

Operation Hammurabi Information Technology: Metrics Analysis Report for Baghdad Courts

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Introduction

As part of the effort to modernize Iraqi court facilities after the war, Multi-National Division – Baghdad (MND-B) supplied local courts in the Baghdad area with computers, Internet service, and computer training for court personnel as part of its Operation Hammurabi project. This project began during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II when the First Cavalry Division (1CD) was a part of MND-B. The project was expanded during OIF III after the Third Infantry Division (3ID) replaced 1CD. To gain insight into the efficacy of Operation Hammurabi, during OIF III the MND-B Governorate Support Team (GST) Justice Section, which has spearheaded much of Operation Hammurabi's information technology effort, began obtaining metric data to determine the impact the Operation Hammurabi information technology effort is having on the Iraqi court system in the Baghdad area. The GST accomplished this by having Iraqi attorneys who are working for the GST visit a majority of the courts in the Baghdad area to obtain the desired metric data and provide it to the GST Justice Section for analysis. Trends from five sets of data obtained over a six month period (July-December 2005) indicate that Operation Hammurabi is achieving a positive effect.

Background

Operation Hammurabi is a Rule of Law project formulated and operated by MND-B.² Part of Operation Hammurabi included installing computers and providing Internet service, computer maintenance, and facility upgrades at several Baghdad area court facilities beginning in late 2004.³ Multi-National Division – Baghdad also began providing computer training to judges and court staff personnel beginning in the spring of 2005. The Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement division and MND-B Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) provided funding for this Iraqi court effort.⁴ Multi-National Division – Baghdad's project intent is to help facilitate achieving desired division-level Rule of Law effects such as creating a more stable governance environment, facilitating local citizens' access to the courts, and marginalizing the insurgency.⁵ In addition, the project is intended to be the first step toward the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement division's Iraq Justice Integration Project, which envisions connecting the court, police, and prison facilities by the use of computers, Internet access, and case tracking software so that an individual can be tracked throughout the entire system, from arrest until release from custody or confinement.⁶ It is noteworthy that International Narcotics and Law Enforcement division funding for Internet service and computer maintenance at the court facilities terminated as of 1 November 2005 with the expectation that the Higher Juridical Council, which is the body governing the courts, would sustain this effort with their own resources.⁷ As will be discussed below, the Higher Juridical

¹ Leader, Team 6, 174th Legal Support Organization, 81st Regional Readiness Command. The author served with the 3rd Infantry Division Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) as the Chief, Justice Section, Governorate Support Team, Multi-National Division – Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom III. Original work on Operation Hammurabi, of which the subject matter of this article is based, was initiated under Operation Iraqi Freedom II, when the Multi-National Division – Baghdad Justice Chief was Major (MAJ) Jeffrey Spears (OSJA, 1st Cavalry Division). Significant assistance in all aspects of the Operation Hammurabi court metrics project was provided by First Lieutenant Jason Wong (OSJA, 3ID). The project was under the direction and guidance of Colonel (COL) William Hudson, SJA, 3ID. The nine Iraqi liaison attorneys who assisted with this project were instrumental in obtaining the necessary data to analyze the success of the operation. Their identities are, however, undisclosed for their safety. Much of the information contained in this article is based on the author's recent professional experiences as the Chief, Justice Section, Governorate Support Team, Multi-National Division – Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom III, from January 2005 – January 2006 [hereinafter Professional Experiences].

² Operation Hammurabi began under 1CD with efforts by MAJ Jeffrey Spears, the 1CD GST Justice Chief, but was substantially expanded when 3ID replaced 1CD in February 2005. This project is part of an overarching Rule of Law program established as part of the reconstruction of Iraq after the recent war.

³ The fourteen court facilities include Khark, Rusafa, Khadimiya, Bayaa, Karada, New Baghdad, Sadr City (Al Thawra), Adhamiya, Al Zahoor, Mahmudiya, Abu Ghraib, and Medain.

