Justice Owen J. Roberts, Chairman of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, known as the Roberts Commission. (Credit: Library of Congress)
No. 1
In the Hope for Peace
How Protecting Cultural Property during War Is Preparing for Peace
By Major Hannah Guarendi He
The United States of America has been committed to the right conduct of war and has paved the way for nations to establish clear rules during conflict. Lofty goals of peace and justice have laid the groundwork for real-world tactics and operations: in his farewell address, President George Washington called on his fellow citizens to strengthen their unity through peace.1 In 1963, President John F. Kennedy exhorted the graduates of American University that as we “safeguard our national interests, let us also safeguard human interests.”2
Respect for the unique dignity of all people and acknowledgment of every cultural contribution is key to this hope for a peaceful future. Traditions of war, customary international law, international conventions, and domestic policy have affirmed the importance of protecting physical symbols of culture during armed conflict. The Lieber Code,3 promulgated to scope a war on domestic soil, ordered commanders to refrain from targeting sites of learning and culture.4 When destruction bled across the culture-rich regions of Europe and Asia during twentieth-century conflicts, generals grappled with shielding some of the world’s great treasures while marching towards victory.5 In the surge of international agreements after World War II, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflict6 provided a clear articulation of the duty to protect the culture of humankind from the ravages of war.
This article offers a historical analysis of the decisions to protect cultural property in Japan during World War II, an exotic and unfamiliar landscape for Service members charged with a peaceful occupation. It introduces customary international law and treaties, focusing on the tradition of protecting cultural property. It then presents U.S. preparations for war in Japan and how they complied with the duty to preserve symbols of the past. This part presents art professionals’ preparations and the decisions of generals, scientists, and the President in selecting targets that brought about the end of World War II. To encourage deliberate and informed decisions, this article recommends establishing a commission to coordinate relevant cultural property information and provide well-trained advisers to commanders.
Cultural property protection has never been ancillary to tactics. The President of the United States warned Iran that “we have . . . targeted [fifty-two] Iranian sites . . . important to Iran & the Iranian culture” in January 2020.7 In November 2020, as churches, museums, and schools in Nagorno-Karabakh were shelled, the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) met with representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan and reminded them of the duty to refrain from targeting cultural sites.8 The ongoing conflict continues to center around the cultural heritage of ethnic minorities in the region.9 Museums, UNESCO Heritage sites, libraries, mosques, cathedrals, and monuments across Ukraine have been subjected to deliberate targeting and collateral damage in a conflict justified by the claim that culture was being suppressed.10 Even the latest negotiations regarding space exploration, the Artemis Accords, include a provision to preserve outer space heritage “in accordance with mutually developed standards and practices.”11 The importance of cultural property in international undertakings is not diminishing. “With conviction that the safeguarding of monuments is an element in the right conduct of war and in the hope for peace,”12 our modern generation must continue the mission to protect shared heritage in present and future conflicts.
Background
The law governing relations among states and nations has developed throughout history. The practice of political powers, through their actions, public statements, and contributions from religious scholars and philosophers, has brought forth a body of law that every state in the modern world recognizes and applies. This customary international law also lays the foundation for entering conflict and state action during conflict. An even more specific subset of these traditions is the body of law protecting civilian property, including monuments, museums, scientific institutions, and religious sites.
Customary International Law
Customary international law is the widespread and customary practice across modern nations: “International jurists speak of a custom when a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions has grown up under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to international law, obligatory or right.”13 Beyond being the practice of nations, actions taken under customary international law stem from a sense of legal obligation.14
In some cases, customary international law is articulated and put into writing in international agreements. For example, representatives from European, Asian, and American nations signed the 189915 and 190716 Hague Conventions. The International Military Tribune of the Far East, as well as the Nuremberg Tribunal,17 found these conventions to be customary international law, and applicable to all parties under their jurisdiction:
The contribution of [the 1899 Hague Convention] consisted less in the addition of new rules to the existing body of international law than in a restatement in more precise form of the rules of customary law and practice already recognized as established. The same observation applies to the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, and the Conventions adopted at Geneva on 6 July 1906 and 27 July 1929.18
While these written international agreements establish certain duties, the unwritten practice of customary international law can begin the discussion regarding common practice or fill gaps that such treaties left.19 Every state actor is bound by customary international law during armed conflict.20 Because these laws govern the relationships between sovereign nations, much of customary international law pertains to regulating armed conflicts between states.
Development of the Law of Armed Conflict
Legal analysis has separated customary international law regarding conflict21 into two major bodies: jus ad bellum, the norms for initiating armed conflict, and jus in bello, governing the conduct of hostilities.22 The law of armed conflict (LOAC) principles, which provide a common foundation for each conflict and era in time, are incorporated into the customary international law tradition.23 The recognized principles are military necessity, humanity, proportionality, distinction, and honor.24 The most consistently defined concepts are humanity, distinction, and honor.25 Military necessity and proportionality, however, have evolved significantly as technological capabilities have changed.
Military Necessity
The discussion of military necessity is perhaps the most important of the LOAC principles. Military necessity applies to conduct both entering into and during war.26 Necessity ad bellum requires a determination that armed force is necessary under the circumstances.27 Necessity in bello, however, is not as clearly established.28 In American practice, the Lieber Code articulated this principle,29 and President Abraham Lincoln pondered its definition in relation to attacks, political moves, and private property.30 By the end of the Civil War, military necessity did not just rationalize targeting military objectives, such as forts and open battlefields, or movable items that the Union Army needed, like supplies and cotton; it also rationalized targeting anything that “hurts the enemy,” including economic infrastructure and commercial property.31 The modern Department of Defense (DoD) definition of military necessity is “the principle that justifies the use of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”32 What started as a limitation has grown into a permissive justification.33
Proportionality
Proportionality is also considered a fundamental of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Initially intertwined with just-war theory, proportionality was the idea that the evil of waging war was in balance with the overall good that would result.34 Modern applications of proportionality ad bellum look to the United Nation’s mission of securing a peaceful future and exhorting its members to use force only in self-defense and after they have tried other means.35
Proportionality prohibits “[l]aunching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”36 American policy defines it as “the principle that even where one is justified in acting, one must not act in a way that is unreasonable or excessive.”37 Further, it “requires that even when actions may be justified by military necessity, such actions cannot result in excessive civilian loss.”38
The basis of proportionality in war is to respect non-belligerents and reduce their suffering. As Professor Judith Gardam notes in her work, sometimes there is a distinct military advantage to targeting civilian property, and trying to minimize damage to people or property is often at odds with military necessity.39 As such, despite the protests of a military establishment focused on tactical success, this principle has developed and continues to evolve.
