MAJ Andrew E. Nist (right), then-brigade judge advocate, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, pre-briefs investigating officers prior to conducting a Joint Forcible Entry–Airborne (JFE-A) during a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. (Photo courtesy of author)
Practice Notes
Preparing a Brigade Legal Section for a CTC Rotation During Decisive Action:
A Brigade Judge Advocate’s Guide for Success in a LSCO Environment at the Army’s Combat Training Centers
By Major Michael D. Winn
Preparing a brigade legal section (BLS) for a combat training center (CTC) rotation1 is a lot like preparing yourself, physically and mentally, for the Army Fitness Test (AFT). Like the AFT tests physical preparedness for battle, a CTC rotation tests how ready a brigade, and thus a BLS, is for ground combat.2 Just as you would not wait until the week before the AFT to begin exercising your muscles, a BLS should start exercising its tactical systems and processes at least six months in advance of the rotation.3 Furthermore, while agonizing over any performance event can be detrimental to results, a little bit of eustress can go a long way toward maximizing potential.4 Finally, just as reaching a personal best in the AFT demands readiness in five distinct events,5 achieving success during a CTC rotation requires the BLS to prepare along five lines of effort (LOEs): (1) manpower utilization within the brigade combat team (BCT) headquarters (HQ) command nodes; (2) paralegal employment apart from BCT HQ; (3) an in-depth communications plan; (4) comprehensive fighting products, including a robust legal running estimate; and (5) effective training of the force on legally related topics.
This article, written from the perspective of a senior operational-law observer–coach/trainer (OC/T), discusses each of these points in turn. Nonetheless, it is not intended to be the only resource on the subject. Read this article in conjunction with two other published commentaries on preparing a BLS for a CTC rotation. The first, Building National Security Law Readiness Through Combat Training Center Rotations, by Lieutenant Colonels (LTCs) Tim Davis and Jason Young, appears in issue 2, 2022, of The Army Lawyer.6 LTCs Davis and Young explain how CTCs function, how they prepare BCTs for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) and multi-domain operations (MDO), and what to do in the lead-up to a CTC rotation.7 The second, Preparing for Success at the Combined Training Centers: an OC/T Perspective, was published in volume 23-3 of The National Security Law Quarterly.8 This article, penned in 2023 by Major (MAJ) Tyler Gattermeyer and the senior judge advocate (JA) OC/Ts of the three “dirt” CTCs, LTCs Andrew Browell, Timothy Davis, and Jason Young, offers seven keys for success at a CTC rotation.9
The article that follows, along with its appendix, Top 5 Considerations for OPLAW in LSCO, is a guide intended for the BCT brigade judge advocate (BJA). It builds on the sage advice of the two articles mentioned above while discussing five practical LOEs on which you—as the BJA—should focus your efforts.
LOE 1: Manpower Utilization Within the BCT HQ
Like a baseball manager filling out a line-up card for an upcoming game, you need to know who exactly is going to be on your team so you can put them in the right spot. But before you can assign players to the batting order, you need to know how the game is structured.
First, to fill out the roster for the BLS, you must identify what the BCT command nodes will look like. In preparation for LSCO, recent CTC rotations have featured small, mobile command posts (CPs) which emphasize speed and survivability, sometimes at the expense of capability.10 Brigades typically have a tactical operations center (TOC) or current-operations (CUOPS) node, which controls the “current fight,” and a future-operations (FUOPS) node, which plans for everything from the deliberate prosecution of targets to detainee operations. These cells are often styled as the main command post (MCP) and rear command post (RCP), respectively,11 and are often placed “one terrain feature” (at least several hundred meters) away from each other to enhance survivability.12
Furthermore, there often will be a tactical command post (TAC) that “pushes out” from the MCP with perhaps only a vehicle or two, carrying the BCT commander, the S2 intelligence officer, and the S3 operations officer, ready to control the fight in certain situations, such as when the MCP displaces, or “jumps,” from one location to another. Yet another node may exist “over the horizon” at a mission-support site (MSS).13 Speak with the S3 well before the rotation to find out how the BCT intends to set up its physical footprint.14
Once you have identified how the BCT will array its CPs, start planning how to staff them. The gold standard is for the BLS to include you, of course, plus two company-grade attorneys and the senior paralegal noncommissioned officer (NCO).15 Presumably, one of the junior attorneys will be the administrative/operational-law (ADLAW/OPLAW) attorney who serves the BCT.16 You may need to request that the staff judge advocate (SJA) augment the team with an additional company-grade attorney, or perhaps two, if the BCT does not have an organic ADLAW/OPLAW attorney.17
The BCT senior paralegal NCO should be well-versed in operational law issues, including the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and rules of engagement (ROE). Because the senior paralegal NCO will spend most of the time in one of the BCT HQ nodes, that individual will need to be able to spot issues pertaining to the fires and protection warfighting functions (WfFs) and relay those issues to the servicing attorney, should advice be needed. Furthermore, prior to the rotation, the senior paralegal NCO will play a critical role in training paralegals from subordinate battalions (BNs) in operational law and the conduct of administrative investigations, as discussed in LOE 2 below. Consider sending the senior paralegal NCO to attend the Battle Staff NCO course,18 the Paralegal Employment in LSCO (PELSCO) course managed by the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO),19 and perhaps the National Security and Law of Armed Conflict (NSLOAC) course at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, well in advance of the BCT’s validation exercise (VALEX).20
Once you identify the players on your BLS starting roster, consider how to array them among the BCT HQ command nodes. Assuming two other attorneys will attend, plus a senior paralegal NCO, the best course of action is for two attorneys to staff the MCP in twelve-hour shifts, while another attorney and the senior paralegal NCO cover the RCP. Except for “fight nights,” fewer legal issues typically arise from the MCP than the RCP, so place the two most junior attorneys there. The more experienced among those two should cover the night shift, as the Army often conducts more combat operations under the cover of darkness than in broad daylight.21
Typically, as the BJA, you will add the most value by serving in the RCP, advising the targeting cell in planning deliberate targets, assisting the protection and fires cells with ROE-change requests,22 and participating in the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) as a member of the BCT battle staff.23 You are the best-positioned officer to help the staff understand the commander’s level of risk tolerance with regard to collateral damage during deliberate targeting.24 That said, under certain circumstances, it may be better for you to man the MCP personally. For example, if you are new to the team and the BCT commander plans to spend significant time in the MCP, your presence there will give you a vital opportunity to build that relationship in stressful situations.
Just like with training for an AFT, success at a CTC will come only by preparing well in advance. Whether it be positioning people in the BLS in the appropriate spots, preparing paralegals to maximize value to their BNs, planning for breakdowns in communications, developing effective fighting products, or training the force correctly, you will get out of the CTC experience what you put into it.
