Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board Rules that the SCRA Prohibits Local
Taxes on Leased Vehicles
By Mr. Matthew A. Morris
The Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act[1]
(SCRA) “postpones or suspends certain civil obligations to enable
Service members to devote their full attention to duty and relieve
stress on their families.”[2]
This includes various financial safeguards for active-duty Service
members, including protections against default judgments in civil
cases, provisions to prevent foreclosures, and mechanisms to reduce
interest rates on pre-service loans.[3]
The SCRA also provides that “[t]he personal property of a [Service
member] or the spouse of a [Service member] shall not be deemed to be
located or present in, or to have a situs for taxation in, the tax
jurisdiction in which the [Service member] is serving in compliance
with military orders.”[4]
Despite the broad reach of the SCRA, active-duty Service members
still need to rely on state and local governments to recognize and
honor the protections provided. Before the recent Massachusetts
Appellate Tax Board (ATB) case,
LtCol Jonathan L. Riggs v. Board of Assessors of the Town of
Bedford
(Riggs),[5]
the consensus among state and local governments in Massachusetts and
nationwide was that the SCRA’s protection against local excise taxes
applied only to vehicles owned by an active-duty Service member
or their spouse and did not apply to leased vehicles.[6]
Lieutenant Colonel (LtCol) Jonathan L. Riggs, an active-duty Marine
officer, disagreed with this interpretation and retained us as his
counsel to represent him pro bono before the ATB in his dispute with
the Town of Bedford, Massachusetts.
The questions presented to the ATB in Riggs were (1) whether a
lessee of a vehicle has standing to pursue an appeal from a local
assessor’s decision to deny an application for abatement of excise tax
and (2) whether the SCRA’s protection against local excise taxes
extends to a motor vehicle leased by an active-duty Service member.
The ATB found in favor of LtCol Riggs on both questions, which set a
new precedent for excise tax cases under the SCRA in Massachusetts and
provided much-needed guidance for local tax cases outside of the
Commonwealth. To the best of our knowledge, Riggs is the first
and only case in the country to specifically provide that the SCRA’s
protections apply to vehicles leased by active-duty Service members.
Factual Background
LtCol Riggs is a West Virginia resident who was serving a temporary
assignment as an active-duty Marine officer at the 1st Battalion, 25th
Marines at Fort Devens, Massachusetts.[7]
On or about 29 August 2017, LtCol Riggs leased a Chevrolet Silverado
from GM Financial (GM) through Best Chevrolet, Inc. in Hingham,
Massachusetts.[8]
The Town of Bedford (Bedford) subsequently charged GM a $350 motor
vehicle excise tax related to the Silverado.[9]
GM passed this cost through to LtCol Riggs, sending him a bill for
$350.[10]
LtCol Riggs paid the bill, notified the Bedford Assessor and GM that
he should be exempt from paying the tax under the SCRA, and requested
a tax refund.[11]
In December 2018, LtCol Riggs’ counsel sent a letter to Bedford’s
associate assessor, which summarized the position that LtCol Riggs
should be exempt from the tax under the SCRA.[12]
After the assessor denied the application for abatement, Riggs
appealed Bedford’s denial in a Petition under Formal Procedure to the
ATB.[13]
In March 2021, Riggs, through counsel, filed a motion for summary
judgment with the ATB.[14]
On 12 October 2021, the ATB allowed the motion for summary judgment
and issued a decision for LtCol Riggs, granting an abatement of the
excise tax.[15]
On 9 March 2023, the ATB promulgated its Findings of Fact and Report
in support of its decision.[16]
Analysis
LtCol Riggs asked the ATB to consider a question of first impression
on both a statewide and national level: “Does the SCRA protect against
the imposition of local property tax on a motor vehicle leased by an
active-duty Service member on active-duty orders in Massachusetts and
domiciled in another state?”[17]
We maintained that this question must be answered affirmatively
because the language of the personal property tax relief provisions in
the SCRA broadly applies to “[t]he personal property
of a Service member or the spouse of a Service member”[18]
