue to the NG through the USPFO.104

As applied to domestic operations, the USPFOs (as the agents of Service Secretaries through CNGB) play a central role at the State NG level in terms of providing oversight for Federal funds and Federal equipment that is in the possession of their State’s NG. During a SAD mission, the State’s Adjutant General (Commander of that State’s NG) has the authority to use Federal equipment for State emergency response as determined by the Governor. The USPFOs are responsible for tracking the Federal equipment (particularly vehicles and helicopters) for reimbursement purposes. Following a SAD mission, the USPFO presents a bill to the State for reimbursement.

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CHAPTER 13

CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS IN THE NATIONAL GUARD

KEY REFERENCES:

- Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities Outside Department of Defense, 10 U.S.C. § 2012 et seq.
- The Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.
- The Pen Trap and Trace Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3121 et seq.
- E.O. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.
- Presidential Policy Directive 41, United States Cyber Incident Coordination, 26 July 2016.
- Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 1100.20, Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities Outside the Department of Defense, 12 April 2004.
- DoDD 5148.13, Intelligence Oversight, 26 April 2017.
- DoDD 5240.01, DoD Intelligence Activities, 27 August 2007, Incorporating Change 3, 9 November 2020.
- Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1215.06, Uniform Reserve, Training and Retirement Categories, 11 March 2014, Incorporating Change 1, Effective 19 May 2015.
- DoDI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, 27 February 2013 Incorporating Change 1, Effective 8 February 2019.
- DoDI 4000.19, Support Agreements, 16 December 2020.
- DoD Manual 5240.01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of Intelligence Activities, 8 August 2016.
- Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 8 June 2018.
- SecDef Memorandum, Reimbursable Activities in Support of Other Entities, 19 Jun 2020.
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) Policy Memorandum (PM) 16-002, Cyber Support and Service Provided Incidental to Military Training and National Guard Use of DoD Information Networks, Software, and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities, 24 May 2016.


Extension to Policy Memorandum 16-002, Cyber Support and Services Provided Incidental to Military Training and National Guard Use of DoD Information Networks, Software, and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities, 1 March 2018.

Extension to Policy Memorandum 16-002, Cyber Support and Services Provided Incidental to Military Training and National Guard Use of DoD Information Networks, Software, and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities, 18 October 2018.

Extension to Policy Memorandum 16-002, Cyber Support and Services Provided Incidental to Military Training and National Guard Use of DoD Information Networks, Software, and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities, 21 March 2019.

Extension to Policy Memorandum 16-002, Cyber Support and Services Provided Incidental to Military Training and National Guard Use of DoD Information Networks, Software, and Hardware for State Cyberspace Activities, 2 March 2020.

SecDef Memorandum, Definition of Department of Defense Cyberspace Operations Forces (DoD COF), 2 December 2019.


National Guard Cyber Strategy, 5 Jan 2018.

National Guard Regulation (NGR) 5-2, National Guard Support Agreements, 14 Oct 2010.

NGR 350-1, Army National Guard Training, 4 August 2009.

Air National Guard Instruction 36-2001, Management of Training and Operational Support within the Air National Guard, 30 April 2019.


A. Introduction

Cyberspace, while part of the information environment, is dependent on the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains. Much as operations in the physical domains rely on physical infrastructure created to take advantage of naturally occurring features, operations in cyberspace rely on networked, stand-alone, and platform-embedded Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, in addition to the data that resides on, and is transmitted through, these components, to enable military operations in a man-made domain.

Cyberspace presents unique challenges by threats from nation-states to individual actors to accidents and natural hazards; anonymity and difficulties with attribution; geography challenges; technology challenges; and private industry and public infrastructure ownership.1 Cyberspace reaches across geographic and geopolitical boundaries. It is integrated in the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as the conduct of commerce, governance, and national defense activities.2 While many elements

1 Joint Publication 3-12, Cyberspace Operations, 8 June 2018 [hereinafter JP 3-12].
2 Id.
of cyberspace can be mapped geographically, a full understanding of an adversary’s disposition and capabilities in cyberspace involves understanding the target, not only at the underlying physical network layer but also at the logical network layer and cyber-persona layer, including profiles of system users and administrators and their relationship to adversary critical factors.3

For example, cyberspace activities are generally not linear in nature. One computer does not normally interact directly with another computer. Rather, data is transferred through multiple routers and servers, all of which are not always in the same town, state or even country. As a result, actions intended to have a domestic effect in cyberspace could have international consequences. Another consideration is that most military equipment is not governed by restrictive licensing agreements, whereas software licensing agreements may restrict who may use a cyber-tool kit and how it can be used. Finally, attribution is not as clear as in the kinetic realm. What may appear to be an action taken by a local resident could be an action orchestrated by a foreign actor.

This complex and evolving battle space requires legal practitioners to have both a basic understanding of how the cyberspace works as well as the laws and policies governing those actions.