The senior paralegal NCO can assist the attorney in the RCP by maintaining communications with paralegals at subordinate BNs. Furthermore, the senior paralegal NCO can cover battle-rhythm events the RCP attorney misses,25 such as when the attorney is called away to meet with a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross or visit the U.S. consulate in the host-nation capital with members of the civil affairs team.26
However, incorporating three highly capable attorneys into the BLS will be of only limited value if they are not properly integrated with the staff. Building relationships with members of the fires and protection WfFs is especially important.27 In the RCP, staff integration starts with getting to know the officer who will be running the MDMP for the BCT; this is often the brigade executive officer (XO) or S3 operations officer, but it is sometimes a staff captain.28 Help this officer (often known as the “plans chief”) understand the contributions the BLS can make to the MDMP.29 Early integration with the planning staff will help you “bake in” legal considerations to the planning process.30
Although the RCP legal advisor is often positioned to provide more legal advice to the BCT, it is still essential for the BCT to have an attorney present in the MCP. Expect this attorney to be the only person in the BCT who is actively monitoring the fight to confirm that the actions of subordinate BNs comply with the LOAC and ROE. For example, if a subordinate BN intended unilaterally to destroy a bridge, that action might not be permissible under the ROE. The legal representative in the MCP is best poised to catch that issue and point out to the BCT staff any disconnect with the ROE, thereby mitigating risk to the BCT commander and the brigade’s mission.
Despite the importance of the MCP legal advisor, the current era of ever-shrinking CPs may limit the ability to maintain a dedicated legal presence there. One potential way to maintain a consistent presence in the MCP is by taking on a collateral duty within the cell. For example, during a recent rotation, a BLS found success in maintaining its position within a small MCP by also managing the digital and analog common operating picture (COP) for the BCT. The BLS was already planning to have a twenty-four-hour presence in the MCP, so managing the COP did not pose an additional burden. In fact, performing this collateral duty helped MCP legal personnel stay alert and actively track the battle, thereby increasing their effectiveness in advising BCT staff.31
What should you do, however, if you cannot meet the gold standard of three attorneys and a senior paralegal NCO?32 Even when a BCT is resourced with only one attorney in addition to the BJA, success remains possible. Consider sending the junior attorney to cover the night shift in the MCP while the senior paralegal NCO takes the day shift. This arrangement would require the senior paralegal NCO to listen closely for legally related issues and engage you in the RCP when legal advice becomes necessary.
There may come a time when, despite advocating for a legal presence and successfully integrating with the staff during pre-rotational exercises,33 MCP configurations exclude a legal advisor. In such a case, you would need to work doubly hard in advance of the rotation to train the battle staff on the LOAC and ROE and how to spot other legally significant events (LSEs) that may require investigation, such as fratricide and civilian casualties.34
LOE 2: Paralegal Employment Apart from the BCT HQ
Paralegal employment in LSCO, known as PELSCO, is about maximizing the contributions of paralegal specialists in a combat environment, where BN commanders and their staffs face existential threats daily. Although these senior officers are closely familiar with how junior-enlisted paralegals support the BN’s mission in garrison—primarily in military justice—senior officers may not be as familiar with BN paralegals’ capabilities in a LSCO setting, where the LOAC, ROE, and administrative investigations dominate the legal space. To best empower paralegals in this arena, CLAMO has identified PELSCO as an area of emphasis, and it offers a course dedicated entirely to it.35 Several articles addressing the topic have also been published recently in the National Security Law Quarterly.36
PELSCO shifts the role of the 27D paralegal specialist beyond its roots as a legal clerk37 to one of an educator. In many BNs, the paralegal enters the investigation process only once it has been approved and the commander, with an attorney’s advice, has already decided how to dispose of the misconduct. In LSCO, however, junior paralegals will need to get involved with administrative investigations under AR 15-638 far left of boom, i.e., as soon as the investigating officer (IO) has been appointed.39
The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) assigned to the senior operational-law observer–coach/trainer (OC/T) for Joint Readiness Training Center sits poised for dispatch alongside other OC/Ts’ tactical vehicles at Fort Polk, LA. (Photo courtesy of author)
Expect a higher threshold in LSCO than in other contexts for triggering investigations of certain types of incidents. For example, in garrison and even during combat deployments in low-intensity conflict, every death of a Service member must be investigated.40 Such stringent investigatory requirements may not endure in LSCO, given the expected high fatality rates in such a conflict.41 Nevertheless, certain events, even in LSCO, will require an administrative investigation, no matter how high-intensity the conflict.
For example, a civilian-casualty (CIVCAS) or fratricide incident would likely require an investigation. For practical reasons, these investigations must be initiated and completed quickly—the appointing authority will want lessons learned to prevent such incidents in the future, and at a CTC, the rotation lasts only a couple of weeks, so time is of the essence. Furthermore, BCTs sometimes experience real-world LSEs, such as when an entire pallet of frozen food is left to melt on a sunny loading dock in the staging area. For these reasons, you must be poised to support investigations, both scenario-driven and real-world, quickly and thoroughly.
Nevertheless, the systems and processes that work for the BLS to support investigations in garrison often turn moribund in “the box” (the combat training area at a CTC). For example, attorneys likely will not be able to track down IOs to in-brief them and hand them the IO toolkit. Attorneys at the BLS often fail to appreciate how immobile they will be, unable to leave the BCT HQ tents.42 The BLS may not have its own vehicle, or if it does, there may be a force-protection requirement that each vehicle leaving the BCT HQ footprint be escorted.43 Additionally, attorneys may simply lack the time to conduct battlefield circulation, and communications to reach IOs who are not located at the BCT main may be unreliable.44
The calm before the storm: The Geronimo drop zone at Fort Polk, LA, appears placid on the afternoon before a JFE-A by 3d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, during a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA, in September 2024. (Photo courtesy of author)
For these reasons, it is essential to prepare every paralegal to support administrative investigations. As a starting point, each paralegal should carry into the box a hard-copy IO toolkit with multiple copies of “fill in the blank” appointment orders, sworn-statement forms, rights-advisement forms, and even blank paper for IOs to use.45 Beyond carrying the forms, however, paralegals should be prepared to in-brief IOs, walk them through the investigation as needed, and examine the finished product once complete. This level of support constitutes administrative, not legal, advice, and thus is appropriate for a paralegal to offer.46 Nonetheless, such assistance is beyond what most paralegals do daily in garrison. Accordingly, start preparing 27Ds early by giving them opportunities at home station to conduct in-briefings and advise IOs well in advance of the CTC rotation.