⁴ Donated computer hardware was installed during OIF II, and 1CD selected contractors to provide computer maintenance, Internet service, and computer training using International Narcotics and Law Enforcement funding (contract #s JCCI/PCO W914NS-04-M-9080 (maintenance/Internet service) and JCCI/PCO W91GY0-06-M-0006 (computer training)). Commander's Emergency Response Program funds have been used to supplement and expand upon the original scope of the project.

⁵ Multi-National Division – Baghdad's Operation Hammurabi implemented a portion of the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement division's 1994 Rule of Law Framework Working Document (ROLFWD), which provided a general scheme for developing the overall rule of law strategy for Iraq.

⁶ The Iraq Justice Integration Project essentially formalized the ROLFWD as incorporated by an interagency and joint US-Iraqi working group.

⁷ See Professional Experiences, *supra* note 1 (recalling contract JCCI/PCO W914NS-04-M-9080 and discussions between 3ID GST and Department of State personnel in the fall of 2005).

Council does not seem to have provided any funds to sustain Internet service or computer maintenance at the various court facilities in Baghdad.

Each court facility contains a variety of court types. These types include Family, First Instance (Civil), Criminal Investigative, Misdemeanor, and Felony courts.⁸ Two court facilities also have appellate courts co-located with the lower level courts.⁹ As a means of determining the success of the project and to provide information regarding future allocation of effort and resources, MND-B Office of the Staff Judge Advocate decided to begin tracking certain metrics that will provide insight into the effect Operation Hammurabi is having on the Iraqi court system in Baghdad.¹⁰ Because of the slowly evolving court system in the current Iraqi environment, it was further decided that metric data need only be collected approximately once per month.¹¹ Nine Iraqi liaison attorneys who were Department of State contractor employees assigned to work with the GST Justice Section collected the metric data. The attorneys were generally assigned to conduct observations in different courts, although in a few cases two attorneys assist with the same court complex due to the high level of activity at the court facility. The attorneys were given two weeks to conduct their observations.¹² Three courts were considered too dangerous for the attorneys to conduct observations due to insurgent activities. These courts, therefore, were deleted from the list of courts to be scrutinized.¹³

The data collection task was developed in June 2005 and ready for implementation by July 2005. The first set of data was obtained in mid-July 2005; the second set in late August—beginning September 2005; and the third through fifth sets in mid-month for October - December 2005 (totaling a six month period). The data was based on in-person court visits by the Iraqi attorneys. The attorneys were directed to visit each court and view cases for at least three hours. They were further directed to follow-up their observations with interviews of the judges and court staff to obtain anecdotal information. They recorded their data on worksheets, which was then entered by GST Justice Section personnel onto Microsoft Excel computer spreadsheets to facilitate later review, comparison, and analysis.¹⁴

The following analysis does not address all of the data collected by the attorneys. Further, much of the discussion in this article is based upon an analysis of the aggregate data from the courts because the intent of this report is to cover some of the most important areas that can provide general trends regarding the Operation Hammurabi's overall effectiveness in the Iraqi court system. Because a review of the data spreadsheets for the various courts can provide more detailed information regarding each individual court, as well as provide additional data not included in this report, future studies may be able to use the data for a more targeted analysis.¹⁵ Finally, a summary of the numerical data addressed in this article is included in Appendix A. The computer spreadsheet data is the source of the summary, which is the basis for the graphs referenced in this article.

Information Technology

A snapshot of the status and trends in the computer technology area can be seen in Figure 1. The figure depicts in graphical form eight of the most important metrics that provide insight into information technology (IT) development and progress. As seen from the graph, there is a general positive overall trend in all areas, including computer training, computer

⁸ According to members of the Iraqi Bar Association, who serve as liaison attorneys to the GST, New Baghdad, Adhamiya, and Al-Zahoor court facilities do not have felony courts. A thorough history and description of the Iraqi judiciary can be found in *Judicial System in Iraq*. JUDGE MEDHAT MAHMOUD, JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN IRAQ (Baghdad, 2004) (Judge Medhat Mahmoud is the President of the Iraqi Council of Judges and Chief Justice of the Iraqi Supreme Court).