B. DoD Cyberspace Missions

The 2018 DoD Cyber Strategy directs the Department of Defense to defend forward, shape the day-to-day competition, and prepare for war by building a more lethal force, expanding alliances and partnerships, reforming the Department, and cultivating talent, while actively competing against and deterring our competitors in cyberspace.4

Cyberspace operations (CO) is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. The Department of Defense has three cyberspace missions: offensive cyberspace operations (OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and DoD Information Network (DoDIN) operations. These three mission types comprehensively cover the activities of the cyberspace forces.5

- **DoDIN Operations.** The DODIN operations mission includes operational actions taken to secure, configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain DoD cyberspace and to create and preserve the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the DoDIN.

- **DCO.** DCO missions are executed to defend the DoDIN, or other DoD cyberspace forces have been ordered to defend, from active threats in cyberspace.

- **OCO.** OCO are CO missions intended to project power in and through foreign cyberspace through actions taken in support of CCDR or national objectives.6

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3 Id.
5 JP 3-12, *supra* note 1, II-2.
6 Id. at II-2-3.
Cyberspace missions are categorized as OCO, DCO, or DoDIN operations based only on the intent or objective of the issuing authority, not based on the cyberspace actions executed, the type of military authority used, the forces assigned to the mission, or the cyberspace capabilities used.\(^7\)

Authority for CO actions undertaken by the U.S. Armed Forces is derived from the U.S. Constitution and Federal law. Authorities for specific types of military COs are established within SecDef policies, including DoD instructions, directives, and memoranda, as well as in Executive Orders and operational orders issued by the Secretary of Defense and subordinate commanders approved to execute the subject missions.\(^8\)

Judge advocates practicing in this area should review National Security Presidential Memorandum 13 (NSPM-13), a classified document providing the overall guidance for cyber activities conducted by the United States, in its entirety. It is important to note that capability does not mean authority. **Understanding the effects of cyber capabilities is key to determining the necessary authority to perform a DoD cyber mission.** The Department of Defense conducts COs consistent with U.S. domestic law, applicable international law, and relevant Federal Government and DoD policies. The laws that regulate military actions in U.S. territories also apply to cyberspace. Therefore, DoD cyberspace forces that operate outside the DoDIN, when properly authorized, are generally limited to operating in gray and red\(^9\) cyberspace only, unless they are issued different rules of engagement or conducting defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) under appropriate authority. Since each CO mission has unique legal considerations, the applicable legal framework depends on the nature of the activities to be conducted, such as OCO or DCO, DSCA, internet service provider (ISP) actions, law enforcement and counterintelligence activities, intelligence activities, and defense of the homeland.\(^10\)

These DoD cyber missions can be categorized as defensive or offensive operations (as depicted in Figure 1. Cyberspace Operations) depending on the capability and the effects of that capability.\(^11\)

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\(^7\) *Id.* at III-2.

\(^8\) *Id.*

\(^9\) The term “blue cyberspace” denotes areas in cyberspace protected by the United States, its mission partners, and other areas DoD personnel may be ordered to protect. Although the Department of Defense has standing orders to protect only the DoD information network (DoDIN), cyberspace forces prepare on order, and when requested by other authorities, to defend or secure other United States Government (USG) or other cyberspace, as well as cyberspace related to critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) of the United States and partner nations. The term “red cyberspace” refers to those portions of cyberspace owned or controlled by an adversary or enemy. All cyberspace that does not meet the description of either “blue” or “red” is referred to as “gray” cyberspace. *Id.* at I-4-5.

\(^10\) *Id.* at III-11.

1. Protecting the DoDIN

The DoDIN operations mission includes operational actions taken to secure, configure, operate, extend, maintain, and sustain DoD cyberspace and to create and preserve the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the DoDIN. These include proactive cyberspace security actions which address vulnerabilities of the DoDIN or specific segments of the DoDIN. It also includes the set-up of tactical networks by deployed forces to extend existing networks, maintenance actions and other non-security actions necessary for the sustainment of the DoDIN, and the operation of red teams and other forms of security evaluation and testing.

DoDIN operations are network-focused and threat-agnostic: the cyberspace forces and workforce undertaking this mission endeavor to prevent all threats from negatively impacting a particular network or system they are assigned to protect. They are threat-informed and use all available intelligence about specific threats to improve the security posture of the network. DoDIN operations does not include actions taken under statutory authority of a chief information officer (CIO) to provision cyberspace for
operations, including IT architecture development; establishing standards; or designing, building, or otherwise operationalizing DoDIN IT for use by a commander.12

Cyberspace security actions are a primary component action of the DoDIN operations mission. Examples of cyberspace security actions include increasing password strength, installing a software patch to remove vulnerabilities, encrypting stored data, training users on cyberspace security best practices, restricting access to suspicious Web sites, or blocking traffic on unused router ports.13

Service-retained cyberspace forces, CCMD cyberspace forces, RC forces, and DoD agency and activity staffs execute much of the DoDIN operations required to secure and operate the various backbones, sub-nets, segments, enclaves, and private networks of the DoDIN under the planning, direction, integration, and synchronization of the JFHQ-DoDIN

2. Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)

DCO missions are executed to defend the DoDIN, or other cyberspace DoD cyberspace forces have been ordered to defend, from active threats in cyberspace. Specifically, they are missions intended to preserve the ability to utilize blue cyberspace capabilities and protect data, networks, cyberspace-enabled devices, and other designated systems by defeating on-going or imminent malicious cyberspace activity. DCO missions, which defeat specific threats that have bypassed, breached, or are threatening to breach security measures, are distinguishable from DoDIN operations, which endeavor to secure DoD cyberspace from all threats in advance of any specific threat activity.