Another way BN paralegals can add value to their units’ missions as educators is by training their formations on the LOAC prior to the VALEX. Not only is such training a practical necessity for Soldiers heading into a CTC rotation, it is required for Soldiers in modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) units under Army Regulation 350-1.47 With the relevant commander’s consent, you may employ a junior-enlisted paralegal to assist you, the ADLAW/OPLAW attorney, or the paralegal NCO in delivering LOAC training at the Soldier level.48 The three of you would have to work hard to ensure each paralegal is “trained to train”; however, like with support to investigations, getting paralegals ready to actively assist in training the LOAC can begin even a year in advance of the rotation. The benefit to involving BN paralegals in conducting LOAC training is the relationship of trust they may build with their respective BN S3 sections—a relationship which, once cemented, may provide the paralegals access to decision-makers as the BN transitions to combat operations.
Paralegals can also provide LOAC education within the BN CP itself. In the same way that in-briefing IOs and checking their work for formatting and completeness are perfectly acceptable tasks for a paralegal, so is talking through LOAC issues with the BN commander and staff—short of providing legal advice, of course. Some issues may be simple, such as fielding a question on the approval authority to crater a main supply route. Other questions may be more complex, such as those that relate to kinetic fires in a populated area. Regardless, the BN paralegal should always be able to point commanders and staff to the proper authority, whether in law, regulation, or policy.
Paralegals may act as sounding boards for commanders and staff. Rather than giving a definitive opinion on a subject, which would constitute legal advice, they might shape the conversation by asking questions. For instance, if a maneuver BN were considering mortar fires into a village, a 27D might ask, “Have you considered the principles of distinction and proportionality?” The paralegal could then explain what those targeting principles comprise. “Legal advice” is not explicitly defined in Army regulation, so it is difficult to determine its exact boundaries.49 Nonetheless, asking pointed questions and engaging in discussion about the LOAC is within the purview of all Soldiers, not just attorneys,50 so it is completely appropriate for a paralegal to have these conversations with BN leaders, as long as all concerned understand the paralegal is not giving legal advice.51
As discussed above, properly educated junior paralegal specialists can add significant value to a BN in aspects that matter to LSCO. Therefore, the BN paralegal must maintain access to the BN CP. Battalion CPs across the Army continue to grow smaller, more mobile, and, thus, more survivable.52 As a result, a dedicated paralegal seat in a BN CP is rare. To mitigate the effects of this evolution, work with the senior paralegal NCO to prepare, well in advance of the VALEX, to ensure a paralegal presence in each BN CP. A variety of options exist to help paralegals maintain placement in or near the BN CP, all with two goals in mind: (1) maintain access to information that will allow the paralegal to support BN operations (as discussed above), and (2) preserve the ability to communicate with BLS personnel at the BCT HQ cells.
One course of action is for the paralegal to get trained as a radio telephone operator (RTO) and then apply that training as a dedicated RTO within the BN CP. That way, the paralegal will maintain access to both information and communications.53 Another approach is for the paralegal to get assigned as the driver for the BN commander or command sergeant major. The paralegal would then have access to relevant information as well as communications equipment inside the vehicle.
For maneuver BNs, a recent rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center demonstrated the effectiveness of proactive BJA involvement. The BJA coordinated with the BN S1 officer-in-charge (OIC) to align paralegal support—the S1 OIC could integrate the paralegal into BN operations, and the paralegal was permitted twice-daily access to the BN CP to gain situational awareness of the battle and report digitally to the BLS.54 The S1 OIC assigned the paralegal to conduct perimeter security around the BN CP for most of each day, and the paralegal gained twice-daily access to information and communications. In this way, the BN paralegal identified and relayed to the BLS two LSEs that had not reached the BCT HQ through operational channels.55
One creative option is for a paralegal at a brigade support battalion (BSB) to nest with the Role 1 medical station or the S1 personnel section.56 Assigning the paralegal to work on casualty tracking or reconstitution packets would allow swift access to information on any mass-casualty event, which could perhaps indicate a fratricide.
SPC Jacob D. Cosmas served in many roles as a battalion paralegal specialist for 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, during a rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, LA. Earning the trust of his battalion while embedded with them, SPC Cosmas assisted with area security during a lull in legal actions. (Photo courtesy of author)
The discussion above assumes each BN has an organic paralegal who will actually participate in the CTC rotation. Should that assumption be incorrect, examine the impact on each BN of not having paralegal support. Consider asking the SJA to attach a non-organic paralegal specialist to the BCT for the rotation.57 Conversely, think long and hard about where and how to assume risk by leaving one or more BNs without legal support.
LOE 3: Communications
If an attorney sends an e-mail in the forest, and there is no one with a suitable device to read it, is it still communication?
Although this question sounds like a glib take on a classic thought experiment,58 it underscores the essence of communication: There must be a sender, a recipient, a message, and a means of transmitting that message.59 It is on that last element, the means of transmission, that BLS often stumble.
The articles mentioned above by LTCs Davis and Young and by MAJ Gattermeyer et al. describe the value of having a communications plan at the BLS level.60 Specifically, the BLS plan must spell out the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) ways of communicating, with the expectation that periods of degraded communications are the norm at CTC rotations.61
While degraded comms are sometimes caused by enemy action, they are often due simply to the friction of bringing a large volume of high-tech systems into an austere environment. Regardless, as with the other points of CTC preparation, it is essential for you and the senior paralegal NCO to start planning well in advance for how to establish and execute an effective PACE plan.62
Once you have determined how legal support to the BCT HQ and BN command cells will be arrayed and who will staff each (discussed in LOEs 1 and 2 above), you are ready to start planning how BLS members will communicate with each other. First, talk with the brigade S6 and S3 to learn which communications platforms will predominate throughout the BCT.63 Then, identify which platforms the attorneys and paralegals will have access to at each node; this includes not only devices but networks as well.64
For example, if you intend to bring laptop computers to operate on a tactical secure Internet protocol router network (TAC SIPRNet) in the MCP, confirm with the BCT S6 signal section you will have access to a SIPRNet “red line.” Assuming you have access to both a TAC SIPRNet machine and network in the MCP, verify you will have the same access in the RCP, and ensure the BN paralegals have access to that hardware and network in their respective CPs as well.
If all BLS personnel have access, even borrowed access, to TAC SIPRNet, you can include it on the BLS PACE plan. If not, however, you may still choose to bring your TAC SIPRNet computer to communicate with higher headquarters (HHQ), assuming that mode of communication in on the HHQ PACE plan. But, of course, you will need to find other comms platforms to use in the BLS PACE plan.
