(Credit: Stockwars – stock.adobe.com)
Practice Notes
Reflections on Resident Foreign Intermediate Level Education at the 66th Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Command and General Staff Course
By Major Alec P. Rice
As the U.S. Army reorients towards strategic competition with the People’s Republic of China (China) and the Russian Federation (Russia), there is an increasingly urgent and pressing need for the development of leaders with “regional focus and cultural fluency” in the Indo-Pacific theater both in the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps and the Army, writ large.1 As part of the U.S. Army effort to strengthen and build on international relationships with key partner nations, I was a student at the 66th Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) Command and General Staff (CGS) Course for one year of Resident Foreign Intermediate Level Education (ILE) under the auspices of the U.S. Army Schools of Other Nations (SON) Program. It was an unrivaled opportunity to see the JGSDF from the inside, specifically: to come to understand how it functions as an organization, to befriend and learn from its brightest officers and future leaders, to share as much as I could about the U.S. Army and the JAG Corps, and to make efforts to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance at a pivotal point in history.
East Asia—Frontline in the New Cold War
As the United States faces immense large-scale national security threats in East Asia, it finds itself in a geo-strategic competition with modern, powerful, nuclear-equipped adversaries, a new Cold War. Because of these challenges, Japan has emerged as an essential U.S. ally in the Indo-Pacific theater. Despite a U.S. security commitment to defend Japan in the event of an armed attack, which has existed for over sixty years,2 opportunities to learn more about our Japanese partners remain.
Japan is physically located at the frontline of the new Cold War. The entire Japanese archipelago is an integral component of both the First and Second Island Chains.3 To break out of the barriers these “chains” present, China has devised its own “Island Chain Strategy,”4 by which it seeks to aggressively assert hegemony in Asia through control of key waterways in the Western Pacific and beyond.5
As a string of almost 7,000 islands,6
the territory of Japan stretches from Hokkaido in the north, only
forty-three km from the Russian territory of Sakhalin across the Soya
Strait connecting the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk,7
all the way to Yonaguni Island in the East China Sea, just 111 km from
Taiwan.8 For the United States’ collective East Asian adversaries, Japan’s stretch of islands looms as a massive barrier blocking their access to the East China Sea, the Pacific, and the Arctic.9 Japan’s geopolitical and strategic significance underlines the enduring importance of the U.S.-Japan military alliance and partnership between the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) and the U.S. Army.
Japan: A Key Ally
Current U.S. national security priorities require a renewed focus on East Asia. Thus, the United States’ emphasis shifted to international partnerships as a necessary component to counterbalance the threat posed by China.10
Surprising to many Soldiers, the population of roughly 54,000 active-duty U.S. military troops of all services stationed in Japan11 exceeds that of any other foreign nation and is nearly twice the approximate population of 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in the Republic of Korea (South Korea).12 Yet within Japan, the U.S. Army is almost an afterthought. The United States has only about 2,600 active-duty Soldiers stationed throughout the entirety of Japan, representing less than 5 percent of total U.S. military forces in the country.13 In stark contrast to the sparse U.S. Army presence in Japan, the JGSDF is by far the largest and most robust branch of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). The JGSDF has about 138,000 active-duty Soldiers, approximately three times the size of either the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) or the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF).14
Japan’s size also puts it in the first rank of U.S. allies. Consider
that, in addition to being the third largest economy in the world,
following the United States and China,15
Japan has a population nearly twice that of the United Kingdom and only
slightly less than the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand combined.16 With 247,200 active duty military personnel, Japan’s military is also substantially larger than those of the Anglophone nations, with roughly 60 percent more personnel than the United Kingdom, more than three times the personnel of the Canadian military, four times the personnel of the Australian military, and over twenty-five times the personnel of the New Zealand military.17 Even when compared with South Korea, the East Asian nation with which U.S. Army personnel are most familiar, Japan is much bigger, both geographically and in terms of population. South Korea’s land area, 96,920 sq km, is not even a third of Japan’s 364,485 sq km,18
and its population of 51 million people is only 40 percent that of
Japan.19 Although the JSDF has fewer overall personnel than the South Korean military,20 it is still ranked as being more powerful,21
and Japan exceeds South Korea in defense spending.
