

THE HUNT FOR BIN LADEN—TASK FORCE DAGGER—ON
THE GROUND WITH THE SPECIAL
FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN

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As far as the Green Berets sergeants were concerned, this war was going to be anything but conventional. The ultimate goal was still Osama bin Laden. Taking Afghanistan was just a stop along the way. The Green Berets knew they must control bin Laden's sanctuary in order to destroy his terrorist apparatus. In spite of the broad mission to liberate Afghanistan, one personal mission remained at the forefront of every Green Beret's consciousness: they had to kill the senior leaders of al-Qaida,² and they had to kill bin Laden.³

Few, if any, authors can match Robin Moore's subject matter immersion in writing a book. Long after his World War II service,⁴ Moore went through Basic Airborne School at Fort Benning, Georgia; and then, in 1964, became the only civilian to complete the Special Forces (SF) Qualification Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.⁵ His

¹ U.S. Army. Written while assigned to the U.S. Army Student Detachment, attending the University of Notre Dame Law School, London England, as a Master of Laws candidate in International and Comparative Law.

² Variouslly spelled Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaida. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Just., *Al Qaeda Training Manual*, available at www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm (last visited May 24, 2004) (spelling the term Al-Qaeda); see Worldtribune.com, *Parents Demand Return of Teens Lured by Al Qaida for "Vacation"*, May 23, 2004, available at www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/breaking_5.html (spelling the term Al-Qaida).

³ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 45.

⁴ Born in Boston on Halloween night of 1925 and educated in New England Schools, a combat tour in the U.S. Army 8th Air Force in WWII, followed by Harvard College class of 1949, Robert Lowell (Robin) Moore Jr. is the author of over twenty-five published books. See, e.g., Robin Moore, *The Hunt For Bin Laden Group*, at www.thehuntforbinladen.com/bio.htm (last visited May 24, 2004) [hereinafter, Promotional Website] (listing Robin Moore's other books and biographical information).

⁵ ROBIN MOORE, *THE GREEN BERETS* 12-18 (1965). In 1968, Hollywood made this book into a popular movie by the same name, but with a slightly altered story line. *THE GREEN BERETS* (Warner Bros. 1968).

reason: to gain access to the troops, locations, and materials that became the heart of his highly popular 1965 book, *The Green Berets*.⁶

Thirty-five years later, after the cataclysmic events of 11 September 2001, Moore traveled back to Fort Bragg then forward to Central Asia to be in the midst of Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations and chronicle the efforts of U.S. and Coalition SOF during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). He intended this book to “show . . . how only a few hundred men, operating from a secret SF base, changed the course of history in Central Asia and destroyed a hundred-thousand man terrorist army in less than ninety days.”⁷

This review comments on Moore’s study of American, Afghan, and coalition members’ operations as part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Force, titled Task Force Dagger, under then-Colonel (promotable) (COL(P)) John F. Mulholland, Jr. It examines the flow of ideas and key themes, and “completes the record” where Moore’s book is otherwise silent or inaccurate with respect to applicable law and policy

⁶ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 11-18. Moore noted that it would have been impossible for him to write *The Green Berets* if he had not had Special Forces training and the media clearance (“accreditation”) from the Department of Defense. Moore wrote his story on Special Forces operations in Vietnam as a fictional account:

[I determined that I] could present the truth better and more accurately in the form of fiction I changed details and names, but I did not change the basic truth . . . because [events] reported in isolation would fail to give full meaning and background of the war in Vietnam Also . . . Special Forces Operations are, at times, highly unconventional. To report such occurrences factually, giving names, dates, and locations, could only embarrass U.S. planners in Vietnam and might even jeopardize the careers of invaluable officers.

Id. at 12-13. Notably, while heading to Vietnam as a journalist, Moore co-wrote *The Ballad of the Green Berets* with Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler. ROBIN MOORE & STAFF SERGEANT BARRY SADLER, *THE BALLAD OF THE GREEN BERETS* (RCA Records) (1966).