Within the BCT, you may need to field calls from BN commanders and staff and even leaders at the company level. Before entering the box, ensure these leaders know how to reach the BLS. When briefing BN- and company-level leaders on the ROE, consider informing them of your PACE plan and of any brigade-level requirements to report LSEs.65
Furthermore, as discussed above with LOE 2, consider delegating IO in-briefings and investigation formatting advice to the BN paralegals. Still, IOs may need to reach an attorney at BCT HQ for legal counsel. Therefore, all BN paralegals should know the BLS PACE plan as well as you do, to ensure they can put someone in touch with you at any time.
The PACE plan is just one element of an effective comms plan. In addition to PACE, make sure all members of the BLS are trained on all platforms. For example, if WebMC—the laptop-based way to access the Joint Battle Command–Platform (JBC-P)—is on the PACE plan, even the most junior paralegal must know how to use it. Furthermore, establish (and enforce) a daily legal sync to drive communications. Sometimes the junior paralegals may not have anything to say, but they still need to hear from you and the senior paralegal NCO frequently.
Finally, make sure the BN paralegals know it is their responsibility to work the PACE plan proactively. If the primary comms platform is unavailable and the alternate method is causing trouble, the paralegal needs to (1) get help from another Soldier who knows how to use the comms platform, (2) find a Soldier who can relay a message to you, or (3) proceed to the contingency or emergency forms of communication. The BN paralegals must understand how often they are expected to check in and that the comms exchange is not complete until they receive an acknowledgment.66
LOE 4: Effective Fighting Products
A fighting product is simply “a tool that aids in the accomplishment of a task.”67 Such a tool may be graphical or documentary.68 All WfFs create and use fighting products, which include templates, matrices, map overlays, prioritized lists, and more.69
For any staff section or WfF, the heart of the fighting products is the running estimate. Per Army doctrine, “A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.”70 Each section’s running estimate includes facts, assumptions, an assessment of current operations, and recommendations for the future, among other elements.71 Running estimates, if kept up to date and accurate, enable the commander and staff to understand the operating environment and, thus, make effective decisions.72
Leverage the legal running estimate to analyze BLS operations and how effectively they are supporting other staff sections and the BCT as a whole.73 The legal running estimate may also help with analyzing the level of legal risk the commander is assuming, along with facts, assumptions, and issues involved with legal support.74 The commander may never ask to see the legal running estimate, but the analysis that goes into building and maintaining it is essential to your ability to contribute meaningfully to the operations process.75
The legal running estimate is especially helpful during planning. Entering the MDMP with a draft legal running estimate will enable meaningful contributions to the planning process. As soon as the BCT receives a warning order from HHQ, start updating the legal running estimate to reflect the new mission.76 Then, with each step of the MDMP, update the running estimate based on the new legally related dimensions of the operating environment.77 The running estimate should go beyond the “what,” informing the “so what,” and shaping the “therefore.”
Field Manual 3-84, Legal Support to Operations, provides a template of a legal running estimate.78 This example incorporates trackers for investigations, BCT orders, and other legally related data.79 Many BLS at recent CTC rotations have chosen to produce trackers and graphic organizers that are distinct from the basic legal running estimate. BLS fighting products typically include an LSE tracker, an ROE-change tracker, a BCT-orders tracker, and an authorities matrix,80 among others, that may be helpful to you and the greater staff.81 Regardless of the format, though, doctrinally, these trackers all nest within the legal running estimate.82
It is never too early to start developing a legal running estimate. In fact, Army doctrine encourages keeping a running estimate updated even during garrison operations.83 At the latest, create it in the lead-up to the VALEX. The VALEX is the opportunity to confirm the legal running estimate is in the right format while you still have time to make any necessary improvements before the CTC rotation, and of course, before a real-world mission.84
Incorporating the running estimate into a broader BLS standard operating procedure (SOP) has worked for some legal sections.85 As MAJ Gattermeyer et al. point out, such an SOP could include not only the running estimate and any attached trackers or matrices, but also packing lists, shift-change briefing agendas, BLS-specific information requirements, wake-up criteria, and doctrinal references.86 Get junior attorneys and paralegals involved in the run-up to the rotation by delegating the responsibility for developing most or all of these products.
Although most BLS are accustomed to working primarily in the digital space, it is essential to carry the SOP, running estimate, and associated trackers in analog format as well. For one reason, computers break, networks fail, and the electricity goes out. As LTCs Davis and Young point out, “In a degraded information environment due to jamming, lack of power, cyberattack, or other enemy means, JALS personnel will learn the importance of planning for such situations.”87 In such an environment, analog fighting products will become essential for you and the BLS to maintain “shared understanding.”88 Additionally, consider posting hard copies of the ROE authorities matrix and key trackers in conspicuous places in command nodes to help other staff sections maintain awareness of legal issues when the BLS is busy or elsewhere.
Leverage the experience of the BLS of any sister BCTs that have gone through a CTC rotation recently.89 Speak with your counterparts to find out which fighting products worked well and which needed refinement. Senior paralegal NCOs ought to do the same with their counterparts. In addition to providing advice, the sister BLS may be able to furnish valuable templates that could subtract hours from the time required to produce the legal running estimate and BLS SOP.
On the subject of documents, you are responsible for producing the legal-support tab, commonly known as the “legal annex.” This document is appended to the BCT operations order, Annex F (Sustainment), Appendix 2 (Personnel Service Support), Tab C (Legal Support).90 Although not a fighting product, per se, this supplement explains to the BCT how the BLS will provide legal support to commanders, staff, and warfighters alike.91 Delegate the first draft of the legal-support tab, as well as the authorities matrix and other products, to an NCO or junior attorney as a valuable developmental experience.
LOE 5: Training the Force
In the half-century since the end of the Vietnam War and the initiation of the Department of Defense Law of War Program in the mid-1970s, the legal advisor in the brigade CP has gone from being non-existent to being as normal as green spots on camouflage.92 In fact, the United States recognizes as customary international law the requirement that a legal advisor be made available to every operational commander.93 During the two decades of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), it was typical for a commander above the BN level to have a JA present, and even concurring, every time the commander authorized a lethal kinetic strike.94 The constant presence of the CP legal advisor was due to the demand for near-perfect decisions in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism environments95 and the fact that our enemies in the GWOT usually were unable to target our CPs, thereby allowing for spacious working environments.96
Such luxuries will not exist in LSCO.97 As noted above in LOE 1, there may be times when space limitations keep legal advisors out of the MCP. Nonetheless, a BLS at a recent CTC facing this reality still found success in setting the table for principled, LOAC-driven decisions on the part of commanders and staff.
