Punitive Versus Protective Debarment Regimes: The Protection of
Government Interests through the Management of Procurement
Risk
By Lieutenant Colonel Bruce L. Mayeaux
Many governments use an administrative process, commonly
known as “debarment” to mark problematic contractors as ineligible for
future public contracts.[1]
While many acquisition professionals view the United States’
administrative—or discretionary—debarment system as a punitive
process, it is, in fact, a protective one.[2]
However, the current U.S. administration has recently issued a robust
whole-of-government strategy on countering corruption, which has
increased the Government’s focus on anti-corruption enforcement.[3]
If U.S. agency-level decision-makers, including those within the Army
and the Department of Defense, decide to refine the administrative
debarment process to be consistent with this strategy, they may
ask—why should it remain protective?
The reason U.S. debarments should remain protective is
that, in general, debarment regimes designed to punish contractors for
prior bad acts are less effective than protective regimes at managing
procurement risk. Present and future risk management is a major
government interest, and the different regimes affect public
procurement risk very differently in the long run.
A comparison of protective and punitive regimes reveals
how they impact risk differently. First, punitive regimes can increase
risk by discouraging contractor cooperation with Government
investigations into alleged problematic conduct through severe and
nondiscretionary sanctions. Second, they can increase risk by
discouraging new firm participation in the marketplace, and, as a
result, limiting competition. In contrast, protective regimes can
decrease that risk. First, they encourage contractor cooperation by
giving contractors an opportunity to prove they are presently
“responsible,” meaning they have a satisfactory performance record,
have shown integrity in their business dealings, and maintain
appropriate business ethics.[4]
Second, they increase new-firm competition in the marketplace by using
alternative methods to debarment.
This article briefly examines how governments use punitive and
protective debarment regimes to manage risk, and why U.S. agency-level
decision-makers should continue to tend towards a protective
administrative debarment process to manage their public procurement
risk.[5]
Types of Procurement Risk and How Debarment Regimes Manage
Them
Protecting government interests through risk management is a
consistent theme across public procurement systems throughout the
world.[6]
Generally, this public procurement risk is broken down into three
categories.[7]
First, performance risk, or the risk that a contractor will fail to
perform on its contract with a government.[8]
Second, reputational risk, or the risk that the reputation of a
government will suffer if it “contracts [or works] with a disreputable
vendor.”[9]
Finally, fiduciary risk, or the risk that taxpayer dollars will be
wasted or inappropriately spent.[10]
There is no clear separation between these categories of risk and a
single matter could concern two—or more—at one time.[11]
However, while qualifying contractors, governments routinely seek to
manage both reputational and performance risk, which tend to serve as
central themes in their debarment regimes.[12]
Generally, governments—through their debarment
regimes—tend to manage their interests by mitigating these risks in
one of two ways. First, under a punitive debarment regime, governments
use debarment more like a means to punish, or sanction, contractors
for past deeds that have already increased performance or reputational
risk to that government.[13]
An example of a punitive debarment regime is the one utilized by the
World Bank. In that regime, if the contractor presents sufficient
evidence to the decision-making body—the Integrity Vice
Presidency—that they committed sanctionable conduct, then the burden
to show the conduct was not sanctionable moves to the contractor.[14]
If the contractor is unsuccessful in proving its burden, then it is
subject to mandatory sanctions.[15]
In other words, if the contractor cannot show that either it did not
do the alleged conduct or its conduct was not sanctionable, there is
no discretion—the contractor must be sanctioned.[16]
Evidence in mitigation only plays a role in how onerous the sanctions
will be, and a present responsibility analysis is not involved.[17]
The focus of the Integrity Vice Presidency throughout this punitive
process is the sanctionable conduct itself, not what the contractor
has done to manage the sanctionable conduct.
In contrast, under a protective debarment regime,
governments use debarment as a means to protect its current and future
interests by refusing to do business with vendors that have
unacceptable levels of performance or reputational risk.[18]
An example of a protective debarment regime is the one the U.S.