⁷ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at inside cover. According to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), the U.S. began building the coalition on 12 September 2001, and at the time of this review, seventy nations were supporting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Some twenty-one nations have deployed more than 16,000 troops to the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). In Afghanistan alone, non-US coalition partners contributed nearly 8,000 troops to OEF and to the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, making up over half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan. U.S. Central Command, *International Contribution to the War on Terrorism*, at <http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/joint.htm> (last visited May 24, 2004).

regarding the most notable comments and vignettes in his book. Moore's work contains equal parts romantic adventure novel and historical analysis of recent SOF operations. The book progresses in twenty-four chapters from the earliest reactions to the World Trade Center and Pentagon disasters,⁸ through Operation Anaconda⁹ in which SOF and conventional forces crushed Taliban and al-Qaida strongholds dug deep into the Shah-i-Kot Mountains of eastern Afghanistan, to an epilogue on Moore's SOF protagonist friends and admired colleagues-in-arms.¹⁰ He carefully details the appearance, actions, and attitudes of the subjects he discusses in his book, using dramatic emphasis and colorful language to paint a picture of the fast-paced, life-and-death decisions that faced Task Force Dagger troops daily. He also shows his pro-SOF or anti-“conventional force” bias throughout the book,¹¹ and glosses over or misstates some key legal considerations bearing upon the conduct of SOF and coalition forces.

Moore takes many opportunities to revel in Task Force Dagger's use of high tech personal weapons, communications equipment, close air support, horse-borne equipment, motorized ground vehicles, and aircraft, with deadly result against Taliban and al-Qaida forces.¹² While Moore concedes that these SOF hardware items were essential to the success of operations in Afghanistan, the abiding requirements for SOF must be consistent with the so-called “SOF Truths.”¹³

General Charles R. Holland, the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), has said that a large part of the reason that U.S. SOF can quickly carry out operations overseas is that

⁸ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 16.

⁹ *Id.* at 271-95.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 303-34; *e.g.*, COL(P) John Mulholland is a hero in Moore's eyes.

¹¹ Moore's work largely ignores the role of conventional forces—traditional non-Special Operations U.S. Army units—and devotes only a miniscule fraction of its total pages to the conventional force operations in Afghanistan. Mention of the predominant conventional land force on the ground in Afghanistan, the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), only rates sparse comments on twenty-five of the 370 pages. *Id.* at 112, 171, 175, 176, 223, 253, 262, 273, 276-78, 281-94. Moore refers to Lieutenant General Mikolashek, the Combined Task Force Commander, on only four pages. *Id.* at 58, 221, 272, 275.

¹² *See generally id.* (detailing this equipment and its effects throughout the book.)

¹³ *See, e.g.*, William P. Tangney, *Threats to Armed Forces Readiness: Testimony to the House Committee on Government Reform on the Critical Challenges Confronting National Security, May 16, 2002*, available at <http://www.westlaw.com> (last visited May 24, 2004).

several “SOF Truths” are embedded in USSOCOM’s philosophy of maintaining high training and deployment readiness.¹⁴ These truths reflect the lessons learned from the history of American SOF employment, and the operations in Afghanistan revalidated them.¹⁵ The SOF Truths are: (1) “Humans are more important than hardware;” (2) “Quality is better than quantity;” (3) “SOF cannot be mass-produced;” and (4) “SOF cannot be created after a crisis occurs.”¹⁶ Moore enumerates these truths in this book, but advocates the need for a fifth SOF truth: “Given that SOF Truth #1 is true, humans deserve the requisite personal hardware to fight and survive.”¹⁷ Moore’s rationale for this novel fifth SOF truth was that many in the Department of Defense caught on to the “humans are more important than hardware” philosophy, and directed the acquisition of many pieces of “SOF-developed” equipment because of its desirability and ability to better protect human life.¹⁸ Moore bemoans, but fails to substantiate, a perceived lack of missions and resources going to Special Forces.¹⁹ Based on that misperception, Moore asserts, with little extra support, that the fifth SOF truth should become reality. Beyond better equipping them, Moore believes the SOF should carry on as the primary force in Afghanistan with conventional force support.²⁰ Moore’s justification is that since “SF ha[s] now shown what they alone [can] do and are now in the hands of the ultimate commander in chief, George W. Bush, and Donald Rumsfeld . . . let them continue to do it, and give them the gear to do it.”²¹

¹⁴ General Charles R. Holland, *Quiet Professionals: U.S. Special Operations Forces Maintain High Training and Deployment Readiness*, ARMED FORCES J. INT’L 1 (Feb. 2002), available at <http://www.afji.com/AFJI/Mags/2002/February/specops.html>.