Proximity alone does not equal influence, as MAJ Dane Rockow and CPT Karolyn Kerwin have pointed out.98 And that is a good thing, because in LSCO, it is inevitable that commanders and staff members at the brigade level will need to apply the LOAC on their own without steady legal advice to guide them.99 Preparing the BCT for LSCO, therefore, requires training the entire team on the LOAC and the ROE before entering the fight.100 The BLS can multiply itself and extend its influence exponentially by equipping commanders and staff members within the BCT with practical knowledge of the LOAC and ROE they can apply without legal counsel in real time.101
In preparing for decisive action, distinguish between two training audiences: trigger-pullers and shot-callers. The LOAC is for everyone, including trigger-pullers; thus, every Soldier in an MTOE unit needs to be trained on it,102 and certainly before the VALEX and CTC rotation. The principles of LOAC are relatively static and set the foundational ground rules for the ethical application of lethal force in combat.103
Network early and often with the BCT S3 section and the corresponding S3 sections of the subordinate BNs. Get on their training calendars months ahead of the VALEX to reach the maximum audience with the LOAC message. As discussed above with LOE 2, you and the senior paralegal NCO should empower the BN paralegals with the LOAC expertise required to deliver these briefings at the BN and company level effectively.
That said, LOAC training will have its greatest effect when the BCT commander emphasizes its importance and uses the training to convey command philosophy and tolerance for risk on the battlefield to the BCT staff and subordinate commanders.104 The Judge Advocates General of the Army in recent years have emphasized the importance of vignette-based training, driven by the commander, to help subordinates think through how the LOAC applies in a variety of settings.105 Such training is important not only to help these commanders and staff members understand the BCT commander’s appetite for risk, but also to give them the confidence to shoot when the situation requires it.106
The full ROE, on the other hand, need to be briefed only to the shot-callers, i.e., the decision-makers, in LSCO. The ROE contextualize the LOAC, turning static principles into dynamic, policy-driven rules for the application of force.107 In LSCO, ROE inform commanders and staff members who (what level of command) may approve the use of which weapon systems and the engagement of what kinds of targets.
Although the ROE are rooted in the LOAC, they constitute policy, so you will not be able to train the shot-callers on the ROE until you receive them from HHQ.108 For a CTC rotation, that opportunity likely will not come until you have arrived at the CTC. Nonetheless, begin planning as early as you can to identify a time to brief the shot-callers on the ROE before entering “the box,” i.e., the maneuver training area. The target audience should include BCT and BN commanders and staff members, as well as company commanders and first sergeants.
To bring the discussion full circle with LOE 1, do not neglect to train your own “force,” i.e., the BLS, on finer points of the LOAC that will apply during the CTC rotation. By serving as the BCT’s subject-matter experts on the LOAC, attorneys and paralegals will foster a specialized skillset that will help them integrate into the staff. Begin by opening up Field Manual 6-27, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare,109 and assigning it to the BLS as required reading. Branch into other topics such as the distinction between the United States and international legal regimes surrounding cluster munitions (such as the dual-purpose improved conventional munition, or DPICM), landmines, and command-detonated devices like the M18 Claymore and M7 Spider.110 Help the attorneys and paralegals understand the legal framework for the treatment and detention of captured persons,111 and make sure they grasp the basics of the targeting process.112
Conclusion
As COL Kristy Radio and her co-authors state, “It’s hard to overprepare for LSCO.”113 Preparing along the five LOEs described above, however, is a good start toward getting ready for a CTC rotation.
Just like with training for an AFT, success at a CTC will come only by preparing well in advance. Whether it be positioning people in the BLS in the appropriate spots, preparing paralegals to maximize value to their BNs, planning for breakdowns in communications, developing effective fighting products, or training the force correctly, you will get out of the CTC experience what you put into it.
The “real world,” with its justice actions, investigations, and ethics opinions, always beckons. But just as you need to do PT several times a week to prepare for an AFT, you need to make time for CTC preparation. Although a rotation may not feel “real” when it is still several months out, the more prepared you are upon arrival, the more effectively the CTC will prepare you, the BLS, and the whole BCT for the day when the mission itself is “real world.” TAL
MAJ Winn is the Chief of Military Justice at Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and Fort Polk, Fort Polk, Louisiana. He previously served as the senior operational-law observer–coach/trainer (OC/T) at JRTC.
The author gives special thanks to LTC Brian Hartley, who served as the Senior Legal OC/T at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), and LTC Derek Carlson, who served as the Senior Judge Advocate OC/T at the National Training Center (NTC), for their detailed feedback and support on this article.
Notes
1. This article focuses on preparation for the maneuver, or “dirt,” CTCs, including the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) in Hohenfels, Germany. The Mission Command Training Program, based at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, represents a different type of CTC that trains divisions, corps, and other Army and joint units. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 350-50, Combat Training Center Program para. 1-5(e) (2 May 2018).
2. A well-known shift in focus away from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, toward large-scale combat operations (LSCO), makes the division “the Army’s principal tactical warfighting formation.” U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 3-0, Operations para. 2-98 (21 Mar. 2025) [hereinafter FM 3-0]. Nonetheless, the brigade combat team (BCT) remains “the Army’s primary combined arms, close-combat maneuver force.” Id. para. 2-99. Although dirt CTCs conduct “division in the dirt” rotations occasionally, their most-frequent training audience, by far, remains the BCT. For that reason, this article focuses on a BCT-level rotation.
3. Ideally, as the brigade judge advocate (BJA), you would start exercising tactical systems and processes as soon as you take the seat.
4. Stress, Anxiety and Arousal, Eduqas, https://resource.download.wjec.co.uk/vtc/2015-16/15-16_30/eduqas/05-heat-of-the-moment/Component5-stress.html https://perma.cc/VA6M-CLBY (last visited Apr. 9, 2026).
5. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Dir. 2025-06, Army Fitness Test para. 4(b) (17 Apr. 2025).
6. Major Timothy A. Davis & Major Jason D. Young, Building National Security Law Readiness Through Combat Training Center Rotations, Army Law., no. 2, 2022, at 15.
7. See id.
8. Captain Tyler Gattermeyer, Major Andrew J. Browell, Major Jason Young & Major Tim Davis, Preparing for Success at the Combined Training Center: an OC/T Perspective, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 3, 2023, at 4.
9. See id.
10. “Army command posts can and must become more flexible, agile, and resilient while not sacrificing effectiveness. Otherwise, our command posts will be a place our leaders go to die.” Lieutenant General Milford Beagle Jr., Brigadier General Jason C. Slider & Lieutenant Colonel Matthew R. Arrol, The Graveyard of Command Posts: What Chornobaivka Should Teach Us about Command and Control in Large-Scale Combat Operations, Mil. Rev., Mar. 2023, at 10, 13.