DCOs are threat-specific and frequently support mission assurance objectives. DCO missions are conducted in response to specific threats of attack, exploitation, or other effects of malicious cyberspace activity and leverage information from maneuver, intelligence collection, counterintelligence (CI), law enforcement (LE), and other sources as required. DCOs include outmaneuvering or interdicting adversaries taking or about to take actions against defended cyberspace elements, or otherwise responding to imminent internal and external cyberspace threats. The goal of DCO is to defeat the threat of a specific adversary and/or to return a compromised network to a secure and functional state. The components of DCO are DCO-Internal Defensive Measures (DCO-IDM), Defensive Cyberspace Operations-Response Actions (DCO-RA), and Defense of Non-DOD Cyberspace.

DCO-IDM. DCO-IDM are those actions taken internally to friendly cyberspace.14 DCO-IDM are the form of DCO mission where authorized defense actions occur within the defended network or portion of cyberspace. It includes pro-active and aggressive internal threat hunting for advanced and/or persistent threats, as well as the active internal countermeasures and responses used to eliminate these threats and mitigate their effects. For example, CPT operations conducted on key terrain in cyberspace, for mission-critical assets in response to indications of malicious cyberspace activity, are DCO-IDM missions, even before indicators of compromise exist.15 In other words, DCO-IDM include

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12 Id. at II-2.
13 Id. at II-6.
14 WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 16.
15 JP 3-12, supra note 1, at II-4.
hunting on friendly cyber terrain for threats attempting to evade security protocols and directing appropriate internal responses.¹⁶

Cyberspace defense actions are the component actions of a DCO-IDM mission. Cyberspace defense actions are taken within protected cyberspace to defeat specific threats that have breached or are threatening to breach the cyberspace security measures and include actions to detect, characterize, counter, and mitigate threats, including malware or the unauthorized activities of users, and to restore the system to a secure configuration.¹⁷ Internal countermeasures are cyberspace defense actions taken as part of a DCO-IDM mission; for example, closing router ports being used by an adversary for unauthorized access or blocking malware that is beaconing out of the DoDIN.¹⁸

**DCO-RA.** DCO-RA are the form of a DCO mission where actions are taken external to the defended network or portion of cyberspace **without the permission of the owner of the affected system.** DCO-RA actions “are normally in foreign cyberspace.”¹⁹ DCO-RA are taken outside the DoDIN to stop or block an attack. Cyberspace exploitation actions and cyberspace attack actions are taken as part of a DCO-RA mission.²⁰ An example of DCO-RA is shutting down an external router from which malicious activity is emanating. Some DCO-RA missions may include actions that rise to the level of use of force, with physical damage or destruction of enemy systems. DCO-RA missions “require a properly coordinated military order and careful consideration of scope, rules of engagement, and measurable objectives.”²¹ In other words, DCO-RA include activities “outside friendly network space to stop an attack before it reaches our key cyber terrain.”²² To use a metaphor, we “catch arrows” with DCO-IDM and we “kill the archer” with DCO-RA.

**Defense of Non-DoD Cyberspace.** DCOs generally focus on the DoDIN, which includes all of DoD cyberspace. However, military cyberspace forces prepare to defend any U.S. or other blue cyberspace when ordered. DoD operations rely on many non-DoD segments of cyberspace, including private sector and mission partner networks, security of which is the responsibility of the resource owners, including other Federal departments and agencies, private sector entities, and other partners. Since DoD associated cyberspace are known targets for malicious cyberspace activity, protection of these non-DoD networks and systems can be a vital component of mission assurance. However, the Department of Defense cannot guarantee the robustness of the security standards applied to such networks. The commander’s mission risk analysis should account for this uncertainty in the security of non-DoD cyberspace.

When required under a specific authorizing order, **and in full coordination with DHS and other Federal departments and agencies,** DoD cyberspace forces undertake DCO-RA and DCO-IDM missions to defend these and other non-DoD cyberspace segments, like national CI/KR or partner networks. Prioritization schemes for defense of CI/KR should be established in advance. If DCO-IDM missions are ordered as part of a defense support of a civil authorities (DSCA) operation, active

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¹⁶ **WILLIAMS,** *supra* note 11, at 16.
¹⁷ **JP 3-12,** *supra* note 11, at II-4.
¹⁸ *Id.*
¹⁹ *Id.* at II-4.
²⁰ *Id.*
²¹ *Id.*
²² **WILLIAMS,** *supra* note 11, at 16.
component forces may be supported by National Guard (NG) forces activated under Title 32 if authorized by the Secretary of Defense or Title 10.\(^{23}\)

### 3. Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO)

OCO are CO missions intended to project power in and through foreign cyberspace through actions taken in support of CCDR or national objectives. All CO missions conducted outside of blue cyberspace with a commander’s intent other than to defend blue cyberspace from an ongoing or imminent cyberspace threat are OCO missions. Some OCO missions may include actions that rise to the level of use of force, with physical damage or destruction of enemy systems. OCO missions require a properly coordinated military order and careful consideration of scope, ROE, and measurable objectives.\(^{24}\) Cyberspace exploitation actions and cyberspace attack actions are taken as part of an OCO mission.\(^{25}\) An example of OCO is hacking an adversary’s computer without the owner’s knowledge or consent. Authorities governing OCO activities are classified and a detailed description is outside the scope of this handbook. However, briefly stated, OCO represents a synergy between Title 50 (national intelligence) authorities to collect signals intelligence, and Title 10 (military) authorities to apply force in that realm. For full situational awareness and to advise on mission capability and authority, judge advocates must obtain the appropriate security clearance to fully understand the DoD cyber missions, including classified portions of the missions.