In fact, Japan’s military budget is the seventh highest in the world,
despite a tradition of limiting defense spending to 1 percent of the
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP).22
Furthermore, in the Global Firepower 2022 Military Strength Ranking,
Japan is rated as having the fifth most powerful military in the world,
following only the United States, Russia, China, and India. Japan’s
ranking is higher than other U.S. allies: France (7), the United Kingdom
(8), Germany (16), Australia (17), Israel (18), and Canada (23).23
Notwithstanding the importance of Japan’s key geographic location in the
Far East—on the doorstep of Russia, North Korea, China, and Taiwan—its
military strength alone makes Japan and the JGSDF crucial partners of
the U.S. Army. Similarly, the U.S. Army should prioritize and leverage
its alliance with Japan in its efforts to build international
relationships and increase interoperability, particularly in the 21st
century Indo-Pacific theater.
The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force: In the Midst of Change
The roots of the modern relationship between Japan and the United States
grew out of the U.S. occupation of Japan following its defeat in World
War II. Part of the restructuring of Japanese society, undertaken by
Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur and his
General Headquarters (GHQ), involved introducing a new constitution to
Japan.24 Born out of idealism and hopes for a peaceful postwar world, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of the belligerency of the state will not be recognized.25
Since the promulgation of the Japanese constitution on 3 November 194626 until the present day, there has been intense debate over the meaning and import of Article 9.27 Despite this controversy, the Japanese constitution has never been amended (although Japan’s official interpretation of what Article 9 actually means has changed over time).28
Shortly after Japan’s “war-renouncing constitution” came into effect,
however, (in order to realistically function as a modern state) General
MacArthur decided that some form of self-defense capability was
necessary.29 This realization led to the creation of an armed organization that eventually evolved in 1954 into the JSDF with ground, air, and maritime components.30
The leadership of the JGSDF operates out of the Ground Staff Office, based out of the Ministry of Defense in Ichigaya, Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo.31 The JGSDF also has a Ground Component Command based out of Camp Asaka in Nerima Ward, Tokyo, with multiple subordinate units; subordinate units include the 1st Airborne Brigade, 1st Helicopter Brigade, the Special Operations Group, and others.32 The bulk of the JGSDF soldiers and capabilities, however, fall into five Regional Armies, 33 which are loosely akin to U.S. Army corps in responsibility and authority. Each Regional Army Headquarters has subordinate divisions and independent brigades normally under their command and control.34 Overall, there are currently a total of nine divisions and eight independent brigades in the active-duty JGSDF.35
The original vision for the JGSDF, at its inception at the onset of the Cold War, was to serve as a force to deter and fight against a Soviet invasion of Japanese territory in northern Japan.36 Following the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, the JGSDF oriented itself towards expanding from an entirely domestic role towards an emphasis on international contributions and participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.37
In the past several years, the JGSDF has shifted towards countering Chinese territorial expansion in the East China Sea.38 Japan is paying particular attention to Chinese incursions near the Senkaku Islands, which Japan claims as its sovereign territory.39 This priority led to the development of the first JGSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade as a force to respond to hostile island takeovers.40 Japan has also established new bases on the Japanese islands in the East China Sea and deployed surface-to-ship missile and surface-to-air missile batteries to those locations.41 Of particular interest to the U.S. Army, the JGSDF possesses a significant and well-developed surface-to-ship missile capability42 (a capability the U.S. Army has, until very recently, ignored).43 The JGSDF has also adopted the “multi-domain” concept with what it refers to as “cross-domain operations,” which emphasize space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic capabilities.44 Each of these new JGSDF endeavors provides new and untapped possibilities for integration, cooperation, and training between the JGSDF and the U.S. Army.
A coin presented to the author on the occasion of his graduation from the 66th Japanese Command and General Staff Course. (Photo courtesy of author)
The JGSDF Command and General Staff (CGS) Course
The JGSDF CGS Course is held at Camp Meguro, a JGSDF base in the Meguro Ward of southwest Tokyo.45 JGSDF CGS falls under the purview of the JGSDF Training, Education, and Research Command, which is somewhat akin to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. JGSDF CGS is currently one year and four months in duration for JGSDF personnel (shortened from two years in past iterations) and one year long for most foreign personnel.46
There were approximately one hundred students in the 66th JGSDF CGS,
nine of whom are non-Japanese—the largest class ever. The nine foreign
students in the 66th JGSDF CGS consisted of four Americans (two U.S.
Army Foreign Area Officers, one Marine Corps infantry officer, and
myself) and one student each from the armies of Mongolia, Indonesia,
Thailand, Singapore, and Cambodia.
Japanese JGSDF students are selected to attend CGS by means of an annual
competitive examination and interview process. The JGSDF officers have a
four-year career window in which to pass the CGS examination, after
which they lose eligibility. All Japanese attendees started the course
as O-3s, though approximately twenty were promoted to O-4 in the first
month.
