Book Review
Rebirth into New Domains
A Review of Phoenix Rising: From the Ashes of Desert One to the Rebirth of U.S.
Special Operations
By Major Sydney M. Haanpaa
Given the nature of operations, the object of planning is not to
eliminate uncertainty but to develop a framework for action in the
middle of it.1
Rebirth into Multiple and All-Domain Operations
Keith Nightingale’s
Phoenix Rising2
is a compelling account of the planning, training, and execution of
Operation Eagle Claw. As the deputy operations officer of the Joint Task
Force (JTF), Nightingale provides a first-hand account of the operation
through personal journal entries.
Phoenix Rising then transitions to an
opinionated, linear account of the institutional barriers and biases
that subsequently undermined the full effectiveness and utilization of
Special Operations Forces (SOF) up until Operation Neptune Spear against
Osama Bin Laden in 2011. Nightingale proffers that although Operation
Eagle Claw was ultimately unsuccessful in rescuing the Iranian hostages,
the “disaster of Desert One worked as the catalyst” that enabled the
creation of the Joint Special Operations Command, the ultimate success
of Operation Neptune Spear, and the “rise of SOF as a valued part of the
defense establishment.”3
Upfront, Nightingale clearly articulates that the diary entries reflect
his in-the- moment perception of issues and individuals.4
Filled with pithy and satirical commentary, his entries are honest,
unapologetic, and refreshingly relatable for anyone who has served as a
junior staff officer. For example, he aptly describes how observers in a
small meeting room line the wall, “all eagerly leaning forward to be
included in the deliberating of the almighty” while musing that their
“primary contribution is to raise the carbon dioxide level.”5
On another occasion, he recalls the staff taking bets on how long it
would take before an unprofessional cup on the briefing table is
noticed, musing, “Do people of such rank and position have a sense of
humor? (Later, yes it was noticed, empirical evidence indicates that a
sense of humor was not present).”6
Moreso, his reflections highlight the intangible importance of
creativity, resourcefulness, and dedication when it comes to solving
novel, complex, and dynamic issues.
Prospective readers should not turn to
Phoenix Rising for an objective or
linear account of Operation Eagle Claw. Instead, military readers should
critically evaluate Nightingale’s conclusions7
as significantly influenced by the thematic frustrations that he
experienced as the deputy operations officer. Therefore, this review
will draw from both Nightingale’s subjective reflections and the Special
Operations Review Group’s
Rescue Mission Report (Holloway Report) to highlight two critical concepts of joint operations: command and
control (C2) and interagency coordination. As multi-domain8
and joint all-domain9
operations become a strategic priority for the Department of Defense,
Nightingale’s account is an example for judge advocates (JAs) of how C2
and interagency coordination can either frustrate or reinforce mission
success. In turn, JAs will be able to identify unknown risks, forecast
the associated impact, and appropriately advise in a dynamic,
multi-domain or joint all-domain environment.