The following table illustrates where each cyber activity falls into the DoD cyber mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DoD Cyber Mission</th>
<th>Cyber Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCO-IDM</td>
<td>Cyberspace security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cyberspace defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Internal countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Cyberspace exploitation, including military intelligence activities, maneuver, information collection, and other enabling actions requires to prepare for future military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCO</td>
<td>Cyberspace attack:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deny (degrade, disrupt, destroy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manipulate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External countermeasures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{23}\) JP 3-12, supra note 1, at II-5.

\(^{24}\) Id. at II-5.

\(^{25}\) Id.
C. DoD Cyber Operations Forces (DoD COF)

The DoD COF consists of units organized, trained, and equipped to conduct offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and DoDIN operations. There are five operational groups (Group 1-5) specifically categorized as DoD COF, including cyber mission forces, U.S. Cyber Command Subordinate Command elements, DoD Component Network Operations Centers and Cyber Security Service Providers, special capability providers, and specially designated units. There are five groups (Groups 6-10) that are specifically NOT categorized as DoD COF. NG cyber units align to the various COF elements within USCYBERCOM and the Service components through the Global Force Management process. Members in Title 32 train for the Federal mission.

Group 1: Cyber Mission Force (CMF). The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, established the CMF to organize and resource the force structure required to conduct key cyberspace missions. CDRUSCYBERCOM exercises COCOM of the CMF, which is a subset of the DoD’s total force for CO. Various Service tactical cyberspace units, assigned to CDRUSCYBERCOM, comprise the three elements of the CMF: Cyber Protection Force (CPF), Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), and Cyber Combat Mission Force (CCMF).27

- Cyber Protection Force (CPF)

The CPF conducts COs for internal protection of the DoDIN or other blue cyberspace when ordered. The CPF consists of cyberspace protection teams (CPTs) that are organized, trained, and equipped to defend assigned cyberspace in coordination with and in support of segment owners, cybersecurity service providers (CSSPs), and users.29

While mobilized in Title 10, members of CPTs provide surge support to active duty cyber components (such as USCYBERCOM, AFCYBER, or ARCYBER) and support defensive cyberspace operations by removing adversary capabilities, defending the supported commander's key cyberspace terrain and critical assets, and preparing local cyberspace defenders to sustain advanced cyberspace defense tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). CPTs are the forces tasked with the DCO-IDM mission under USCYBERCOM.30

- Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF)

The CNMF conducts COs to defeat significant cyberspace threats to the DoDIN and, when ordered, to the nation. The CNMF is comprised of various numbered national mission teams (NMTs), associated national support teams (NSTs), and national-level CPTs for protection of non-DoDIN blue cyberspace.31 NMTs are the forces tasked with the DCO-RA mission under USCYBERCOM.32

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26 See SecDef Memorandum, Definition of Department of Defense Cyberspace Operations Forces (DoD COF), 12 December 2019 for description of each Group.
27 JP 3-12, supra note 1, at I-9.
28 CPT is the term used when that unit is mobilized.
29 JP 3-12, supra note 1, at I-9.
30 WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 16.
31 JP 3-12, supra note 1, at I-9.
DCO-RA missions are normally assigned to NMTs, which are tactical units of the CNMF that defend the DoDIN, or other blue cyberspace when ordered. NSTs provide specialized technical and analytic support for the units of the CMF, including intelligence analysis, cyberspace capability development, linguist support, and planning.33

- **Cyber Combat Mission Force (CCMF)**

  The CCMF conducts CO to support the missions, plans, and priorities of the geographic and functional CCDRs. The CCMF comprises various numbered combat mission teams (CMTs) and associated combat support teams (CSTs). OCO missions are normally assigned to CMTs, tactical units of the CCMF that support CCDR plans and priorities to project power in support of national objectives. CSTs provide specialized technical and analytic support for the units of the CMF, including intelligence analysis, cyberspace capability development, linguist support, and planning.34

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32 *Id.* at II-8.
33 *Id.*
34 *Id.*
D. DCO-E

The Army National Guard has Defensive Cyberspace Operations-Elements (DCO-E), which by design do not have an active component CMF mission. As such, DCO-Es do not perform a Title 10 mission or function. DCO-Es may provide surge capacity at the same capability level of Title 10 assets, but they are prohibited from being mobilized, as a unit, for Title 10 missions. The DCO-E area of responsibility is that State’s network enclave within GuardNet; in other words, the DCO-E defend that State’s National Guard portion of DoDIN. With proper authorization, DCO-Es may support a validated request for assistance (RFA) to provide support outside of the DoDIN; however, personnel from the DCO-Es providing support and services outside of the validated RFA process must be in SAD and activated pursuant to State law.