The Japanese students come from all sixteen JGSDF career fields:
infantry, armor, field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, military
intelligence, aviation, engineer, signal, ordnance, quartermaster,
transportation, chemical, military police, medical, finance, and
band.47 In addition, there was one student each from the JMSDF and JASDF amongst the student body. There were five female students in the 66th CGS, and the average age of the JGSDF students was thirty-three.
Of particular interest to judge advocates, there are no specialized JGSDF legal officers in the course, as the JGSDF does not have a separate JAG Corps. In all branches of the JSDF, legal billets are standard staff assignments—as opposed to a designated career field in the U.S. military—and service in a legal billet does not require a license to practice law. Perhaps, part of the reason for this difference with the U.S. military is Japan has had no historical impetus to develop a military justice system with universal jurisdiction over troops who could be potentially deployed to foreign nations. Therefore, the JSDF has had no need for deployable military trial counsel, defense counsel, military judges, courts-martial, or the creation of a Uniform Code of Military Justice analogue. Hence, JSDF legal officer responsibilities consist of what U.S. Army officers would characterize as international law, operational law, administrative law, and claims.
Coursework at JGSDF CGS consists of a combination of large-group lectures, smaller seminars, group presentations, and practical planning exercises. The curriculum includes classes in the history of operational thought, operational planning (including multiple practical group exercises), national security strategy, military history, national security law, exercise planning and training, and leadership, amongst other topics. Most instructors are O-4 and O-5 JGSDF officers, with frequent guest lecturers, to include members of the media, diplomats from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, representatives from the Diet (Japan’s legislative body), members of Japanese business and industry, and university academics. Foreign students are responsible for completing a project and presentation on military leadership. In addition, they must complete a research paper on a faculty-approved topic, which they then present to the student body and instructors.
In traditional Japanese fashion, all classes begin and end with a standing bow to the instructors as a sign of respect—the proper angle of which is 10 degrees. All instruction and class discussion are conducted in Japanese. Although the foreign students are given the option of submitting their final thesis in either English or Japanese, they must deliver presentations in Japanese. As one might imagine, the language hurdles can be formidable. Furthermore, in general, Japanese social norms are initially extremely reserved (particularly in comparison with American social norms), and it takes a significant amount of time to build deep relationships.48 One benefit of the year-long length of the course is that it allows time for each of the foreign students to gradually integrate with their classmates, meaningfully contribute to the academic environment, and earn the trust of their fellow students, who are expected to be the future elite leaders of the JGSDF.
The JGSDF and the U.S. Army JAG Corps: Fields for Future Collaboration and Education
For decades, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has been legally and politically contorted to create, legitimize, and define the scope of the JSDF.49 Over time, efforts to reinterpret Article 9 have led to the evolution of an extremely complex national security law structure, which has never been tested in the real world (as the JSDF have never engaged in actual combat).50
In conjunction with its post-World War II dependence on the United States, the JGSDF has developed within these constitutional confines as a highly controlled and (almost purely) domestically oriented armed governmental self-defense organization.51
This war-renouncing, non-expeditionary comportment of the JGSDF has
profound ramifications for U.S. military personnel when they try to work
with the JSDF.
Properly trained judge advocates of all services are in a unique
position to guide commanders through the maze of Japanese legal and
policy limitations, and to utilize cultural understanding and diplomatic
skills to facilitate understanding, communication, and teamwork.
Although, JGSDF legal officers do not occupy the same role that U.S.
military JAG officers do within their respective military staffs (for a
variety of historical, cultural, and organizational reasons), national
security law is potentially the most fruitful area of collaboration and
instruction between the two groups. As just one example, much can be
done to integrate the law of armed conflict and rules of engagement into
both bilateral training and exercises and actual operational planning,
which is essential to integrate U.S. and Japanese fighting capabilities.
A mutual understanding of U.S. Army and JGSDF authorities and how
corresponding permissions and limitations will directly affect bilateral
operations is indispensable. In the past several years, Japan has also
become particularly concerned about the application of international law
to Chinese “grey zone” activities: harassing and provocative actions
deliberately taken below the threshold of traditional armed
conflict.52 This is another area of potential training, discussion, education, and collaboration. Furthermore, with the increased emphasis by both the U.S. Army and the JGSDF on multi-domain operations, the application of law in the space, cyber, and electromagnetic realms are other emerging areas of collaboration.