¹⁵ *Id.*

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 330-34.

¹⁸ *Id.* at 330-34. Of what Moore might term “conventionally-developed” hardware, Moore wrote that the conventional forces’ research and development efforts “go toward developing the wherewithal to fight huge battles, as they should.” By implication, he means that such equipment may be inadequate for “less than huge battles,” whatever and whenever those may be. *Id.*

¹⁹ *Id.* at 330-34. The USSOCOM experienced an unprecedented expansion of missions, in addition to increased resources with which to accomplish those missions during the GWOT. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 estimated budget increases for USSOCOM is forty-seven percent over FY 2003, including an additional \$391 million for operations and related expenses, and about \$1.1 billion in procurement of critical equipment. U.S. ARMY, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, POSTURE STATEMENT 2003-2004, 89-99 (2003).

²⁰ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 330-34.

²¹ *Id.*

At its core, this book remains a story of innovative and heroic men, rather than military machines. Moore emphasizes the SOF operators' long years of training,²² the sage SOF commanders whose experience guided training and preparation,²³ and the SOF operators' interpersonal skills and key relationships they built with Afghan resistance commanders and their forces.²⁴ Those relationships were built on "drinking chai,"²⁵ leading by example in combat rather than training in classroom settings,²⁶ and maximizing the resources of cash and equipment to work and fight together.²⁷ Readers quickly discover that not all the vignettes of Afghan or Northern Alliance leadership were of noble warriors with pure purposes. The seamier side included strained support alliances with Pakistan and Uzbekistan;²⁸ General Franks' purported alienation from Afghan commanders due to intercultural misunderstandings;²⁹ conflicting loyalties of Afghan commanders like Ismail Khan and others with ties to Iran;³⁰ repugnant practices, such as General Naderi's "right of the lord" deflowering of newlywed wives in his tribe;³¹ and the flamboyant and aggressive homosexual advances of some Afghans towards SOF operators.³²

Moore recounts incidents of unintended consequences, such as several purported fratricides resulting from transposed target coordinates, confusion in target identification, and "danger close" proximity to fires.³³ He also outlines how integrated, timely, coalition efforts routed Taliban

²² *Id.* at 38-50.

²³ *Id.* at 40.

²⁴ *Id.* at 51.

²⁵ *Id.* at 24, 66, 129, 133 ("Drinking chai" literally means drinking tea, but more importantly, the term refers to listening and maintaining personal contact.).

²⁶ *Id.* at 41.

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *Id.* at 24-25.

²⁹ *Id.* at 24-25, 53.

³⁰ *Id.* at 164-65.

³¹ *Id.* at 24-25.

³² *Id.* at 189, 261-62.

³³ *Id.* at 170-81 (casualties at Qala-I-Jangi prison), 218-23 (SOF and coalitional personnel casualties, to include the current president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, who was lightly wounded), and 278-79 (purported SOF and coalitional fratricide casualties). Moore correctly describes, but confusingly juxtaposes five types of engagement incidents within the span of four pages at 311-14: "blue on blue" (U.S. fires on U.S. and coalition forces), "green on green" (warlords using fires of their own or of the United States against each other), "blue on green" (U.S. fires on Afghan allies or "innocents"), "blue on red" (U.S. and coalitional fires on opposing forces), and "blue on white" (inadvertent killing of innocent civilians by U.S. forces).