⁹ These two courts include the Khark and Rusafa court complexes.

¹⁰ This decision followed extensive discussions between the GST Justice Chief and the MND-B Staff Judge Advocate (COL William Hudson) in the spring/early summer of 2005.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² The author formulated the overall data collection and analysis plan, which was approved by the OIF III MND-B Staff Judge Advocate, COL William Hudson. The author developed the plan in close coordination with the Iraqi liaison attorneys who worked with the GST Justice Section

¹³ A determination to eliminate the courts was made following discussions between the GST Justice Chief and the GST Iraqi liaison attorneys. The following three courts were deleted from the list: Abu Ghraib, Medain, and Mahmudiya. One liaison attorney offered to call court personnel at the Mahmudiya facility each month to obtain the information, but since such information was not based on personal observations, it was not included in the statistical analysis for this project.


¹⁴ Data collection procedures, data sheets (in the form of questionnaires to be used by the Iraqi liaison attorneys during their court observations), and spreadsheets to incorporate the data were developed by the author, 1LT Jason Wong, and COL William Hudson and his OSJA staff in the spring of 2005.

¹⁵ Although the older data worksheets were destroyed to save file space, all of the data has been captured on the spreadsheets, which are located with the primary court metrics file in the GST Justice Section office in Baghdad, Iraq, and are available for review.

and Internet capability, and computer and Internet usage. A sudden drop in Internet capability, however, in the December data can be attributed to the expiration of an MND-B contract to provide Internet service and computer maintenance. In addition, the Higher Juridical Council stated its intent to provide only select courts with Internet service in the foreseeable future.¹⁶ The information regarding manual court administration methods was added to enable a comparison to the number of courts using computers to assist with court administration.

As seen in Figure 1, there was a tremendous increase in the number of judges and clerks who reported having received computer training through Operation Hammurabi. This increase can be partly attributed to the on-going training effort throughout OIF III under a computer training contract.¹⁷ Another likely reason for the substantial jump in trained personnel is because the Iraqi Chief Judge (currently Judge Medhat Mahmoud) and the Chief Appellate Judges (currently Adnan and Amer) recently directed the lower court judges to take the training opportunity more seriously and ensure as many personnel as possible attend. This direction by the judges resulted from a meeting the GST Justice Section had with the judges in which they were notified that the training contractor reported that many court personnel failed the training classes due to absences.¹⁸

Regarding the use of information technology equipment for court business, Figure 1 shows that although the number of courts using computers to draft documents and assist with court administration and using the Internet for research and other court business is still small, the overall increases since the first set of data was recorded is impressive. The number of courts using computers to draft documents increased by 650% (from two to thirteen), and the number of courts using computers to assist with court administration increased by 375% (from four to fifteen). The number of courts using the Internet to conduct court business improved by 800% (from one to eight) through November of 2005 until Internet service was disrupted. Iraqi courts still have a long way to go since, over *forty* courts are included in the project, but the trend is quite favorable. The results indicate that court personnel increasingly recognize the value of using computers and the Internet for court work. The data in Figure 1 concerning the number of courts using a manual court administrations method (averaging thirty-three over the five sets of data) provides a reference to compare with the number of courts using computers to assist with court administration.



Although Figure 1 shows the number of courts that reported having computers increased over the three-month period, many of the courts have only a few computers to serve many personnel. In fact, Iraqi courts have an average of only three computers that are shared by all employees, and some courts have only one computer or no computers at all.¹⁹ Court staff made many anecdotal comments, which are included in the data worksheets, expressing an interest in using computers for court duties but currently being unable to do so because of an insufficient number of computers in the courts. As a result, if additional computers are provided to the courts, the numbers of courts using them for court-related business will likely increase. Anecdotal comments obtained during the December 2005 observation period indicated that at least a few courts have begun obtaining some additional computers but not nearly enough to ensure easy computer access for all employees.