(Credit: Vital11 Vodolazsky1-stock.adobe.com)
Development of Protection of Cultural Property within LOAC
Aggressive warfare consists of death, destruction, and subjugation—plunder and pillage have likewise been hallmarks of conquest. Traditions of war shifted as civilizations developed and the idea of culture and religion became associated with inherent human rights.40 In Greece, philosophers advised against destroying religious sites and monuments out of vengeance, and Alexander the Great was commended for preserving the cultural centers of the nations he conquered.41 To display the glory of his empire, he also built museums and filled them with the plunder of his conquests, both artifacts and academics.42 Into the Renaissance period and Enlightenment of the 1700s, conduct during war evolved alongside new technologies and philosophies, but respect for the “common property of mankind” remained a much-discussed topic.43
The American Civil War
During the Civil War, Professor Francis Lieber compiled the first codified reference for LOAC in the United States: the Lieber Code.44 He articulated principles such as military necessity45 and specified that works of art and academic property should be “secured against all avoidable injury.”46 Notably, the Lieber Code placed the duty to identify and secure such sites upon both the attacker and the defender.47 Most of the rules in the Lieber Code applied only to the Union Army and remained in effect once the Civil War was over.48
The Lieber Code remained a primary source of international custom until the Hague Conventions with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land in 1899 and 1907.49 The 1899 Convention forbade the pillaging of private property and designated that the property of “religious, charitable, and educational institutions, and those of arts and science” was private, even if it was state property.50 In 1907, protections included buildings dedicated to “religion, art, science, . . . charitable purposes, [and] historic monuments.”51 These protections did not apply if the building was used for military purposes and in cases of military necessity.52 Altogether, these documents support the protection of cultural property as a duty under customary international law. This duty need not be limited to the definitions and provisions of a four-sided document.
The World Wars
In 1914, war swept across the European and Asian continents, encompassing culturally rich regions such as Mesopotamia, Turkey, China, and much of Europe.53 Despite the diplomatic talk of protecting culture and history, a new war brought new methods of warfare. The fate of the Rheims Cathedral in France illustrates the German army’s complete disregard of the Hague Convention principles.54 The advancing German forces used the Gothic cathedral as a field hospital.55 Upon retreat, knowing the building was filled with highly flammable straw, they targeted the church with artillery that set off an inferno.56
World War II brought cultural property even more sharply into focus. In Europe, Nazi Germany looted countless works of art from public and private collections and laid plans to destroy the symbols of civilization in Rome, Paris, Moscow, and the rest of the historic continent.57 The Allies acknowledged that military necessity and preserving the lives of American Soldiers would take precedence over preserving monuments or museums but still placed that determination squarely on the lowest commanders.58 The Monuments, Fine Art, and Archives (MFAA) Department of the Civil Affairs and Military Government Section of the Allied Army was established to advise commanders, identify cultural property in the path of the army, and secure and assess damaged monuments as the army marched forward.59 As the army approached Italy, General Dwight D. Eisenhower admonished his commanders:
If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men’s lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the choice is not always so clear-cut as that. In many cases the monuments can be spared without any detriment to operational needs. Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted principle. But the phrase “military necessity” is sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or even of personal convenience. I do not want it to cloak slackness or indifference.60
Shortly after this letter was distributed to all American troops approaching the Italian peninsula, the Fifth Army prepared to attack the Gustav line at the town of Cassino.61 Prominently placed along the Gustav line was the Monte Cassino Abbey, a geographic strong point and the site of a monastery built, and then re-built, by Saint Benedict.62 Both the Allies and the Nazis approaching the Gustav line acknowledged that the abbey was a protected place.63 A New Zealand commander, Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyburg, observed the slow progress of troops attempting a frontal attack and proposed a bombing campaign of the area.64 General Mark Clark, the American general commanding Fifth Army, disagreed with General Freyburg’s opinion that German troops were occupying the monastery and was convinced that a ruined, strategically available, and no longer protected location would provide a windfall advantage to the Nazis holding the line.65 General Sir Harold Alexander, the superior British commander coordinating the movement up the Italian area, most likely made the decision to call in the bombers.66
On 15 February 1944, while locals fleeing the fighting in the south attended mass in the abbey chapel, 250 bombers attacked the top of Monte Cassino, reducing the entire area to rubble.67 The New Zealand Corps, much like the American Corps in the preceding weeks, could not reach the area for three days, allowing the Nazi troops time to secure locations in and around the destroyed abbey and call in airborne reinforcements.68 The noncombatants still in the area were evacuated.69
Both sides immediately faced a public backlash against the destruction. The abbot later declared, via Nazi radio stations, that no soldiers had been occupying the abbey at the time of the bombing.70 General Fridolin Senger, the Wehrmacht commander general of the region, also supported this stance; in an interview after the war, he stated that, as he was dining with the abbott on Christmas Eve 1943, he did not even look out of the windows at the amassing Ally formations down in the valley.71 Reports after the war, which were kept classified until 1980, noted that no intelligence or eye-witness reports to any of the commanders on the ground noted any German activity within the abbey.72 Newspapers in America confronted President Franklin D. Roosevelt about the decision to bomb the site, and he declassified the Eisenhower memo about the preservation of monuments in Italy for the first time to clarify the Allied position.73
Though the discussion of whether this bombing was permissible under the law of war continues, the United States and many other nations helped draft the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.74 It defined cultural property75 and articulated nations’ specific duties to protect it during conflict. While requiring that governments refrain from making cultural property a target, military necessity or use for a military purpose still waives any protections.76
Specific protections for cultural property arose from a respect for shared heritage, even among enemies. As the traditions of war adjusted to modern methods, the protection of monuments became even more defined. During World War II, preserving the heritage of occupied countries proved to be a key element in ensuring the success of peace.
Mosque in Kabul City, Afghanistan. (Credit: mbrand85-stock.adobe.com)
Protecting Culture in Japan
The United States focused on the Pacific Theater from early 1942, as did China, the British Navy, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.77 To secure a landing strip close enough to launch aerial bombardments onto mainland Japan, Allied troops fought up the long chain of islands in the Pacific Rim until finally securing Iwo Jima and Okinawa, putting the Army Air Forces in striking range of Tokyo.78 Land invasion in Japan was imminent, and the only decision to be made had critical ramifications: whether and where to use the powerful new atomic bomb.79 Throughout the decision-making process, cultural property protection was a key element that influenced the coming peace. This section will consider the actions taken on both sides to protect cultural property with customary international law.