“Get Your C2 Right Up-Front”10
Understanding a command structure or the nature of the command’s
relationship to other commands is impactful in all stages of an
operation, from planning to execution. As a joint function, the concept
of C2 encompasses the operation of a joint force, the exercise of
authority over subordinate forces, and a means for allocating resources
and managing risk.11
It is also an element of joint planning that is usually identified as
part of the operational design and refined for each course of action
developed in the planning process.12
Aptly titled “In the Beginning,”13
Nightingale’s first entry draws the audience into the conception of
Operation Eagle Claw. The requirement is simply stated: “to rescue the
hostages in Iran.”14
Nightingale asserts that there was no available capability to action the
requirement. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff “concluded it had
in reality no capabilities other than nuclear weapons or mass
conventional forces, neither of which were rational tools to
respond.”15
Then-Army Chief of Staff, General Edward Meyer, issued the initial
planning guidance: “We need a specialized force for a reasonable chance
to free our hostages.”16
The scope and understated complexity of the Joint Chiefs’ intent was
refined by the JTF planners, “Fly 15,000 miles around the world, the
last 850 miles in hostile airspace, and arrive undetected . . . . Free,
without injury, 60+ American citizens from their guards without injury
to any civilians . . . .”17
The planners then identified the forces and capabilities in their
operational approach, outlined the course of action, and memorialized
their work in “the Book.”18
While Nightingale recalls that “the Book” annotated each critical
commander decision point, it is unclear if the concept ever included an
outline of the JTF’s command structure or the supporting/supported
relationships between other command elements.19
The palpable tension between components rears its head as the JTF shifts
into exercising the plan with the identified mobility assets and ground
forces. The training is the first time that the individual elements
would “confirm their planning assumptions and coalesce to work out joint
issues.”20
Accordingly, the helicopters aboard the USS
Nimitz were directed to stress the
equipment to determine the assets’ limitations and expose risks.21
Despite such direction, the JTF commander is informed that the
Nimitz commander did not comply with
training profiles.22
Although the JTF elevated the issue to the Joint Chairman and the
commander-in-chief of the Pacific Command was directed to comply, the
JTF was prohibited from visiting the ship to validate the training.
Subsequently, when the mission launched, none of the helicopters had
flown more than ninety minutes.23
As highlighted by Nightingale, the mechanical issues encountered during
mission execution would have been identified with the proper
training.24
Arguably, a clearly defined command relationship would have also
reinforced the JTF mission as a priority.
Interestingly, Nightingale never reflects on how a defined C2 within the
planning and training phase of the operation could have reduced
friction. Although Nightingale dismisses the conclusions of the
Holloway Report because its outcome was
“pre-ordained and lacked real integrity,”25
the report does fairly identify C2 as an issue. Specifically, the
Holloway Report determined that C2
relationships beneath the JTF commander were “not clearly emphasized”
and became “tenuous and fragile at intermediate levels.”26
The report further discusses how the lack of clear command relationships
impacted the planning, training, and execution phases of the
operation.27
Thus, Phoenix Rising serves as a
cautionary tale for any JA serving on a joint staff or in a unit
involved in multi-domain operations. In a focus paper on C2 in a joint
environment, the Joint Staff J7 notes that “form follows function” when
crafting a task organization.28
Rather than relying on established task organizations, flexible and
adaptable C2 is created when the organization takes into account how the
“logical battlespace geometry” aligns with a concept of an
operation.29
Instead of defining C2 upfront to ensure “unity of command of the force
and unity of effort with partners,” Nightingale’s account assumes that
the very existence of the JTF inherently created relationships with
other commands.30
Just as Nightingale’s JTF planned a rescue mission “before ‘Joint,’
Nunn-Cohen, and Goldwater-Nichols were on the books,”31
multi-domain and joint all-domain operations will likely present nuanced
and novel questions about C2 structures.32
“I Thought We Were on the Same Team”33
Although Phoenix Rising broadly
showcases the importance of interagency cooperation for joint
operations, a critical reader will recognize the delicate nuances
involved in unified action. Current joint doctrine provides a suggested
framework for planners, but application requires that a practitioner
consider the following, at a minimum: What is the overall U.S.