¹⁶ See *supra* note 7.

¹⁷ See Professional Experiences, *supra* note 1.

¹⁸ The author, along with Department of Justice personnel, met with Baghdad-based Iraqi judges on a routine basis to discuss a variety of current judicial matters.


¹⁹ The lack of computers was determined by data obtained during court observations and discussions with court personnel conducted by GST Iraqi liaison attorneys.

Figure 1 also appears to indicate a monthly variation in the number of courts having Internet service. In fact, as noted above, all of the courts had Internet service until November 2005. However, even during the period in which MND-B provided Internet service, there were still occasional service disruptions due to equipment difficulties. The fluctuations in Internet service observed in Figure 1 for July to November of 2005 likely indicate the number of courts experiencing service difficulties at the time the observations were made. In discussions between the GST Justice Chief and Chief Judge Medhat, the Iraqi Chief Judge of the Higher Juridical Council, Chief Judge Medhat indicated that he currently has additional funds to expend for information technology purposes but will limit Internet service to only a few courts because of his perception that the Internet is not used much for court purposes.²⁰ It is expected that future MND-B Office of the Staff Judge Advocate personnel will meet with Chief Judge Medhat to recommend that he continue Internet service to all courts because many were just beginning to use the service for court-related purposes when the service was terminated.²¹

Finally, as with all the data comparisons noted in this report, it should be remembered that a partial reason for differences in monthly data can be attributed to a fluctuation in the number of courts reporting during each observation period. During the first period, thirty-six courts reported data; during the second period, the number of courts reporting fell to thirty-one; during the third period, the number of courts reporting increased to thirty-eight; during the fourth period, the number of courts reporting increased to forty-two; and during the fifth period, the number of courts reporting reached forty-three. These fluctuations were due to the following: (1) difficulties some of the attorneys had in receiving court permission to obtain the data from a specific judge; (2) confusion among the attorneys regarding who was responsible for obtaining data for each court; and (3) visiting only one of multiple court buildings for a given court facility. Over time these problem areas were resolved so that the December 2005 data represents virtually all courts readily accessible to the observers. Eliminating reporting obstacles should result in a more stable number of courts reporting in the future, as indicated by the similarity in the numbers obtained between the fourth and fifth data sets.

Court Facilities

In addition to obtaining data regarding information technology, GST Justice Section also obtained a variety of data about the court facility. This data included anecdotal information from court personnel regarding court buildings, utilities, office equipment, and other items of concern. Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the areas of concern about court facilities expressed by the judges and staff.



Two primary areas of continued concern for the court infrastructure are unreliable grid electricity and the lack of working generators. As seen in Figure 2, problems in these areas are being remedied. The number of courts complaining of a lack of reliable power declined from thirty-one to four (an eighty-seven percent decrease) over the three-month period,

²⁰ The author and Department of Justice personnel met often with Chief Judge Medhat to discuss judicial matters of common interest, including Operation Hammurabi. As the Iraqi Chief Judge, Medhat approved implementation of Operation Hammurabi and requested periodic feedback on its progress. He also provided support to Operation Hammurabi through directives to the lower courts to cooperate with GST Justice Section personnel and their Iraqi liaison attorneys.


²¹ Due to the transition between 3ID and 4th Infantry Division in the December 2005 through January 2006 timeframe, GST Justice Section personnel were unable to review the final findings with Chief Judge Medhat. During discussions with replacement personnel, the author recommended they meet with Chief Judge Medhat to discuss thoroughly the results of the metrics analysis and to recommend that he support funding Internet access to all Baghdad courts.

while the number of courts reporting either a lack of a generator or a need for generator repair declined from fourteen to nine (a thirty-six percent decrease). These declines are likely due to the following: (1) a combination of Coalition efforts to improve grid electrical power; (2) a decrease in electrical power requirements as air conditioning demands decreased due to seasonal temperature drops; and (3) efforts by the MND-B and the High Juridical Council²² to assist courts in obtaining generators. Note, however, that generator problems began resurfacing during November and December of 2005. This increase was likely attributable to maintenance requirements and fuel issues, the latter becoming more prominent as the cost of fuel spiked significantly over the period.²³