Domestic Legal Protections of Cultural Property in Japan
The cultural patrimony of Japan is complicated and intertwined with traditions from throughout Asia. The Japanese War of Imjin in the late sixteenth century resulted in the removal of a wide variety of tangible and intangible cultural assets from Korea to Japan, and practices such as pottery became integrated into Japanese traditions.80 By the 1870s, the increasingly global Japanese administration began to codify protections for traditional Japanese cultural expression.81 The initial preservation law had a two-fold intention: to encourage respect for a historic Japanese identity and to prevent patrimonial items from being exported, retaining them for future generations in Japan.82
The Imperial Household created a Department for the Investigation of Cultural Assets in 1888, which led to an inventory of thousands of cultural properties and items.83 The subsequent Koshaji Hozonho, Law for the Preservation of Ancient Shrines and Temples, established a centralized registry for cultural assets, charged specific entities with their preservation, and provided subsidies from the Department of Religion.84 About three decades later, a series of laws for the “Preservation of Historic Sites, Scenic Spots, and Natural Preserves” created a designation process for historic sites and criminalized the disturbance of a protected area.85 Notably, Japanese administrators in charge of the “protectorate” enacted almost-identical laws in Korea between 1909 and 1924.86
Law 17, the National Treasures Preservation Law, consolidated these measures in 1929.87 Registration was required for “any structure, treasure, or object of historical significance,” whether owned by the government or private individuals.88 A National Treasures Preservation Committee was formed to ensure all national treasures, or kokuhō, were preserved and to administer all requests for ownership change, alteration, or change of condition.89 Organized under the Ministry of Education, the government made continuous efforts to consolidate an inventory of culturally significant places and things and preserve them for the Japanese people.90 The ministry continued to document and administer the preservation committee until 1943, when it focused on the safe storage of listed kokuhō to protect them from the anticipated invasion.91
The Roberts Commission
As conflict brewed slowly in Europe and American involvement became more likely, Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone approached President Roosevelt to establish a group to advise on the protection of cultural property in Europe and America, should a land invasion ever become likely.92 Chief Justice Stone proposed that this group work within an appropriate Army branch so that “as far as is consistent with military necessity,” the advancing troops would be prepared to protect monuments and works of art.93 The proposal also suggested that museum officials and art historians be attached to general headquarters and that the committee prepare a list of property looted by the Axis forces.94 These suggestions were all based on the duty under customary international law to avoid harming cultural property, which starts with the ability to identify the protected property.
Even before official government action to establish a commission, members of the American Counsel of Learned Societies organized themselves in 1943.95 They provided a list of potential civil affairs officers to the director of the School of Military Government and drafted lists of monuments, museums, and private collections throughout Europe and Asia.96 Some months later, the Department of State (DoS) announced the formation of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, known as the Roberts Commission, after its chairman Justice Owen J. Roberts.97
Though most of the work focused on the massive looting and destruction occurring in Europe, an adventurous scholar named Langdon Warner, curator of the Fogg Museum at Harvard University and a specialist in Far Eastern art and archaeology, joined the committee and focused on the East.98 He advised the Roberts Commission on the many cultural sites in Japan and other vulnerable regions of the Far East and drafted lists based on the national treasures inventory in Japan.99 The commission provided aerial maps annotated with the location of various monuments and protected sites to the War Department; they made 786 maps throughout the war.100 The diligent work and extensive preparations proved to be very useful once the Allied forces approached the Japanese mainland.
(Credit: CrazyCloud-stock.adobe.com)
Saving Kyoto from the Atomic Bomb
As the war in the Pacific progressed and the scientific success of the atomic bomb was confirmed, President Harry S. Truman faced the grave responsibility of deciding whether to unleash the world’s greatest weapon upon an unsuspecting civilian population. The decision was not taken lightly; President Truman, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and teams of military and scientific advisors carefully pondered the best course of action for months.101 Ultimately, the President decided that using the bomb would achieve peace through the final and complete surrender of Japan.102 The strategic decision of an appropriate target, which would not only cripple Japan’s military power but also break the will of Japanese leadership, was carefully considered. Selecting a dual-purpose target, with both a military purpose and civilian presence, was not only a criterion for the committees but also unavoidable.103
Contrary to criticism of indiscriminately bombing civilian cities like Rotterdam and London, the United States had already demonstrated a willingness to use air superiority to pressure the Japanese leadership.104 The firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945 caused the death of perhaps 100,000 people and left more than a million homeless.105 Within a few weeks, more than fifty-six square miles of Tokyo and the surrounding area were affected by American air raids, and almost all structures completely burnt to the ground.106 Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki were among the few cities spared this attack, which made them available as targets for the atomic bomb.107
Secretary Stimson’s personal diary and his writing after the war illuminate the careful thought put into finding an appropriate target. He knew that the destruction from American bombers was being blamed entirely on Americans; further destruction would not weaken the Japanese population’s will against Americans. Rather, it would embitter the Japanese against any occupiers who then swept in and tried to take control of a beaten country.108 If the goal was to effect surrender and a peaceful future, targeting the Imperial Palace or Kyoto, symbols to the Japanese people of their national identity, would not achieve that.
In contrast to the destruction the Nazis had wreaked across Europe, Stimson noted, “I did not want to have the United States get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities.”109 Stimson mentioned to President Truman, who agreed that “the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long postwar period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians.”110
Throughout the process, every recommendation agreed that Kyoto was a key strategic target.111 The scientific committee at the Manhattan Project suggested the Imperial Palace112 but noted Kyoto had been relatively preserved during the war and held converging rail lines that moved war material throughout Japan.113 General Leslie Groves received a memo summarizing the military targets in Kyoto; explicitly, this memo noted that Kyoto was known prewar for its “arty” industries and that universities and cultural sites were all located in the north and east of the city, away from the industrial area.114 The old Imperial Palace grounds were regularly referenced as the city’s center.115
In July 1945, Secretary Stimson and President Truman agreed that Kyoto should be spared when approving the final target list. Both of these men had slightly different reasoning: Stimson admitted that it was a target of “considerable military importance” but also a “shrine of Japanese art and culture. We determined that it should be spared.”116 Truman noted in his diary:
I have told the [Secretary] of War, Mr. Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless, and fanatic, we, as the leader of the world for the common welfare, cannot drop that terrible bomb on the old capital or the new.117
The preservation of Kyoto proved vital to the country’s stability once the emperor surrendered.