Government strategy? What are the missions of specific agencies, and how
will that drive their perspective on success? What external factors
shape that agency or organization’s interpretation of the strategy?34
Specifically,
Phoenix Rising includes two vignettes
to consider: the Department of State’s complete lack of cooperation and
the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) tenuous cooperation. From the
beginning of Operation Eagle Claw, planners struggled with the lack of
intelligence on the exact location of the hostages.35
This critical information requirement lingered as an outstanding
question throughout the majority of the planning, training, and
execution of the operation.36
Although it was generally known that the hostages were being detained at
the U.S. embassy, the absence of a precise location within the
twenty-seven acre complex or details on the internal structure of the
embassy buildings increased the risk and lowered the probability of
operational success.37
Nightingale recalls how attempts to liaise with the Department of State
were abruptly terminated after two weeks of initial cooperation due to
the increasingly “hostile” and “uncooperative” nature of the State
employees.38
He questioned the lack of cooperation, musing, “I thought we were on the
same team . . . . It’s their employees who are hostages, and we (the
military) are working to bring them back.”39
While at face value, the frustration is reasonable, it is based on a
flawed assumption that the Department of State shared his perspective,
specifically, that the military was the best method to achieve the
strategic goal of freeing the hostages. In reality, the Secretary of
State, Cyrus Vance, was a staunch supporter of negotiation and diplomacy
as the most successful means of resolving the hostage crisis.40
Thus, as the JTF was being established in mid-November 1979, the
Department of State was working on diplomatic resolution through
negotiations with Iranian foreign ministers and prioritizing diplomatic
sanctions over military solutions.41
While Nightingale conjectures that the Department of State’s
non-participation was a result of either personalities or “historic
antipathy toward ‘things military,’” a more interesting analysis would
be a reflection of how the diverging priorities could have been enjoined
under a unified line of effort.42
Nightingale’s account also identifies the CIA as an uncooperative
stakeholder. The CIA was initially invited to the table because “[it]
was a true joint interdepartmental effort” and the agency was the
proponent of the best possible intelligence.43
Yet, Nightingale described meetings with the Agency men as “the
longest-running non-conversation in the same language ever held in this
building,” and generally unproductive.44
He theorized that the lack of information was compounded by the
intelligence community’s competing desire to retain the integrity of
their assets.45
Additionally, he believed the lack of cooperation was influenced by the
prevailing belief that the military operation would never be
approved.46
Although Nightingale’s astute perception is actually reinforced in the
CIA director’s recollection of the crisis,47
he fails to consider the extent to which the JTF’s organization impeded
interorganizational cooperation. Although intentionally limited to a
review of the Department of Defense, the
Holloway Report identified that the
lack of external “centralized and integrated intelligence support” and
the urgency of planning requirements resulted in fragmented and
undeveloped intelligence.48
The Holloway Report also proffers that
an interagency Intelligence Task Force would have resolved this issue by
creating a centralized authority to supervise and coordinate the various
intelligence activities.49
While not prescriptive, current joint doctrine also underscores the
importance of centralized interorganizational cooperation within a joint
force command.50
Conclusion
Phoenix Rising offers a rare,
unfiltered perspective on Operation Eagle Claw. Although the book’s
discussion of the special operations enterprise culminates with the
successful Operation Neptune Spear, it also serves as an example of
important considerations as the Department of Defense shifts focus to
multi-domain and joint all-domain operations. In multi-domain
operations, there will likely be uncertainty about who owns C2 over the
operation and the supporting or supported organizations. Multi-domain
and joint all-domain operations will also likely involve personnel from
a variety of entities beyond the joint force. Understanding the nuances
and complexities that Nightingale faced during the planning and
execution of Operation Eagle Claw will only better inform JAs’
perspectives as the military paradigm undergoes another transformation.
TAL
MAJ Haanpaa is a student in the 73d Graduate Degree Program at The Judge
Advocate General’s Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia.
Notes
1.
U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual
5-0,
Planning and Orders Production
para. 1-3 (04 Nov. 2024).
2. Keith M. Nightingale,
Phoenix Rising: From the Ashes of Desert One to the Rebirth of U.S.
Special Operations
(2020).
