The Wager
A Tale of Shipwreck, Mutiny and Murder
Reviewed by Major Pamela M. Gaulin
Even though judge advocates (JAs) are not mentioned until the last twenty pages of the book, author David Grann’s most recent novel, The Wager: A Tale of Shipwreck, Mutiny and Murder1 (The Wager), is not without lessons for those attorneys willing to dive into its
pages. The book details an account of the voyage of His Majesty’s Ship,
the Wager (the HMS Wager), as the crew sailed from Great Britain around the Horn of Africa to ransack a Spanish galleon and achieve both fortune and fame.2 The book encompasses multiple points of view, primarily from the captain, several midshipmen, and the ship’s gunner, during the voyage and upon their return to Great Britain.3 With a range of viewpoints, Grann’s exposition attempts to document the many challenges the crew faced over the sixteen-month journey.4 Ultimately, The Wager proves an entertaining and quick read that offers some simple parallels; the book reminds JAs to keep good records, emphasizes the need for ample and accurate information, and highlights the importance of appropriately framing an issue.
Establishing and Maintaining the Record
One of the most obvious lessons from the book is the need for documentation. Whether it is physical evidence or written records detailing what transpired, the documentation is imperative to tell the story. Specifically, this book successfully captures and demonstrates the importance of documentation in creating a formal record of events and ensuring the preservation of those records once created.
As highlighted in The Wager, records are paramount when determining the baseline instructions or guidelines for a unit and recalling key decisions or actions. Firsthand accounts of the ship’s voyage are plentiful, from the British Admiralty records to the journals and logs of men aboard the ship, including John Bulkeley and John Cummins, John Byron, Alexander Campbell, and C.H. Layman.5 One benefit of the presented records is documentation of the legally and historically significant activities on the ship.6
The available records also help document the guiding rules and
regulations to evaluate the men’s actions.7
Lastly, the records provide key insights into the decision-making of the
official and de facto leadership throughout the journey, documenting
instances of misconduct and actions taken, the justifications for
mutiny, and the decision to abandon crewmembers ashore.8
For example, the ship’s gunner, Bulkeley, and First Lieutenant Robert
Baynes drafted a document prior to overthrowing Captain David Cheap so
that “every officer involved in the insurrection would be able to
present [the] paper to ‘justify himself in England.’”9
In reviewing the recitations from the available records, it also becomes
obvious from Grann’s writing that once evidence is created or collected,
there is a tremendous need to safeguard those records.
Records preservation may be compulsory or voluntary, but in both
instances, The Wager highlights how a failure to preserve the record may prevent future justice. On British naval ships, “[l]ogbooks were supposed to be preserved from a wreck so that the Admiralty could later determine the potential culpability of not only the captain but also the lieutenant, the master, and other officers.”10 However, on two occasions, Bulkeley found that the logbooks were seemingly intentionally destroyed following the initial shipwreck.11
In another instance, Grann highlights the request from Midshipman Henry
Cozens—relying on the hope of retribution at a future court-martial—to
preserve evidence that the ship’s highest-ranking officer, Captain
Cheap, shot him.12
Lastly, readers gain insight into the potential destruction of evidence upon Bulkeley’s arrival to Brazil following the shipwreck, where multiple parties attempted to break into his cabin to steal his journal.13 “Bulkeley had been the only person to keep a contemporaneous account on Wager Island, and [John] King and some of his allies apparently feared what it might divulge about their roles in overthrowing Captain Cheap.”14 It is clear from these examples that preserving evidence is the necessary secondary task once the record is established. Additionally, while The Wager illustrates how preserving a record has always been important, it is also necessary to consider the integrity and accuracy of the record when assessing its usefulness.
Though Grann brilliantly highlights the need for record creation and preservation, he fails to fully address potential issues or flaws with the sources that form the foundations for his book. There is a singular discussion in the Author’s Note in which Grann acknowledges “conflicting, and at times warring, perspectives,” but he leaves it to the reader to weigh the perspectives “instead of smoothing out every difference, or further shading the already shaded evidence.”15 This acknowledgment places a substantial burden on the reader to assess which accounts of the ship’s journey may contain ulterior motives or bias and which portions of the book may be slanted with those perspectives. However, Grann takes precautions to build a thorough account of events by including a broad range of seemingly reliable accounts from individuals at all stations and ranks aboard the ship.16 Ultimately, while not completely unbiased, the book is a robust retelling of events that includes multiple viewpoints for the reader.