Planning for the Past in Preparation for the Future
The approach to targeting in Japan during the war demonstrated an unprecedented respect for the culture of its people, resulting in cooperative occupation and enduring foreign relations for over seventy years. Key contributors to this success included the preparation and integration of expert advice at the early stages of planning, streamlining information, and the expertise of officers who were able to advise commanders. This was emphasized at the highest levels, including policy discussions between the President and Secretary of War, signaling to the warfighters that these factors were important.
A modern version of the Roberts Commission should be established to coordinate the U.S. Government’s response to protecting vulnerable cultural property in areas where the DoD is operating. America’s partners agree that protecting cultural property during conflict is not merely a legal obligation but goes beyond military tactics; it is crucial to post-conflict stability.118 Such an organization could provide a common touchpoint for academics to provide vital information and research to multiple stakeholders and coordinate DoD and DoS efforts. Such a commission could identify well-trained individuals who are already serving to provide commanders with advice about cultural property on the battlefield and integrate into the planning process. A centralized organization could also provide an efficient link between strategic political goals, academic information, and mission success.
Remains of the church of Oradour Sur Glane after World War II. (Credit: compulnfoto-stock.adobe.com
Cultural Property Protection Contributed to Postwar Stability
The Roberts Commission established a single point for information to be collected from civilian experts and coordinated access to this information to both the DoS and War Department. This organization was composed of experts in their fields, many with government ties, and was chaired by Justice Owen J. Roberts.119 It had support from the highest levels of government—Chief Justice Stone recommended the central committee to President Roosevelt, and the President appointed the Commission after consultation with the War Department.120
This mission proved to be a critical element of success in stabilizing society after World War II. As the Supreme Allied Command undertook its mission, the Japanese press responded positively to the arrival of MFAA officers, reporting on the American efforts to save Kyoto and prevent the use of Japanese treasures as reparations.121 Mr. Warner was awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure by the emperor, and to this day, the date of his death is commemorated at Nara’s Monju-in Temple.122 Public displays of art and artifacts became more commonplace; in November 1947, a four-kilometer line awaited the opening of an exhibit at the Nara National Museum.123 As the population rejected the militant philosophy foisted on them by the prewar government, a national identity as a “nation of culture” emerged; the preservation of historical cultural heritage strengthened this modern identity and cultivated a sense of pride in a defeated country.124
The government officials in the Ministry of Education continued to perform their duties after the official surrender and worked closely with the Supreme Allied Command and Army officers assigned to the civil-military government roles.125 Throughout Japan, the MFAA worked with local ministries to support the preservation of damaged cultural property, stating:
The immediate postwar problem consists of the reconstitution of the artistic and historical heritage of enemy-occupied countries.
. . .
The protection of art in a time of war is based upon the universally accepted principle that cultural property is inviolable. . . . The artistic and historic treasures of a nation are regarded as that nation’s patrimony, and the great public collections of the world as an international heritage. It is the preservation of this irreplaceable cultural heritage of all nations which is recognized today, as an international responsibility.126
As Japanese officers began to formally surrender their swords to the Americans, some ancestral Samurai treasures, the MFAA advised American Soldiers they should consult the Ministry of Education to ensure any swords they received were not registered before trying to take them home.127 General MacArthur fully supported the mission stating that “historical, cultural, and religious objects and installations (including several [i]mperial [p]alaces) will be carefully protected and preserved.”128
A New Commission for an Old Problem
As the mission in Japan culminated, Gordon Bowles, an anthropologist who worked with the civil-military government in Japan, recommended that future efforts encourage the slow and deliberate assessment of threats during peacetime to avoid a rapid and haphazard mobilization of expertise during the stress of wartime.129 In preparation for future conflicts, Congress or the President should establish an advisory group to act as a “clearinghouse” and coordinate actions among the DoS, the DoD, and academic communities. Executive-level support would convey the seriousness of the mission and encourage the retention of experts.
Despite the clear benefits of such a group, it does not exist. In preparation for the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2018,130 the DoD submitted a Report on Cultural Preservation in Armed Conflict,131 which responded to queries about safeguarding cultural heritage sites during armed conflict and other military operations. In response, the 2018 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to designate a current employee to serve as a Coordinator for Cultural Heritage Protection.132 To date, this duty has been delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of Stability and Humanitarian Affairs.133
Within the DoS, the Cultural Heritage Center contains several programs to negotiate and enforce cultural property agreements with other nations and combat illicit trafficking of antiquities and cultural items.134 These policymakers in executive agencies should be responsive to an external advisory group to coordinate their efforts in protecting cultural property, articulating cultural property protection policies, and gathering information from international academic organizations.
Non-governmental organizations within the United States attempt to provide cultural property information to commanders at all levels. The U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield was formed in 2006 and serves as an emissary to Blue Shield International; it currently advises and assists on the protection of cultural property that armed conflict threatens, providing technical assistance and training to the professional community.135 The Cultural Heritage by Archaeology & Military Panel and Military Cultural Heritage Advisory Group of the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA) provided training, advice, and reach-back support for U.S. Central Command,136 but the AIA has since disbanded the group and has not created a new iteration to address concerns in Ukraine.
Legal Compliance with the 1954 Hague Convention
Other legal obligations support forming an advisory group. The 1954 Hague Convention requires that parties “foster . . . a spirit of respect for culture and cultural property of all peoples” and to plan for specialist personnel “whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property.”137 The DoD provides cultural training in preparation for missions but does not have an annual training requirement or comprehensive cultural property training program available for commanders.138 In 2019, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs Corps branch began recruiting officers for the Army Monuments Officers Training Program, in cooperation with the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative, to develop career officers with expertise in the fields of archaeology, art history, and more to provide specialized restoration and archival capabilities to post-conflict areas.139
While this new program will provide the Army with special skills, such experts should also be fully integrated into the planning process for operations and be made available to anyone with target engagement authority. Just as MFAA officers were deployed to provide advice to general-level headquarters on cultural property matters, modern monuments officers should be incorporated into today’s general staffs. They should also be conversant in basic targeting doctrine and be prepared to advise target engagement authorities on any proportionality concerns regarding targeting cultural property.