and because the SCRA broadly defines “taxation” as “licenses, fees, or
excises imposed with respect to motor vehicles and their
use.”[19]
Riggs argued that the Bedford excise tax “falls squarely within the
scope of the property tax exemption of the SCRA” because (a) “it is an
excise imposed concerning a motor vehicle of a nondomiciliary Service
member” and (b) there is no limiting language in the statute that
supports the interpretation that leased vehicles are ineligible for
the property tax exemption.[20]
Riggs further argued that “[l]easing a vehicle as opposed to owning
the vehicle outright is a distinction without a difference in this
case because LtCol Riggs will ultimately bear the burden of the excise
tax when GM charges him back for the taxes that GM paid on his
behalf.”[21]
In support of Riggs’ position that the SCRA should protect against
the imposition of local property taxes on leased vehicles, we cited
two U.S. Supreme Court cases: In California v. Buzard, the
Court held that “[t]he very purpose of [the SCRA] in broadly freeing
the nonresident [Service member] from the obligation to pay property
and income taxes was to relieve him of the burden of supporting the
governments of the states where he was present solely in compliance
with military orders.”[22]
In Dameron v. Brodhead, the Court held that the SCRA’s
protections against the imposition of local excise taxes on property
owned by active-duty Service members were not limited to instances of
multiple taxation but instead were broadly intended to “free[]
[Service members] from both income and property taxes imposed by any
state by their presence there as a result of military orders.”[23]
In our letter to Bedford’s associate assessor, which was incorporated
into the motion for summary judgment, we argued that the “consistent
theme of these cases is that it is the Service member’s state of
original residence—and not the state in which the Service member is
temporarily stationed—that has the ‘sole right of taxation’ with
respect to property or income of an active-duty Service member.”[24]
The ATB divided its analysis into two discrete but interrelated
questions: (1) Does LtCol Riggs have standing to challenge the tax,
and (2) Does the SCRA protect against local excise taxes on vehicles
leased by active-duty Service members outside their home states?
Although the ATB framed these as two distinct issues, whether LtCol
Riggs has standing to challenge the tax is inextricably connected to
the substantive protections under the SCRA. The ATB addressed both
questions by focusing on the out-of-pocket impact on the Service
member rather than the technical distinction between the lessor and
lessee.
LtCol Riggs Has Standing as a “Person Aggrieved”
In its response to the motion for summary judgment, Bedford argued
that LtCol Riggs lacked standing to challenge the tax because he was
the lessee of the vehicle rather than the lessor.[25]
Bedford contended that GM, as the assessed taxpayer, is the only party
with standing to bring this appeal and that LtCol Riggs was not an
appropriate “aggrieved party” to appeal an abatement denial under
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 59, section 64.[26]
LtCol Riggs responded to Bedford’s jurisdictional argument by
asserting that he “derives standing from the [SCRA] and the Supremacy
Clause in Article VI of the [U.S.] Constitution” and that he has
standing under Massachusetts law as a “person aggrieved” because his
“pecuniary interests are or may be adversely affected.”[27]
LtCol Riggs argued that even though he was not the vehicle owner, “his
pecuniary interests were adversely affected because the incidence of
the tax ultimately fell upon him.”[28]
The ATB agreed with LtCol Riggs on the standing issue, ruling that he
has standing to appeal the abatement denial because the incidence of
the tax ultimately fell upon him.[29]
In reaching its conclusion in favor of LtCol Riggs on the standing
issue, the ATB cited the Supreme Court’s holding in
First Agricultural National Bank v. State Tax Commission that
“a sales tax which, by its terms, must be passed on to the purchaser
imposes the legal incidence of the tax upon the purchaser.”[30]
In First Agricultural Bank, the Court determined that the
ultimate question is “On whom does the incidence of the tax fall?”