Another area that formerly represented a significant problem in the Iraqi court system was computer and Internet maintenance. Although the Coalition had a contractor providing computer maintenance and Internet service for Iraqi courts until 31 October 2005,²⁴ the GST Justice Section received continuous complaints by court personnel about computer and Internet problems.²⁵ It was not until mid-November 2005; however, that the contractor actually stopped providing the Internet service to the courts. As seen in Figure 2, computer complaints dropped dramatically over the first four-month period (from seven to zero complaints). This drop in computer equipment complaints was likely due to continued pressure on the maintenance contractor to comply with the contract, as well as court personnel knowing how to remedy minor computer and Internet equipment problems themselves after having received computer training. In addition, no complaints about Internet service were reported during that three-month period. In December, however, twenty courts reported losing Internet capability and two reported computer maintenance problems. Complaints about Internet capability will likely continue unless the Higher Juridical Council makes a serious effort to provide the requested services or some other outside entity (e.g., MND-B) again provides it for the courts.

It is instructive to note that there has been a significant increase in the demand for more information technology equipment. As seen in Figure 2, such requests jumped from six in July to twenty-four in October before dropping to twelve in December. This spike may be partially due to court personnel becoming more familiar with computers and their advantages. As the employees' familiarity increases, they would logically demand more equipment to enhance their information technology capability. As noted earlier, this notion is supported by the anecdotal data from many court staff personnel, who noted that while they are enthusiastic about using computers, they are unable to use computers to do their office work because of computer shortages at the courts. In addition to a request for more computers, many courts also reported a desire to obtain photocopiers and additional scanners and printers. Further anecdotal evidence obtained by the GST Iraqi liaison attorneys during their court observations confirms that the Higher Juridical Council did in fact place additional computers in some courts. This is the likely cause of the decrease in requests for additional computer hardware over the last two reporting periods.

Finally, as essential services, such as electricity and certain basic office equipment, become more available, it is logical for the court staff to adjust their focus to secondary needs such as better furniture and air conditioning systems and more office supplies. This change in focus is reflected in Figure 2.



²² The High Juridical Council is an independent ministry level government agency that governs the Iraqi court system, including the disbursement of funds to the various courts for approved projects. As head of the High Juridical Council, Chief Judge Medhat has tremendous influence on the judiciary budget and is, therefore, the main contact between the GST and the Iraqi judiciary for such matters.

²³ During the fall and winter of 2005, the Iraqi government took steps to increase the price of petroleum-based fuels by reducing government subsidies. See, e.g., *Minister goes in Iraq Oil Crisis*, BBC NEWS, Dec. 30, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4569360.stm.

²⁴ See Professional Experiences, *supra* note 1.

²⁵ Court personnel contacted the GST Iraqi liaison attorneys to forward their complaints to the author, who served as the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) for the contract.

Case Processing Data

The first set of court case processing data gathered by the GST Iraqi attorneys was obtained in October 2005. The attorneys gathered additional court case processing data for the last two reporting periods. This data is graphically represented in Figure 3. The data is based on a review of court records for the calendar month prior to the attorney's visit. The data is limited to the following three categories: (1) the number of cases logged into the court for the prior month; (2) the number of cases the court completed during the prior month; and (3) the number of cases the court partially completed during the prior month. As can be seen in Figure 3, there is some variance in the sets of data, but it is likely that the Operation Hammurabi tools have not had any discernible impact to date.