11. This article uses the term “MCP” to refer to the TOC or CUOPS cell, and “RCP” to refer to the FUOPS cell.
12. Current Army doctrine, now four-to-five years old, reserves the term RCP for the division and corps level, while affording BCTs only an MCP and a tactical CP (TAC). See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization and Operations para. 7-29, tbl. 7-1 (16 May 2022); U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 3-96, Brigade Combat Team paras. 4-42, 4-227 (19 Jan. 2021) [hereinafter FM 3-96]. Nonetheless, doctrine allows the BCT CDR flexibility in structuring CPs “to meet changing situations,” with “CP survivability . . . vital to the success of the BCT mission.” FM 3-96, supra, paras. 4-41, 4-225. CTCs have routinely seen BCTs fight with an RCP or FUOPS cell in addition to a small MCP and TAC. Compared to 2021–2022, when FMs 6-0 and 3-96 were released, BCTs are favoring smaller, more dispersed nodes to keep their staffs alive.
13. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Techs. Pub. 6-0.5, Command Post Organization and Operations para. 1-23 (1 Mar. 2017) [hereinafter ATP 6-0.5]. Some BCTs staff a fourth node, the administrative and logistics center (ALOC), which is dedicated to sustainment support and is typically located further to the rear than the RCP. Resist being placed in the ALOC. Although legal support is doctrinally part of the sustainment Warfighting Function (WfF), the BLS has a role in all six WfFs in a way most staff sections do not. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 3-84, Legal Support to Operations para. 2-54 (1 Sep. 2023) [hereinafter FM 3-84]. A recent CTC rotation demonstrated that when the BJA and other BLS members were relegated to the ALOC, they were disconnected from the fight, which limited their ability to advise on BCT operations.
14. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-61.
15. See Gattermeyer et al., supra note 8, at 5. Recent CTC experience shows that bringing three attorneys (including you, the BJA) increases the total training value. With three attorneys, each has more flexibility to integrate with and learn from the planning staff and digest the information they are learning about the operations process. Furthermore, with three attorneys present, they have more opportunities to engage with enablers, such as civil affairs and psychological operations, on legally related issues arising from their respective activities. If you arrive with only one other attorney, however, you may find yourselves struggling to keep your heads above water.
16. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-27.
17. As Gattermeyer et al. advise, get the SJA involved early in a manning problem. See Gattermeyer et al., supra note 8, at 8. Help the SJA see the long-term value to the division and the greater JAG Corps to sending a third attorney. See id.; see also Colonel Andrew McKee & Lieutenant Colonel Jason Elbert, Embrace the Crucible Experience: An Intentional Approach to Training Opportunities, Army Law., no. 2, 2022, at 9 (explaining why division SJAs should engage early in preparing for a CTC rotation) (“[L]eaders within the JAG Corps must approach training requirements such as . . . [CTC] rotations and Warfighter Exercises (WfX) with intentionality, devoting serious thought and their own time into ensuring every member of the team gets the most they can out of these opportunities. . . . [SJA] preparation for these events should start well in advance of execution.”).
18. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-28.
19. See Sergeant First Class William W. Angle III, Leading Organizations Through Change: Paralegal Employment in Combat Operations, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 2, 2024, at 24, 29–30.
20. A VALEX is a BCT-level exercise at home station that serves as a final rehearsal before the CTC rotation. It is typically controlled by the division staff, with the division chief of national security law playing the division SJA. As its name implies, the VALEX is where the BCT staff, including the BLS, seeks to validate its systems and processes prior to traveling to the CTC.
21. The term “fight night” refers to a period of intense combat activity, typically at night. During a CTC rotation, expect the BCT to face at least one “fight night” on defense and one on offense.
22. For example, the ROE may withhold the authority to employ a certain weapon system to the division commander. If the BCT commander wants that authority, the BCT staff must prepare an ROE-change request with your advice and then route it to the division commander through operational channels.
23. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, paras. 3-49 to 3-51.
24. Davis & Young, supra note 6, at 18 (“BLS and OSJAs can do a couple of things to posture for success: 1) set the dial on risk tolerance and LOAC compliance in the targeting process; 2) advocate for physical space and staffing; and 3) develop training objectives aligned with the BLS state of readiness, OSJA guidance, and any follow-on mission with redundant and analog fighting products to ensure readiness for an austere environment.”); see Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instr. 3160.01D, No Strike and Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology glossary (21 May 2021) (defining collateral damage).
25. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, tbl. 3-2 (listing battle-rhythm events requiring legal support).
26. These engagements may be part of the exercise.
27. Recent articles in The National Security Law Quarterly (NSLQ) emphasize the importance of staff integration and how to accomplish it. Some articles are written from the division perspective, but their concepts transfer easily to the BCT level. See Colonel Kristy Radio, Major Wesleigh Cochrane, Captain Javier Diaz, & Captain Jason Vickers, LOAC in LSCO: Transitioning a Division in the Dirt, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 1, 2025, at 37 (discussing how to integrate with the staff WfFs); Major Uilisone Tua, The Role of the Judge Advocate in Division Fires During LSCO, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 4, 2024, at 28 (describing the role of the legal advisor in supporting deliberate and dynamic targeting); Captain Trevor Deakin, Earn Your Seat, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 1, 2025, at 44 (highlighting the importance of engaging outside the legal practice area and not bunching up in one command node).
28. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 5-0, Planning and Orders Production para. 5-10 (4 Nov. 2024).
29. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, paras. 3-25, 3-50.
30. See Radio et al., supra note 27, at 41; McKee & Elbert, supra note 17, at 9–10 (underscoring the importance of integrating with the battle staff very early and “baking in” LOAC considerations). “In combat, the pace of battle will move too quickly for on-the-spot legal advice. Success will require LOAC considerations during planning, a deep understanding of the commander’s targeting philosophy, and iterative war game discussions that involve legal considerations.” McKee & Elbert, supra note 17, at 9.
31. The notion of JAs taking on collateral duties outside their legal responsibilities may be controversial, for, at first blush, the practice appears to be prohibited by AR 27-1. The regulation states, “JAs will perform only professional legal duties for which they are trained. They should not perform any nonlegal duties.” U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 27-1, Judge Advocate Legal Services para. 3-6(c) (24 Jan. 2017) [hereinafter AR 27-1]. Nonetheless, fulfilling a collateral duty within the MCP to maintain a seat there does not create a conflict of interest, and, as explained above, doing so may actually enhance your ability to provide legal advice. See id. para. 3-4(a). Therefore, do not fear accepting collateral duties, but accept only those that enable or enhance your ability to perform core legal functions.