On the JGSDF side, there is a strong desire to work with, learn from, and teach with the U.S. Army JAG Corps. In recent years, this has been clearly evidenced by the JGSDF dispatching new officers to attend the Judge Advocate Officer Basic Course and field-grade officers to the Judge Advocate Officer Advanced Course. JGSDF officers started attending the Judge Advocate Officer Advanced Course with the 67th Graduate Course in 2018-2019.53 The ability for the U.S. Army JAG Corps to reciprocate in some fashion by sending judge advocates for training and education with the JGSDF is of immense benefit to the U.S.-Japan alliance, the U.S. Army, and the JAG Corps. Engaging in such bilateral exchanges and training vastly increases the U.S. Army’s knowledge and interoperability with an essential ally. Not only that, it also has rich symbolic meaning in that such activities concretely demonstrate that we, the United States, are making efforts to understand our allies.
MAJ Rice takes a break from his studies to glance at the camera in class. (Photo courtesy of author)
The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force and the U.S. Army—Unparalleled Opportunity to Cooperate
As the U.S. Army focuses on the Indo-Pacific and seeks to redefine its role in areas such as the First and Second Island Chains54 and the Arctic,55 the United States’ relationship with Japan and the JGSDF has taken on renewed importance. For the U.S. Army, there are unrivaled opportunities to work with the JGSDF in multiple domains and geographic areas; and as long as the United States maintains a substantial military presence in East Asia, the need to develop this relationship will only become more imperative.
It will undoubtedly require tremendous effort by both Japan and the United States to further build the U.S. Army-JGSDF relationship and realize all of the potential of this pairing. However, that also means that there is plenty of constructive, meaningful work that can be done, and great opportunity and benefit for both Japan and the United States. These potential fields of future collaboration and cooperation include multi-domain operations and long-range precision fires, as well as concepts long-neglected by the U.S. Army such as coastal defense and surface-to-ship missile capability.56
Despite the likely difficulties, the potential benefits to both nations
in proactively increasing JGSDF-U.S. Army interaction are too important
to pass up or put off for another day. Within the JGSDF, there is a
powerful desire to increase bilateral training, exercises, planning, and
operations with the U.S. Army.
Although the Japan-U.S. alliance faces daunting adversaries in the
Indo-Pacific, my experience at the 66th JGSDF CGS has acutely shown me
that the relationship between the U.S. Army and the JGSDF is primed to
reach an even more meaningful and integrated level that I believe would
help us to counter those adversaries. As shown by recent national
security endeavors in the theater, such as the reanimation of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“the Quad”) relationship between Japan,
India, Australia, and the United States,57
the time is clearly ripe for the U.S. Army to grow its partnership with
the JGSDF as a key component of its Pacific reorientation. The U.S. Army
is unlikely to find a more eager and more capable military partner than
the JGSDF. TAL
MAJ Alec Rice is an attorney in the National Security Law Division in the Office of The Judge Advocate General at the Pentagon. He is a graduate of the 66th JGSDF Command and General Staff Course and former Chief of National Security Law for U.S. Forces Japan.
Notes
1. See, e.g., Colonel George R. Smawley & Colonel (Retired) Pamela M. Harms, Developing Regionally-Focused Leaders, The Army Law., Nov./Dec. 2018, at 58, 60. Then-Colonel Smawley and Colonel (Retired) Harms make the compelling argument that the Army and the JAG Corps need to identify and cultivate leaders possessing regional focus and fluency with the nations of the Indo-Pacific. Id. at 59-60.
2. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan-U.S., Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1632. The current commitment of the United States to respond to an armed attack on Japan is discussed in art. V: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.” Id. at 1634. The provision providing for U.S. basing rights in Japan is addressed in art. VI: “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” Id.
3. These island chains have been a part of U.S. security strategy in the Pacific going back to the middle of the last century. See, e.g., John F. Dulles, Security in the Pacific, Foreign Affs., https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1952-01-01/security-pacific (last visited Jan. 14, 2023) (discussing American security strategy to contain the Soviet Union and Communist China during the Korean War).
4. For an explanation of China’s maritime strategy in the Pacific (and beyond), see Jennifer Rice & Erik Robb, China Mar. Stud. Inst., China Maritime Report No. 13: The Origins of
“Near Seas Defense and Far Seas Protection”
(2021).