E. Title 32 Cyberspace Activities

The National Guard must have both proper fiscal authority and the mission authority to conduct cyberspace activities in a Title 32. The National Guard is funded by Congress to train for the Federal mission. IDTs and annual training are conducted under 32 U.S.C. § 502(a) within an existing published training plan. Additional funds for training or other missions, if appropriate, may be authorized under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f). The President and the Secretary of Defense have authority to authorize operational missions under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2).

National Guard personnel are prohibited from conducting DCO-RA and OCO when in a Title 32 or SAD status. These activities must be conducted while in a Title 10 status. Therefore, the National Guard can train for the Federal mission in a Title 32 but is limited to DoDIN operations and DCO-IDM activities. Title 32 training authorities can be leveraged to provide support to (1) active component, (2) civil authorities; and (3) other statutorily eligible entities.

1. Support to Active Component

The National Guard can provide incidental operational support (OS) while conducting training. The key is that the primary purpose of the activity must be military training. DoDI 1215.06, para 6.2, encourages maximum Reserve Component utilization by stating, “all training duty planned and performed by Reserve Components members shall capitalize on Reserve Components capabilities to

35 Training plans must be in accordance with NGR 350-1 and ANGI 36-2001.
36 Civil support teams, counterdrug, and homeland defense are operational missions authorized by statute that fall under 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2). There are currently no operational cyber missions.
37 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., POL’Y MEM. 16-002, CYBER SUPPORT AND SERVICE PROVIDED INCIDENTAL TO MILITARY TRAINING AND NATIONAL GUARD USE OF DoD INFORMATION NETWORKS, SOFTWARE, AND HARDWARE FOR STATE CYBERSPACE ACTIVITIES (24 May 2016) [hereinafter PM 16-002]. This memorandum is also commonly referred to as the “CTAA” memo. CTAA stands for coordinate, train, advise, and assist cyber support and services provided by members of the National Guard incidental to military training when using DoD information networks (DoDIN), software, and hardware for State cyberspace activities.
38 See DoDI 1215.06, Uniform Reserve, Training and Retirement Categories (19 May 2015) para 6.2.
accomplish operational requirements while maintaining their mission readiness for domestic and overseas operations. RC members may be employed to support active component mission requirements as part of conducting training duty.”39 Additionally, “support to mission requirements, i.e., operational support (OS), may occur as a consequence of performing training.”40

Established and approved training plans cannot be altered to meet operational requirements. Units or individuals that participate in IDT or AT may provide incidental OS to DoD mission requirements; however, this should not be used as a façade to conduct actual operations nor as a substitute for mission assignments from the Department of Homeland Security (for example, through Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) etc.) during or in preparation for disaster response. OS assignments can be given to prescheduled, pre-determined mission requirements as long as documented and in accordance with the established approved training plan.

The OS should be considered only after determining the training value and ensuring the DoD mission is consistent with the already existing and approved training plan. Showing the predictability of training and validated training requirements will likely warrant less scrutiny on the proper use of federal training funds. Activity where training value is not the primary purpose as determined by the NG commander is a violation of fiscal law and DoD policy.

There is a much narrower application of OS in OCO and DCO-RA activities. Commanders should use the following factors when considering whether training which provides an incidental operational benefit is permitted or in other words, whether the mission is appropriate for the National Guard or active component:

- Whether performance of the federal operational mission is consistent with the unit's formalized training program;
- Whether the Federal Government can perform the mission without the National Guard unit. In other words, is the active component capable of performing the mission without support from the National Guard? If not, then the National Guard has moved beyond a support role into an operational role and is exceeding the scope of its authority; and
- Whether the use of full-time Guard personnel is disproportionate to its Reserve Component mission.

To properly consider these factors, the necessary facts must be present to identify the proposed task and duration of the task, whether the task fits into required individual or unit training, and if not, whether the training will nevertheless benefit the Department of Defense. This analysis should consider policy issues with risk assessment and the appropriateness when using NG forces.

OS likely collapses into actual operational missions for activities that fall under OCO and DCO-RA, i.e. cyberspace attack and cyberspace exploitation. Commanders must independently assess each activity, giving greater scrutiny to live Title 10 and Title 50 missions. Generally, if an activity requires affirmative positive authority to be conducted (such as under Title 10 or NSPM-13), then there likely is

39 Id.
40 Id.
no Title 32 OS when the Title 32 unit is training for that METs; the OS ceases to exist and the training activity merges into the operational activity of OCO and DCO-RA which are conducted in Title 10. Currently, there is no hip-pocket authority to auto-convert from Title 32 to Title 10 for cyber missions.