3. Id. at 281.
4. Id. at xiii.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Id.
7. Compare id. at 182 (concluding
that five obstacles prevented the success of the operation,
specifically: most service principals were not willing to commit
resources and risk beyond what was required; there was minimal sharing
of personnel and assets or assumption of responsibility from senior
officers; the JTF was constrained by operational security concerns and
the lack of a budget; senior civilian leadership priorities were not
reflected in the support for the JTF’s endeavors; the “start-stop of
the program throughout its existence marred credibility and attracted
a non-supporting attitude”),
with
Special Operations Rev. Grp., Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rescue Mission
Report 60 (1980) [hereinafter
Holloway Report],
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB63/doc8.pdf (concluding that
“the ad hoc nature of the organization and planning is related to most
of the major issues and underlies the [report’s] conclusions” and that
a specific operational security plan based on “selective disclosure
rather than minimum disclosure” would have better enabled the JTF).
8. See Andrew Feickert, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF11409, Defense Primer: Army
Multi-domain Operations (MDO) (2024),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11409/10.
9. See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command
& Control (JADC2) Strategy 2 (2022),
https://media.defense.gov/2022/mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/summary-of-the-joint-all-domain-command-and-control-strategy.pdf.
10.
Deployable Training Div., Joint Chiefs of Staff, JTF C2 and
Organization 4 (2d ed. 2020) [hereinafter
J7 Focus Paper].
11. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-0, Joint Campaigns and
Operations, at III-1 (18 June 2022).
12. See
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Planning, at IV-19 (1
Dec. 2020) (C1, 1 July 2024).
13. Nightingale,
supra note 2, at 2.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 15.
18. Id. at 19.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 91.
21. Id. at 122.
22. Id. at 184.
23. Id. at 185.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 191.
26. Holloway Report,
supra note 7, at V.
27. Id. at 15-17.
28. J7 Focus Paper, supra note 10, at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1.
31. Nightingale,
supra note 2, at 187.
32. See Miranda Priebe et al., RAND
Corp., Multiple Dilemmas for the Joint Force: Joint All-Domain
Command and Control 1
(2020), www.rand.org/t/RRA381-1 (examining how all-domain operations
necessitate experimentation with alternative C2 structures).
33. Nightingale,
supra note 2, at 26.
34. See
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-08, Interorganizational
Cooperation, at I-5 (12 Oct. 2016) [hereinafter
Joint Pub. 3-08].
35. Nightingale,
supra note 2, at 25.
36. See id. at 25, 81.
37. See id. at 81.
38. Id. at 26;
see also id. at 188 (“State was opposed to any rescue attempt and would not
cooperate out of principle.”).
39. Id. at 26.
40. See
Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: the
First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam
169-174 (2007) (ebook);
The Iranian Hostage Crisis, Off. of the Historian, U.S. Dep’t of State,
https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises
(last visited Apr. 25, 2025).
41. See Betty Glad,
Personality, Political and Group Process Variables in Foreign
Policy Decision-Making: Jimmy Carter’s Handling of the Iranian
Hostage Crisis, 10 Int’l Pol. Sci. Rev. 35,
37-50 (1989) (explaining how the initial American response was a “dual
track strategy” that prioritized negotiations and sanctions and
specifically outlining Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s main concerns
with military action).
42. Nightingale,
supra note 2, at 188-89.
43. Id. at 24-25.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 27.
46. Id. at 183. Such organizational
apprehension did not occur in Operation Neptune Spear.
See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E.
Barnes,
Spy, Military Ties Aided bin Laden Raid, Wall St. J. (May 23, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704083904576334160172068344.html
(highlighting the cooperation between the CIA and the military forces,
“reflect newfound trust between two traditionally wary groups”).
47. See Albert F. Eldridge,
Spymasters Warning, 48
Bull. of the Atomic Scientists
43, 43 (1992) (detailing that Stanfield Turner acknowledged that the
CIA did not always provide effective intelligence).
48. Holloway Report,
supra note 7, at 20.
49. Id.
50. Joint Pub. 3-08,
supra note 34, at II-31 (“[A]
decentralized approach makes internal synchronization of the staff’s
activity more difficult. It incurs the highest risk of functional
stovepiping and a disjointed or duplicative effort with external
entities.”).