32. But see Davis & Young, supra note 6, at 17 (“Failing to fully staff a CTC rotation with legal personnel sends an implicit message that providing legal services in LSCO is not as important as our home-station mission, undercutting an effort to show the importance of legal personnel regardless of the type of conflict.”).
33. See Gattermeyer, supra note 8, at 6.
34. See Major Dane Rockow & Captain Karolyn Kerwin, Judge Advocates on the Loop, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 1, 2025, at 29, 31 (“JAs will add the most value before conflict by educating commanders and understanding how the unit intends to fight. This allows for anticipation of legal issues and resolving those issues in advance . . . .”) See also Radio et al., supra note 27, at 40–43 (highlighting the importance of “heavy judge advocate presence and engagement—early on . . . to ‘bake LOAC into our targeting process’”).
35. Angle, supra note 19, at 29–30.
36. See, e.g., id.; Staff Sergeant Michael N. Furio, Essential Tips for Paralegals in Division Operations during LSCO, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 4, 2024, at 40; Sergeant First Class Eric Tuel, Paralegal Utilization: Best Practices and Lessons Learned, Nat’l Sec. L.Q., no. 3, 2024, at 38.
37. See Fred L. Borch, Lore of the Corps: From Legal Clerks to Paralegal Specialists, Army Law., no. 3, 2019, at 10, 10.
38. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 15-6, Procedures for Preliminary Inquiries, Administrative Investigations, and Boards of Officers (22 June 2025).
39. A paralegal serving a remote BN may even need to assist the commander in drafting appointment orders.
40. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 385-10, The Army Safety and Occupational Health Program paras. 3-9(a), 3-19(e)(1) (24 July 2023); see U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instr. 1300.18, DoD Personnel Casualty Matters, Policies, and Procedures paras. 4.2.1, 4.5 (8 Jan. 2008) (C2, 29 Mar. 2023).
41. See Lieutenant General Mary Krueger Izaguirre et al., To Conserve Fighting Strength in Large-Scale Combat Operations, Mil. Rev. Online Exclusive 1 (Mar. 2025) https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/Online-Exclusive/2025/Conserve-Fighting-Strength-in-LSC/conserve-fighting-strength-UA.pdf https://perma.cc/T36J-PNS4.
42. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-70 (“Operations often occur in fluid, chaotic, and dangerous environments in which mobility is constrained.”).
43. See id. para. 3-72 (discussing mobility considerations).
44. See supra Section titled LOE 3 for more on this topic.
45. Blank paper is at the highest premium for units conducting an airborne insertion.
46. See AR 27-1, supra note 31, para. 3-8(c). Also consider in-briefing likely IOs in advance, perhaps en masse.
47. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development tbl. C-2 (1 June 2025) [hereinafter AR 350-1]. Every BCT is presumably a modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) unit. See Ctr. for Army Lessons Learned, Handbook No. 15-01, Command Deployment Discipline Program: Version 2 (3 Apr. 2017). Commanders of MTOE units train their Soldiers on LOAC as needed, and certainly prior to every combat deployment. See AR 350-1, supra, tbl. C-2.
48. The 2017 version of AR 350-1 specifically allowed that a paralegal NCO could train on the law of war once certified by a JA. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 350-1, Army Training and Leader Development tbl. F-2 (10 Dec. 2017). Nonetheless, the 2025 edition of the regulation gave total discretion on such training to “SJA,” presumably referring to you for training at the BCT level. AR 350-1, supra note 47, tbl. C-2.
49. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Army, Regul. 27-26, Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers (26 Mar. 2025) (providing no definition of “legal advice”).
50. See Lieutenant General Milford Beagle Jr., Lieutenant General Joseph B. Berger III, & Lieutenant Colonel Jack D. Einhorn, Lethal Force, Risk, and LSCO: Preparing for Permissive Rules of Engagement in Large-Scale Combat Operations, Mil. Rev. Online Exclusive 3 (Jan. 2025), https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/Online-Exclusive/2025-OLE/Lethal-Force-Risk-and-LSCO https://perma.cc/93ZY-S6WS (“Commanders must be confident in their ability to conduct a LOAC analysis without a JA and have confidence that their subordinates can do the same. This confidence can only be achieved by engaging in debates about the LOAC and sharing ideas up, down, and across echelon.”).
51. Although paralegal specialists are not authorized to practice law, they are expected “to primarily perform duties of a legal nature,” which may include discussions about what the law means and requires. FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-29.
52. See Beagle, Berger, & Einhorn, supra note 50, at 15; FM 3-0, supra note 2, para. 8-11; FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-44.
53. See Gattermeyer et al., supra note 8, at 7–8.
54. This agreement meant the paralegal could not be pushed out to the BN forward line of own troops (FLOT).
55. In contrast to this experience at JRTC, a reported trend at NTC is that paralegals are assigned to BN S1 sections in combat trains command posts (CTCPs), which are usually 10-20 km back from the forward line of own troops (FLOT), closer to the brigade support area. This practice generally makes it impossible for paralegals to have much involvement in the fight. For this reason, work to keep paralegals out of CTCPs.
56. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-29 (“Battalion paralegal Soldiers are assigned to the S-1 section of each subordinate battalion.”).
57. Bear in mind, however, if you face an uphill battle convincing BNs to allow their own paralegals to perform legally related duties in LSCO, the struggle will be even harder to get them to employ non-organic paralegals on anything but perimeter security or basic Soldier tasks.
58. See If a Tree Falls in a Forest and No One Is Around to Hear It, Does It Make a Sound?, Wikipedia (Mar. 7, 2026), https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/If_a_tree_falls_in_a_forest_and_no_one_is_around_to_hear_it,_does_it_ make_a_sound%3F https://perma.cc/822F-27FL.
59. Richard Nordquist, The Basic Elements of Communication, ThoughtCo. (June 4, 2024), https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-communication-process-1689767 https://perma.cc/9XG7-487L.
60. See Davis & Young, supra note 6, at 18; Gattermeyer et al., supra note 8, at 7–8; see also FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-69 (“The ability to communicate—sending and receiving information—represents JAG Corps personnel’s primary materiel requirements to deliver timely legal support in garrison and the deployed environment.”).
61. Gattermeyer et al., supra note 8, at 7.
62. Consider starting work on the BLS PACE plan at least a couple of months in advance of the VALEX.
63. A recent trend is that BCTs have been moving away from SIPRNet-based systems, toward a “secure but unclassified–encrypted” (SBU-E) environment. See Lauren C. Williams, The Army’s Dream of Vastly Simplified Networking Is Starting to Come True, Def. One (Oct. 18, 2024), https://www.defenseone.com/defense-systems/2024/10/armys-dream-vastly-simplified-networking-starting-come-true/400365 https://perma.cc/5HPH-P663.