Overall, The Wager provides ample reminders of the importance of establishing and preserving records, and it reminds readers to consider potential flaws and biases when evaluating the strength of information. Any young JA can readily apply these key points, whether preparing and building a case file for a court-martial or advising on an administrative or criminal investigation. The most obvious application is ensuring records are preserved and accurate to meet admission requirements under the Military Rules of Evidence as proof at a court-martial.17 Evidentiary records form the basis of many actions within the Army. When establishing records, JAs should be both prepared and cognizant of the risks of insufficient or inaccurate information, as further evidenced in Grann’s work.
Fighting for Information
Another key takeaway for JAs reading The Wager is that information gathering is vital when preparing for any mission or journey. Many JAs likely already understand the need to conduct or support detailed planning and preparation in their duties, whether an operational mission or a court-martial.18 Grann’s story carefully reiterates the importance of detailed planning before the mission and the barrier that misinformation poses to mission success.
The conceptual need to conduct prior planning and information gathering has withstood the test of time, as evidenced in the planning conducted by officers and crew aboard the HMS Wager:
One British captain recommended that a young officer in training bring onboard a small library with the classics by Virgil and Ovid and poems by Swift and Milton. “It is a mistaken notion that any blockhead will make a seaman,” the captain explained. “I don’t know one situation in life that requires so accomplished an education as the sea officer. . . . He should be a man of letters and languages, a mathematician, and an accomplished gentleman.”19
Aboard the ship, each man fulfilled an identified role.20 For the key players identified in Grann’s work, Captain Cheap, one of the midshipmen, Byron, and the gunner, Bulkeley, it is evident that their planning and knowledge of their jobs and the seas were critical to the successes and failures of the voyage. For example, on multiple occasions, Captain Cheap and the navigators resorted to “relying on those imaginary lines drawn onto the globe by cartographers” to estimate the ship’s position and path, combined with their knowledge of the geographical landmarks along the planned voyage.21
Improper or poor planning also hindered the voyage when the dead reckoning of the navigators was wrong, nearly causing the HMS Wager to shipwreck on at least one occasion before the shipwreck at Wager Island.22 The utility of prior planning was also evident much later in their journey when Bulkeley was able to ascertain a route to Brazil through his own study and observations of the geographic markings in the area compared to those detailed in the books he was studying.23 The crew’s acquisition of knowledge and skills through training prior to their journey were instrumental to their eventual survival, but the maximum benefit of their training was only observed when they obtained accurate information.
In many instances, the success of the voyage depended on the available information, regardless of whether that information was well-researched or accurate. For instance, although the ships were overstocked with personnel, the many bouts of sickness on the ship drastically reduced the number of available seamen to assist in daily operations.24 The surgeons and medical professionals of that time did not have sufficient information on the causes and treatments for the illnesses they experienced.25 The preferred season to sail around Cape Horn was another significant information gap.26 While many crewmembers aboard the HMS Wager believed the best time to sail around Cape Horn was during winter, it proved to be the most difficult sailing season.27
The crew’s views on the applicability of the laws of the navy following
the shipwreck at Wager Island are another example of misinformation that
Grann highlights.28 While some believed the laws of the navy applied following the shipwreck, the naval courts ultimately held they did not.29
These examples illustrate that information can work in either a leader’s
favor or to the mission’s detriment, and other factors, such as the
intended audience, may impact the results.
As evidenced in The Wager, JAs should consider the intended audience when relaying or gathering information. The HMS Wager’s crew comprised individuals with varying backgrounds, intelligence levels, and morals, including “highwaymen, burglars, pickpockets, debauchees, adulterers, gamesters, lampooners, bastard-getters, imposters, panders, parasites, ruffians, hypocrites, [and] threadworn beaux jack-a-dandies.”30 While the U.S. Army’s requirement to recruit upstanding citizens would disqualify many of those described in The Wager from joining, it is still just as relevant to understand the varied backgrounds of Soldiers serving in today’s military and operating environment.31 Judge advocates may draw the easiest parallels when considering how they interact with a legal assistance client, the accused, or a commander, considering all aspects of an individual’s background in how they present or receive information.32
This review touches only a small sampling of the book’s vast examples, which detail the importance of preparing for the mission, understanding the possible issues with information gained, and the need to adapt the information based on the audience. The Wager provides critical insights into the importance of filtering information, whether receiving or distributing, to ensure mission success. Once the necessary information is transmitted, one of the final considerations, as detailed in Grann’s work, is what disposition is appropriate in light of the totality of the circumstances.