5. See, e.g., Joshua Espena & Chelsea Bomping, The Taiwan Frontier and the Chinese Dominance for the Second Island
Chain, Australian Inst. of Int’l Affs. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/taiwan-frontier-chinese-dominance-for-second-island-chain; Christopher P. Cavas, Powers Jockey for Pacific Island Chain Influence, Def. News (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2016/02/01/powers-jockey-for-pacific-island-chain-influence. The First Island Chain runs south to north roughly from Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa and the Japanese Nansei Islands up through and including the main Japanese islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu, and Hokkaido, thorough the Kurils on the Sea of Okhotsk to the Russian Kamchatka Peninsula. See Espena & Bomping, supra. The Second Island Chain extends from Micronesia and Guam north to include the Japanese Ogasawara Islands through and including the Japanese archipelago through the Kurils to the Kamchatka Peninsula. Espena & Bomping,
supra. The Cavas article includes U.S. DoD and Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) versions of maps of the First and Second Island Chains. See Cavas, supra. Notably, where the DoD version includes the islands of the South China Sea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and the Nansei islands of Japan in the East China Sea, its delineation terminates at the Japanese island of Kyushu. Cavas, supra. The Chinese map of the First Island Chain does not terminate in southern Japan, but instead includes all of Japan up through and including Honshu, Hokkaido, and the entire Kurile Island chain to the Russian Kamchatka Peninsula. Cavas, supra.
6. The Japanese archipelago is made up of 6,852 islands. Japan: A Nation of Nearly 7,000 islands, nippon.com (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h00806. Of these islands 416 are inhabited, and 6,847 are classified as “remote.” Id.
7. Le Perouse Strait, Britannica (Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/place/La-Perouse-Strait.
8. Yonaguni Island, Visit Okinawa Japan, https://www.visitokinawa.jp/destinations/yaeyama-region/yonaguni (last visited Nov. 29, 2022).
9. See Japan Ministry of Def., 2020 Defense of Japan Pamphlet 4 (2020).
10. See, e.g., Jim Garamone, Austin Signs Internal Directive to Unify Department’s China
Efforts, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (June 9, 2021), https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2651742/austin-signs-internal-directive-to-unify-departments-china-efforts. Secretary of Defense Austin is quoted as stating the initiatives he is putting forth, based on recommendations from the China Task Force he formed in February 2021, “are intended to streamline and strengthen cooperation with [United States] allies and partners, particularly in the Indo-Pacific.” Id.
11. Guidance from the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Forces Japan, https://www.usfj.mil/About-USFJ (last visited Nov. 29, 2022).
12. Robert Burns,
Seoul Agrees to Pay More for Hosting American Troops in 2021, Associated Press (Mar. 10, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-world-news-seoul-south-korea-asia-640d3811b01c7eae552c7bbf31fea68d.
13. Ministry of Foreign Affs. of
Japan, Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements, Reference4: Deployment of
U.S. Forces in Japan
(2019),
https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/pdfs/arrange_ref7.pdf.
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as of September 2019,
there are 55,227 total U.S. troops in Japan, made up of 20,392 Navy
personnel, 12,602 Air Force personnel, 19,607 Marine personnel, and only
2,626 Army personnel (all numbers approximate).
Id. Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiled this data based on references from the Defense Manpower Data Center, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Department of Defense (DoD). Id.
14. According to the Japan Ministry of Defense, as of March 31, 2022, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has 139,620 personnel (150,590 authorized); the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force has 43,435 personnel (45,307 authorized); and the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force has 43,720 personnel (46,928 authorized) for a total of 230,754 total personnel (247,154 authorized) across all services. 防衛省・自衛隊の人員構成, 防衛省・自衛隊 (Mar. 31, 2022) [Ministry of Def., Personnel Composition of the Ministry of Defense
and the Self-Defense Forces], https://www.mod.go.jp/j/profile/mod_sdf/kousei.
15. GDP Ranked by Country 2022, World Population Rev., https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/countries-by-gdp (last visited Nov. 30, 2022). Japan’s nominal Gross Domestic Product is $5.15 trillion, compared with $20.49 trillion for the U.S. and China at $13.4 trillion. Id.
16. See Military Size by Country 2022, World Population Rev., https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-size-by-country
(last visited Nov. 30, 2022). The respective populations are as follows:
Australia: 26,177,413; Canada: 38,454,327; New Zealand: 5,185,288;
United Kingdom: 67,508,936. Id. The total of these four nations is 137,325,964. The population of Japan is 123,951,692. Id.
17. See id. The respective sizes of the active-duty militaries of these nations are as follows: Australia: 58,600; Canada: 67,400; New Zealand: 9,000; United Kingdom: 148,500. Id.
18. Compare Korea, South, CIA.gov: The World Factbook (Nov. 14, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south, with Japan, CIA.gov: The World Factbook (Nov. 14, 2022), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/japan.