The Iraqi liaison attorneys obtained the data from the written court records provided to them by court personnel. A study of the underlying data, however, indicates that some of the data is suspect. This conclusion is based on the reasonableness of some of the numbers obtained by the attorneys. For example, looking at the September data, the Karkh Family Court reported receiving 380 cases, while the New Baghdad court reported receiving 817. As another example, while the Karada Investigative Criminal Court reported completing 167 cases during September, the Bayaa Investigative court reported completing 2,308. Such disparities bring into question the accuracy of some of the reported data. One reason for the unusually high numbers obtained from some courts, however, could be explained by an additional use of the case processing data: it is provided each month to the Iraqi Judicial Review Committee, which uses the data to assess each judge's performance for that month. It is also possible that some judges may be exaggerating their data to improve the appearance of their court's performance.²⁶ As more sets of case management data are received and the GST Iraqi liaison attorneys continue to try to verify the accuracy of the source data, it may be possible to sift through the data to eliminate the more suspect data and thereby obtain a more accurate view of case processing. As the case processing data becomes more accurate, it may be possible to better gauge the impact the Operation Hammurabi project is having on the court system case processing, even before court administration software is introduced to the courts pursuant to the Department of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement division's sponsored Iraq Justice Integration Project.

Conclusions

Based upon the five sets of data obtained to date from an average of thirty-eight Baghdad area courts per set (at nine court facilities), several conclusions can be drawn. First, Operation Hammurabi is providing a distinct and positive impact on the courts, thereby facilitating the Rule of Law effort in Iraq. This positive impact furthers MND-B Office of the Staff Judge Advocate's goal of affecting the division's Rule of Law battle space by achieving such desired effects as creating a more stable governance environment and facilitating local citizens' access to the courts, which achieves more support for the current government and marginalizes the insurgency. Successfully modernizing the court system aids in achieving these desired effects.

Second, it is evident from the data that there is still substantial work to be done before achieving the desired end-state of preparing the court facilities and personnel for the Iraq Justice Integration Project. But the success achieved to date for the Operation Hammurabi project indicates that the court system will soon be able to move to the next step in integrating the courts, police, and prisons. As of this date, the next planned step is to obtain a court administration software program and establish a pilot program using the court administration software in a court facility in Baghdad to prove its capabilities and to begin training court personnel in its usage.

Third, as Coalition forces begin to reduce funding for these Rule of Law projects, relying instead on Iraqi funding, MND-B must continue to monitor and assist the courts to ensure continued success. For that reason, it is necessary to continue conducting the observations, which will provide a means of gauging whether the Iraqi's are successfully funding and managing the projects. For example, during Operation Hammurabi Coalition forces ceased funding court computer maintenance and Internet service on 1 November 2005 due to direction from the Department of State. However, by continuing the court observations, MND-B was able to observe that the Higher Juridical Council has not yet successfully taken over funding and managing those services. This issue should continue to be a topic of discussion between MND-B Judge Advocates and Iraqi judges, including Chief Judge Medhat and Chief Appellate Judges Adnan and Amer. In addition, future metric data will provide insight as to whether the Higher Juridical Council favorably addresses the various court requests for additional office equipment, furniture, and other items noted during the observations.

²⁶ According to the GST Iraqi liaison attorneys, the court case processing records provided to them are handwritten and the information contained therein has historically been suspect. Additional sources of error may be inadequate recordkeeping quality control practices and a non-uniform practice of what data is to be included in each category. These discrepancies make a fair comparison of the data among the various courts difficult. There is currently no means to verify the accuracy of the court records provided to the liaison attorneys.

Finally, although MND-B will transfer some project management and funding to the Higher Juridical Council, it will continue to play a significant role in other court-related projects. To succeed in those projects, it is critical to continue the court observations. Future data analysis will enable MND-B Office of the Staff Judge Advocate to discern whether changes need to be made in implementing those projects as well as to provide insight regarding how resources should be allocated.