The Wager is a quick read that serves as a prudent reminder to JAs of the importance of good recordkeeping, getting accurate information, and appropriately framing issues to achieve mission success.
Framing the Issue
Albeit not discussed in detail, possibly the most significant lesson in The Wager is the impact a charging decision can have on the outcome of a case. As noted in the book, when the crew members of the HMS Wager finally stood trial, the only issue the judges questioned them on was whether there was “anything to object to the conduct of the captain or officers, or to his proceedings in all respects for the good and preservation of the ship and crew.”33 After receiving testimony, the court unanimously found “that Captain David Cheap had done his duty, and used all means in his power to have preserved His Majesty’s Ship Wager under his command;” the court relied on a clause in the naval regulations that seamen were not on payroll and not subject to naval rules following a shipwreck.34 Specifically, Grann notes that the Admiralty ignored a clause under which seamen drawing supplies from a wreck remained on payroll and provides multiple political justifications for the final ruling.35 The Admiralty’s decisions in scoping the court-martial are particularly relevant to JAs as they advise commanders on charging decisions in a case or how an investigation is scoped.
Judge advocates can shape the potential outcomes and ensure the command’s intent in a case by artfully drafting allegations of misconduct. Excepting offenses specifically under the purview of the Office of Special Trial Counsel, “each commander has discretion to dispose of offenses by members of that command” pursuant to Rule 306(a) of the Rules for Courts-Martial.36 However, while there is discretion in these decisions, JAs advising commanders must remain vigilant of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers
in recommending charges or other dispositions.37
As JAs advise commanders and prepare charges in a case, they may draw
inspiration or caution from the tale of
The Wager.
Conclusion
While young JAs have their pick of leisurely and professional reading, The Wager should be a top selection for those wishing to blend adventure with the desire to further personal growth as leaders. Judge advocates should understand the need to create and maintain an accurate record of events. They should remember the importance of preparing for the mission and finding ways to limit misinformation. Lastly, JAs should consider how to suitably frame an issue to achieve the commander’s intent. Ultimately, The Wager is a quick read that serves as a prudent reminder to JAs of the importance of good recordkeeping, getting accurate information, and appropriately framing issues to achieve mission success. TAL
MAJ Gaulin is a student in the 72nd Graduate Course at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia.
Notes
1. David Grann, The Wager: A Tale of Shipwreck, Mutiny and Murder
(2023). As of the date of this writing,
The Wager: A Tale of Shipwreck, Mutiny and Murder
placed first on the New York Times Hardcover Nonfiction Best Sellers
list and was featured on the combined print and e-book nonfiction best
sellers list for thirty-six weeks.
Combined Print & E-Book Nonfiction, N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/combined-print-and-e-book-nonfiction; Hardcover Nonfiction: Best Sellers, N.Y. Times (Jan. 14, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/books/best-sellers/hardcover-nonfiction.
2. See Grann, supra note 1, at 13.
3. See id. at 267 n.3 (citing several key primary sources used in the writing, including John Bulkeley & John Cummins, A Voyage to the South Seas
(1743); John Byron, The Narrative of the Honourable John Byron (2012); Alexander
Campbell, The Sequel to Bulkeley and Cummins’s “Voyage to the South
Seas” (1747); C.H. Layman, The Wager Disaster
(2015); “and records in [The National Archives, Kew, Surrey – Admiralty
official correspondence and papers] and [Joseph Spence papers in the
James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book
and Manuscript Library, Yale University]” among many others).
4. See id. at 24–25 (noting that the HMS Wager’s convoy officially began its journey on 18 September 1740); id. at 197 (noting that following the shipwreck, the first ships to return to civilization arrived in Brazil on 28 January 1742).
5. Id. at 267 n.3.
6. Id. at 48; see also id. at 137 (documenting a public trial to adjudicate Marines’ thievery on Wager Island).
7. E.g., id. at 62 (reminding the seaman of the Articles of War that regulated every man’s behavior onboard the ship); id. at 166 (documenting the newly established rules for the voyage to Brazil). At the time of the voyage, officers and seaman were required to “doe theire endeavours to detect apprehend [and] bring to punishment all Offenders and . . . assist the Officers appointed for that purpose therein upon paine to bee proceeded against and punished by the Court martiall att discretion.” An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders for the Regulateing and Better Government of His Majesties Navies Ships of Warr & Forces by Sea 1661, 12 Car. 2 art. 31 (Eng.), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314 (original spelling and grammar retained).