19. The population of South Korea, as of 2022, is 51,844,834. Korea, South, supra note 18.
20. Compare, Korea, South, CIA World Factbook (Jan. 24, 2023), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/korea-south, with Japan, CIA World Factbook (Jan. 24, 2023), https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/japan.
21. The Global Firepower Rankings assess Japan as fifth in military strength, with South Korea as sixth. 2022 Military Strength Ranking, Glob. Firepower, https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php (last visited Nov. 30, 2022).
22. Defense Spending by Country (2022), Glob. Firepower, https://www.globalfirepower.com/defense-spending-budget.php (last
visited Nov. 30, 2022). Japan’s military budget is estimated to be $51.7
billion, only slightly less than number four ranked Germany ($57.43
billion), and the number five ranked United Kingdom ($56.042 billion).
Id. For a detailed breakdown of the latest Japanese military budget see Ministry of Defense, Defense Programs and Budget of Japan, Overview
of FY2021 Budget, https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_budget/pdf/210331a.pdf.
23. 2022 Military Strength Ranking, supra note 21 (assessing a nation’s non-nuclear theoretical fighting capability to determine the rankings).
24. See Japan’s Postwar Constitution, Council on Foreign Rels., https://www.cfr.org/japan-constitution/japans-postwar-constitution (last visited Jan. 31, 2023).
25. Nihonkoku Kenpō [Kenpō][Constitution], art. 9 (emphasis added).
26. The Constitution of Japan, Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2022).
27. See Sheila A. Smith & Ayumi Teraoka, Early Postwar Attitudes on Constitutional Revision, Council on Foreign Rels. (July 28, 2016, 6:24 PM), https://www.cfr.org/blog/early-postwar-attitudes-constitutional-revision.
28. For a historical analysis on the formation and meaning of the Japanese post-war constitution, see John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War
II
346-404 (1999). For a discussion on recent changes to official Japanese
constitutional interpretation regarding collective self-defense, see
Masahiro Kurasaki,
Japan’s Evolving Position on the Use of Force in Collective
Self-Defense, Lawfare (Aug. 23, 2018, 3:27 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/japans-evolving-position-use-force-collective-self-defense.
29. The seeds of the JSDF grew as a direct result of the Korean War. As U.S. forces in Japan were dispatched to the Korean Peninsula after the invasion of South Korea by the North in 1950, General MacArthur directed the formation of a Japanese “National Police Reserve” of 75,000 personnel (approximately four divisions) to provide for Japanese defense. Frank Kowalski, An Inoffensive Rearmament: The Making of the Postwar
Japanese Army
21-32 (Robert D. Eldridge, ed., 2013).
30. The National Police Reserve was expanded to 110,000 troops in
October of 1952 and rechristened the “National Safety Force.”
Id. at 72. The National Security Force name was again changed to the Japan Self-Defense Forces, consisting of the Ground, Maritime, and Air components on July 1, 1954, with the promulgation of the Japan Self-Defense Force Law. Jieitaihō [Self-Defense Forces Law], Law No. 165 of 1954.
31. About Ministry, Japan Ministry of Def., https://www.mod.go.jp/en/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2023).
32. Ministry of Def., Japan Ground Self-Defense Force 27 (2019), https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/fan/pamphlet/pdf/2019_02.pdf.
33. The five Regional Armies are (from northernmost to southernmost):
the Northern Army, based out of Camp Sapporo, Hokkaido; the Northeastern
Army, based out of Camp Sendai, Miyagi Prefecture; the Eastern Army,
based out of Camp Asaka, Nerima Ward, Tokyo; the Middle Army, based out
of Camp Itami, Hyogo Prefecture; and the Western Army, based out of Camp
Kengun, Kumamoto Prefecture. See 駐屯地・組織, 陸上自衛隊, https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/station/na/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2022) [Garrison/Organization, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36.
In the days of monolithic communism, Russia was the enemy of Japan, as it had been in the eyes of the Japanese people for several generations. Now [in 1952] reports were heard on the debating platforms that Russia was bolstering its forces in Far East Asia. There were rumors that Russian air force and airborne units were being deployed on Kamchatka, Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands. According to those who said they knew, the Russians were preparing for the invasion of Japan. With the United States committed in Korea, immediate, massive rearmament was the only hope for Japan.
Kowalski, supranote 29, at 136.
37. See Japan’s Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): Outline
of Japan’s International Peace Cooperation,
Ministry of Foreign Affs. of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/page22e_000683.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2023).