2. Support to Civil Authorities

a. Support to Civil Authorities - Generally

The National Guard can provide DSCA, when a qualifying entity requests assistance. DoD publications on DSCA focus on a response in Title 10 or 32 U.S.C. §502(f)(2) status. Currently, DTM 17-007 is the only publication on DSCA for cyber operations, or Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response (DSCIR). DSCIR may be provided in Title 10 or in §502(f) for a cyber incident in response to a request for assistance from a lead Federal department or agency for asset response or threat response outside DoDIN as described in PPD-41. This includes DSCIR for immediate response authority to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. Based on the nature of support, liability waivers, memorandums of understanding or agreements (including permission from asset owner to access appropriate information and information systems), non-disclosure agreements, or other appropriate legal documents requested by Department of Defense must be signed before providing DSCIR.

b. Support to Civil Authorities – Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement

Cyber teams likely have intelligence personnel assigned to them. Executive Order 12333, and DoD associated IO rules and procedures, will apply if those intelligence personnel provide support to law enforcement. While any intelligence activities (including collection) must be done in a Title 10 status with proper mission and authority, SecDef approval is required for the use of intelligence assets for anything other than foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or intelligence training. This includes training with an incidental benefit (i.e., OS). Intelligence support to law enforcement requires SecDef approval in accordance with Procedure 12 under DoD 5240.1-R.

c. Support to Civil Authorities – Economy Act

The Economy Act allows Federal agencies to provide support to other Federal agencies on a reimbursable basis, unless the support is provided in the normal course of training or operations, or the support results in a substantially equivalent training value. The Secretary of Defense determines whether reimbursement will be sought or waived pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 277(c). Alternative funding sources (through Stafford Act or as appropriated by Congress) are not directly contemplated here but exist.

41 32 U.S.C. Chapter 9 and the implementing DoD publication recognizes homeland defense as an operational mission. A SecDef-approved Chapter 9 request would give Title 32 National Guardsmen authority for homeland defense activities in the cyber domain to protect and defend critical infrastructure outside of the Defense Industrial Base.

42 The DoD 3025 series of publications govern providing DSCA to a qualifying entity and primarily apply to response under Title 10 and 32 U.S.C. §502(f)(2). State law governs state responses conducted in SAD.

43 DTM 17-007 is set to expire on 21 June 2021 and will be converted to a new issuance.
3. **Other Entities.** DepSecDef PM 16-002, commonly referred to as the CTAA memo, provided guidance on the National Guard providing cyber support and services incidental to military training through Innovative Readiness Training (IRT) projects.\(^{44}\) IRT projects have traditionally been used for engineering and construction projects (such as building a bike trail for a local government or fixing shelters for the Boy Scouts), or for providing medical care to underserved communities. The CTAA memo clarified that IRT includes cybersecurity projects. Specifically, the CTAA memo provides guidance that coordinating, training, advising, and assisting certain qualifying mission partners must be done in accordance with IRT eligibility and program requirements under 10 U.S.C. § 2012. Most recently, the IRT portion of the CTAA memo was written into permanent DoD guidance with the new IRT DoDI 110.24.

It is important to note that CTAA memo does not preclude consultation or other methods of training under other authorities, such as the Economy Act and the Stafford Act.\(^{45}\)

**F. Intelligence Oversight (IO)**

As stated above, cyber teams likely have intelligence personnel assigned to them triggering Executive Order 12333 and associated IO rules and procedures. In determining whether IO rules apply, look to the people, pipes, process, platforms, purpose, and purchase (or funding source) for the activity. The facts drive the analysis and determination of whether IO applies to that cyber activity:

- **People.** Are intelligence personnel being used at any point to provide any capability or assistance from the tasking through delivery of the product to the client?
- **Pipes.** Are any intelligence systems being used at any point to disseminate or collect the information?
- **Process.** Are intelligence capabilities/units/personnel being used at any point to exploit or process the data collected and/or generate a product?
- **Platform.** Is either the platform or sensor owned or operated by an intelligence person?
- **Purpose.** What is the intended purpose for which the platform/capability is being used and who is the ultimate client/recipient of data or products generated?
- **Purchase.** Was the platform/operation purchased with NIP or MIP funds?

\(^{44}\) The CTAA memo expires on 1 March 2021 or when the overarching policy issues contained in the memo are contained in permanent DoD publication.

\(^{45}\) Outside of CTAA activities, the CTAA memo provides guidance that consulting with government entities and with public and private utilities, critical infrastructure owners, the Defense Industrial Base, and other non-governmental entities, as needed, in order to protect DoDIN, software, and hardware, enhance DoD cyber situational awareness, provide for DoD mission assurance requirements, and provide cybersecurity unity of effort are outside the context of CTAA training activities.
If any of the responses to the above questions indicate intelligence involvement, those cyber teams need to be cautious in proceeding with their training or mission to comply with IO rules, including requiring SecDef approval for use of intelligence equipment for a non-intel purpose.

The key to the analysis of whether data collection is an intelligence activity is the definition of intelligence. JP 2-0 defines intelligence as “the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations.”\textsuperscript{46} JP 2-0 further distinguishes intelligence from information, in that intelligence “allows anticipation or prediction of future situations and circumstances, and it informs decisions by illuminating the differences in available courses of action.”\textsuperscript{47} JP 3-12 recognizes that intelligence may be derived from information gained during military operations in cyberspace or from other sources. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.

In short, the Department of Defense defines intelligence as information regarding an adversary and the process used to produce that information. Getting information on what happened, when an incident occurred, and how an incident occurred from local system logs is likely data and at most information. Where an incident occurred can be both information and intelligence depending on where the compromised network is located. Who caused an incident, and why an incident occurred, falls into the intelligence.