8. See, e.g., Grann, supra note 1, at 109, 140, 166–67.
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id. at 102; see also id. at 48; An Act for the Establishing Articles and Orders for the Regulateing and Better Government of His Majesties Navies Ships of Warr & Forces by Sea 1661, 12 Car. 2, art. 25 (Eng.), http://www.british-history.ac.uk/statutes-realm/vol5/pp311-314.
11. Grann, supra note 1, at 102; see also id. at 120.
12. Id. at 145–46.
13. Id. at 201–02.
14. Id. at 202.
15. Id. at xiii.
16. See id. at 267 n.3.
17. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
pt. III (2024) [hereinafter MCM].
18. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 3-84, Legal Support to
Operations
para. 2-55 (1 Sept. 2023) (“Commanders, supported by their staffs, use
the operations process to drive conceptual and detailed planning
necessary to understand, visualize, and describe the operational
environment, make and articulate decisions, and direct, lead, and assess
operations.”).
19. Grann, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting Letter from Edward Thompson to J.T. Junior (May 21, 1756), in 1 Sailor’s Letters Written to His Select Friends in England, During His
Voyages and Travels in Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, From the
Year 1754 to 1759 by Edward Thompson, Lieutenant of the Navy
146, 155–56 (1766)).
20. Id. at 32–34. The captain served at the “pinnacle” of the hierarchy of the ship, with the ranking officers ensuring his orders were followed, the navigators plotting the ship’s course, the quartermaster directing the steering of the ship, the non-seamen fulfilling specialized trades, the seamen executing tasks as directed by their group, the marines helping with physical tasks, and the midshipmen helping with “everything from trimming the sails to carrying officers’ messages.” Id. at 32–33.
21. Id. at 63–64.
22. See id. at 80.
23. Id. at 150–52.
24. Id. at 78–79 (noting that less than 200 of the initial 250 officers and crew remained on the HMS Wager by March 1741).
25. See, e.g., id. at 20 (noting a “devastating epidemic of ‘ship’s fever,’ now known as typhus[, which n]o one then understood . . . was a bacterial infection, transmitted by lice and other vermin”); id. at 50–52 (documenting yet another lice infestation spreading illness); id. at 74–75 (making it clear the crew suffered from “‘the plague of the sea’: scurvy,” the cause of which remained unknown).
26. See generally Daniel Wade, When to Sail Around Cape Horn, Life of Sailing (June 15, 2022), https://www.lifeofsailing.com/post/when-to-sail-around-cape-horn.
27. Grann, supra note 1, at 14, 65.
28. See id. at 114. Contra id. at 109.
29. See id. at 241.
30. Id. at 32 (quoting Henry Baynham, From the Lower Deck: The Navy
1700-1840 (1969)).
31. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 601-210, Regular Army and Reserve Components
Enlistment Program
ch. 2, sec. I (8 Nov. 2023) (describing requirements that must be met to
qualify for enlistment in the Army).
32. Similarly, Captain Cheap adapted his recitation of the Articles of
War to the situations at hand.
Compare id. at 62 (“It was [Captain Cheap’s] duty to recite the Articles of War—thirty-six rules regulating the behavior of every man and boy onboard.”), with id. at 114 (“To prevent them from falling into a Hobbesian state with ‘every man against every man’ Cheap believed the castaways needed binding rules and rigid structures—and their commander. Cheap summoned everyone and reviewed the Articles of War, reminding them that the rules still applied on land, particularly those prohibiting any ‘mutinous assemblies . . . practices, designs’—on ‘pain of death.’”).
33. Grann, supra note 1, at 239.
34. Id. at 240–41.
35. See id. at 242 (“Ferreting out and documenting all the incontrovertible facts of what had happened on the island . . . would have undercut the central claim on which the British Empire tried to justify its rule of other peoples: namely, that its imperial forces, its civilization were inherently superior. That [British] officers were gentlemen, not brutes. Moreover, a proper trial would have offered an unwelcome reminder that the War of Jenkins’ Ear had been a calamity . . . .”).
36. MCM, supra note 17, R.C.M. 306(a)(1). “Except for offenses over which a special trial counsel has exercised authority and has not deferred, each commander has discretion to dispose of offenses by members of that command in accordance with this rule.”
37. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 26-27, Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers para. 7 (28 June 2018).