38. See Japan Ministry of Def., Defense of Japan 2022, at 4 (2022), https://www.mod.go.jp/en/publ/w_paper/wp2022/DOJ2022_EN_Full_02.pdf.
39. See Japanese Territory: Senkaku Islands,
Ministry of Foreign Affs. of Japan, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/index.html (last
visited Nov. 30, 2022).
There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent part
of the territory of Japan, in light of historical facts and based upon
international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid
control of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be
resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands.
Id.
40. Eric Johnston, ‘Japan’s Marine Corps’: The Nation’s First Responders for Remote
Island Defense, The Japan Times (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/28/national/japan-sdf-brigade.
The Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade was established in March 2018, under the Ground Self-Defense Force. It was set up to respond to security situations that require faster mobilization of land, sea, and air forces at a national level than had been traditionally available. The brigade was formed with 2,100 personnel—that includes the Western Army Infantry Regiment, which was established in 2002 for the purpose of specializing in amphibious operations. The brigade’s primary duty is to secure any islands that have been illegally occupied.
Id.
41. These new JGSDF bases are Camp Amami (Amami Oshima Island, Kagoshima Prefecture), and Camp Miyakojima (Miyakojima, Okinawa Prefecture), both of which were activated in 2019. GSDF Launches New Bases in Kagoshima and Okinawa for Defense of
Japan’s Southwestern Islands, The Japan Times (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/26/national/politics-diplomacy/gsdf-launches-bases-kagoshima-okinawa-defense-japans-southwestern-islands. An additional base is currently being constructed on Ishigakijima (Okinawa Prefecture). Remote Control: Japan’s Evolving Senkakus Strategy,
Asia Mar. Transparency Initiative (July 29, 2020), https://amti.csis.org/remote-control-japans-evolving-senkakus-strategy.
42. “The JGSDF’s role in coastal defence [sic] and control of certain straits was manifested in the decision in the early 1980s to develop a surface-to-surface anti-ship missile, designated the SSM-1 Type-88 and also called the Shibasuta, specifically for the JGSDF.” Desmond Ball & Richard Tanter, The Tools of Owatatsumi: Japan’s
Ocean surveillance and Coastal Defence Capabilities
20 (2015). See also Steven Stashwick, Japan Considering New Anti-Ship Missiles for its Southwestern
Islands, The Diplomat (Mar. 1, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/japan-considering-new-anti-ship-missiles-for-its-southwestern-islands.
While Japan has long deployed truck-mounted anti-ship missiles, its close ally the United States has not. As they consider how to counter the growing size and capability of China’s fleet, both countries are looking at how to leverage the geographic advantage the first island chain provides against China’s ability to project power beyond its near seas.
Id. The United States could do well to learn from its alliance partner Japan in this field.
43. All U.S. Army Coast Artillery units were deactivated between 1944 and 1946, and the Coast Artillery Corps was dissolved in 1950. Coast Artillery Corps: U.S. Army Coast Artillery Corps
1901-1950,
Coast Defense Study Group, https://cdsg.org/coast-artillery-corps (last visited Nov. 30, 2022). The extensive reanimation of the capability to target and destroy sea vessels from land-based launching sites seems an obvious and fruitful way the U.S. Army can meaningfully contribute to joint warfighting in the twenty-first century Indo-Pacific theater.
44. See, e.g. Daisuke Akimoto, Japan’s Emerging ‘Multi-Doman Defense Force’, The Diplomat, (Mar. 18, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/japans-emerging-multi-domain-defense-force. The Japanese refer to these new domains collectively as “USADEN”, an abbreviation of Uchu (宇宙-outer space), Saiba (サイバー-cyber), and Denjiha (電磁波-electromagnetic waves). See 宇宙・サイバー・電磁波領域における挑戦, 防衛省・自衛隊, https://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2021/special_cyber/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2022) [Challenges in Space, Cyber, and Electromagnetic Domains, Ministry of Def.].
45. Pamphlet, Japan Ground Self Defense Force Training Evaluation Research and
Development Command, https://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/tercom/pamphlet.html (last visited Nov. 30,
2022). Several courses for all of the JSDF branches are held
concurrently year-round on Camp Meguro, to include the JGSDF Advanced
Command and General Staff Course, the JGSDF Technical Advanced Course,
and the JGSDF Command Sergeant Major Courses, as well as both the
Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and Japanese Air Self-Defense Force
Command and General Staff Courses. Id.