and al-Qaida forces with unprecedented speed and force of effect in spite of interagency disputes over information flow and conflicting “conventional versus SOF” points of view.³⁴ On that latter point, Moore contradicts his earlier assertion of “conventional versus SOF” points of view.³⁵ In an early pre-deployment vignette, Moore describes how Major General C. Lambert, the then-Commanding General of U.S. Army SF Command purportedly briefed 5th SF Group Soldiers that “once [they] were on the ground, [they would be] engaged in World War II-type combat. It’s good old fashioned conventional war.”³⁶ Moore then implies some derision on the part of the briefed Soldiers: “The Green Berets chuckled at the naïveté of conventional thinking . . . and they were about to show American Generals exactly how futile conventional warfare initiatives were against well-trained, highly experienced unconventional killing machines.”³⁷ According to Moore, the real culprit for SF’s lack of missions and resources, paradoxically, is USSOCOM rather than the conventional force leadership.³⁸

From a legal perspective, there are no rousing discussions of “rules of engagement, right or wrong,” nor any mention whatsoever of legal support to operations.³⁹ Nonetheless, Moore raises some controversial legal and policy matters with respect to the conduct of U.S and coalition forces in combat operations. While in Afghanistan, Moore flaunted the longstanding prohibitions on troops consuming alcohol in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility by offering up liquor he secreted in his walking cane to SF Soldiers, and then thanked an officer in theater by name for “refills for the cane.”⁴⁰ Moore mentioned the

³⁴ *Id.* at 16-25, 294-95, 314-15.

³⁵ *See supra* note 12 and accompanying text.

³⁶ *Id.* at 44-45.

³⁷ *See supra* note 12 and accompanying text.

³⁸ *Id.* at 330-34; *but see supra* note 20 discussing the expansion of the USSOCOM missions, budget, and resources.

³⁹ In my oversight role as Deputy Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) from 2001-2003, I observed that in addition to organic SOF Judge Advocates and Paralegal Specialists, Active and Reserve Component legal professionals from all armed services involved themselves in Coalition SOF mission preparation, rehearsals, and support during operations in Afghanistan in a variety of locations and means. The value of legal professionals to the commanders and troops they served was not necessarily measured by the proximity to the “battlefield.”

⁴⁰ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at xii-iii. Moore states:

The simple fact was that the Green Berets would fight hard and party hard, no matter where they were, and one hundred General Orders would not get in the way of either endeavor . . . the sergeants knew

motivation for fighting, and also discusses the capture and treatment of U.S. citizen-turned-Taliban soldier John Walker Lindh.⁴¹ Moore does not, however, discuss Lindh's legal status or ultimate disposition.⁴² Another controversial discussion in Moore's book involved Colonel General Jurabek,⁴³ the Northern Alliance Qala-I-Jangi prison commander.⁴⁴ Moore alleges Jurabek flooded a prison basement where revolting al-Qaida detainees were hiding, and then poured diesel fuel into the basements to try and burn the detainees out.⁴⁵ This maltreatment of detainees, Moore opined—without legal analysis or justification—meant

this was a moment for those who had been bathed in fire and blood. They realized I knew that getting a drink was virtually impossible, and if there was one thing I wanted to do, it was to have a private drink with these twenty-first century heroes. We each took a sip of bourbon, which glistened gold in the dim light.

Id. For the restrictions on alcohol consumption then in effect in Afghanistan, see Memorandum, Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to subordinate commands, subject: Prohibited Activities for U.S. Department of Defense Personnel Present Within the USCENTCOM AOR (19 Dec. 2000) (not titled as, but commonly referred to as General Order #1A); see also Memorandum, Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to subordinate commands, subject: Partial Waiver of USCENTCOM General Order Number 1A (11 Apr. 2001).

⁴¹ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 168, 176-81, and 266.