regardless of how a state court characterizes the tax.[31]
Both the Supreme Court and the ATB were careful to clarify that the
inquiry regarding the incidence of the tax is for the limited purpose
of determining Federal immunity from state taxation.[32]
Accordingly, this inquiry should not affect whether a taxpayer has
standing to appeal personal property or real estate tax as a “person
aggrieved”[33]
in a case that arises purely under Massachusetts law.[34]
The SCRA Protects Against Local Excise Taxes on Vehicles Leased
by Active-Duty Service Members Outside Their Home States
On the issue of whether the SCRA should be broadly interpreted to
afford protections to vehicles leased by active-duty Service members,
Bedford argued that the two cited Supreme Court cases,
Buzard and Dameron, are inapposite because they relate
to situations in which the Service member owned, not leased, the
assessed personal property.[35]
Bedford acknowledged that there was not a single case that directly
addressed whether the SCRA applied to leased vehicles, but it cited a
Question and Answer (Q&A)-format article by U.S. Navy Judge
Advocate General’s Corps Captain (Retired) Samuel Wright, entitled
The SCRA Protects You from Having to Pay Personal Property Tax on
the Vehicle that You Own, but Not a Vehicle You Lease.[36]
In this article, Captain Wright advised an active-duty U.S. Navy
lieutenant, temporarily on assignment in Virginia, to “purchase an
automobile instead of leasing it” because the SCRA protects against
the imposition of local taxes on personal property, and a leased
vehicle is not technically the Service member’s personal property.[37]
In LtCol Riggs’ Reply to Bedford’s Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, we asked “why the U.S. Supreme Court would hold that the
purpose of the statute is to ‘relieve [a Service member] of the burden
of supporting the governments of the states where he was present
solely in compliance with military orders’ while simultaneously
prohibiting lessee Service members from the benefits of this
interpretation.”[38]
In response to Bedford’s citation of Captain Wright’s article, we
argued that a practical guide in a Q&A format should not dictate
the outcome of this case because it is directed to whether a Service
member should purchase or lease a vehicle rather than the more complex
inquiry of whether the SCRA should be interpreted to apply to leased
vehicles.[39]
The ATB agreed with LtCol Riggs that the SCRA “is specifically
designed to limit the power of states to enact a tax on individuals or
entities that would otherwise be subject to state tax.”[40]
The ATB ruled that “the imposition of the excise violated Federal law
providing specific rules for the treatment of the property of Service
members who are stationed outside of their state of residence.”[41]
Like its analysis of the standing issue, the ATB’s analysis of the
SCRA’s protections focused on the tax’s broad impact on affected
Service members rather than the technical definition of the assessed
taxpayer. Accordingly, the ATB allowed LtCol Riggs’ motion for summary
judgment, issued a favorable decision, and granted a complete
abatement of the excise tax.[42]
Recommendations to Active-Duty Service Members
Based on the ATB’s decision in Riggs, we offer the following
recommendations to active-duty Service members and their
representatives:
-
For active-duty Service members considering whether to purchase or
lease a vehicle outside of their residence: We agree with Captain
Wright that purchasing the vehicle should result in an uncontroversial
exemption from local taxes in the Service member’s temporary
residence. However, many non-tax reasons exist for which a Service
member may prefer to lease a vehicle rather than purchase it. For
example, Service members who could be deployed overseas on short
notice would probably choose the flexibility of a short-term lease to
purchasing a vehicle outright. Accordingly, we would never advise a
Service member to buy a vehicle they would otherwise prefer to lease
purely based on local tax protection under the SCRA. For those Service
members who would like to lease and share our conviction that the SCRA
should protect against local taxes on leased vehicles outside the
Service members’ home states—and are comfortable with the potential
time and expense associated with a tax dispute—we recommend that they
discuss the possibility of a local tax exemption with their local
assessor and the lessor before signing the lease.
-
For active-duty Service members who have already been billed and paid
local taxes outside their home states to the lessor: We recommend that
these Service members send letters to their lessors and local
assessors requesting an abatement of local excise taxes. We also
advise that these Service members consider citing Riggs as
authority for their position. Although LtCol Riggs does not bind local
tax assessors and appellate tax boards outside of Massachusetts as
precedent, this case serves as an insightful roadmap for how other
jurisdictions should apply local tax exemptions under the SCRA.