For example, an operator tracing an Internet Protocol (IP) address to a specific foreign or domestic actor or collecting data during an incident is likely not an intelligence activity. This would only be a data collection. However, if the data is tied to a known signature and there is additional data with corresponding analysis to indicate that the activity is part of a broader scheme, then you may be crossing the line into an intelligence activity. The following graph will help illustrate when data turns into intelligence.

\textsuperscript{46} Joint Publication 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 October 2013 at GL-8.

\textsuperscript{47} Id. at I-1.
G. National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP)

The National Preparedness System (NPS) outlines an organized process for the whole of community to move forward with their preparedness activities and achieve the National Preparedness Goal. The NPS integrates efforts across five areas – Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-41, “U.S. Cyber Incident Coordination,” sets forth principles governing the Federal Government’s response to any cyber incident, provides an architecture for coordinating the response to significant cyber incidents, and requires DHS to develop the NCIRP to address cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure.\(^48\) The NCIRP is part of the broader NPS and establishes the strategic framework and doctrine for a whole-of-Nation approach to mitigating, responding to, and recovering from a cyber-incident.

The Department of Justice is the lead Federal agency (LFA) for threat response during a significant cyber incident, acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force.\(^49\) The Department of Homeland Security is the LFA for asset response during a significant cyber incident, acting through the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC).\(^50\) PPD-41 further discusses and defines threat response activities, asset response activities, and significant cyber incidents.

The NCIRP states that the Department of Defense is responsible for threat response to cyber incidents affecting DoD assets and DoDIN.\(^51\) The Department of Defense can also support civil authorities for cyber incidents outside the DoDIN when requested by the LFA, and approved by the appropriate DoD official, or directed by the President. Such support is provided based upon the needs of the incident, the capabilities required, and the readiness of available forces.

The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies and in accordance with the NCIRP is required to regularly update, maintain, and exercise the Cyber Incident Annex to the National Response Framework (NRF).\(^52\) The NRF is part of the NPS and is a guide on how the Nation responds to all types of disaster and emergencies. The NRF contains 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and annexes that describe the Federal coordinating structures to group resources and capabilities into functional area that are most frequently needed in a national response.\(^53\) Cyber capabilities most likely will fall under ESF #2,

\(^{48}\) Presidential Pol’y Dir. 41, United States Cyber Incident Coordination (26 July 2016) [hereinafter PPD-41].  
\(^{49}\) PPD-41, supra note 32, sec V, para B.1.  
\(^{50}\) Id. at sec. V, para B.2.  
\(^{52}\) Id. at 9.  
\(^{53}\) Dep’t of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (June 2016) [hereinafter NRF 2016].
communications under the responsibility of DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).  

H. State Active Duty (SAD)

1. Background

Personnel in SAD are under the command and control of the Governor. State laws govern issues in discipline, ethics, information protection, privacy, and liability, but certain Federal laws may apply in areas, such as Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. States cannot engage in international warfare, i.e., a State cannot attack a foreign country by cyber or kinetic means. Any DCO-RA or OCO activities must be carefully reviewed and should receive a written opinion from the State Attorney General in order to set parameters of activities.

DoD rules generally do not apply to SAD personnel, but apply to use of equipment procured through a Federal trace, including reimbursement requirements for the use of Federal equipment, as recently clarified by both DA and DAF CIO. Some of the cyberspace equipment or programs may be limited to Federal use for Federal systems and, therefore, would not be authorized for State use in a SAD or outside of the DoDIN. E.O.s 12968 and 13549, as amended, and DoD implementing guidance govern access and use of DoD information networks, software, hardware, systems, tools, tactics, techniques, and procedures beyond the classification level of SECRET,” and is prohibited in SAD.

2. SAD Access to Federal Security Clearances

Executive Orders 12968 and 13549 govern security clearances, including eligibility for, access to, and need to know determinations, to ensure proper safeguarding of information shared with State, local, tribal, and private sector entities (SLTPS). Blanket access to a DoD security clearance for State use is not authorized. State use of DoD security clearances must conform to the laws and DoD policies governing access to and protection of Federal Government classified information and systems, and controlled unclassified information and systems. Access to DoD security clearances can be granted by a Federal sponsor on a case-by-case, mission-specific basis if the following requirements have been met:

- NG member in SAD has an adjudicated Federal security clearance;
- NG member in SAD is carrying out a Federal sponsor mission;

54 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTION 2, COMMUNICATIONS ANNEX (June 2016), [hereinafter ESF 2]. CISA is responsible for protecting the Nation’s critical infrastructure from physical and cyber threats. CISA’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) provides 24x7 cyber situational awareness, analysis, incident response and cyber defense capabilities to the Federal government; state, local, tribal and territorial governments; the private sector and international partners. CISA provides cybersecurity tools, incident response services and assessment capabilities to safeguard the networks that support the essential operations of Federal civilian departments and agencies.

55 PM 16-002, supra note 38, at 3.
• Federal sponsor determines that that member has a “need for access” and “need to know” to carry out the assigned mission; and

• Federal sponsor has security cognizance over the assigned mission.56

I. Federal Laws Governing Cyber Activities

National Guard personnel may be subject to Federal criminal laws if they exceed the scope of their mission.57 This is particularly important for National Guard personnel as they may only perform DCO-IDM activities. National Guard personnel may only perform actions on a network when they have permission from the network owner to do so, otherwise, they may be subject to Federal and/or state criminal laws.

1. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2523)

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored Wire Electronic Communications Act together are commonly to as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. The ECPA updated the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968, which addressed interception of conversations using "hard" telephone lines, but did not apply to interception of computer and other digital and electronic communications. Several subsequent pieces of legislation, including The USA PATRIOT Act, clarify and update the ECPA to keep pace with the evolution of new communications technologies and methods, including easing restrictions on law enforcement access to stored communications in some cases. Overall, the ECPA, as amended, protects wire, oral, and electronic communications while those communications are being made, are in transit, and when they are stored on computers. The Act applies to email, telephone conversations, and data stored electronically.


The Wiretap Act prohibits the “intentional interception of any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”58 It also prohibits “intentional disclosure or use of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication while knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained illegally.”59 The Wiretap Act focuses on real-time content.


The Stored Communications Act governs unlawful access to stored communications by prohibiting “(a) intentionally accessing, without authorization, of a facility through which an electronic

56 Currently, DoD’s delegation of authority to USCYBERCOM to sponsor access to DoD security clearances for SAD is effective until the CTAA memo expires.
58 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), (b).
communication service is provided; or (b) intentionally exceeding an authorization to access that facility and thereby obtaining, altering, or preventing authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.” 60 It protects the privacy of the contents of files stored by service providers and of records held about the subscriber by service providers, such as subscriber name, billing records, or IP addresses. The Stored Communications Act focuses on past content and records.

4. Pen Register and Trap and Trace Act (18 U.S.C. § 3121)

The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Act prohibits the real-time interception of the non-contents of communications by a “pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order.” 61 However, the prohibition does not apply to a service provider for the operations, maintenance, and testing of the service. 62 It also does not apply to a service provider in the “protection of the rights or property of such service provider, or to the protection of users of that service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service.” 63 The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Act focuses on real-time non-content.


In 1984, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, as related to fraud and related activity in connection with computers, was added to Title 18, Chapter 47 – Fraud and False Statements. It prohibits, among other things, the theft of information through unauthorized access or exceeded authorization on a “protected” computer. 64 A protected computer is a computer that is (a) exclusively used by a financial institution or U.S. Government; or used by financial institute or U.S. Government and conduct that affects that use; or (b) used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including computers outside the United States, and conduct that affects that use. 65

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act also prohibits damage by “(a) knowingly causing the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; (b) intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage; or (c) intentionally accessing a protected computer without authorization, and as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss.” 66

Overall, CFAA is concerned with trespass, theft, and damage. The crux of whether a Title 32 NG person would violate the CFAA is whether that person’s activities is beyond the scope of authorized access. Each situation would be fact-specific and can be scoped through the rules for the use of cyber and a memorandum of agreement or understanding.

60 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a).
62 18 U.S.C. § 3121(b)
J. Judge Advocate Responsibilities

The National Guard, just like Department of Defense, can partner with Federal agencies, such as Department of Homeland Security, through the Economy Act or provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities supporting the National Response Framework, just like any other incident response preparation through the National Preparedness System. In the cyberspace domain, there are unique rules for the use of cyber that need to be reviewed and agreed upon by the National Guard and the asset owner through Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement and Nondisclosure Agreements. It is imperative to develop relationships with the State Attorney General’s office to be aware of any state specific rules that may apply as well as the constraints that apply to Federal equipment. Some of the issues to consider are:

- Written permission from asset/network owner to access their system;
- Scope of assistance to be provided (assessment and report finding; mitigation and remediation; responses outside scope of assistance);
- Status of military personnel (SAD, Title 32), command and control, and legal basis for disciplinary actions;
- Destruction/storage of data obtained, to include privacy and security restrictions;
- Confidentiality of proprietary data or information (i.e., certain federal cyber equipment may report all data to USCYBERCOM);
- Whether the system will only scan or actively respond to the adversary action (i.e., hack or hackback, which is prohibited outside of Title 10);
- Privacy balanced with required disclosure of criminal/fraudulent activity;
- Privacy of network users (union, contractor, etc.);
- Privacy of business to not publicize discovered activity requiring criminal investigation;
- Industry regulatory requirements to disclose incident;
- Liability for unintended impact to operations;
- Intelligence Oversight requirements (i.e., collection of USPI);
- Payment for services (look to the FAR and DFARS for specific requirements);
- Disputes resolution mechanism;
- Conflicts of interest (use of a proprietary tool in which a National Guardsman may have personal pecuniary interest);
Licensing limitations for use of a cyberspace capability and data rights for TTPs or software developed in conjunction with private entities as part of a cyber response or exercise; and

Other relevant laws (Privacy Act, HIPAA, FOIA, FTCA, State laws, etc.).

The laws governing cyber activities are constantly changing in response to new technology and uses of cyber capabilities in warfare. It is critical to ensure attorneys review the most recent laws, regulations and policies when advising in this continually evolving area of the law. If you are addressing an issue involving the cyber law, you should seek out additional expertise to assist you in this complicated area.