⁴² *Id.* John Walker Lindh pled guilty 15 July 2002, and the court sentenced him on 4 October 2002. Attorney Andrew Cohen, *Sentencing Day For John Walker Lindh*, CBSNews.com (Oct. 4, 2002), at <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/15/news/opinion/courtwatch/main518767.shtml>. While the final publication of Moore's book took place in early 2003, Moore's acknowledgements, and presumably his final manuscript, are dated 11 September 2002, before Lindh's sentencing. See *supra* note 1, at 168, 176-81, 266; see also Interview with Margaret Warner & James Brosnahan, Lindh's attorney, *News Hour with Jim Lehrer* (PBS television transcript, July 15, 2002), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec02/plea2_7-15.html (indicating that in 2002, after his lawyers negotiated an agreement with government prosecutors, John Walker Lindh pled guilty to providing services to the Taliban under 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2; 31 C.F.R. §§ 545.204-206(a) (2004), a felony charge with a maximum sentence of ten years. Since Lindh, as a Taliban soldier, carried grenades and an assault rifle (18 U.S.C. § 924(c), he agreed to an additional ten years for using a firearm in the commission of a felony. Based on his plea, the court sentenced Lindh to the maximum twenty years in prison, with credit for the seven months already spent in custody. Under the mandatory fifteen percent credit for "good time," Lindh cannot remain incarcerated more than seventeen years).

⁴³ Under various authorities of the Soviet-influenced rank-structure for Northern Alliance and other forces in Afghanistan, the rank of Colonel General existed. See USSR MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, REGULATIONS ON WEARING MILITARY UNIFORMS (Military Publishing House 1989).

⁴⁴ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 176-81.

⁴⁵ *Id.*

that “[o]ne thing was for sure—the enemy had given up their POW status voluntarily and taken up arms, and if they didn’t surrender now they were going to die, every last one of them.”⁴⁶

Moore also said—without substantiating fact—that “if caught, bin Laden would not survive . . . they (US SOF) would most assuredly kill him even if the command said no.”⁴⁷ Finally, Moore touched ever so lightly on the contentious issue of SOF operating in “nonstandard” uniforms. Moore called a black and white scarf given by Northern Alliance forces to COL(P) Mulholland an “unauthorized scarf . . . not part of any U.S. military uniform.”⁴⁸ Moore asserted that the wearing of that scarf while in an official capacity at a military-civilian ceremony with international media present “surely would be questioned by some in the continental United States.”⁴⁹ Moore said SOF “adopt[ed] the scarf as a symbol of their solidarity with the “mujahadeen”⁵⁰ warriors and their absolute dedication and willingness to give all to achieve victory.”⁵¹ Nonstandard uniforms, purportedly or actually worn during OEF, were, and are, a matter of some continuing operational and legal controversy. On 7 April 2003, W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to The Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, and Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, addressed this uniform

⁴⁶ *Id.* at 176. For legal analysis of the status of conflict and treatment of detainees during combat operations, see John Embry Parkerson, Jr., *United States Compliance with Humanitarian Law Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause*, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 41-42 (1991) (applying analysis to determine whether U.S. invasion of Panama on behalf of Endara government made conflict “international” for the purposes of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also Major Geoffrey S. Corn & Major Michael Smidt, “*To Be or Not to Be, That is the Question*”: *Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel*, ARMY LAW., June 1999, at 1 (citing an interview with DOD law of war expert Hays Parks, who advocates a purely de facto standard of detainee treatment without regard to political factors); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 61 (J. Pictet ed., 1960) (continuing to act as a “custodian” of international humanitarian law, the ICRC was instrumental in drafting the Geneva Conventions.).

⁴⁷ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 236-37. Moore also said that if bin Laden surfaces, “the Green Berets will execute him.” *Id.* at 310-11.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 88, 253-54.

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ The term “mujahadeen,” also sometimes spelled “mujahideen,” “mujahedein,” “mujahedin,” “mujahidin,” and “mujaheddin,” refers to a military force of Muslim guerrilla fighters engaged in a “holy war” or “jihad.” See, e.g., <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/mujahadeen> (last visited June 22, 2004).

⁵¹ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 88, 253-54.

matter.⁵² Mr. Parks noted that in international armed conflict, all conventional forces and most SOF missions are executed in “full” uniform, with extremely limited exceptions.⁵³ Dependent upon mission and unit, “indigenous” clothing may be a military uniform worn in conjunction with some distinctive device—for example, part of the Desert Camouflage Uniform (DCU)—with a tribal hat or scarf.⁵⁴

At the end of the day, both in the book⁵⁵ and in present-day reality,⁵⁶ Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts remain unknown, and the Global War on Terrorism continues unabated. Nevertheless, Moore’s work demonstrates great admiration for the heroes of Task Force Dagger and their victory over the forces of terror and evil they encountered.