The current DoD Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan includes specific objectives related to preserving the decision space for commanders while mitigating civilian harm during combat.140 Cultural heritage experts can contribute to these goals through their expertise both during the plans and operations phases and during potential restoration of the built environment after conflict.141 Updates to the Law of War Manual emphasize the presumption of civilian status and added a new subsection titled “Feasible Precautions to Verify Whether Objects of Attack Are Military Objectives.”142 Military practitioners cannot comply with this new addition to the United States’ authoritative interpretation of the law of war without cultural heritage experts’ knowledge and experience.
Another key contribution the Roberts Commission made was identifying personnel qualified to advise on the identification and use of cultural property. For example, First Lieutenant (1LT) Walter Popham was a landscape architect who studied at Cornell and Harvard before he was drafted in 1942 and commissioned as an intelligence officer.143 He was training in civil affairs when Langdon Warner “strongly recommended” him for service in Japan.144 Upon recommendation by the Roberts Commission, 1LT Popham was appointed as a director of the MFAA on General MacArthur’s staff, where he served until 1947.145 By the war’s end, the Roberts Commission had provided multiple lists with recommendations from experts to every branch of the armed forces.146
Similarly, the DoD would benefit from identifying Service members with background and training in relevant skills, such as art history, archaeology, or architecture, and who could complete extracurricular training and be available to commanders as needed while continuing to serve in their primary branches. An additional skill identifier (ASI)147 could establish a roster of qualified Army personnel and make additional training available to them in support of specific mission requirements. A field artillery officer with a history degree could be trained to identify and advise on cultural property targets in an area of operations, or a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officer interested in art history could provide additional skills in historic preservation requirements for projects overseas.
Such a program would satisfy the requirements of the 1954 Hague Convention and be an asset to any command. These identified specialists could validate their training and support their commands through cultural-property-specific training scenarios within any level of unit exercise. The Army could offer its current Army Monuments Officer Training Program, which awards an ASI to graduates,148 to officers or noncommissioned officers in any military occupation specialty; this would help commanders identify the right person for the right jobs on their staff. These personnel could also earn the ASI through internships with installation or garrison cultural resource management offices, planning and conducting training programs for units, or identifying assignments that already require knowledge of cultural sites.
The immediate need for people with knowledge of cultural heritage issues is real and relevant to current conflicts. Museum experts acknowledge the need to identify specialists in this area, not only to help enforce the treaties protecting cultural property but also, potentially, to prosecute nations that violate these international norms during armed conflict.149 For instance, the International Criminal Court recently brought a case against Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz for charges including intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments in the region of Timbuktu during the Al Qaeda control of the area in 2012 and 2013.150 Moreover, the prosecutor general of Ukraine and other members of the international community are committed to collecting evidence, building cases, and bringing charges against Russian combatants for their actions during the current conflict in Ukraine.151
The immediate need for people with knowledge of cultural heritage issues is real and relevant to current conflicts.
In the multi-domain battlespace, aggressors are increasingly identifying cultural identity and association with cultural property as a method of exploiting local populations or inciting action.152 The vulnerability of digital assets poses as much of a problem for cyber operators as the identification and protection of cultural property in the built environment.153
In some instances, threats to movable cultural property have instigated responses that are interpreted as acts just below warfare. When the Estonian government proposed moving the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn and the remains of Soviet soldiers to a cemetery outside of the city center, the local population was split between viewing Estonia as a victim of Soviet-Russian aggression or of Russian victory over fascism.154 This decision, to move a piece of cultural heritage, was met with a coordinated cyberattack of unparalleled size against Estonian internet-facing systems.155 Most of the attacks came from outside of Estonia and were disseminated in Russian,156 and many attacks included a message related to the Bronze Soldier.157
The potential for destructive actions in the information space in response to actions surrounding cultural property is an example of cultural heritage exploitation that must be considered in multi-domain warfare. Cultural heritage is not only vulnerable on the battlefield; the information domain also presents risks. Tying those risks to physical sites will help commanders prepare for a multi-domain front and better predict an opponent’s actions and generate an opportunity to garner local civilian support. A cultural heritage expert could be pivotal to mission success.
Conclusion
During the initial phases of World War II, a concerned group of academics took initiative and successfully enabled generals to preserve and protect the monuments of every theater in which they were fighting. More than just helping ground commanders avoid destroying historic monuments, the mission to identify key cultural sites helped shape the future of warfare and contributed to the decision-making process for the world’s most powerful weapon. Because both Japan and the United States were committed to identifying cultural property and following the customary laws of armed conflict, the occupation of Japan not only ushered in a new era of peace for the Japanese people but also helped them establish a modern national identity rooted in their past.
As current conflicts have shown, respecting cultural heritage during armed conflict did not happen just because the 1954 Hague Convention was signed. The thoughtful and deliberate process of protecting cultural property should begin at the earliest stage of any conflict, or even before. A commission to consolidate the information needed to support potential operations and provide this crucial link between commanders and the academic community would comply with current laws, support DoD objectives in the conduct of war, and support the preservation of the built environment. Respect for world heritage legitimizes military operations and is a vital tool for any commander who hopes for peace. TAL
MAJ He is the Deputy Chief of Military and Civil Law at U.S. Army Europe and Africa Headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany.
Notes
1. George Washington, Farewell Address (17 Sept. 1796), reprinted in 2 George Washington Papers: Letterbooks 1754-1799, bk. 24, at 219, 222-23, https://www.loc.gov/resource/mgw2.024.
2. John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, Commencement Address at American University, Washington, D.C. (June 10, 1963).
3. Headquarters, U.S. War Department, Gen. Orders No. 100 (24 Apr. 1863) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
4. See id. art. 34.
5. Robert Edsel et al., The Monuments Men: Allied Heroes, Nazi Thieves, and the Greatest Treasure Hunt in History 25 (2009).
6. Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 214 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention].
7. Jeremy Diamond, Caroline Kelly & Greg Clary, Trump Warns Iran If It Hits Any Americans or American Assets ‘We Have Targeted 53 Iranian Sites,’ CNN Politics (Jan. 5, 2020, 12:51 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/04/politics/trump-warning-iran-52-assets/index.html.
8. Nagorno-Krabakh: Reaffirming the Obligation to Protect Cultural Goods, UNESCO Proposes Sending a Mission to the Field to All Parties, UNESCO (Nov. 20, 2020), https://en.unesco.org/news/nagorno-karabakh-reaffirming-obligation-protect-cultural-goods-unesco-proposes-sending-mission.