Government uses now. What makes the U.S. Government’s regime
protective, and distinguishes it from punitive regimes such that of
the World Bank, is a focus on present responsibility and the
discretion given to decision-makers.[19]
Here, although the U.S. decision-maker—the suspension and debarment
official (SDO)—may have evidence of sanctionable conduct, generally,
they must consider any mitigation and remedial measures the contractor
presents, along with the seriousness of the conduct, to determine
whether the contractor is presently responsible.[20]
The SDO has great discretion as to not only the severity of sanctions
but also whether to sanction at all.[21]
Both punitive and protective debarment approaches seem to entice
contractors into compliance with law, regulation, and policy intended
to mitigate the aforementioned risk.[22]
However, the punitive approach is less effective, as it can lead to
increased performance and reputational risk.
The Punitive Approach
Punitive debarment regimes are less effective than protective regimes
at managing interests and mitigating risk because they can discourage
contractor cooperation with investigations and, indirectly, severely
limit competition. Punitive debarment regimes discourage cooperation
with official investigations via harsh and often nondiscretionary
sanctions that governments levy due to prior bad acts.[23]
Moreover, mitigating measures—such as cooperating with
investigators—do not affect the likelihood of sanctions, only their
severity.[24]
This is the case even if the contractor has made changes to address
the cause of those acts.[25]
This lack of cooperation seems to also make it harder for governments
to detect conduct that has increased its performance risk.[26]
Additionally, because contractor cooperation with investigations
benefits the overall integrity of a procurement system, the lack of it
affects a government’s reputational risk.[27]
This is because regimes that discourage cooperation could lead to less
transparency and a more suspicious public. Indeed, the punitive
debarment regimes’ discouragement of cooperation with contractors over
official investigations can increase the likelihood of performance and
reputational risk as opposed to mitigating it.
Second, punitive regimes seem to severely limit competition by
discouraging new vendors from doing business with a government.[28]
Ostensibly, these new firms would fear the overly onerous punishment
they could receive under a punitive debarment regime “if a subsidiary
company, individual, or small group of individuals” did anything to
increase that government’s performance or reputational risk.[29]
These regimes operate like a “zero-sum game” and inevitably lead to a
smaller pool of contractors, which could lead to lower-quality
products and services available to a government.[30]
Again, this likely increases, not decreases, both performance and
reputational risk. Consequently, because the punitive approach
realistically can increase both performance and reputational risk, it
is less effective at managing it. In contrast, the protective approach
is more effective at mitigating risk and, therefore, managing
it.
The Protective Approach
Protective debarment regimes are more effective than punitive regimes
at managing risk because they encourage contractor cooperation with
official investigations and increase competition. As an initial
matter, protective regimes deliberately consider their interest
management by discretionally using debarment to mitigate their current
and prospective—and not just retrospective—procurement risk.[31]
Stated in other terms, protective regimes tend to focus on a
contractor’s present qualification—or responsibility—and its future
behavior by looking at not only its conduct but also how it responded
to the conduct.[32]
As an example, these regimes allow governments to consider mitigating
factors when deciding whether to debar, which allows a contractor to
use mitigating factors to demonstrate it has reduced both performance
and reputational risk.[33]
Therefore, these regimes focus on protecting governmental interest
instead of just punishing bad behavior.
In the United States, which is under a protective administrative
debarment regime, these mitigating factors include contractor
cooperation with official investigations.[34]
An SDO considers contractor cooperation with investigations to
determine whether a contractor is presently responsible and,
therefore, able to continue to do business with the U.S. Government.[35]
As a result, the protective regime encourages contractors to cooperate
with the government on official investigations. This cooperation seems
to contribute to both lower performance risk and lower reputational
risk for the United States—and other similar protective regimes; it
gives a contractor a means to demonstrate that it has nothing to hide
and, past problematic conduct notwithstanding, it is serious about
making changes.[36]
Therefore, unacceptable present or future performance and/or
reputational risk is mitigated, and the procurement risk is managed.[37]
Additionally, a protective debarment regime encourages competition.
