Virtually every aspect of the enterprise has a software dependent capability—our weapons, communications and resourcing. It would be hard to find a single, mission-essential function in any command, that doesn’t depend on software in some shape, form, or fashion. In short, software can be a critical enabler to increasing the lethality within warfighting formations, yet the vast majority of the processes and associated policy remains focused on the hardware of the enterprise.1

Intelligence gathering, or “spying,” is one of the oldest professions. In fact, the practice of intelligence has been a key component of U.S. military operations since the formation of the U.S. military. Recognized as a critical military strategy, George Washington spent more than 10 percent of his military operational funds on surveillance and intelligence.

The United States stands at the threshold of a looming national security crisis.1 It has relied upon clear military advantages and technological superiority to deter the aggression of near-peer adversaries, but, recently, these advantages have largely disappeared.

The existential threat to the world order is arguably higher than it has been at any point since the end of the Cold War.1 Russia is conducting a drawn-out, unprovoked war against Ukraine and poses a bona fide threat to European economic stability.2

As the Command Judge Advocate of the 1st Multi-Domain Task Force (1st MDTF), it has been my privilege to serve in a team focused on innovation. Since its inception, 1st MDTF has experimented with new capabilities, tactics, and procedures in an effort to better realize the full potential of multi-domain operations (MDO).