9. See Hundreds of Armenian Heritage Sites at Risk in Nagorno-Karabakh, Cornell Univ. College Arts & Scis. (Sept. 21, 2023), https://as.cornell.edu/news/hundreds-armenian-heritage-sites-risk-nagorno-karabakh.
10. Isabel Coles & Francis X. Rocca, Russia’s War Rages, Putting Ukraine’s Cultural Sites at Risk, Wall St. J. (Mar. 15, 2022, 7:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-war-rages-putting-ukraines-cultural-sites-at-risk-11647342931?st=7uax2lf8j703bjk&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink.
11. The Artemis Accords: Principles for Cooperation in the Civil Exploration and Use of the Moon, Mars, Comets, and Asteroids for Peaceful Purposes, § 9, para. 1, Oct. 13, 2020, https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/img/Artemis-Accords-signed-13Oct2020.pdf; see also Alice Gorman, Who Is Responsible for Heritage in Outer Space? Apollo Mag. (Nov. 23, 2020), https://www.apollo-magazine.com/artemis-accords-heritage-outer-space.
12. George L. Stout, Protection of Monuments: A Proposal for Consideration During War and Rehabilitation 1 (1942), https://www.aaa.si.edu/collections/items/detail/george-stout-draft-protection-monuments-16208.
13. I L. Oppenheim, International Law § 17 (Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1955).
14. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102(2) (Am. L. Inst. 1987).
15. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter 1899 Convention].
16. Hague Convention (IV) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter 1907 Convention].
17. Hans Leonhardt, The Nuremberg Trial: A Legal Analysis, 11 Rev. of Pol. 449, 470 (1949).
18. Int’l Mil. Tribunal for the Far E., Judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 39 (1948).
19. Customary Law, Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/customary-law (last visited Aug. 9, 2023).
20. Id.
21. The terms “law of war” and “law of armed conflict” are used interchangeably and synonymously in reference to these rules; this article uses the term “law of armed conflict” or “LOAC” unless citing an original source.
22. See Judith Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality, and the Use of Force by States 1 (2004).
23. See Off. of Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense Law of War Manual § 2.1.2 (12 June 2015) (C1, 31 July 2023) [hereinafter Law of War Manual].
24. Id. § 2.1.2.3.
25. See id. § 2.3 (“Humanity . . . forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.”); id. § 2.5 (“Distinction, sometimes called discrimination . . . distinguish[es] principally between the armed forces and the civilian population, and between unprotected and protected objects.”); id. § 2.6 (“Honor demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense and a certain mutual respect between opposing military forces.”).
26. See Gardam, supra note 22, at 1-2.
27. Id. at 5-6.
28. See id. at 7.
29. Lieber Code, supra note 3, art. 14 (“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”).
30. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 Am. J. Int’l L. 213, 215 (1998).
31. Id. at 226.
32. Law of War Manual, supra note 23, § 2.2.
33. See Craig J. S. Forrest, The Doctrine of Military Necessity and the Protection of Cultural Property During Armed Conflicts, 37 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 177, 186 (2007).
34. Gardam, supra note 22, at 9.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Rule 14: Proportionality in Attack, Int’l Comm. of Red Cross, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule14 (last visited Aug. 9, 2023).
37. Law of War Manual, supra note 23, § 2.4.
38. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 6-27, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare para. 1-21 (7 Aug. 2019) (C1, 20 Sept. 2019).
39. See Gardam, supra note 22, at 18.
40. Jiří Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 4 (1996).
41. See Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, 42 A.F. L. Rev. 277, 279-83 (1997); see also Toman, supra note 40, at 4.
42. Kastenberg, supra note 41, at 282-83.
43. Stanislaw E. Nahlik, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 Hastings L.J. 1069, 1070-71 (1976).
44. Jenny Gesley, The “Lieber Code” – the First Modern Codification of the Laws of War, Lib. of Cong. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2018/04/the-lieber-code-the-first-modern-codification-of-the-laws-of-war.
45. Lieber Code, supra note 3, art. 27.
46. Id. art. 35 (“Classical works of art, libraries, scientific collections, or precious instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as hospitals, must be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.”).
47. Kastenberg, supra note 41, at 285.
48. Gesley, supra note 44.
49. Id.
50. 1899 Convention, supra note 15, Regulations: art. 56.
51. 1907 Convention, supra note 16, Regulations: art. 27.
52. Id. (“In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.”).
53. Kastenberg, supra note 41, at 286.
54. See Lorraine Boissoneault, The Debate Over Rebuilding That Ensued When a Beloved French Cathedral Was Shelled During WWI, Smithsonian Mag. (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/debate-over-rebuilding-ensued-when-beloved-french-cathedral-was-shelled-during-wwi-180971999.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See generally Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War (1994) (providing a detailed account of the Third Reich’s attack on European art, history, and culture leading up to and during World War II).
58. Memorandum from Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gen., U.S. Army, to G.O.C. in Chief, 21 Army Group et al., subject: Preservation of Historical Monuments (26 May 1944), https://www.eisenhowerlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/research/online-documents/monuments-men/033-006.pdf.
59. Edsel, supra note 5, at 60.
60. Memorandum from Gen., U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, to all commanders, subject: Historical Monuments (29 Dec. 1943), https://i0.wp.com/text-message.blogs.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/02/eisenhower_december-1943.jpg.
61. U.S. Army Ctr. Mil. Hist., Fifth Army at the Winter Line 93 (1990).
62. See Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino 401 (Ctr. Mil. Hist. 1993) (1969).
63. See id. at 400-01; see also Frederick Jones, Report on the Events Leading to the Bombing of the Abbey of Monte Cassino on 15 February 1944, at 7 (on file with The National Archives, London).
64. Id. at 402.
65. Id. at 404; see also David Hapgood & David Richardson, Monte Cassino 31, 173 (1986). General Clark was known for trying to make a good impression on the local population as he moved through Italy, and his troops had even conducted a fundraising campaign to help pay for damage done to a church outside Salerno. Hapgood & Richardson, supra; see also Letter from Bernard C. Freyberg, Commander, 2d N.Z. Expeditionary Force, to Major General Sir Howard “Kip” Kippenberger, commander N.Z. Div. (Aug. 11, 1950) (on file with The National Archives, London) [hereinafter Freyberg Letter]. General Freyburg notes that General Clark later made public statements about not wanting to bomb the abbey but had clearly given it much thought and had opinions regarding the best way to do it. Freyberg Letter, supra, at 2.