Just as Moore achieved great popular success with *The French Connection*,⁵⁷ *The Happy Hooker*,⁵⁸ and *The Green Berets*,⁵⁹ among other works,⁶⁰ this book may be a matter of journalistic history (and accompanying socio-political controversy) repeating itself. The Johnson administration was furious over sensitive information included in Moore’s *The Green Berets*.⁶¹ Moore wrote in his acknowledgements for

⁵² See Transcript, U.S. Dep’t. of Defense, Briefing on Geneva Convention, EPWs and War Crimes, presented by Mr. Bryan Whitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), with W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General and Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2003/t04072003_t407genv.html.

⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁵ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 310-11.

⁵⁶ Current as of June 2004.

⁵⁷ ROBIN MOORE & EDWARD KEYES, *THE FRENCH CONNECTION* (1969). As Moore integrated himself into SOF operations in Afghanistan, he has similarly delved deep into his subject matter for past works. See Promotional Website, *supra* note 5 (noting that Moore joined the New York Police Department in one of their most spectacular drug busts as research for his book, which later turned into the popular 1971 movie by the same name).

⁵⁸ XAVIERA HOLLANDER & ROBIN MOORE, *THE HAPPY HOOKER* (1972).

⁵⁹ See MOORE, *supra* note 1.

⁶⁰ See Promotional Website, *supra* note 5 (discussing his other fiction and nonfiction novels involving world travel, politics, and adventure).

⁶¹ MOORE, *supra* note 1, at 8-9; see also Letter from Robin Moore, to Lieutenant General (Ret.) William P. Yarborough, former Commander, U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School (May 16, 2000), available at http://www.sfalx.com/h_letter_to_gen_yarborough_on_88.htm. In this letter, Moore writes:

The Hunt for bin Laden, of the need to change “a few minor facts and names to protect confidential sources and secret material and to maintain certain aspects of the Green Berets’ OPSEC—operational security.”⁶² In addition to previous comments on journalistic license with facts, Moore wrote in *The Hunt for bin Laden* about purportedly “top secret meetings,”⁶³ “super secret” commands,⁶⁴ and “classified” locations.⁶⁵ If this information was true, and Moore had access to classified information for which he was not cleared, then such access and reference to classified matters would justifiably cause consternation in military and political circles alike.⁶⁶ Moore’s work generally achieved his stated and implied purposes,⁶⁷ but future historical works may offer a less romanticized and more balanced history of conventional and SOF operations—and their legal implications—in Afghanistan. Given the popularity of Moore’s other works and ongoing operations in Afghanistan, military members and civilians alike will read *The Hunt for Bin Laden* for years to come for entertainment, if not for education.

About that time General Bud Underwood called me into the Pentagon and let me know that (Sec. of Defense) Bud McNamera was planning to prosecute me under the Secrecy Act (sic). Bud showed me a copy of the book with a bunch of red tabs sticking out. “Each of those eighteen tabs marks a top secret piece of information.” I couldn’t believe it and reached for the marked book. He snatched the book away. “This book is classified,” he growled. Fortunately Jerry Ford, minority leader in the [H]ouse, heard about my problem. I had addressed his House Armed Services Committee my first week back from Vietnam. Jerry read all the classified sections of the book into the Congressional Record, automatically declassifying them and disposing of that problem for me.

Id.

⁶² MOORE, *supra* note 1, at xiii.

⁶³ *Id.* at jacket cover.

⁶⁴ *Id.* at 52.

⁶⁵ *Id.* and at jacket cover.

⁶⁶ Only time will tell whether authors coming after Moore will gain the fullest trust, confidence, and access to information when so attached or embedded with combat units, or whether they can create such a colorful account of their subjects’ exploits.

⁶⁷ *Supra* note 8 and accompanying text.