While both punitive and protective regimes aim to encourage vendors to
“invest in themselves for future work with [a] government,” only
protective regimes are able to use alternative methods to
debarment—such as administrative agreements—to reasonably protect a
government’s interest without narrowing competition too
dramatically.[38]
This approach seems to provide hope to new firms that they could
invest in working with a government without the risk of being strictly
liable for a rouge actor or partner’s problematic conduct and
automatically cut-off from future business with that government. Thus,
this approach likely encourages new firms to compete in the government
marketplace and, hence, increases the availability of higher-quality
products and services in that marketplace. This reduces performance
and reputational risk and suggests that protective regimes are more
effective than punitive regimes at managing it.
Conclusion
Punitive debarment regimes are less effective than protective regimes
are in managing a government’s public procurement risk. Punitive
regimes seem to increase both performance and reputational risk
through their onerous sanctions and by scaring new firms away from
entering the government marketplace. In contrast, protective regimes
manage that risk through their discretionary use of both mitigating
factors when deciding whether to debar and alternatives to onerous
debarment. Therefore, protective regimes better manage public
procurement risk. As such, U.S. agency-level decision-makers should be
sensitive to how changes that push their regimes toward either process
will affect that risk. This is especially important if the U.S.
administration’s current focus on anti-corruption causes any agency to
consider reforming its current administrative debarment process.
LTC Mayeaux is the Deputy Chief of the Contract & Fiscal
Actions Division in The Office of the Judge Advocate General at the
Pentagon.
[1]
See Christopher R. Yukins,
Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis, 45
Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev.
219, 219 (2013) (noting how the concept of debarment is also known
as “blacklisting” in other governments); see also
John Cibinic, Jr. et al., Formation of Government Contracts
457 (4th ed. 2011) (suggesting that debarments are also considered
“exclusions” in the United States).
[2]
See
Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
RL34753,
Procurement Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors:
Legal Overview
7 (2015) (citing IMCO, Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1422, 1427
(Fed. Cir. 1996)) (summarizing the IMCO decision as
“upholding an agency’s debarment determination but noting that the
outcome could have been different had the debarment been imposed for
purposes of punishment”). But see id. at Summary (providing
that statutorily required debarments for prohibited conduct are
“often mandatory, or at least beyond the discretion of the heads of
procuring agencies, and are intended as punishments”).
[3]
See The White House, United States Strategy on Countering Corruption:
Pursuant to the National Security Study Memorandum on Establishing
the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National
Security Interest (2021); see also
Remarks by Secretary Janet L. Yellen on Anti-Corruption as a
Cornerstone of a Fair, Accountable, and Democratic Economy at the
Summit for Democracy, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury
(Mar. 28, 2023),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1371 (discussing
ways leaders from around the world address threats to democracy and
that corruption is a “common adversary” for democracies).
[5]
This article is born from the author’s experience in various
positions as a contract litigator and advisor to acquisition
professionals throughout the United States and Europe. He also
received an LL.M. in Government Procurement Law, with Highest
Honors, from The George Washington University Law School in 2021.
The author would like to thank Professor Christopher R. Yukins, the
Lynn David Research Professor in Government Procurement Law at The
George Washington University Law School, and Mr. Mark A. Rivest, the
Chief of the Procurement Fraud Division in The Office of the Judge
Advocate General, for their guidance and advice.
[6]
See Christopher Yukins & Michal Kania,
Suspension and Debarment in the U.S. Government: Comparative
Lessons for the EU’s Next Steps in Procurement, 19-2
Upphandlingsrättslig Tidskrift [Procurement L.J.]
47, 52 (2019). The term “government” also refers to international
organizations throughout the article.