66. Hapgood & Richardson, supra note 65, at 183; see also Jones, supra note 63, at 23. No records exist regarding actual approval of the bombing campaign.
67. Blumenson, supra note 62, at 409, 414-15.
68. Id. at 416.
69. Id. at 415.
70. Id. at 414.
71. Id.
72. See Jones, supra note 63, at 15-16.
73. Hapgood & Richardson, supra note 65, at 231.
74. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 6. There are currently 133 signatory nations. United nations Edu., Sci. and Cultural Org., Implementation of Standard-Setting Instruments Part I: General Monitoring Comprehensive Report by the Director-General on UNESCO’s Standard-Setting Instruments annex 1 (2021).
75. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 6, art 1(a).
[M]ovable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above.
Id.
76. Id. art. 4(2).
77. Timothy P. Maga, Vision and Victory: Franklin Roosevelt and the Pacific War Council, 1942-1944, 21 Presidential Stud. Q. 351, 352 (1991).
78. The Gen. Staff of Gen. MacArthur, 1 Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific 399-400 (1994).
79. See id. at 399-400; 434-40.
80. For a more complete summary of the campaigns by the Japanese into modern-day Korea and China, see Geoffrey R. Scott, Spoliation, Cultural Property, and Japan, 829 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 803, 830-834 (2008) [hereinafter Spoliation].
81. Geoffrey R. Scott, The Cultural Property Laws of Japan: Social, Political, and Legal Influences, 12 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y J. 315, 346 (2003) [hereinafter Cultural Property Laws of Japan].
82. Id.
83. Id. at 347.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 348.
86. Spoliation, supra note 80, at 847-48.
87. Cultural Property Laws of Japan, supra note 81, at 349.
88. Id. at 348-49.
89. Id at 348-49, 397. A hierarchy of designations was created for tangible property and sites, with national treasures being the highest. See id. at 348-49.
90. See id. at 348.
91. Id. at 351.
92. Greg Bradsher, Committee of the American Council of Learned Societies on the Protection of Cultural Treasures in War Areas, Nat’l Archives: Text Message (Oct. 9, 2014), https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2014/10/09/committee-of-the-american-council-of-learned-societies-on-the-protection-of-cultural-treasures-in-war-areas.
93. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Franklin D. Roosevelt, President, United States of America, encl. para. 4(A)(i) (Dec. 23, 1943), in 1 Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General 471-72 (William M. Franklin & E.R. Perkins eds., 1963), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1943v01/d482.
94. Id. paras. 4(A)(i)-(ii).
95. Bradsher, supra note 92.
96. Id.
97. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe (Aug. 20, 1943), reprinted in IX Dep’t of State Bull. 111 (1979) (publishing content dated August 21, 1943). The Roberts Commission would later replace “Europe” with “War Areas” to include the Far East. Nat’l Archives and Recs. Admin., M1944, Records of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (The Roberts Commission), 1943-1946, at 1 n.1 (2007).
98. Nassrine Azimi, The United States and Cultural Heritage protection in Japan (1945-1952), at 51-52 (2019). Langdon Warner is sometimes called the inspiration for the popular culture archaeologist Henry “Indiana” Jones. Id. at 145.
99. See Japan [List of Monuments], 1943-1945, Nat’l Archives Catalog: Recs. of Am. Comm’n for Prot. & Salvage of Artistic & Historic Monuments in War Areas, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/66897142 (last visited Aug. 25, 2023) [hereinafter Japan List].
100. See Nat’l Archives & Recs. Admin, M1944, Records of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (The Roberts Commission), 1943-1946, at roll 155 (2007).
101. See Louis Morton, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Foreign Affs. (Jan. 1, 1957), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1957-01-01/decision-use-atomic-bomb.
102. Henry L. Stimson, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, Harper’s Mag., Feb. 1947, at 97 [hereinafter The Decision].
103. F. G. Gosling, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb 45-46 (1999).
104. See Mark Selden, A Forgotten Holocaust: US Bombing Strategy, the Destruction of Japanese Cities & the American Way of War from World War II to Iraq, 5 Asia-Pac. J. 1, 4 (2007).
105. Id. at 9.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 11.
108. Jason M. Kelly, Why Did Henry Stimson Spare Kyoto from the Bomb?: Confusion in Postwar Historiography, 19 J. of Am.-E. Asian Rel. 183, 192 (2012).
109. Henry Lewis Stimson, Personal Diary Entry, Wednesday, June 6, 1945, at 4 (on file in The Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries at the Yale University Library), Ctr. For Rsch. Librs., v.1-52.
110. Henry Lewis Stimson Papers: Series XIV: Diaries, 1909-1945: v.49-v.52, 1944 November 1 – 1945 September 21: Tuesday, July 24, 1945, at 3, Archives at Yale, https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/1961455 (last visited Aug. 25, 2023).
111. Memorandum from Major J.A. Derry and Dr. N.F. Ramsey to Major General L.R. Groves, subject: Summary of Target Committee Meetings on 10 and 11 May 1945 (12 May 1945), https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/28512-document-11-memorandum-major-j-derry-and-dr-nf-ramsey-general-lr-groves-summary.
112. Id. para. 6(A)(6) (“The possibility of bombing the Emperor’s palace was discussed. It was agreed that we should not recommend it but that any action for this bombing should come from authorities on military policy.”).
113. U.S. War Dep’t, File of Major General L.R. Groves titled “New Dope on Cities,” Unaddressed memorandum titled “Kyoto,” para. 2 (2 July 1945).
114. Id. para. 1, at 5 (“Prewar industry predominantly textiles and cloth dyeing; also household furnishings and ‘arty’ handicrafts.”); id. para. 3, at ii (“Universities, colleges and such areas of culture are generally located to the east and north of the old imperial palace ground . . . .”).
115. See id.
116. The Decision, supra note 102, at 13.
117. Harry S. Truman, Diary Entry, (July 25, 1945) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, DC), https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/lesson-plans/was-trumans-decision-drop-bomb-end-war-pacific-justified-or-not.
118. Joris D. Kila & Christopher V. Herndon, Military Involvement in Cultural Property Protection: An Overview, 74 Joint Force Q. 116, 123 (2014).