46. The course typically runs from August each year, but due to disruptions from the coronavirus, the 66th JGSDF CGS commenced in December 2020. Most foreign personnel graduated in December 2021, and the JGSDF officers graduated in Spring of 2022. The 67th JGSDF CGS commenced on schedule in August 2021, with one U.S. Army foreign area officer and one U.S.M.C. officer as the only two American representatives.
47. Ministry of Def., supra note 32, at 24 (2019).
48. Blaine Goss, Friendliness Does Not Make Friends in Japan, 10
Intercultural Commc’n Stud. 39, 42 (2000) (detailing the cultural differences between building friendships in
America and Japan and noting that “[f]or outsiders, developing
friendships with Japanese can be a slow process”).
49. See generally David Hunter-Chester, Creating Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force,
1945-2015: A Sword Well Made (2016) (examining the impact of Japan’s constitutional, policy, and
legal restrictions on the formation of the JSDF).
50. See generally Jeffrey W. Hornung, Japan’s Potential Contributions in an East China Sea
Contingency 89-101 (2020).
51. Other Basic Policies, Ministry of Def., https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_policy/basis/others/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2022). The Japanese government maintains an “Exclusively Defense-Oriented Policy” (Senshu bōei -専守防衛). According to the Ministry of Defense:
The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack, that the extent of the use of defensive force is kept to the minimum necessary for self-defense, and that the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense. The policy including these matters refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.
Id.
52. See, e.g., James Kraska, Japan’s Legal Response in the Gray Zone, The Diplomat (Aug. 6, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/japans-legal-response-in-the-gray-zone. Although such Chinese maritime activities are more familiar to most people in reference to the South China Sea, China’s provocations in the East China Sea are extensive and frequent. Id. These include the dispatch of fishing vessels (with Chinese Coast Guard protection) and its “maritime militia” in the vicinity of the uninhabited Senkaku Islands, which Japan claims as its sovereign territory. Id. The intent of these activities by the Chinese is multi-fold. Their aims likely include probing the boundaries of Japanese law enforcement and military response to provocation, as well as creating a fait accompli for possession of the islands, and the concomitant rights to the sea and resources surrounding them (to include oil deposits). See Adam P. Liff, Brookings Inst. China, Japan, and the East China Sea:
Beijing’s “Gray Zone” Coercion and Tokyo’s Response
(2019).
53. This statement is based on the author’s professional experience as a
fellow student of the 67th Graduate Course at The Judge Advocate
General’s Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia.
54. See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Army, U.S. Army Pacific, America’s Theater Army for
the Indo-Pacific (2021).
55. See generally U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Regaining Arctic Dominance: the U.S. Army in the
Arctic
(2021).
56.
Following nearly two decades of counterinsurgency operations, the Army
has made long-range precision fires its top modernization priority as
the Defense Department refocuses on great power competition. Major
initiatives underway or under consideration include the Extended Range
Cannon Artillery; Precision Strike Missile; Strategic Long-Range Cannon;
Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon; and modification of existing Navy SM-6 and
UGM-109 missiles for ground launch, according to the Congressional
Research Service.
Jon Harper,
Sibling Rivalry: Military Services in High-Stakes Tussle Over
Long-Range Fires, Nat’l Def. (June 1, 2021), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/6/1/military-services-in-high-stakes-tussle-over-long-range-fires. Harper’s article provides background on development in this field, discusses the current friction between the U.S. Air Force and Army regarding this capability, and also touches on basing options in the Indo-Pacific, to include Japan. Id.
57. For a brief synopsis on the Quad, see Sheila A. Smith, The Quad in the Indo-Pacific: What to Know, Council on Foreign Rels. (May 27, 2021), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/quad-indo-pacific-what-know. The Quad’s 2021 joint statement provides a demonstration of the Quad as a source of international collaboration and diplomacy. Joint Statement from Quad Leaders, White House (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders. However, any U.S. and Japanese expectations regarding the potential for the Quad to serve as a viable future security partnership must be tempered by the fact that, for some time, India has maintained an extensive and robust strategic partnership with Russia. See, e.g., Isabel Van Brugen, Russia and India Sign Military Agreement Despite U.S. Threat of
Sanctions, Newsweek (Dec. 6, 2021, 6:24 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/russia-india-weapons-agreement-cooperation-us-sanctions-1656272; Geeta Mohan, India-Russia Summit: 28 Agreements Inked, Afghanistan, Chinese Incursions
Discussed, India Today (Dec. 7, 2021, 2:19 AM), https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/india-russia-summit-agreements-inked-afghanistan-chinese-incursions-discussed-1884890-2021-12-07.