[11]
See
Jesper Stenberg Johnsøn, U4: Anti-Corruption Res. Ctr., The
Basics of Corruption Risk Management
7 (2015).
[12]
See Yukins & Kania, supra note 6, at 52; see also
Steven A. Shaw & Jade C. Totman,
SUSPENSION & DEBARMENT: Strengthening Integrity in
International Defence Contracting
15, 26, 43 n.99 (2015) (describing how India and Brazil consider
reputational and performance risk in their suspension and debarment
regimes).
[13]
See William A. Roberts III, Tracye Winfrey Howard &
Samantha S. Lee,
Two Systems, Two Types of Risk: How the World Bank Sanctions
Regime Differs from US Suspension and Debarment, Procurement Law.,
Fall 2015, at 6, 7, 9 (citing World Bank Sanctions Procedures §
3.01(b) (2011)).
[18]
See Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 7; see also Jessica Tillipman,
A House of Cards Falls: Why “Too Big to Debar” Is All Slogan and
Little Substance, 80
Fordham L. Rev.: Res Gestae
49, 50 (2012) (citing FAR 9.402(b)).
[19]
See Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 7.
[22]
See The Practitioner’s Guide to Suspension & Debarment
1 (Frederic Levy & Michael Wagner eds., 4th ed. 2018)
[hereinafter
The Practitioner’s Guide]; Lauren O. Youngman, Note, Deterring Compliance: The Effect of
Mandatory Debarment Under the European Union Procurement
Directives on Domestic Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Prosecutions,
42
Pub. Cont. L.J.
411, 415 (2013) (citing Jessica Tillipman,
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act & Government Contractors:
Compliance Trends & Collateral Consequences, 11-9
Briefing Papers,
Aug. 2011, at 13).
[23]
See Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 10 (referring to the World Bank’s mandatory ten-year debarment
for any infraction during its “Voluntary Disclosure Program”);
Shaw & Totman,
supra note 12, at 16.
[24]
See Shaw & Totman,
supra note 12, at 16; see also Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 7 (explaining how mitigating measures may reduce how onerous
sanctions are, but they cannot help a contractor avoid sanctions in
the first place).
[25]
See Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 7.
[27]
See
Shaw & Totman,
supra note 12, at 16; see also Yukins & Kania,
supra note 6, at 62 (referring to the central nature that cooperation with
government investigations plays in a normal system of corporate
controls in the United States).
[28]
See
Youngman, supra note
22,
at 425.
[31]
See Roberts et al., supra note 13, at 7 (referring to FAR 9.406-1(a)).
[32]
See id. (referring to FAR 9.406-1(a));
Shaw & Totman,
supra note 12, at 18 (discussing how the United States is a combination of a
mandatory, automatic, and discretionary regime); see also FAR
9.104-1(c)–(d) (2023) (defining a “responsible” contractor in this
context as one that has both a satisfactory performance record and a
satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics).
[33]
See generally
The Practitioner’s Guide,
supra note 22, at 124; FAR 9.406-1(a) (2023).
[34]
See FAR 9.406-1(a)(2), (3) (2023).
[35]
See generally Rehabilitation or Punishment?—The Evolution of
Suspension and Debarment, Crowell (May 15,
2012),
https://www.governmentcontractslegalforum.com/2012/05/articles/suspension-debarment/rehabilitation-or-punishment-the-evolution-of-suspension-and-debarment.
[36]
See Letter from David M. Sims, Lori Y. Vassar, & Monica
Aquino-Thieman, Interagency Suspension and Debarment Committee, to
Hon. Ron Johnson, Chairman, Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affs. 1
(Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.acquisition.gov/isdc-reporting.
[38]
See Yukins & Kania, supra note 6, at 55, 57 (citing Robert T. Rhoad & David Robbins,
Fraud, Debarment and Suspension – Part II: Suspension and
Debarment, in 2019
Government Contracts Year in Rev. Briefs
26 (Thomson Reuters 2019)).