119. See Bradsher, supra note 92.
120. Azimi, supra note 98, at 69.
121. Id. at 150.
122. Id. at 152; Hiroshi Chida, Scholar Still Honored for Saving Japanese Cultural Treasures, Stripes (May 27, 2004), https://www.stripes.com/travel/scholar-still-honored-for-saving-japanese-cultural-treasures-1.23054; Carlotta Coccoli, La Sezione Americana “Arts and Monuments” E La Tutela Dei Monumenti Giapponesi Danneggiati Dalla Seconda Guerra Mondiale [The American “Arts and Monuments” Section and the Protection of Japanese Monuments Damaged During the Second World War], 140 Storia Urbana [Urban Hist.] 49, 57 (2013).
123. Sherman E. Lee, My Work in Japan: Arts and Monuments, 1946-1948, in The Confusion Era: Art and Culture of Japan during Allied Occupation, 1945-52, at 91, 100 (Mark Sandler ed., 1997).
124. Azimi, supra note 98, 121-22.
125. Notably, this partnership illustrates the requirement under Article 5 of the 1954 Hague Convention to “support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.” 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 5, para. 1.
126. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Conservation of Cultural Property (Aug. 16, 1946) reprinted in XV Dep’t of State Bull. 385, 386 (1946) (publishing content dated August 25, 1946); see also Cultural Property Laws of Japan, supra note 81, at 353.
127. Cultural Property Laws of Japan, supra note 81, at 358-59.
128. Id. at 353 (quoting archived press reports of the Supreme Allied Commander).
129. Coccoli, supra note 122, at 84 n.162.
130. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283 (2017).
131. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Report on Cultural Preservation in Armed Conflict (2017), https://ogc.osd.mil/Portals/99/report_on_cultural_preservation_in_armed_conflict_no_1_D6C4919.pdf.
132. Sec. 1279C, 131 Stat. at 1702.
133. Cultural Resources: International Cultural Property Protection, DENIX, https://www.denix.osd.mil/cr/international (last visited Sept. 28, 2023).
134. See Cultural Heritage Center, Bureau of Educ. & Cultural Affs. https://eca.state.gov/cultural-heritage-center (last visited Aug. 28, 2023).
135. About the U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield, U.S. Comm. of Blue Shield, https://uscbs.org/uscbs-mission.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2023).
136. See Laurie W. Rush, Rep. No. 06-324, Heritage Forward: The Central Command Historical-Cultural Advisory Group (2013), https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA592284.pdf.
137. 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 6, Art 7.
138. A General Training Aid, GTA 41-01-002, published April 2023, is available for general training, but not mandatory. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, GTA 41-01-002, Civil Affairs, Arts, Monuments, and Archives Guide (April 2023).
139. Ralph Blumenthal & Tom Mashberg, The Army is Looking for a Few Good Art Experts, N.Y. Times (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/21/arts/design/new-monuments-men.html; Army Monuments Officer Training & Military Programs, Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative, https://culturalrescue.si.edu/what-we-do/resilience/military-training (last visited Aug. 28, 2023); Graham Bowley, Ukraine War Bares U.S. Army Delay in Creating New ‘Monuments Officers,’ N.Y. Times (Feb. 25, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/25/arts/ukraine-cultural-sites-art.html.
140. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) (25 Aug. 2022).
141. See id. at 1, 9-10.
142. Law of War Manual, supra note 23, § 5.5.3.
143. Coccoli, supra note 122, at 67-68; Walter Desmond Popham (1898-1979), Monuments Men and Women Found., https://www.monumentsmenfoundation.org/popham-capt-walter-d (last visited Aug. 28, 2023) [hereinafter Walter Desmond Popham].
144. Records of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (The Roberts Commission): Personnel Cards, compiled: 1943-1945: Popham, Robert D., Fold3, https://www.fold3.com/image/270296790 (last visited Aug. 28, 2023) [hereinafter Personnel Cards] (record group 239, page 248).
145. Coccoli, supra note 122, at 68.
146. See, e.g., Records of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas (The Roberts Commission): Personnel Cards, Compiled: 1943-1945: Compilation Description, Fold3, https://www.fold3.com/image/270296555 (last visited Aug. 28, 2023) (record group 239, page 13).
147. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 611-1, Military Occupational Classification Structure Development and Implementation (20 Dec. 2022).
148. See Army Civil Affairs Officer – Reserves: Civil Affairs Skill Identifiers: 38G/6V – Heritage and Preservation, U.S. Army Talent Mgmt., https://talent.army.mil/job/civilaffairs-reserve (last visited Aug. 28, 2023).
149. See, e.g., James Cuno & Thomas G. Weiss, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Ukraine and Beyond, Wall St. J. (April 14, 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraine-bucha-cultural-heritage-unesco-babyn-yar-maria-prymachenko-irina-bokova-mostar-bridge-bamiyan-buddhas-great-mosque-of-aleppo-hague-convention-1954-blue-shield-monuments-men-rome-statute-2002-11649974297.
150. Al Hassan Case, Int’l Crim. Ct., https://www.icc-cpi.int/mali/al-hassan (last visited Oct. 2, 2023).
151. Andriy Kostin, Prosecutor General of Ukraine Speaks to West Point Cadets, Articles of War (Sept. 22, 2023), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/prosecutor-general-ukraine-speaks-west-point-cadets.
152. See, e.g., Sarah Cascone, How Tech Experts in the West Are Rushing to Save the Digital Archives of Ukraine’s Museums, Artnet (Mar. 14, 2022), https://news.artnet.com/art-world/saving-ukrainian-cultural-heritage-online-2084036; Ronald Alcala, Ukraine Symposium – The Ukraine Conflict and the Future of Digital Cultural Property, Articles of War (May 13, 2022), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/ukraine-conflict-future-digital-cultural-property.
153. See Ronald Alcala, Cultural Evolution: Protecting “Digital Cultural Property” in Armed Conflict, 104 Int’l Rev. of Red Cross ١٠٨٣, ١١٠٩ (٢٠٢٢).
154. Siobhan Kattago, War Memorials and the Politics of Memory: The Soviet War Memorial in Tallinn, 16 Constellations ١٤٩, ١٥١ (٢٠٠٩).
155. Rain Ottis, Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks against Estonia from the Information Warfare Perspective, Proceedings of the 7th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security para. 1.1 (2008), https://ccdcoe.org/library/publications/analysis-of-the-2007-cyber-attacks-against-estonia-from-the-information-warfare-perspective.
156. Id. para. 2.1.
157. Id. para. 3.1.