64. See FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-70.
65. See infra Section titled LOE 5 for more on the ROE briefing.
66. An example from a recent rotation is typical of comms challenges: A BN paralegal was unable to use an assigned comms platform. He found a buddy in the BN S4 section and climbed into his truck. The paralegal duly borrowed the Soldier’s Joint Battle Command–Platform (JBC-P) device to send a message to the BLS at the BCT HQ. The BLS did not have its own JBC-P device, but another BCT HQ staff member relayed the message to the BLS several minutes later. Nevertheless, by the time the BLS was able to respond to the BN S4’s user name, the paralegal had already climbed out of the truck. The BN S4 Soldier either did not know whom the message was intended for or did not want to be bothered, so the communication failed, and neither the BLS nor the paralegal knew what had happened until the final after-action review.
67. Sean Leary, Planning to Win the Tactical Level Fights: How Simple Operations Products Enable Synchronized Success, From the Green Notebook (Sep. 6, 2022), https://fromthegreennotebook.com/2022/09/06/planning-to-win-the-tactical-level-fights-how-simple-operations-products-enable-synchronized-success https://perma.cc/8BE4-KJCQ (citing ATP 6-0.5, supra note 13, app. D).
68. Id.
69. ATP 6-0.5, supra note 13, app. D.
70. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Doctrine Pub. 5-0, The Operations Process para. 1-54 (31 July 2019) [hereinafter ADP 5-0].
71. See id. paras. 1-55, 1-56, 5-12.
72. Id. paras. 1-31, 1-33.
73. See id. para. 1-54, 1-55.
74. FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-54.
75. See ADP 5-0, supra note 70, para. 1-54; see also id. para. 1-58 (“[A] commander may need a running estimate at any time.”). The operations process comprises the steps of planning, preparation, and execution, with continual assessment built into each step. FM 3-0, supra note 2, para. 8-28, fig. 8-1.
76. ADP 5-0, supra note 70, para. 1-58.
77. FM 3-84, supra note 13, tbl. 3-1; ADP 5-0, supra note 70, para. 1-58.
78. FM 3-84, supra note 13, tbl. D-1.
79. See id.
80. An authorities matrix is a chart that describes what level of command may engage certain targets (like low-water crossings) or authorize the use of various weapons (like forty-eight-hour landmines).
81. FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. D-1.
82. Id.
83. ADP 5-0, supra note 70, para. 1-58.
84. See Gattermeyer et al., supra note 8, at 7.
85. Id. at 6.
86. Id. at 6–7.
87. Davis & Young, supra note 6, at 17.
88. Id.
89. Gattermeyer et al., supra note 8, at 8; Rockow & Kerwin, supra note 34, at 34.
90. FM 3-84, supra note 13, para. 3-52.
91. Id.
92. See Craig Jones, Legal Advice in Modern Aerial Warfare, Arts. of War (Nov. 22, 2021), https://lieber.westpoint.edu/legal-advice-modern-aerial-warfare https://perma.cc/46H2-8K7K, cited in Lieutenant General Stuart W. Risch & Colonel Ryan B. Dowdy, Multi-Domain Operations: Judge Advocate Legal Services’ Role in MDO and Bridging the Eighteenth Capability Gap, Army Law., no. 4, 2022, at 90, 97 n.67; Frederic L. Borch, Judge Advocates in Combat 30–31, 51, 319–20 (2001).
93. Risch & Dowdy, supra note 92, at 97, n.69 (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 82, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3). The United States considers Article 82 of Additional Protocol I to be customary international law. Michael Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor to U.S. Dep’t of State, 6th Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International, Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y ٤١٩, ٤٢٨ (١٩٨٧), reprinted in Nat’l Sec. L. Dep’t, The Judge Advocate Gen.’s Legal Ctr. & Sch., U.S. Army, Law of Armed Conflict Documentary Supplement 249–50 (2022).
94. Rockow & Kerwin, supra note 34, at 30.
95. See Beagle, Berger, & Einhorn, supra note 50, at 6; Rockow & Kerwin, supra note 34, at 35 (citing Off. of Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense Law Of War Manual, § 2.2.3.3 (12 June 2015) (C1, 21 July 2023)) [hereinafter DoD Law of War Manual].
96. See Rockow & Kerwin, supra note 34, at 30.
97. See Beagle, Berger, & Einhorn, supra note 50, at 3.
98. Rockow & Kerwin, supra note 34, at 31.
99. See Beagle, Berger, & Einhorn, supra note 50, at 3. Soldiers often apply the LOAC without a JA nearby. For instance, military occupational specialty (MOS) 11C mortarmen may frequently send indirect fire into a populated area without ever speaking to a JA in the course of their duties.
100. Rockow & Kerwin, supra note 34, at 31.
101. As one brigade commander said to his BJA prior to a CTC rotation, “[I]f you do your job, I can’t think of a single LOAC question I’ll have for you during force on force.” Id. at 33.
102. See AR 350-1, supra note 47, tbl. C-2.
103. U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 6-27, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare paras. 1-18 to 1-22 (7 Aug. 2019) (C2, 21 May 2025) [hereinafter FM 6-27]. Of course, the LOAC informs much more than just targeting decisions; it encompasses detainee operations, treatment of civilians, the lawfulness of weapons, and more. See generally id. (detailing LOAC principles in each of these categories).
104. Beagle, Berger, & Einhorn, supra note 50, at 3, 5–6.
105. Risch & Dowdy, supra note 92, at 96; Beagle, Berger, & Einhorn, supra note 50, at 6–9. As discussed in the latter resource, JRTC has published a series of vignettes that may be helpful in training LOAC principles. See Joint Readiness Training Ctr., Ethical Bedrock Vignettes, Law of Armed Conflict in Large Scale Combat Operations (n.d.).
106. See Beagle, Berger, & Einhorn, supra note 50, at 2–3.
107. DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 95, § 1.6.5.
108. See id.
109. FM 6-27, supra note 103.
110. See DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 95, §§ 6.12–6.13, as a starting point.
111. See id. chs. VIII and IX. Another valuable and digestible resource is Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (3d ed. 2021).
112. See generally U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 3-60, Army Targeting (11 Aug. 2023); U.S. Dep’t of Army, Field Manual 3-09, Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations (12 Aug. 2024).
113. Colonel Kristy L. Radio, Lieutenant Colonel Michael E. Schauss, Lieutenant Colonel Matthew B. (Blake) Williams & Major Walter J. (Joey) Sepulvado, LOAC 101 in New Operational Environments, Army Law., no. 2, 2022, at 2, 3.