In African Kaiser, Robert Gaudi vividly details the masterful guerrilla campaign of General Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, the only undefeated German commander in World War I.3 Von Lettow commanded the Schutztruppe, a racially integrated unit led by both German officers and African noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

In October of 2017, the Wall Street Journal reported Russia opened a new battlefront with NATO by exploiting a point of vulnerability for almost all allied soldiers: personal smartphones.1 The campaign targeted the contingent of some 4,000 NATO troops deployed to Poland and the Baltic States and involved sophisticated drones equipped with surveillance electronics.2

Thirty-five miles separate the northwestern Missouri towns of Edinburg and Laclede.3 Although never particularly populous, and located over 4,500 miles from the Western Front in France,4 this small geographic area retains distinction for the 1859 and 1860 birthplaces of Major General (MG) Enoch H. Crowder and General of the Armies (GEN) John J. Pershing.5

From 28–30 May 2018, LTG Charles N. Pede, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG), U.S. Army, hosted nearly fifty multinational senior military lawyers at the 4th Major General John L. Fugh Symposium on Law and Military Operations (Fugh Symposium) and the Multinational Judge Advocate General Interoperability Symposium (MJIS). The biennial symposia convened at The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School in Charlottesville, Virginia. The events invited the most senior military legal officials and law of war experts from around the world to exchange views on current and emerging legal issues in the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

Never has the U.S. military been more reliant upon strategic partners for mission success. Operations and readiness requirements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, Eastern Europe, and across the contingency spectrum all rely upon the Army’s ability to cultivate and leverage interoperability with others. In this multilateral world, Army leaders are empowered and most effective when they are able to think and act with a regional focus in concert with allies, and when they learn to link military education and experience with partners—both long-standing and evolving—in new and different ways.

The Army JAG Corps should abandon the Foundation of Five as a leadership model because it has no basis in Army doctrine, confuses the chain-of-command and noncommissioned officer (NCO) support channels, and de-emphasizes members of the organization. This unique leadership model describes a group of people at JAG Corps offices that serve in certain roles.