OPERATION HAMMURABI COURT IT METRICS ANALYSIS
28 December 2005

Total Courts Reporting	Set #1 (July 05)		Set #2 (Sep 05)		Set #3 (Oct 05)	
	Affirmative Responses	Negative Responses	Affirmative Responses	Negative Responses	Affirmative Responses	Negative Responses
Info. Technology Data						
Judge Op. Hammurabi Computer Trained	21	13	15	13	30	8
Clerk Op. Hammurabi Computer Trained	10	23	10	19	26	11
Computers in Court	26	10	25	3	33	4
Draft Documents w/Computer	2	30	4	27	5	32
Internet Capable	25	11	20	15	27	11
Use Internet for Court Business	1	32	3	28	5	33
Manual Court Admin Method Operational	30	5	28	3	34	4
Computer Assisted Court Admin	4	31	4	25	7	31
Court Case Flow						
No. Cases Rec'd in Prior Month	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Number	Average/Court
No. Cases Completed in Prior Month	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	6926	182
No. Cases Partially Completed in Prior Month	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8116	214
					13415	353
Problem Areas						
Unreliable Electrical Power	31	N/A	19	N/A	10	N/A
Need Generator/Generator Repair	14	N/A	7	N/A	4	N/A
Bldg Structure Problems (Size, Damage, Needs Remodeling)	10	N/A	8	N/A	13	N/A
Computer Problems	7	N/A	1	N/A	0	N/A
Need Additional Office Equip (Computers, Printers, Copiers)	6	N/A	4	N/A	24	N/A
Need Furniture, AC, Office Supplies and/or Miscellaneous Items	21	N/A	12	N/A	20	N/A
NOTES:						
1. Three judges (set #1) and six judges (set #2) received non-Operation Hammurabi computer training. Courts have multiple judges, so numbers will not necessarily match between sets.						
2. By data set #5, the average number of computers in each court was three.						
3. Documents include court decisions, transcript, letters, case docketing, and administrative functions.						
4. Some courts complained about equipment generally without providing specificity and others complain that they do not have enough computers, especially for clerks.						

Appendix A (continued)

Total Courts Reporting	Set #4 (Nov 05)		Set #5 (Dec 05)	
	42		43	
Info, Technology Data	Affirmative Responses	Negative Responses	Affirmative Responses	Negative Responses
Judge Op. Hammurabi Computer Trained	35	5	40	3
Clerk Op. Hammurabi Computer Trained	30	12	29	11
Computers in Court	40	2	42	1
Draft Documents w/Computer	8	34	13	30
Internet Capable	35	7	16	24
Use Internet for Court Business	8	34	0	43
Manual Court Admin Method Operational	38	4	33	9
Computer Assisted Court Admin	13	26	15	28
Court Case Flow	Number	Average/Court	Number	Average/Court
No. Cases Rec'd in Prior Month	11510	280	11582	269
No. Cases Completed in Prior Month	10624	259	10514	244
No. Cases Partially Completed in Prior Month	12841	313	11623	270
Problem Areas	Affirmative Responses		Affirmative Responses	
Unreliable Electrical Power	1 facility (4 courts) plus one other court	N/A	1 facility (4 courts)	N/A
Need Generator/Generator Repair	2 facilities (10 courts)	N/A	2 facilities (9 courts)	N/A
Bldg Structure Problems (Size, Damage, Needs Remodeling)	3	N/A	2	N/A
Computer Problems	0	N/A	2 (plus 5 facilities(20 courts) had no internet service	N/A
Need Additional Office Equip (Computers, Printers, Copiers)	15	N/A	12	N/A
Need Furniture, AC, Office Supplies and/or Miscellaneous Items	20	N/A	22	N/A
Notes (continued)				
6. In several cases, groups of courts within specific facilities are the ones who are using the computers and internet (i.e., Khark, Rusafa, Kadhamiya, and Al Bayaa).				
7. Only New Baghdad reported having no operable case filing system				
8. Case flow totals/averages are for all courts. Additional breakdown of numbers for each type of court should be considered for future analysis.				
9. In set #5, no clerks in Karada and Al Zohour had received any Hammurabi computer training.				
10. As of 1 November 2005, the Coalition stopped funding the internet service and computer maintenance for the Baghdad courts. The Higher Juridical Council is now responsible for those items and Chief Judge Medhat is aware of the situation and said the Higher Juridical Council would provide them.				