It is impossible to predict whether this case will directly impact
local tax assessors’ and appellate tax boards’ interpretations of the
SCRA outside of Massachusetts. In the absence of specific case law in
this area, however, Riggs provides a basis for an exemption to
which any Service member stationed outside their home state should be
entitled.
Conclusion
Although the amount of the tax at issue, in this case, was relatively
small, LtCol Riggs was always convinced that the SCRA should protect
him from paying any excise taxes to the Town of Bedford and refused to
give up on his challenge. As a direct result of LtCol Riggs’
confidence in the merits of his position and refusal to yield to the
assessment, the ATB has now provided Service members with long-awaited
clarity on the SCRA’s protection against local taxes on leased
vehicles.
The ATB’s ruling clarifies that active-duty Service members stationed
in Massachusetts and domiciled elsewhere are not responsible for
excise taxes assessed on motor vehicles owned or leased by
those Service members. Because the scope of the SCRA’s protection to
local taxes on leased vehicles was a question of first impression,
Service members stationed outside of Massachusetts should consider
citing Riggs in support of their position that assessors
outside of the Service members’ home states are prohibited from
imposing property taxes on leased vehicles.
At the time the ATB case was decided (March 2023), Mr. Morris was a
Tax Partner at Sherin and Lodgen LLP, a law firm based in Boston,
Massachusetts. Mr. Morris is now Director of Tax Controversy for a
national retail company.
The author thanks his colleague, attorney Julia Royce, for her
valuable contributions to this article. The briefs for this case are
unavailable on Westlaw, but Ms. Royce can provide copies on request
via email to jroyce@sherin.com.
[1]
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Amendments of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-189, 117 Stat. 2835 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§
501-96).
[2]
See Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act, Off. of Comptroller of Currency,
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/consumers-and-communities/consumer-protection/servicemembers-civil-relief-act/index-servicemembers-civil-relief-act.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2024).
[3]
50 U.S.C. § 3931 (2016) (protection against default judgments in
civil cases); 50 U.S.C. § 3937 (2016) (six percent cap for
interest on obligations incurred before service date); 50 U.S.C. §
3953 (2023) (protection against foreclosure).
[4]
50 USC § 4001(d)(1) (2022).
[5]
LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of Assessors of the Twn. of Bedford,
No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776 (Mass. App. Tax. Bd. Mar. 9, 2023).
[6]
See
Mass. Dep’t of Rev., Local Tax Benefits: Veterans and Active
Servicemembers
§ 3.2.1 (2009) (“This
exemption applies just to property owned by the servicemember. If
the servicemember leases a vehicle, the owner/lessor is billed for
the excise and the terms of the lease govern whether that cost is
passed along to the servicemember/lessee.”); Motor Vehicle Excise Information,
Sec’y of the Commonwealth of Mass.,
https://www.sec.state.ma.us/divisions/cis/tax/motor-excise.htm (last
visited Oct. 10, 2024) (“Leased vehicles are also not eligible for
this exemption . . . .”);
Active Duty Military Motor Vehicle Exemption,
Craven Cty. N.C., https://www.cravencountync.gov/2270/Active-Duty-Military-Motor-Vehicle-Exemp
(last visited Oct. 10, 2024) (“Exemptions cannot be claimed on
leased vehicles unless they have a tax situs on a
military base in an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction.”). The
view that the SCRA does not protect against the imposition of local
taxes on leased vehicles is shared by Captain (Retired) Samuel
Wright, U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General’s Corps. See Captain
Samuel F. Wright,
The SCRA Protects You from Having to Pay Personal Property Tax on
Vehicle that You Own, But Not a Vehicle You Lease,
Serv. Members L. Ctr. L.R. 20055, June 2020.
[7]
Riggs, 2023 WL 2603776, at *1.
[12]
This statement is based on the author’s professional experiences as
LtCol Riggs’ counsel in this matter [hereinafter Professional
Experiences].
[13]
Riggs, 2023 WL 2603776, at *1.
[14]
Professional Experiences, supra note 12.
[17]
See Appellant LtCol Jonathan L. Riggs’ Reply to Appellee’s
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, at 4, LTC Jonathan L.
Riggs v. Bd. of Assessors of the Twn. of Bedford, No. F337365, 2023
WL 2603776 (Mass. App. Tax. Bd. Mar. 9, 2023) (on file with author).
[18]
See Appellant LtCol Jonathan L. Riggs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment, Exhibit A, at 2 (letter to Bedford associate assessor
dated Dec. 4, 2018) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 4001(d)(1)) (emphasis
added), LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of Assessors of the Twn. of
Bedford, No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776 (Mass. App. Tax. Bd. Mar. 9,
2023) (on file with author).
[19] Id. (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 4001(g)(2) (2022)) (emphasis
added).
[22]
California v. Buzard, 382 U.S. 386, 393 (1966).
[23]
Dameron v Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 326 (1953).
[24]
Appellant LtCol Riggs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, at 2
(letter to Bedford associate assessor dated Dec. 4, 2018) (quoting
Dameron, 345 U.S. at 326), LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of
Assessors of the Twn. of Bedford, No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776
(Mass. App. Tax. Bd. Mar. 9, 2023) (on file with author).
[25]
See Bedford’s Opposition to Lt. Col. Riggs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, at 3, LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of Assessors of
the Twn. of Bedford, No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776 (Mass. App. Tax.
Bd. Mar. 9, 2023) (on file with author).
[26]
Id. at 3;
Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
59, § 64 (2016).
[27]
Appellant LtCol Jonathan L. Riggs’ Reply to Appellee’s Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2-3, LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of
Assessors of the Twn. of Bedford, No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776
(Mass. App. Tax. Bd. Mar. 9, 2023) (on file with author).
[29]
See LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of Assessors of the Twn. of
Bedford, No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776, at *2 (Mass. App. Tax. Bd.
Mar. 9, 2023).
[30]
First Agric. Nat’l Bank of Berkshire Cnty. v. State Tax Comm’n, 392
U.S. 339, 347 (1968).
[31]
Id. at 347-48 (reversing the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court’s decision in First Agric. Nat’l Bank of Berkshire Cnty. v.
State Tax Comm’n, 229 N.E.2d 245 (Mass. 1967) that the bank, as
purchaser, was not entitled to relief because the incidence of the
sales tax falls upon vendors).
[32]
See Riggs, 2023 WL 2603776 at *3 (discussing 229
N.E.2d 245).
[33] See Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 59, § 64 (2016).
[34]
See Riggs, 2023 WL 2603776 at *3 (“We see no reason,
however, for changing our conclusion on the incidence of the sales
tax in a situation where Federal immunity from State taxation is not
involved.”) (quoting Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. State Tax
Comm’n, 260 N.E. 2d 822, 824 (Mass. 1970)).
[35]
Professional Experiences, supra note 12.
[36]
Id.; see Wright, supra note 6, at 5
(“Section 4001(d)(1) does not exempt the leasing company from the
obligation to pay the personal property tax, nor does it exempt you
from the obligation to reimburse the leasing company for the
personal property tax the company pays.”).
[37]
See Wright, supra note 6, at 5.
[38]
Appellant LtCol Jonathan L. Riggs’ Reply to Appellee’s Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 2-3 (citing California v. Buzard,
382 U.S. 386, 393 (1966)), LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of Assessors
of the Twn. of Bedford, No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776 (Mass. App.
Tax. Bd. Mar. 9, 2023) (on file with author).
[40]
LTC Jonathan L. Riggs v. Bd. of Assessors of the Twn. of Bedford,
No. F337365, 2023 WL 2603776, at *4 (Mass. App. Tax. Bd. Mar. 9,
2023).